Contesting Power as Political Theology: Traditionalist Islamic Preaching and Post-Secularism in the West

Abstract

Traditionalist Islamic preaching in the West is not limited to the normative aspects of theology, law, and ethics. In addition, it addresses the most pressing social and political issues that Muslims are currently confronting in the West; it also challenges Western modernity in general and secularism in particular. Two critical sermons of secularism delivered by two of the most well-known traditionalist Muslim preachers in their respective countries—Hamza Yusuf in the USA and Hani Ramadan in Switzerland—are analyzed in this study. First, I shall examine the arguments put up by these preachers against secularism and in support of post-secular society. Next, I will study the rhetorical strategies used in these two sermons. Finally, I will discuss the relevance of these two sermons to the contemporary debates in the West on contesting secularism and multiple secularisms. It is argued here that traditionalist Muslim preachers see secularism as an encroaching power that poses a danger to the figures of authority and norms that control gender, knowledge, and education within Muslim communities and societies.

1. Introduction

Since the 1990s, Islamic preaching has become a major component of Muslim discourse in the West, thanks in large part to digital tools. The Muslim preacher, dā‘iya is a type of authority figure who utilizes rhetoric of incitement and warning to urge Muslims to adhere to traditional behaviors and orthodox views (Frégosi 2004; Belhaj 2022a). Its effectiveness depends on its capacity to adjust, develop, and incorporate the most current issues that Muslims in the West are facing at societal and political levels. It is not restricted to merely normative elements of theology, law, and ethics. Most studies on Islamic preaching have been conducted by anthropologists and have mostly concentrated on the Muslim world (Gaffney 1994; Hirschkind 2006; Millie 2011; Mulkan 2014; Olsson 2015; Stille 2020; Megari 2022; Tabassum 2023; Putri 2023). Research on Islamic preaching in the West is still in its beginnings; it primarily focuses on the ways that traditionalist Islamic preaching establishes traditional legitimacy, creates communities, and maintains the Muslim tradition (Reeber 1993, 2000; Özdalga and Stjernholm 2020).

A major theme of traditionalist Islamic preaching is challenging Western modernity. Specifically, the majority of traditionalist Muslim preachers contest secularism as a subtly effective strategy to challenge Western modernity’s philosophical and political underpinnings, as well as the West’s contemporary policies and power structures. Although Islamic ideology and theology oppose secularism in Muslim contexts as well, it is difficult to characterize most Muslim states as secularist due to the diverse roles that Islam still plays in these countries (Agrama 2012; Krämer 2015). This is why there is less of a stake in challenging secularism in the Muslim world. On the other hand, traditionalist Islamic preaching takes its mission seriously when it challenges secularism in the West since secularism forms the cornerstone of the Western system of social and political dynamics.

In this paper, two of the most well-known traditionalist Muslim preachers in their respective countries—Hamza Yusuf in the USA and Hani Ramadan in Switzerland—have been selected for analysis. These two preachers were chosen based on three factors: 1. They are the most authoritative traditionalist Islamic preachers in their respective communities; 2. They are influential worldwide, receiving support or criticism in the mainstream media and political institutions; 3. They use sophisticated rhetoric that fully benefits from digital tools to widely diffuse their discourse on secularism. I analyze Yusuf’s and Ramadan’s sermons using an argumentative-rhetorical method, highlighting their primary objections to secularism as well as their rhetorical devices. The goal of outlining the primary objections to secularism is to distinguish the domains within which traditionalist Islamic preaching opposes secularism, together with the political and philosophical foundations of this power struggle. This article chiefly focuses on how these traditionalist preachers adapt traditional Islamic discourse for a Western audience of young Muslims.

Our presentation and discussion of traditionalist Islam on secularism may be interpreted by the reader as imbalanced representation. Although the first section of this article mentioned modernist viewpoints, the main focus remains on traditionalist preachers such as Hamza Yusuf and Hani Ramadan. This is because the article deals with post-secular religious preaching and rhetoric that is primarily influenced by anti-secular Muslim preachers. Many Muslim thinkers in the US and France, however, subscribe to secularism. To provide the reader with a more comprehensive understanding of Islamic thought on secularism in the West, we shall dedicate the last section of this article to secularist Muslim intellectuals in the West.

2. Western Muslim Discourses on Secularism

Diverse Muslim perspectives exist on secularism in the West. This diversity of Islamic discourses can be attributed to the varied origins, schools of thought, and figures of authority that shape these discourses. If we were to look closer at a country such as France, where the largest Muslim community in Europe lives, three different French Muslim discourses on secularism can be found: 1. Moderate proponents of secularism who are reformists and advocate for treating all religions equally under the law without adopting extreme secularism. Tareq Oubrou, Tariq Ramadan, and Latifa Ibn Ziaten are a few examples of these figures (Hashas 2014; Belhaj 2022b). 2. Secularism enthusiasts within the liberal/enlightened/spiritual Islam school of thought, exemplified by Abdennour Bidar and Ghaleb Bencheikh, who think secularism offers the perfect framework for Islam to overcome its modernity dilemma (Hashas 2013; Belhaj 2023; Riwanda and A’la 2023). 3. The conservative Islam of Salafis and neo-traditionalists contend that secularism is merely a plot against Islam and that its goal is to fully integrate Muslims into a culture devoid of religious significance, establishing secularism as a philosophy rather than the teachings of Islam. This viewpoint is supported by theologians and intellectuals, including Youssef Hindi, Kareem El Hidjaazi, and Aïssam Aït-Yahya (Belhaj 2024). These three perspectives have an impact on French-speaking countries outside of France as well, including Belgium and Switzerland.

