Confucianism as the Foundation for a “Secular State”: François Bernier’s Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

Abstract

From the late 17th to the early 18th century, Europe witnessed various intellectual debates, and it undeniably received help from places outside Europe such as China. When Chinese history, culture and thought, especially the Confucian classics translated into Latin, were introduced to Europe, they provided resources for comparison and reference for Europe’s ideological crisis. Confucius ou la Science des Princes, the Confucian classic translated by François Bernier, is a typical example. From the perspective of the cross-cultural history of ideas, after carefully analyzing the terminology used in Bernier’s translation and his understanding of Confucius’s thought, this paper will show that Bernier accepted, through the Jesuit translation, the non-religious dimension of politics and ethics in Confucianism, but unlike the Jesuits, he did not see Confucianism as needing Christianity; on the contrary, he believed that politics and ethics could be based on a purely secular philosophy. Based on his secular understanding of Confucius’s thought, Bernier reconstructed Confucius’s texts as a manual to teach European princes, regarding the prince’s virtue, reason and benevolence as the foundation of a country’s good government.

1. Introduction

There has always been an intricate connection between Church and State in Europe, but after Machiavelli, they sought to free themselves from ecclesiastic control, developing new political theories that gave predominance to the State over the Church. Those new theories promoted Reason of State, giving absolute priority to the conservation of the State. Christian moral and political values did not disappear, but the State ideology used religion for its advantage whenever necessary. This means that the State could limit the power of religion when it opposed the interests of the State. When the first translation of the Confucian classics, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus,1 was published in Europe by the Jesuits in 1687, “in many ways, the Confucius Sinarum Philosous seems to corroborate with evidence from China the common place in Jesuit critiques of reason of state that morally unscrupulous behaviour is, in the long run, detrimental to the security and prosperity of a state” (Canaris 2019, p. 101).

In the works of Voltaire (1694–1778), we can precisely see the shift from a religious to a secular foundation of the State. For him, the Christian views on morality and politics were no longer relevant to the State, but the secular notion of tolerance became the absolute foundation of the State. Like for Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), Voltaire considered tolerance as fully realized in China since the activities of the missionaries in China show precisely the tolerance of the Chinese emperors admitting and even protecting a foreign religion. For Voltaire, Emperor Yongzheng (Yung-Chin) 雍正 is the model of a tolerant emperor (Voltaire 2000, pp. 21–22). But in fact, according to the Jesuit missionaries in China, Kangxi 康熙 was more tolerant, since he gave a legal status to the Catholic Church, and he promoted the activities of the missionaries in the domain of science and arts. Kangxi did not adopt this policy of tolerance because he recognized the theological truth of Catholicism, but for secular motives, namely the moral and social usefulness of Christianity for China. However, when the Catholic Church was opposed to the interests of the State, Kangxi would be ready to strictly control the Church and even to suppress it entirely if needed. This happened precisely with the Rites Controversy: when the Church attempted to forbid Chinese Catholics to perform the traditional rituals to Confucius and to the ancestors, Kangxi reacted very forcefully, expelling all the missionaries who did not follow the accommodationist rules of the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552–1610).

On the contrary, the European kingdoms appeared to Voltaire as intolerant because the Catholic countries did not tolerate Protestants, and the Protestant countries did not tolerate Catholics. The intolerance of Louis XIV was especially shown with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, which caused the massive departure of Protestants from France. For Voltaire, the tolerance of a country is not determined by the ruler, but it can be explained better by the cultural and philosophical roots of a nation. Also, he considered that the tolerance of Chinese culture and society was rooted in the figure of Confucius.