If we broaden the survey of Islamic discourses on secularism to the USA, intellectuals like Abdolkarim Soroush deserve recognition. This is not only because he is a prominent Muslim intellectual who lives in the USA where he has followers, but also because of his views on secularism, which offer an alternative viewpoint to those previously mentioned. Soroush makes a distinction between “philosophical secularism” and “political secularism”, endorsing the latter and opposing the former. Philosophical secularism, according to Soroush, is atheistic and does not reflect the historical and cultural makeup of religious societies. On the other hand, he contends that essential parts of political secularism include the division of the institutions of state and religion, as well as individual rights and political sovereignty (Soltani 2018, p. 13). This contrast is articulated by Soroush using the language of sense and essence of secularism. He acknowledges the usefulness of secularism in political systems aimed at limiting the authority of despots by denying religious legitimacy to the state and isolating religion from politics (the sense of secularism). But he rejects the essence of secularism as the offspring of rational metaphysics promoted first by philosophers (mainly the Greeks) when they began the task of philosophizing the world order and subsuming it under nonreligious metaphysical categories, separating God and his designs from the world and its explanation (Soroush 2000, p. 65). This process was continued with European science and modernity, first in the natural world and later in the social and political spheres, advocating nonreligious ways of seeing the world. For Soroush, the story of secularism is the tale of reason that is neither anti-religious nor religious (Soroush 2000, p. 68).

In 2007, Soroush was invited to give a talk in Paris on secularism amidst tensions between Muslims and secularism in France. Therein, Soroush made another interesting distinction between tolerant and militant secularism. Soroush asserted that:

In European countries, States are slowly losing their tolerance toward religious minorities, and their tolerant secularism is turning into militant secularism, which means that it is no different from religion. Because Secularism was supposed to have been capable of digesting religions, not to turn into a religion in its own right that banishes some other religions. Was this not the objection to religions after all? That an Islamic State, for example, does not treat Jews or Christians well, that it does not view them as equals, that it gives Muslims special rights which it denies to others? Well, if secularism starts behaving in this same way and does not treat non-secular people well and withholds some rights from them, we will have returned to where we began.

(Soroush 2007)1

Soroush thus supports tolerant secularism as long as it does not meddle in the governance of religions and instead embraces and recognizes a wide range of religious practices. In his view, tolerance—which includes accepting both strong and weak minorities—is a fundamental human value and virtue, and it is the cornerstone of secularism.2 Conversely, militant secularism is a form of secularism that is intolerant and does not hold a universal perspective on all religions. In the West, Soroush explains, Islam as a religion and identity only opposes militant secularism, which cannot accept Islam, not moderate and tolerant secularism, which allows other religions and identities to resurface.3

Though traditionalism is a minority school of thought in Muslim communities in the West, it frequently and vehemently challenges secularism. On the other hand, certain Muslim modernist viewpoints are deeply committed to maintaining secularism and are particularly sensitive to its challenges. This is the situation with “secularist ex-Muslim voices” in the UK, who are vocal since secularity has a long tradition of embracing diversity in the country. These voices confront social and cultural forms (the discussion of Islamophobia and freedom of expression) as well as institutionalized levels (state-church ties, multiculturalism, and communitarianism) (Vliek 2018). In France, the former Grand Mufti of Marseille, Soheib Bencheikh, openly endorses laïcité and secularism in addition to the French prohibition on headscarves. Secularism, according to Bencheikh, is defined as “administrative neutrality”, which means that the state should carry out governing functions apart from religion, arguing that secularism will clarify Islam as a divine spiritual doctrine rather than as a tool that can be abused to seize power (Rabasa et al. 2007, p. 133). Sherman Jackson, a Muslim scholar in the United States, developed the concept of the Islamic secular. He argues that the latter is a non-shar’īa domain and is “secular” in that it uses a different standard to evaluate human behavior than sharia. But in rejecting the idea of acting “as if God did not exist”, it stays “Islamic”, and thus “religious”. His differentiation between the shar‘ī and non-shar‘ī has a rich history in the legal and theological traditions of Islam (Jackson 2017, pp. 1–41).

Thus, even though this study focuses on conservative discourses on secularism, I am fully aware and recognize that Islamic discourses are not limited to confrontation with secularism and that Islamic ethics and teachings cannot only be understood from the perspective of resistance and challenge to secularism. Many contemporary preachers and intellectuals who speak at religious services do not oppose secularism but, in some cases, actively promote it. My perspective here is limited to critically analyzing traditionalist preachers, and my arguments here solely address conservative Islamic discourse; to complete the picture and avoid taking a biased stance, a different study may investigate modernist Islamic discourses on secularism in the West.

I have taken a two-pronged approach to researching these Muslim traditionalist discourses. I provide, on the one hand, a synopsis and explanation of the central claims made in each discourse. This phase aims to comprehend traditionalist Muslims’ beliefs and objections to secularism rather than to increase the influence of these groups in the West. Ultimately, their discourses are social facts that express opposition to secularism even at the local and small-scale community level. On the other hand, I will approach these discourses critically, examining their rhetorical devices and the social implications of challenging secularism in the West. My aim is to highlight the limitations of these Islamic discourses.

3. Hamza Yusuf: Contesting Secularism on Knowledge, Education, and Gender

American Islamic preacher and intellectual Hamza Yusuf, who was born Mark Hanson in 1958, converted from Catholicism to Islam in 1977 after enduring a car accident and researching other faiths. He is well-known in the US Muslim intellectual community for co-founding Zaytuna College, which was the first Muslim liberal arts college in the country (Korb 2013; Spannaus and Razavian 2018). He adheres to the Sunni-Maliki school of Islam, in which he was trained in the Mauritanian traditional schools, particularly through his discipleship to the Mauritanian scholar ‘Abdallāh bin Bayya (al-Azami 2023). Typically, researchers tend to perceive Hamza Yusuf as a traditionalist or neo-traditionalist who opposes liberal Islam, holds critical views on Islamic reformism, and emphasizes Islamic spirituality. He, on the other hand, actively promotes intellectual and interreligious dialogue with people of different religions and beliefs (Jawad 2018; Sedgwick 2020; Takahashi 2021; Quisay 2023). He has sided with American conservatives and reached out to the Religious Right, working with Southern Baptists, conservative Catholics, and Mormons in an attempt to defend religious freedom against what he perceives as aggressive secularism (Williams 2023, p. 340). He is more invested in his work as a preacher, dā‘iya, than as a scholar, ‘ālim, since a Muslim scholar should, in the conventional sense, be able to generate argued opinions in Islamic legal matters. However, in his sermons and writings, Yusuf does not assert his religious authority as a qualified jurist. His works reflect an interest in theology, ethics, and spirituality (rather than law) and consist of brief volumes that translate and comment on theological and ethical subjects such as The Purification of the Heart (Yusuf 2004) and The Prayer of the Oppressed (Yusuf 2010).4

Yusuf presents three arguments in this sermon regarding the difficulties posed by secularism to Islam and how the latter might be able to prevail over it in a Western context. These claims address issues of knowledge, education, and gender. His first argument consists of asserting that secularism endorses a scientist perspective and lacks a comprehensive philosophy of knowledge, claiming that secularism prioritizes investigative science, ignoring other aspects of knowledge. In his second argument, he maintains that secular education is anti-religious and ideological rather than neutral. His third and last criticism of secularism accuses the latter of being hedonistic, materialist, and capitalist.5

Thus, secularism, according to Yusuf, uses science to remove religion from society (rather than only separate religion and science, state and church matters). Secularism is, therefore, an aggressive ideology using scientism to try and eradicate faiths. For him, “the religious people feel the secularists are the pugnacious ones forcing secularity down their throats, ignoring their most sacred beliefs” (Yusuf 2003, p. 4). In consequence, contemporary science possesses a restricted comprehension of the human condition, and scientific understanding is subject to change, irrationality, and speculation. As a result, in contrast to religious beliefs, a secular perspective is unable to answer all of humanity’s questions.

For Yusuf, Islam recognizes that human reason is capable of great achievements, but it does not trust human reason. Thus, he implicitly claims that the Islamic worldview displays an epistemic pessimism. Islam does not trust human nature either, which is why Islamic law is required to maintain justice and balance in the world. His claim here can be said to be a form of moral pessimism. He, therefore, advises prudence, if not outright pessimism, regarding the ability of human reason and behavior to create the ideal society. The current state of Western society (which is disastrous in his view) is often used as evidence by Yusuf that human cognition and behavior are incapable of self-regulation. It is precisely a religious type of knowledge—Islamic revelation in particular—that he believes is needed to restrain human thought and behavior.

According to Yusuf, one significant area where secularism threatens religions is in the field of education. He believes that secular education has undermined the spiritual authority of Islamic scholars and that most modern schools are less effective in promoting the social, intellectual, and spiritual growth of children (Sedgwick 2020, p. 136). In this sermon, he claims secular education challenges religious worldviews by adopting similar concepts (to religions) in an attempt to indoctrinate students and keep them under their influence for an extended period of time. Thus, in the US, secular education has succeeded in displacing religious education, as seen by the removal of Catholic education from its prominent role in the education system. Likewise, schools serve as a key theater of conflict between Islam and secularism. He warns his audience that the main purpose of a secular school is to impose a nonreligious viewpoint rather than to provide instruction. Consequently, he challenges the modern school’s purported neutrality by highlighting its ideological nature.6

The secular worldview is portrayed as materialistic, capitalist, and avaricious. It reduces people to commodities that can be sold and used for financial gain. One instance of this type of commodification is the marketing of the female body, which includes selling it in the fashion industry as well as traditional prostitution. In terms of the emphasis placed on the female body, Yusuf appears to be implying that there is a significant difference between Islamic ethics and Western materialism and capitalism. He suggests that women are better valued and protected by Islamic ethics than by the secular West.

Thus, another key area of conflict between secularism and Islam is gender. While the Islamic worldview promotes a conservative view of gender in order to protect femininity—basically, motherhood—secularism offers a liberal ethics that views womanhood as a pleasure and seeks to undermine traditional womanhood. Like the commodification of human beings, materialism and capitalism devastate the environment because they treat it as only a physical resource for profit rather than as something sacred. Ecology, then, also divides the secular and Islamic worldviews; the latter considers nature as God’s creation to be protected in the same way that women are, while secularism views nature as a resource to be exploited for financial gain.7 For him, the cult of material prosperity that accompanied modernity had also spread among Muslims. Over the past 200 years, Muslims have become infected by it as a result of their adoption of Western concepts such as secularism and nationalism. Yusuf attributed this problem to certain Muslim reformers who reinterpreted Islam to fit with modernity (Yuskaev 2013, p. 268) and to Western influence on the Muslim world (Ali 2012). That said, some researchers consider him to be an unprecedented reviver of Islam in the West (Rabbi 2023, p. 185).

It is significant that Hamza declared secularism to be the worst threat to Islam at the beginning of his sermon, while his sermon, taken as a whole, contradicts this claim; it seems that, for Yusuf, Islam poses the biggest challenge to secularism in the West. He views secularism as a fact in the West, whereas Islam as a worldview contests this reality, even though Muslims may find it difficult to do so. He lists many characteristics of Islam (family, law, integration of science, ethics, etc.) that make it resistant to secularism, if not impossible to secularize. Thus, as put forth by Amina Chaudary, he exhibits discontent with conventional American values, a draw to the counterculture, and a desire for spiritual fulfillment outside of the mainstream of Judaism and Christianity (Chaudary 2020). However, he still admits that some Muslims and Christianity have been subdued by secularism around the world, particularly in the West.

In the discussion section, we will be able to critically and in-depth explore the rhetoric and relevance of Yusuf’s critique of secularism. Here, it is sufficient to argue that secularism—the separation of religion from worldly matters, such as political and public matters—is not the only issue at stake. He challenges the dynamics of Western civilization as a whole, which includes secularism, rather than critiquing secularism in and of itself. He argues that the foundations of Western civilization—science, modern education, and capitalism—are to blame for humanity’s moral decay and loss of meaning in life. His criticism is post-secular in that it challenges the idea that living in the West’s secular society fulfills a person’s needs rather than yearning for a religious one. More specifically, he questions secularism and Western civilization’s claim to be role models for Muslims. The fact that this way of opposing secularism does not separate the differentiation of the societal domains (religion, politics, education, science, etc.) from the excesses of secularism, Western hegemony, and the issues facing Western civilization may be its weakest point. Moreover, modern Muslim societies that have not been westernized or sufficiently secularized can be subjected to the same ethical critiques that he developed here. His logic rejects historical secularization as a means of resolving religious strife, persecution, and warfare. It does not view secularization as a sociological and political movement that promotes inclusivity in pluralist societies. This casts doubt on Islamic traditionalism’s ability to recognize the accomplishments of a secular society. Islamic traditionalism maintains a confused understanding of the relationships that should exist between different elites, groups, and domains of human activity. Conversely, Soroush and Jackson recognize secular societies’ role in properly organizing societal domains to curtail the power of religious elites and to desacralize the political authority of ruling elites. Islamic traditionalism depends on an integrated and integrating view of various groups and activities, which may function in small, remote communities to some extent but not in today’s complex, interconnected societies.