Another scholar who developed similar ideas even before Bayle and Voltaire is François Bernier (1620–1688). He translated the Confucian classics into French from their Latin version, the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus. In terms of his translations and understanding of Confucianism, he might be called a pioneer of the secularism that emerged more than one hundred years later. However, scholars have not paid enough attention to Bernier’s translation. In 1932, Virgile Pinot (1883–1936), in his pioneer study on the influence of China on French philosophical thought in the 17th and 18th centuries, took note of Bernier’s translation of the Confucian classics (Pinot 1932). In 1937, there were two doctoral theses on Bernier, both defended at the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Paris: Louis Bouger (1910–2001) examined Bernier’s life, travels and racial classification ideas (Bouger 1937); Elie Stora (1910–?) primarily studied Bernier’s role as a physician in the 17th century (Stora 1937). The sinologist José Frèches (1950–) was the first, in 1973, to delve into Bernier’s sinological works and his understanding of Confucian thought, but his research was limited to the content of Bernier’s “Introduction à la lecture de Confucius”, without touching on the content of the “three books” (Daxue 大學, Zhongyong 中庸, Lunyu 論語) translated by Bernier (Frèches 1973). It was not until 2015 that Bernier’s manuscripts were edited and published by Sylvie Taussig, with a lengthy introduction, and Thierry Meynard provided extensive sinological annotations, allowing a comparison between the original Chinese text, the Latin version by the Jesuits and the French translation from the Latin by Bernier (Bernier 2015). In 2019, Ping Zeller, a Chinese-language instructor at the University of Geneva and doctoral candidate at the same university, analyzed Bernier’s Confucian political thought by comparing the original Chinese text, the Latin Jesuit translation and Bernier’s French translation (Zeller 2019). Since 2020, Chinese scholars have increasingly studied Bernier’s writings, but most of these studies are translation studies, comparing Bernier’s French translation with the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, while other studies are focusing on Bernier’s reading of Confucianism.2

In this article written from the perspective of the cross-cultural history of ideas, we shall show that Bernier accepted, through the Jesuit translation, the non-religious dimension of politics and ethics in Confucianism, but unlike the Jesuits, he did not see Confucianism as needing Christianity; on the contrary, he believed that politics and ethics could be based on a purely secular philosophy. We shall also explain that Bernier anticipated not only the secularism of the 18th century French Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, but also, two hundred years later, the laicity of the 19th century.

2. The Crisis of the European Mind and François Bernier

The French historian of ideas Paul Hazard (1878–1944) provided us with the historical and intellectual context of the period in his famous book La Crise de la Conscience Européenne, 1680–1715 (The Crisis of the European Mind, 1680–1715). From late 17th to early 18th century, Europe witnessed various intellectual debates, including “the quarrel of the ancients and moderns”, the fight between heresy and orthodoxy, the struggle between rationalists and traditionalists and the conflict between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, as well as “the Chinese Rites Controversy”3. These years, as Hazard said, “so rude and unpolished, so crowded with events, with quarrels and calls to arms, so prolific of ideas, are, nevertheless, not without a beauty of their own. (Hazard 2013, p. xviii)” Even so, in this period of history, “ideas so pregnant with life, so rich in power whether for attack or defense, that even now the force of that movement is far from spent (Hazard 2013, p. xvi)”. Obviously, the new ideas that emerged during this period had an indelible impact on the spirit of the 18th century. Those new ideas came from the skepticism and the rationalism which were rooted in Europe itself, like in ancient Greece, in the Middle Age, and especially in the Renaissance, but undeniably received help from exposure to cultures outside Europe, especially that of China: “For in this panoramic survey of ideas, China holds the most conspicuous place. (Hazard 2013, p. 20)” The French scholar René Étiemble (1909–2002), likewise noted, “Around 1700, whether one was a Jansenist, a Jesuit, a skeptic, or a Cartesian, anyone who thought inevitably had to imagine China and think about China (Étiemble 2008, p. 241)”.

Regarding China, in addition to the travelogues of the European travelers, missionaries sent reports and books, while others translated Chinese Classics into Europe. The Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, which was edited by the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet (1623–1693) before its publication in Paris, was hailed as “a culmination of Ricci’s accommodation (Mungello 1989, p. 247)” and as the “milestone in introducing Confucianism to Europe (Zhang 2016, pp. 121–28)”. It provided European scholars for the first time with complete texts of the Confucian classics—Daxue (The Great Learning), Zhongyong (The Doctrine of the Mean) and Lunyu (The Analects).4 After its initial publication in 1687, the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus “achieved immediate success and was later reviewed, copied, translated, and quoted abundantly (Meynard 2015, p. 2)”, becoming “a real bestseller, spreading throughout Europe and sustaining the thinking of intellectuals by imposing the idea of a certain philosophical China that was to last until the beginning of the 19th century (Taussig 2015, p. 58)”. While reading Latin posed no obstacle for elite intellectuals at that time, it was far from easy for the general public. Consequently, three French versions based on the Latin Confucius Sinarum Philosophus emerged in Europe, introducing Confucius’ works and thoughts to the European audience. They are Simon Foucher (1644–1696)’s Lettre sur la Morale de Confucius, philosophe de la Chine (The Letter on the Morals of Confucius, Philosopher of China), La Morale de Confucius Philosophe de la Chine (The Moral of Confucius Philosopher of China) with an unclear authorship,5 and François Bernier’s translation, Confucius ou la Science des Princes (Confucius or the Science of Princes).