4. Hani Ramadan: Contesting Exclusive Secularism

Born in Geneva in 1959, Hani Ramadan is a Swiss preacher and intellectual of Egyptian origin. He is the son of a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader in Europe, Saïd Ramadan, and the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as the brother of the well-known Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan. Hani Ramadan has been the director of the Islamic Center of Geneva since 1995, which is regarded as a hub for moderate Islamist doctrine and the Muslim Brotherhood in Switzerland (Amghar 2008; Banfi 2013; Keller-Messahli 2024). Ramadan is widely known in Switzerland because of the decision by the authorities in Geneva to dismiss him from his job as a teacher of French in the secondary school in 2004 for extremism and then to re-integrate him after a long legal battle (Lonfat 2013, p. 269). Hani Ramadan is also renowned for his works written in French, starting with La Femme en Islam (Women in Islam), published in 1991, and L’islam et la dérive de l’Occident (Islam and the Drift of the West) in 2001. These works exhibit a conservative tone on gender and rejection of Western civilization in contrast to Tariq Ramadan’s more liberal views, especially in regard to Hani Ramadan’s famous and controversial defense of sharia in his La charia incomprise (Sharia Misunderstood) published in Le Monde in 2002 (Frégosi 2004, p. 140).

His sermon’s title Islam et Laïcité, Deux Doctrines qui s’affrontent? (Secularism and Islam: Two Doctrines that Clash?) is a rhetorical question that suggests that secularism and Islam do not always conflict according to Ramadan. Thus, it is a loaded question since, as we shall see, the conflict between Islam and secularism arises only when secularism is intrusive and exclusive, not when secularism is inclusive. Ramadan makes three arguments against secularism as well. In his first argument, he claims that Islam and secularism are two different civilizations. Then, he distinguishes between three forms of secularism in his second argument: inclusive, intrusive, and exclusive secularism. He asserts that only inclusive secularism and Islam can coexist. Finally, his third argument sustains that secularism is a hollow edifice of meaning, and secular schools reduce people to materialism and rationalism, challenging the removal of spirituality and the effects of secular education on gender norms.8

Ramadan had recourse to s this argument from difference to make his first case against secularism. One key feature of Western civilization is secularism, which separates religion from science and public affairs. For him, Islam, on the other hand, takes an integrated stance on these issues and does not separate them. The right to difference implies that secularism cannot force its beliefs on Islam. That said, dialogue between civilizations is possible, but it requires that attempts to reduce Muslims to secularism be abandoned and that the unique characteristics of Muslim civilization be acknowledged. A participant in the conversation cannot force their opinion on the other or shut it out if they disagree with it. It thus follows that Muslims have the liberty to reject secularism.9

Ramadan uses the notion of encroaching secularism (laïcité intrusive) which he borrowed from the French political scientist Haouès Seniguer. The latter defined laïcité intrusive “as an invasive secularism or laicism (a suspicious and unsure secularism) in France. This secularism interferes with Muslims’ internal “kitchen” rather than rigorously evaluating whether or not their actions are lawful under stricto sensu; that is, their approaches to religion and identity align with the structure of the law of separation and its goals (neutrality of the State and public services, rather than the denial of a composite or plural identity)” (Seniguer 2009, p. 83). Seniguer adds that this invasive secularism “would like to dictate what people can and cannot wear in public area. In fact, the Printemps républicain movement’s model of associating veiled women with Daech warriors is being followed” (Seniguer 2022, p. 256). The Printemps républicain is a small group of enthusiastic French academics and activists of the Center-Left who claim to be defenders of secularism.10

According to Ramadan’s typology, inclusive secularism appears to represent a liberal secularism that respects the autonomy of religions and embraces adapting to different religions, hence rejecting exclusive and invasive secularism. In order to balance religious demands with those of secular states, such secularism would operate on the principle of coexistence, which would allow people of different beliefs and convictions to live in harmony with one another and open venues for public discussion. Another inclusive secularism tenet is freedom of religion, which would permit Muslims to follow their faith openly and without hindrance, including in public spaces. In his understanding, the 1905 law separating church and state—a liberal kind of secularism—was once implemented in France.11 Therefore, he challenges the present secular model by utilizing a century-old model, which seems to be the best model to reduce the state’s influence over religion.

Ramadan denounces what he sees as the ongoing lack of meaning in secularism; given that religion provides a complex framework for understanding. He claims that eliminating religion from the classroom and substituting it with secular education reduced the human being to its physical and intellectual abilities, eliminating its ethical and spiritual aspects. He believes that the chaos and intellectual deprivation of today’s youth are the result of reduction to rationalism and materialism. The French authorities used this same argument he publicly made—that secularism is an empty construction of meaning—to justify barring him from entering France. He finds an example of this assertion in the secular school, which he is familiar with, having taught French in a secondary school in La Golette, close to Geneva, from 1981 to 2003. He was dismissed from teaching in public schools in Switzerland because he breached laïcité through his public activities as a religious figure who promoted religious positions in a secular school and also for adopting perspectives against liberal gender norms (Sanchez-Mazas 2023, pp. 86–87).

For him, secular education not only reduces humanity to the body and reason, but it misrepresents society as a space without religious cultures.12 He claims that by forbidding women from wearing headscarves, secular schools are incompatible with the diversity of communities within society (along the line of religious affiliations).13 Secular schools fail in their objective of preparing students for life in society despite their assertions that they do so by banning religious signs in schools, including the Kippah and the Muslim headscarf. Similarly, if a teacher carries out their duties with competence, there should not be an issue if they display religious symbols in front of the students. Religious markers usually illustrate a rich culture that should not be removed from secular schools nor hidden from students.14

In his book L’Islam et la dérive de l’Occident (Islam and the Drift of the West), Ramadan states that secularism is a continuation of positivism (H. Ramadan 2001, p. 15) and Islam is a civilization that goes beyond secularism since it reconciles revelation with the outside world (H. Ramadan 2001, p. 65). This book exemplifies the same view of the West that Ramadan expressed in his sermon, which is that the West has turned away from religion after a protracted march toward materialism, secularism, and atheism that only apply to the history of Christianity and not to Islam (Platti 2008, p. 359). Ramadan supports a liberal laïcité, as demonstrated by the 1905 statute, along with Muslim reformists like his brother Tariq Ramadan. Tariq Ramadan claims that the 1905 statute effectively separates church and state without supporting anti-religious policies or specifically targeting Muslims with a number of laws (Belhaj 2022b, p. 12). However, Hani Ramadan also shares with Salafism (a radical Sunni school of thought) traditionalist views, including that secularization only happened “naturally” in Christian countries, that secularism is but a plot against religion, and that Islam is unique and impervious to secularism (Belhaj 2024, p. 13). Despite the fact that they do agree on several points of Islamic thought, this makes Hani Ramadan more traditionalist than his brother.

Ramadan discards from his discourse the element of individualization, a crucial aspect of secularization. Religious education cannot halt the individual search for meaning that has taken place in both Western and non-Western societies, especially in the digital era, as access to meaning, especially religious meaning, is fragmented, complex, and changing. The individualized interpretation of meaning has impacted Muslim youth in the West as well. The right to critical thinking—and even the need to cultivate a critical mind—in regard to one’s own religious tradition is likewise rejected in his idealized picture of religious education as spiritual education, which is insufficient given the state of the world today where combining religious and political claims often leads to disasters. Religious authorities also practice manipulation by disguising the teaching of politics and ideologies as spirituality in religious education. The question of what kind of religious education a youngster would be willing to accept in current societies is very complicated to answer, which is all the more so since Western societies are plural, and so are religious identities. It appears that for him, meaning and religion are synonymous, despite the fact that faiths can only address particular issues with limited solutions. Religion cannot provide answers to all questions just because secularism is unable to provide answers to some.

Ramadan also aims to rethink laïcité, which in France and Switzerland came to entail separating religious affairs from the public sphere. While one may expect renegotiation in a democratic society, in these two nations, the presence of religion in public institutions has been muted in order to end decades of religious conflict and repression. It demonstrates a lack of historical understanding of what laïcité means, disregarding the religious histories of these two nations and how social peace was achieved when states and religions refrained from interfering in one another’s matters. A lack of his historical awareness also extends to Islamic history, as evidenced in the conflicts between Sunnis and Shi’is, to name just one example, which highlights the negative effects of combining political claims and religion on societal peace in the history of Islam. This is an ideological, historical perspective that conceals the crisis of religion and politics in the history of Islam in favor of a cordial relationship between politics and religion. Having such a perspective on history may skew reality and lead one to believe that Islamic history fared better in terms of the interaction between religion and politics, but actual instances of this interaction, such as those in modern-day Saudi Arabia and Iran, demonstrate how problematic such a perspective is and how it can lead to significant conflicts.

5. Discussion: Contesting Secular Power as Islamic Theology

In their book Rhetoric and Religion in the Twenty-First Century, DePalma et al. came to the conclusion that post-secularism, pluralism, and indigenous rhetorical traditions are common practices among different religions (DePalma et al. 2023). In this regard, Yusuf and Ramadan challenge secularism, using traditionalist rhetorical strategies while also appealing to diversity in a post-secular society.

5.1. Rhetorical Strategies

Shaimaa El-Naggar, who studied Yusuf’s rhetoric, contends that he recontextualizes religion as a vehicle for change by using intertextuality—alluding to various texts in his sermon—and interdiscursivity—addressing a range of topics in one sermon (El Naggar 2012, p. 90). In Yusuf’s sermon on secularism, he blends contemporary rhetorical devices with traditional Muslim sermon techniques. Let us start with traditional rhetorical tools. He maintains the khuṭba (Friday sermon) style, standing in front of the audience and asserting his authority as the preacher to speak to them. He also starts and ends the sermon with a prayer in classical Arabic (while the sermon itself is uttered in English). Furthermore, he makes arguments of authority crucial to his critique of secularism by frequently quoting the Quran (associating secularization with aberrations denounced in the Quran). For instance, he cites a text from the Quran Q. 53:28 (But they have no knowledge therein. They follow nothing but conjecture; and conjecture avails nothing against Truth)15 to further his argument that modern science is founded on speculation (in contrast to the certainty of revelation). However, Q. 53:28 alludes to Q. 53:27, which says, (Indeed, those who do not believe in the Hereafter name the angels’ female names).16 Consequently, Q. 53:28 and Q. 53:27 describe a discussion between the Prophet Muḥammad and those in Quraysh who opposed him and asserted that angels were women. The point made in Q. 53:28 is that people who make such claims about the gender of angels lack supporting proof and are only acting on presumptions.

The pulpit behind Yusuf symbolizes the place’s holiness while also allowing the speaker to be less serious (given that he is not speaking to the audience from the pulpit itself) and use humor in the sermon—something that is not appropriate for a regular Friday sermon presented from the pulpit. His rhetoric is further structured around the arguments of authority when he quotes the Prophet Muḥammad and Muslim medieval scholars as authorities on revelation, ethics, language, and theology. Because of these justifications, his sermon appears to be circular and limited to the Muslim audience: he uses justifications from the Muslim tradition itself to demonstrate why it is superior to secularism.

Besides arguments from authority, Yusuf frequently uses the fallacies of cherry-picking and reductionism. Thus, in order to bolster the Muslim view that causality is relative, he invokes Hume’s argument regarding the non-absoluteness of human knowledge. Here, he refers to Hume’s notion of necessary connexion, which is central to his theory of knowledge. According to Hume, there is a relation of constant conjunction between cause and effect, and the experience of the constancy of temporal conjunction does lead to inference or constrained belief, which is what gives rise to the idea of necessity; the necessary connection depends on the inference rather the inference depending on the necessary connection (Hume 1975, p. 88; Garrett 1998, vol. 4, p. 545). Since he believes that the claims made in the Quran and Sunna are inspired by God and have a divine nature, he does not apply Hume’s skepticism to religious knowledge, which is nonetheless absolute in his view since the laws of human knowledge do not apply to this religious knowledge. Then, he compares scientists to “children playing with dangerous toys in contrast to God’s perfect creation” by using anecdotes about scientists destroying the environment of a region in the Pacific following a failed experiment (reducing scientists to this particular mistake). He also reduces oriental studies to searching for faults in the Muslim tradition, and especially the Quran, although, despite this, they were, according to him, unsuccessful in their endeavor: presumably, the only works they authored were about a comparison between biblical stories in the Bible and the Quran, which concluded in favor of the Quran.