Unlike the later multiple reprints of the previous two abridged translations, François Bernier’s Confucius ou La Science des Princes remained unpublished due to his sudden death in the fall of 1688, leaving only a few manuscript copies circulating within Bernier’s small social circle. There are three manuscripts handed down to date: Arsenal. Ms. 2331, Arsenal. Ms. 2689, and the third one was given to China as a gift and is now kept in the Central Library of the China National Archives of Publications and Culture. However, the prefatory portion of the translation, “Avis au lecteur” (Notice to the reader), was published under the title “Introduction à la lecture de Confucius” (Introduction to Reading Confucius) in the 7 June 1688 issue of Journal des Sçavans.

As pointed out by Pinot, both Lettre sur la Morale de Confucius, philosophe de la Chine and La Morale de Confucius Philosophe de la Chine extol Confucius’s morality, considering it to be derived from reason rather than some “abstract principle”; it is the morality of practitioners rather than metaphysicians (Pinot 1932, p. 375). Taking Confucius’s morality as an example, they demonstrate the existence of universal moral principles. However, while the two French works emphasize that Confucius’s ethical thought originates from reason, they also strive to link it with Christian morality, believing like the Jesuits that Confucian thought is compatible with Christianity. However, as a traveler, a physician, a philosopher and especially as a Libertine (or freethinker), Bernier’s translations and interpretation of Confucius and of his thought are evidently different from the two French works and from the Jesuit Latin work.

We want to particularly highlight Bernier as a Libertine, for the Libertines are a group of thinkers who responded to the crise at the intersection of the 17th and 18th centuries. Like Pierre Bayle, Bernier was one of them. As Hazard summarized, the word “libertine” signified “a person without a religious belief”, while another meaning denoted “one who lives a life of gross self-indulgence. (Hazard 2013, p. 128)” The Libertines “had disseminated, and, in the process, diluted, at least two philosophies: the Paduan school…; then came Gassendi and his system, at least the non-Christian part of it”(Hazard 2013, p. 120). Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) was one of the leading freethinkers who sought to popularize Epicurean atomism and skepticism. François Bernier was Gassendi’s protégé; according to Pintard, Bernier played the role of Gassendi’s famulus, as well as his “disciple, secretary and valet”.6 Gassendi imbued in Bernier a spirit of skepticism and, of course, Epicurean materialism.7

3. Bernier’s Secular Interpretation of Confucianism

The Jesuit translations are at the crossroads of multiple concerns and centers of interest: defending their missionary actions in China, promoting the idea of a natural theology in China, presenting Confucianism as a political and moral model that Christianity would perfect, etc. Bernier largely ignores the Jesuits’ theological or missionary concerns, and he does not care about taking a position for or against the Jesuit missionary method of accommodation, remaining silent on the question of the Chinese Rites. Bernier did not use the world “secular” or “secularism”, but he obviously shifted the not-a-religion-yet-religious interpretation of Confucianism introduced by the Jesuits into a purely secular Confucianism. Therefore, he systematically omitted the contents in the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus that reflected the religious nature of Confucianism.

We shall analyze next Bernier’s translation of the Doctrine of the Mean 中庸, which is not only a Confucian classic, but also an extremely important text for the Jesuits in China because it contains lots of core terms, such as Shangdi 上帝, guishen 鬼神, sacrifice 祀, ceremonies 禮, that provided a starting point for the Jesuits’ accommodation of Confucianism but also posed a challenge, and these terms need to be treated with caution.

3.1. Guishen

“How abundantly do spiritual beings display the powers that belong to them!” (鬼神之為德，其盛矣乎! guishen qi wei de, qi sheng yi hu) (Legge 1960, p. 397). This sentence from the Doctrine of the Mean best reflects the difference between Bernier’s translation and that of the Jesuits. After translating guishen 鬼神 as spiritus (spirit) endowed with vis intellectiva (intellectual power), the Jesuits used a long paragraph in italics to explain guishen, part of which I quote as follows:

“Quamvis autem non desint qui per duas illas voces intelligi volunt unicum numen supremum eò quod in libris officiorum et al.ibi modo nominetur coeli spiritus, modo coeli terraeque spiritus, modo supremus spiritus, modo spiritus, vel spirituum supremus Imperator, modo supremi Imperatoris spiritus, plerumque tamen hic agi videtur de spiritibus illis seu intelligentiis quos Deus tuendis et conservandis rebus creatis seu praesides et administros constituit, quos alibi Interpres vocat Xámtí chi xin, id est supremi Imperatoris clientes & subditos qui Planetis et reliquis Astrorum, qui Elementorum nec non regionum rerumque sublunarium curam habeant…”

(Couplet et al. 2021, p. 180)

The following is my English translation of this passage.