Furthermore, Yusuf reduces secular modernity to commercialization, scientism, and secular education; nevertheless, some societies are secular without being capitalist, and secularization does not equal capitalism. Communist governments, for instance, are secular, and the Soviet Union, where one may experience one of the strictest types of secularism, enforced anti-religious laws and public schools to teach atheism (Luehrmann 2011). Furthermore, Yusuf disregarded two elements of secularization that are essential to secular states: pluralism and political organization. In terms of pluralism, secular states permit different ideologies and religions to exist, express themselves, and be acknowledged. Thus, in principle, Islam in the West can enjoy the same rights to religious freedom and coexistence with other religions in secular Western democracies as other religions. In Muslim societies ruled by Islamic law, this may not be the case for other religions and philosophical systems. Furthermore, secular societies, which keep religious and political matters apart, function properly most of the time and do not undermine the religious and political spheres of expertise. Combining the two, as is common in many Muslim and non-Muslim societies, compromises the efficiency and purpose of each of these domains (Clark and Corcoran 2000; Mislin 2016; Admirand 2019). Secularism also permits different faiths, religions, and philosophical systems to coexist and exercise religious freedom on an equal footing in many cases without impeding the government’s or science’s work. Conversely, in religious societies, including Muslim societies, religious minorities face persecution or exclusion, religious leaders keep an eye on governments (or the governments keep an eye on religious leaders), and religious beliefs limit the potential of scientific research. The history of Muslim empires and societies, which is replete with documented wars, conflicts, and persecution of philosophers and minorities, contradicts the ballooning of Muslim culture into an ideal society where religion, science, and government were supposedly harmonious.

As for Ramadan’s rhetoric, he mainly promotes an apologetic attitude. In order to recover the right to activity in both France and Switzerland, without making any concessions to secularism, his discourse strives to defend himself against the accusations that he opposes secularism in these countries. He believes that although secularism and Islam have completely different views, there is a minimal form of secularism, which he labels inclusive secularism, that allows the coexistence of religious and philosophical systems, particularly in public spaces, and which Islam may be ready to live under. Many reformist Muslim intellectuals in the West share this opinion, including Tariq Ramadan. According to the latter, Muslim communities in France, for instance, consider the 1905 law on secularism as fitting well with Muslims’ aspirations to live in a secular society. Ramadan formulated this argument in his 2009 book Mon intime conviction (What I Believe), asserting that “nothing in laïcité was opposed to a free and autonomous practice of Islam” (T. Ramadan 2009, p. 162). He advocates the strict application of the French law on secularism (1905), “in its letter and spirit, in an egalitarian way for all citizens, Muslims or not” (T. Ramadan 2009, p. 162). He then distinguishes between the 1905 law on the separation of the state and church and the current laïcité, which is, in his view, a sectarian and fundamentalist form of secularism, the purpose of which is the rejection (and the hope of disappearance) of religion (T. Ramadan 2009, p. 162). T. Ramadan believes that such secularism is dogmatic, adopted by militant atheism and that this ideology “hides something”, namely its will to colonize religions (T. Ramadan 2009, p. 162). Thus, this argument purports to be faithful to the fundamental liberal values of pluralism and coexistence while criticizing secularism as it is understood and implemented by the states in France and Switzerland.

H. Ramadan’s rhetoric of differentiation forms his second main discursive strategy. Perhaps it is a trace of his philosophical education (he obtained a PhD degree on Descartes) (H. Ramadan 1990), especially with regard to how he discusses definitions. His first use of this rhetoric of differentiation in his sermon on secularism consists of contrasting various forms of secularism, presenting himself as an opponent of exclusive secularism and an ally of inclusive secularism. He also makes a distinction between the three human faculties—reason, senses, and faith—which gives secularism the right to simply discuss reason and senses without including the element of faith. Therefore, Islam, which claims to consider all human faculties together, continues to have the right to speak to an individual in a way that goes beyond what secularism can do.

Often, his rhetoric of differentiation fails to reveal a genuine distinction between the objects he claims to be different. For him, inclusive secularism differs from exclusive secularism in that the former permits Islam to exist in public spaces while the latter does not. The discrepancy here lies in the notion of public space. The French law on secularism does not apply to public spaces per se; rather, it applies to public institutions (such as state administration and schools). For instance, Islamic girls are free to wear the hijab in private schools, businesses, and other establishments where the law does not apply, as well as streets, squares, subways, train stations, etc. Therefore, inclusive secularism would only permit the expression of Islam in public offices and educational institutions. Given the state’s two centuries of conflict with the Catholic church, this is a contentious issue in France (Guérard 2005, pp. 49–70). While he acknowledges that inclusive secularism would permit religious expression in public institutions, he asserts that Islam requires public display of piety, in contrast to Christianity. If so, inclusive secularism is a kind of secularism that permits the open expression of Islam. The extent to which Islam might be present in public, at least in this sermon, is unclear. Furthermore, he sees Islam and secularism as two different civilizations, even though there are many different interpretations of Islam, including secularist ones. In the Muslim world, there are a number of state models (such as Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, and others) where varieties of secularism are practiced and the lines between state and religion are identifiable (Bubandt and Van Beek 2011; Krawietz and Reifeld 2008). There are also scholars who contend that Islamic political history has validated the separation of spiritual and worldly orders since the time of the Umayyads and that since then, two authorities have emerged: the worldly authority of the rulers and the spiritual authority of the religious scholars (G. Bencheikh 2005, p. 60; Carré 1993; ‘Abd al-Rāziq 1994).