“Although some wish to understand by these two words a single supreme deity, which, in the Liji 禮記 and other books, is called the spirit of heaven, the spirit of heaven and earth, the supreme spirit, the spirit or the supreme emperor of spirits, the spirit of the supreme emperor, generally here it seems that we are dealing with those spirits or intelligences whom God appoints to protect and preserve the created things, as their governors and administrators, whom the Interpreter [Zhang Juzheng] elsewhere calls Xámtí chi xin 上帝之臣, that is, the supreme emperor’s clients and ministers who take care of the planets and the other stars, who take care of the elements as well as of the sublunary regions and things…”

As Meynard pointed out, the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus is not only a translation of and commentary on the “original” classics, but also a discussion between Neo-Confucian and Western philosophy. In this work, the Jesuit translators developed a hermeneutics of Confucian texts using three complementary approaches, which are rooted in Chinese hermeneutics: the philosophical hermeneutics of the Song, the practical hermeneutics of the Ming and the evidential hermeneutics of the early Qing (Meynard 2011, p. 27). In addition to commentaries of the Song dynasty philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹(1130–1200), they mainly adopted the commentaries of the Senior Grand Secretary in the late Ming dynasty Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582), which were written for the Wanli 萬曆 Emperor (Meynard 2015, pp. 19–40).

From the Latin passage quoted above, we can see that guishen are equivalent to angels in Catholicism, who have intellectual power, similar to humans. This understanding can be traced back to Matteo Ricci’s Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義 (The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) (Ricci 2014, pp. 19–40). By “whom God has appointed to protect and preserve created things, or governors and administrators”, the Jesuits introduced Deus (God) and Catholic creationism into Confucian texts: God arranged guishen as angels or ministers to sustain the created world of nature and humans (stars, elements and sublunary things).8

Comparing Bernier’s translation, his translation of the corresponding part clearly refers to the Jesuit’s italicized explanation:

“Do likewise so that the spirits are honored and respected in your families; it is they whom Heaven has appointed as its Ministers to the care and conservation of sublunary things; they are the ones who take care of the planets and the other stars, and who preside over the Elements, the Empires, the Kingdoms, the Provinces, the cities and your houses, the mountains and the rivers. Don’t we know the example that Shun舜 left us! When this great Emperor, this wise and learned Legislator, visited his Kingdom, he sacrificed to Heaven, to the sovereign Emperor of Heaven, a sacrifice consecrated and reserved for Emperors only; he then sacrificed in an inferior manner to the six principal Spirits, to the directors of the four seasons of heat, cold, sun, moon and Planets; he passed from there to the more distant spirits, namely to those who preside over the mountains and the rivers, and finally he sacrificed and rendered his duties to the innumerable multitude of spirits who are scattered everywhere, ordering that in the hundred principal cities of the Empire animals be fed to immolate them at appointed times; and letting the people know that they had to prepare for these solemn days of sacrifices to honor with all their strength the sovereign Emperor of Heaven and the spirits who preside over the most famous mountains, the most famous rivers and the four Regions of the Earth for the happiness of the people.”9

Obviously, this long passage does not appear in the original Chinese text, nor does it appear in the Chinese commentaries, but we can find its direct source in the Jesuits’ Latin translations. The example of Shun completely comes from the Latin commentary in italic of the Jesuits about the Shujing 書經.10 However, when translating guishen, Bernier did not follow the Jesuits’ translation. As we quoted above, the Jesuits explain it as “the spirit of heaven, the spirit of heaven and earth, the supreme spirit, the spirit, or the supreme emperor of spirits, the spirit of the supreme emperor”, and they made an important addition: “whom God appoints to protect and preserve the created things, as their governors and administrators, whom the Interpreter elsewhere calls Shangdi zhi chen (上帝之臣), that is, the clients and ministers of the supreme emperor, those who take care of the planets and the rest of the stars, who take care of the elements as well as the care of the sublunary regions and things”.

Bernier adopted the explanation as Shangdi zhi chen: “the Ministers appointed by Heaven for the care and conservation of sublunary things”. But he deliberately made two changes. First, he purposely did not use the word God but Heaven (Ciel) to translate Shangdi (Xámtí). It seems that Bernier leans here toward Song and Ming Confucianism, such as Zhu Xi’s interpretation of Heaven. Secondly, he changed the “created things” into “sublunary things” to downplay the theological background of creationism and replace it with the secular vocabulary of Aristotelian cosmology.

3.2. The Sacrifices and Shangdi

There is another example in the Doctrine of the Mean that reflects the hidden intentions of the Jesuits and that has also attracted widespread attention from contemporary scholars.

“By the ceremonies of the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth they served God, and by the ceremonies of the ancestral temple they sacrificed to their ancestors. He who understands the ceremonies of the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, and the meaning of the several sacrifices to ancestors, would find the government of a kingdom as easy as to look into his palm! (Legge 1960, p. 404)” (郊社之禮，所以事上帝也；宗廟之禮，所以祀乎其先也。明乎郊社之禮、禘嘗之義，治國其如示諸掌乎！Jiaoshe zhi li, suoyi shi shangdi ye, zongmiao zhi li, suoyi si hu qi xian ye. Ming hu jiaoshe zhi li, dichang zhi yi, zhiguo qi ru shi zhu zhang hu.)

The Confucius Sinarum Philosophus has this interpretation in italics after the translation of the original texts: “This is a famous passage to prove that, from the point of view of Confucius, there is one first principle; when he (i.e., Confucius) said that there were two sacrifices, heaven and earth, he did not say to serve heaven and earth, nor to serve the separate gods of heaven and earth, but to serve the heavenly or supreme Emperor who is God.”11 There are two points worth noting here. First, the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth are in fact two sacrifices, jiao 郊 and she 社, as clearly distinguished by Zhu Xi and Zhang Juzheng. Couplet, however, follows Ricci and treats them as one, to serve God. Second, Couplet ignored here the stance of the opponents in the Terms Controversy inside the Jesuits (Ricci versus Longobardo) and between the Jesuit and other missionaries in China (Dominican and Franciscan friars), and he followed once more Ricci, by identifying the term Shangdi (Xámtí) in the quote above with the Deus of Catholicism.

Next, let us take a look at Bernier’s translation of the corresponding paragraph.

“That being so, let us say boldly that he who worthily fulfills his duties of piety, first towards Heaven, and then towards those who brought him into the world, will not fail to reign happily, and that having clearly understood both the strength and the reasons for the ritual which he must render to Heaven and the sacrifices which he must offer to it, as well as for the ritual and the duties of piety which he owes to his parents, he will be as easy to govern the Empire as to look into the palm of his hand.”12

Bernier followed the Latin text, “quod is qui caelo in primis, ac dein progenitoribus suis debitum pietatis officium persolverit, cum omni felicitate Imperium sit administraturus (the one who has paid the duty of piety first to heaven, and then to his progenitors, will manage the Empire with all happiness) (Couplet et al. 2021, p. 212)”, but he mentioned only the sacrifice to Heaven, letting aside the Jesuits’ interpretation identifying Heaven with God. Not only that, we cannot find Dieu (God) throughout the book, but le Ciel (Heaven) is everywhere. Obviously, Bernier insisted on translating the Chinese word Shangdi as Ciel, and not as Dieu.

The two passages mentioned above corroborate each other. They both illustrate the fact that Bernier, as a freethinker, put aside in his translation of Confucian classics completely the “religious disputes” that shrouded the ecclesiastical, intellectual and even political circles in France at that time. As far as the text is concerned, we can conclude that Bernier translated the Confucian classics using secular rather than theological or Catholic terms. Bernier’s translation and understanding of the Confucian classics is not only reflected in the fact that the terminology he adopted was different from that used by the Jesuits, but also in his secular understanding of Confucian thought, as we are going to show next.

4. Bernier’s Secular Understanding of Confucianism

Bernier systematically excluded religion from the Confucian classics. When we compare the Latin translation of the Jesuits with the three French versions we have mentioned above, Bernier’s translation, like the other two French translations, pays close attention to Confucius’ morality, but it is very conspicuous that in Bernier’s translations and interpretations, morality is dissociated from religion but closely related to and inseparable from politics. Although Bernier translated from the Latin version, he weakened Confucius’s identity as “philosopher”, which is strongly emphasized by the Jesuits, and he highlighted Confucius’ identity as a politician. He wanted to educate the French prince with Confucius’s thoughts. “… because I have noticed that there is no morality that better instructs princes in their duties more wisely, more prudently, more respectfully. (Bernier 2015, p. 155)” The title of his work, Confucius or the Science of Princes, reveals that Bernier, “has given to the Chinese classics a definitively political turn”, and “transformed them into a manual of government addressed to princes (Taussig 2015, p. 90)”.