5.2. The Significance of Contesting Secularism

Traditionalist and non-traditionalist schools of thought from all over the world contest secularism in various ways. Berg-Sørensen and colleagues contend that the diversity of secularisms in the West highlights the fact that secularism is a contentious concept, with multiple contestable and contested conceptions coexisting. These conceptions are subject to democratic negotiations that define the boundaries between religion and politics and establish what constitutes an acceptable and unacceptable point of view in democratic governance (Berg-Sørensen 2013, pp. 3–6). In the Middle East, Turkey and Iran’s religious-political changes are in line with what Shakman Hurd refers to as the politics of secularism. She shows that what passes for “religious revival” in these two countries is a public conflict over secular policies imposed by the Shah of Iran and the Kemalists of Turkey (Shakman Hurd 2013, pp. 182–201). The same is true for Egypt, Iraq, and Yemen, all of which have embraced various types of Islamization of power following secular political regimes. The Islamization movement is a response to secular influences that have defined the state and its policies in the past. This official secularism sanctioned and controlled by the state, has led Luizard to argue that because official secularism is authoritarian and enforced by the state in Muslim societies, it lacked the ability to establish strong roots (Luizard 2008).

It is not necessary to oppose plurality in order to resist secularism. Pluralism is a fundamental byproduct of secularism, and Yusuf, Ramadan, and traditionalist Muslims often embrace it as a way to allow various religious ideas and worldviews to coexist. In this framework, Yusuf and Ramadan wish to freely practice their religion and express their critique of secularism while fully reverting to their religious rhetoric about Islam’s supremacy over all other systems and civilizations. Their objection to secularism stems from what they perceive as its infiltration into the community’s life through secular worldviews, education, and norms that either force religion out of society or enforce it on those who follow it.

A major critique of secularism, as put forth by Ramadan, is that several different forms of secularism exist rather than just one. Similar criticisms can be found among various sociologists, such as the seven distinct secularisms of Baubérot (Baubérot 2015), multiple secularisms (Burchardt et al. 2012; Bhargava 2013), or the varieties of secularism (Bubandt and Van Beek 2011). Both Yusuf and Ramadan (and other Muslim preachers) demonstrate awareness of the debates surrounding secularism and the disputed theory of secularization as a process that all societies go through. Additionally, their knowledge of social theory and contemporary and post-modern philosophy enables them to critically examine secularism from a basic philosophical standpoint.

In Ramadan and Yusuf’s primary assumption, there seems to be a contestation of the functional differentiation between diverse spheres of action and discourse, which forms a core principle of secularism and modernity. That is, they do not believe that the social evolution that follows urbanization, modernity, and industrialization in the West—which are objective factors rather than the product of a plot by any one force—has caused the economy, politics, education, society, and science to become independent from religion. The theory of differentiation has been used by sociologists to explain the emergence of relatively autonomous spheres of values, codes, and functional systems that have led to the gradual decline of religious relevance in society at large. Most sociologists agree that the fundamental element of secularization is the differentiation between religious and worldly values and activities (Weber 1980; Durkheim 2007; Wilson 1982; Tschannen 1991; Casanova 1994). The processes of functional differentiation between Islam and the state in the Muslim world (and Christianity and politics in the West) may differ from one another, though, as the former can be linked to the investiture issue and the history of Europe (Pollack 2013).

One notable aspect of both Yusuf and Ramadan’s discourses is their continued emphasis on the imagined Islamic community as a collective identity. In contrast, modernity—including Muslim societies and Muslim communities in the West—has seen a decline in the social significance of religion, leading to a shift in the dominant forms of religion, which now take on a strongly individual, syncretic, and diffuse character, and which Luckmann refers to as “invisible religion” (Luckmann 1967; Pollack 2013). While Yusuf and Ramadan certainly oppose secularism as an ideology that aims to control society, they also view Islam as a collective ideology that does not give much consideration to people’s freedom to follow their own personal or private religious beliefs.

Islam is mobilized as a political theology by Yusuf and Ramadan to challenge the discursive and institutional dominance of secularism in the West. By the same token, Islam is raised to an anti-secular civilization and taken out of its historical context. Ramadan believes Islam has a vision of the state that he refers to as an Islamic state; this is in line with his other Islamist beliefs, which also include the application of sharia as law. However, his belief in the idea of an Islamic state appears to be decontextualized given that, in contrast to the Muslim world, only a small number of radical Islamists in the West promote the project of an Islamic state, and their influence on Muslim communities is negligible. In Yusuf’s view, Islam, like other religions, is victimized by secularism. He views secularism as an ideology of oppression and power that wreaks havoc on religions despite the fact that Islam is still powerful enough to be extremely important to Muslims.

Ramadan views conflict as a reality between Islam and secularism, while Yusuf perceives secularism as a threat and the biggest challenge to Islam. Given that Muslims are still mostly considered immigrants and outsiders, this suggests that Yusuf and Ramadan reflect existential insecurity among Muslims in the West. This lends credence to Norris and Inglehart’s insecurity hypothesis, which explains why active religiosity is more common in the United States than in Europe. They attribute this to the country’s lower level of material and existential security relative to other modern societies (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Pollack 2013).

Thus, a perspective that may be applied to different anti-secular religious discourses is that of conflicting claims to authority and power dynamics, both religious and secular (George 2009; Day and Coleman 2013). This is one way to interpret anti-secular Muslim preaching. Secularism can often conceal unequal power dynamics and societal hierarchies and downplay religion’s role as a power structure (Woodhead 2007). There are also times when a power struggle for knowledge and truth leads to the creation of apparent and rigid boundaries between state and religion or science and religion (Day and Coleman 2013). In the eyes of Yusuf and Ramadan, secularism is a tool of oppression that targets all religions, but especially Islam. It is also seen as a competitor to their rule over the truth. They regard secularism’s scientist and rationalist claims—as well as their neutrality—as purely ideological assertions. In this regard, Asad (1993) has demonstrated how attempts by secularism to describe and refer to religion are rooted in power dynamics. Additionally, he illustrated how Western secularism’s promotion of a clear separation between politics and religion led to the view of public Muslim discourse as merely a front for a real goal, which is the obtaining of political power (Asad 1993; Day and Coleman 2013). The discourses of Yusuf and Ramadan, while not explicitly expressing an interest in political power, may then be interpreted as anti-power projects. That said, challenging the secular’s power in Islamic discourse does not take into account, at least explicitly, the fact that religion itself is a social hierarchy embedded in a structure of authority that imposes moral and political beliefs on people as well as society.