Bernier writes in his introduction that he loves his prince and his country, and that the thought of Confucius could be useful to the tutors of young princes (Bernier 2015, p. 156). He is referring here to the debates on the education of the dauphin and on the choice of his tutor, which animated France at the time. By intending the work to be used to tutor the future king, Bernier remains well in line with Zhang Juzheng’s interpretation, paying particular attention to the moral education of the emperor as the political foundation of the nation. Bernier was personally convinced of the high ethical and political ideals presented in Confucian texts, which present a moral harmony between the ruler and the people that transcends conflicts of particular interests. Bernier believed that this Confucian ideal could be applied in France.

4.1. Virtue Is the Foundation of Good Government

By claiming that, for Chinese ancient emperors and legislators, virtue is the foundation of good government, Bernier combines morality and politics, and he summed up three ways from the Confucian classics (Bernier 2015, p. 143). The first one, which he called the arcanum politicum (the political secret)13 or the main foundation of the government of the Chinese Empire, is la piété paternelle (paternal piety) or l’obéissance filiale (filial obedience), which means, “love, respect and complete and perfect submission to their father and mother”(Bernier 2015, pp. 143–44). Bernier found that, in the empire of China, “the laws ought to insist all the more on this paternal piety”, and this maxim was founded in nature, in justice, in reason and consequently in the will of Heaven. “It is Heaven which inspires in the father this natural love which he has for his child and which has given him this authority and this natural superiority which he has over him. (Bernier 2015, p. 144)” Bernier attaches great importance to what he calls “paternal piety” and gives many concrete examples, such as for the parent’s birthday or for three whole years children mourn the death of their parents; he even mentioned that the parents are considered as les Divinités terrestres (earthly deities) (Bernier 2015, p. 145). However, the above is only one aspect of piété paternelle; as Ping Zeller pointed out, the paternal piety for Bernier is reciprocal: not only must children love and respect their parents, but parents must also love and respect their children (Zeller 2019, p. 22). “Moreover, if these wise politicians demand all these virtues in children, they mean, on the other hand, that fathers should be examples to them of virtue and moderation, of gravity, modesty, gentleness, piety, justice, benevolence, and clemency, so that virtue may be as a servant and as hereditary in every family, and that it may pass through a sort of succession from father to son… (Bernier 2015, pp. 146–47)” Here, Bernier shifts the Confucian focus on children’s duties towards the political focus on the duties of the ruler as a father. This is a way for Bernier to restrain the power of the ruler, which could be read as an implicit criticism of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV.

The second means is “the example of the prince”. According to Bernier, European princes have recognized the principle that Regis ad exemplum totus componitur Orbis (The world follows the example of kings), but they content themselves by saying it only, while the Chinese “make it the head of their policy and the foundation of good government as being the source of virtue and good morals from which the happiness of the state necessarily follows (Bernier 2015, pp. 147–48)”. Again, Bernier’s insistence on the concrete virtue of the ruler serves to restrain his power.

The third one is music. Although, Bernier had not figured out the reason yet, he was really impressed by the fact that “music and harmony are considered among them as one of the main things on whom the gentleness, concord, union, tranquility, rest, good morals, virtue and consequently the happiness and tranquility of the Empire depend, so far as to want to change, alter or abolish music would be almost like wanting to lose the State (Bernier 2015, p. 148)”. In his translation of chapter 3 of Lunyu (III.20, III.23 and III.26), Bernier expressed his surprise at the role of music in the government in China (Bernier 2015, pp. 233, 235, 236).

As we can see, Bernier’s understanding of Confucian texts was not only not groundless, but more accurate than many of his contemporaries. As Pinot rightly points out more than 240 years later, for the ancient Chinese government, “the principle of which is the same as that of the family, whose policy, in short, is only the adaptation to national life of the very principles which govern individual and family life (Pinot 1932, p. 368)”. According to Bernier’s understanding, the first two of the three ways, which he summarized from Confucius’s books, Piété paternelle and example of the prince are intertwined with each other. In fact, they come from the eight steps八目 in The Great Learning and the five essential relationships 五倫 of Confucian ethics in The Doctrine of Mean, the relationships or the duties between sovereign and minister 君臣, as well as between father and son 父子. In a family, the father should be a virtuous example for his children: when he loves, respects and educates his children, then children will love, respect and obey their parents, and submit gently to the Laws and Magistrates, and consequently willingly obey the orders of the prince. The princes, as the father of the royal family, and at the same time the father of the whole country as a huge family, “must have no other interest than that of his subjects, so that, loving what they love, and hating what they hate, they love them as tenderly as a good father loves his own children (Bernier 2015, p. 156)”. The example of filial obedience in the Doctrine of the Mean with King Wen 文王 and King Wu 武王 must have left a deep impression on Bernier. There, Bernier concluded, “we can generally say that, after the proper worship that the sovereign knows how to render to Heaven and the solemn sacrifices that he knows how to offer to it, filial obedience is the foundation of good government, peace and public tranquility of the happiness of the prince and the happiness of the subjects. (Bernier 2015, p. 187)” “If the King does so well that, by his example and his imitation, they (the people) all obey their parents, they will also all obey him in the same way, and will willingly submit to his commands as to the common father of peoples. Moreover, if they obey the command of the King, how much more willingly will they obey reason and the commandments of Heaven, which is the dispenser of Crowns and Empires! (Bernier 2015, p. 188)” Thus, in Bernier’s view, the most powerful means for introducing virtue into a State is the example of the prince, an example for his children at home and for his subjects in the country. “The example of the prince is the general and primitive foundation of the good government of the State (Bernier 2015, p. 158)”.

Therefore, the virtue of the prince himself is particularly crucial. Confucius’s morality, compared to the morality of European philosophers, “instructs the princes of their duties more wisely, more prudently, more respectfully”.14 Then, how did Confucius’s morality instruct the princes?

4.2. From Reason to Benevolence

The education or the science for the princes that Bernier constructed from Confucius’s texts mainly came from The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, for in Bernier’s view, the first two books are two principal or fundamental books, containing the substance of the doctrine of Confucius: “there we find a truly considerable quantity of very considerable dogmas and a quantity of very important maxims and instructions” (Bernier 2015, p. 153). The most important things about The Great Learning are the three principles 三綱 and the eight steps 八目. In the first paragraph of his translation, he translated the contents of the three principles as follows.

“The great and important Science of Princes generally consists of three things. The first to cultivate or polish the natural light that Heaven has spread in all men so that, like a very pure and very clear mirror, it can make the stains of passions and lusts being removed, return to its origin clarity. The second to renew the people in virtue and good morals by their own example and by their wise manifestations. The third to remain firm and constant in the Sovereign Good, that is to say in great conformity of all their actions with Right Reason.”15

Bernier’s translation basically follows the Jesuits’s Latin translation, but is clearer and more concise. The Jesuits translated Confucius’ books in terms of scholastic philosophy, based on the interpretation of Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism, which gave the Latin translation of the Four Books a metaphysical and rationalist tone.16 Illustrious virtue 明德 was translated into Latin as rationalis natura (rational nature), and as la lumière naturelle (the natural light) by Bernier. He seems to have intentionally replaced reason with light here, which is more in tune with mirror, but still has connotations of reason in scholastic discourse. In several places in the Latin version, the Jesuits also used similar terminology, lumen rationis (the light of reason), followed by Bernier as la lumière de la raison. About the second principle, to renovate the people 親民, Bernier emphasized that the prince should be an example to the people in virtue. In the Latin version, the Jesuits translated the highest excellence 至善 with the scholastic term summum bonum (the highest good), which is often understood as a supernatural purpose, and associated with God. Bernier adopted it as le Souverain Bien, but after that, he added and highlighted that the actions of princes should conform with la Droite Raison (the Right Reason), which comes from the Latin recta ratio. Here we can see that Bernier followed the Jesuits’ rationalist interpretation of the Confucian classics but rejected their attempt to Christianize them.