The challenge to secularism posed by traditionalist Islam in the West can be interpreted as a contestation of authority and de-theologizing as well as a symptom of post-secular religious revivalism. Muslim traditionalist preachers derive their authority from upholding Islam as the canonical reference for both personal and public discourse and behavior. In practical terms, this means that an imam, scholar, or intellectual asserts political, moral, or epistemic authority about correct knowledge, proper society, right education, or appropriate public deeds. By bringing in other authority figures and experts to contend with them on various matters, secularism subverts this Muslim authority. Additionally, secularism de-theologizes the world, giving Muslims access to new sources of meaning and rendering many Islamic traditions obsolete in the majority of spheres of endeavor and daily life. Traditionalists believe that restricting Islam to personal affairs is a mutilation of the Muslim tradition. Furthermore, Muslim traditionalists express critical thinking and knowledge of the post-secular resurgence of religion in their opposition to secularism. They feel comfortable reclaiming religious traditions and supporting an open and liberal society made possible by secularism, becoming, in a sense, neo-traditionalists, having absorbed post-modern philosophical and sociological reconsiderations of secularism. Their opposition to secularism stems from the belief that it has overreached into what they consider to be the purview of religious ethics. They acknowledge that religion cannot influence Western governments, which should be secular, but they also think religion should be permitted to serve as a moral compass for public organizations. That being said, modernist and reformist Muslims provide a counterbalance to traditionalist Muslim ideologies. While most reformists embrace secularism with little criticism, the modernist school of thinking fervently upholds it. As this article has already demonstrated in the first section, there are differences among Muslims in the West regarding secularism as the Muslim communities are diverse. Instead of a categorical rejection or resistance to an anti-religious concept, it is more often a process of embracing secularism and investigating its possibilities and limitations. It is part of a continuing, lengthy struggle that began in the 19th century to engage and battle secularism, which has seen a number of successes and setbacks along the way. It is possible that the influence of Muslim traditionalist discourses has grown thanks to internet tools and support networks. However, this does not negate the limitations of these discourses or their weak defense of a homogenous society in which Islam provides the only source of meaning and social structure for issues of gender, education, and public life. The impact of traditionalist discourses on secularism on Muslims is countered and lessened by the individualization of religiosity, the fragmentation of authority, and the growth of critical thinking among Muslims in the West.

5.3. Counter-Discourses: Secularist Muslims in the West

We have so far looked at how traditionalist Islam views secularism; to conclude this article, I will briefly discuss a counter-Muslim perspective on secularism that is supported by Soheib Bencheikh, a prominent Muslim religious figure in France (and by many others in various countries in the West). This section aims to assist the reader in appreciating the richness of the Islamic intellectual sphere in the West and the variety of perspectives that extend beyond conservative Islam. Soheib Bencheikh, while being a recognized Muslim theologian and intellectual, has effectively assumed a role of religious authority in his Franco-Algerian community even if he was often contested there, and he openly claimed to be secularist since the 1990s.17 Bencheikh is also a historian of religions and former Mufti of Marseille (1995–2005). He has published numerous works including Monothéisme et violence (Monotheism and Violence) (co-author, 2013), Marianne et le Prophète: l’islam dans la France laïque (Marianne and the Prophet: Islam in Secular France) (2003), L’islam et la République: des musulmans de France contre l’intégrisme (Islam and the Republic: French Muslims against Fundamentalism) (with Martine Gozlan) and L’Islam et la liberté religieuse (Islam and Religious Freedom) (1998). He defines his reading of Islam as counter-Islamist, based on the criticism of the heritage of prophetic traditions and the Islamic legal corpus, on the questioning of literal and reformist readings of the Quran, engaging in a direct reading of the Quran, following an approach of historical contextualization of the Quran and distancing himself from the legal and historical injunctions of the Quran, and in the pursuit of a universal ethical coherence, with the flagship idea of “walking with one’s century” (S. Bencheikh 2008, pp. 119–67). On the question of the veil, S. Bencheikh illustrates these remarks on liberal Islam in a clear manner:

In Islam, the veil is not a religious symbol, it has no dogmatic meaning. It is a secular piece of clothing that was recommended for reasons of modesty and protection of young women. Some Muslims actually try to ritualize it, because they see it as a way to brandish their faith. However, the Koran denounces this attitude. If the Muslim invites others to his faith, it is not by force, but by wisdom, literally by a ”delicate exhortation”. The question now is: how can a young Muslim woman defend herself against any attack on her femininity and dignity, in France, today? By going to school, not by wearing a veil! It is up to Muslims to tell Muslims that in Islam, knowledge and learning are more important than the veil. And that the veil of the Muslim woman in France—in the symbolic sense—is the secular, free and compulsory school18

It should be noted here that S. Bencheikh uses a crucial hermeneutic tool among secularist Muslims, namely, starting from the historical context and the issues of the present to read the text and go beyond the exegetical and legal heritage on this particular question of the veil; a question on which there is a consensus within traditionalist Islam to consider the veil as a mandatory religious sign. In Bencheikh’s words, it is a matter of highlighting the historical realities and the evolving temporality of the Quran, separating the temporal from the universal, and seeking the ethical teaching of the Quran (S. Bencheikh 2008, p. 126). In this way, one can perceive an opposition between secular Muslims and traditionalist Muslims in the reading of the Quran. Such a contextualizing reading has the immediate effect of privileging modernity over tradition and the values of the republic over religious law.

6. Conclusions

This study examined sermons delivered by two well-known traditionalist preachers in the West, Hani Ramadan in Switzerland and Hamza Yusuf in the USA, who use Islam as a political theology to oppose the institutional and discursive domination of secularism in the West. I have identified a few consistent arguments and rhetorical devices in their discourses that demonstrate how crucial power contestation is to Islamic preaching in the post-secular West. These discourses argue against the rationalist conception of knowledge and are in favor of a more harmonious coexistence of religious and rational epistemologies. Additionally, they want education to promote a holistic perspective that respects religious diversity and incorporates religion. Finally, these Islamic preachers advocate traditional ethical viewpoints against liberal gender norms. In terms of their rhetoric, these discourses emphasize the rhetoric of distinction (to highlight the idea of multiple secularisms and challenge the societal progression toward secularization) and reductionism (to reduce Western societies to rationalism, materialism, and anti-religious ideologies).