The Doctrine of the Mean was considered to be the political and moral doctrine of Confucius, as can be seen from the title of the book translated by Prospero Intorcetta (1626–1696) as Sinarum Scientia Politico-moralis (Political–moral science of China), which was published by Melchisédech Thévenot (1620–1692) in his series of Relations de divers voyages curieux in 1672, together with Bernier’s letters sent from India (Dew 2009, pp. 132–33). We may assume that Bernier understood this book as a doctrine of political morality at that time. In translating it, he affirmed the importance of reason again, that the right reason “is the principle and source of all virtues”, “the regularity and good conduct of the Royal person depends likewise on the universal rule of reason by which he can discern good from evil, just from unjust, so that rejecting this one and choosing that one he gives to each one what belongs to him faithfully and equitably (Bernier 2015, pp. 189–90)”. As Taussig argues, Bernier wanted to construct Confucius’s doctrine into a “science” that is both universal and particular. At the same time, he also attached great importance to the difference and even conflict between universality and particularity (Taussig 2015, p. 89). As we mentioned earlier, Bernier did not regard Confucius as a philosopher, but he valued the practicality of Confucius’s doctrine. Then, he learned about la charité (benevolence) 仁: “and this (universal) rule of reason is fulfilled and put into execution by that solid virtue, love, and universal and general piety towards all, which is called benevolence” (Bernier 2015, p. 190).

As we know, ren 仁 (now usually translated as benevolence, or sometimes perfect virtue) is the core concept of Confucius’s thought, so much so that his doctrine can also be called the doctrine of benevolence (renxue 仁學). This is the core idea that Bernier learned from Confucius, and it is also the key point that he believes European princes need to learn from Confucius. So, regarding ren, what did he learn from Confucius’s texts exactly?

From The Great Learning, Bernier learned about Confucius:

“As he knew that in order to govern subjects happily, what has more force and efficacy is a certain love, a certain benevolence which one generally has for all, what did he do? Acting like a king, he fixed and conformed himself to the extent of this benevolence. As he was not unaware that the principal virtue of the subject is honor, respect and veneration towards the King, acting as a subject he fixed himself and conformed to this respect and constantly fulfilled all the duties of a prompt and faithful subject. As he also knew that the first and principal virtue of children consists in obedience, considering himself as a son he applied himself constantly to obedience and without ever relaxing he fulfilled all the duties and all the offices of a son who effectively and cordially loves his father. And as the principal virtue of a father is also a natural tenderness and a certain cordial love towards children, considering himself as a father, he fixed and confirmed himself in that love of children which he made appear from time to time, not by a certain and rather ordinary vicious indulgence, but by a continual instruction and direction to virtue, which passed for a kind of propagation to his nephews and their children. Finally, as good faith is what is most praiseworthy and most commendable in commerce and the natural society of men, when dealing with his subjects he set himself and applied himself to keeping his word to them inviolably.”17

It is explained more concisely in The Doctrine of the Mean, where the three virtues (zhi, ren, yong 知仁勇) of Confucianism were translated and discussed. Ren was interpreted as “a universal love that leads us to love all men in general”, and following in the next paragraph, “this perfect benevolence which consists in loving all men generally (Bernier 2015, p. 191)”. Here, Bernier understands ren as “love for all people”. In The Analects, Bernier encountered many examples of Confucius discussing ren,18 especially his famous maxim, “not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself 己所不欲, 勿施於人. (Bernier 2015, p. 299)” In fact, this maxim was Confucius’s answer to his student Zhong Gong’s 仲弓 question about what ren is. In the same part, Confucius also answered the same question from two other students, Yan Hui 顏回 and Fan Chi 樊遲. He answered the former with “to subdue one’s self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue (Bernier 2015, p. 299)”, and the latter with “to love all men (Bernier 2015, p. 306)”.

After analyzing Bernier’s translation and understanding of Confucius’ texts, we can summarize the science of the princes constructed by Bernier into three words: reason, virtue and benevolence. Bernier extracted from the texts three ways to introduce virtue into the state; the core is the example of the princes. “The example of the prince is the general and primitive foundation of the good government of the State, (Bernier 2015, p. 158)” “the example of the prince is the true and natural method to renew the subjects, to reform them, to bring them back to reason and to their duties. (Bernier 2015, p. 159)” The example of the prince lies in the virtue, reason and benevolence of the prince. For, firstly, “the virtue of a King alone strengthens an entire Kingdom (Bernier 2015, p. 165)”, “virtue is the foundation of good government (Bernier 2015, p. 143)”. Bernier hoped that princes would have virtues. Secondly, “right reason is the principle and source of all virtues (Bernier 2015, p. 190)”, “after the cultivation of reason which is always supposed to be the foundation of everything, to think beforehand of the rule and the cultivation of his own person (Bernier 2015, p. 158)”, and then the princes become an example for their subjects. Thirdly, the rule of reason is accomplished and put into execution by charity. It means that the princes must love their subjects, regard their interests as their own interests and their happiness as their own happiness. Contemporary Chinese scholars’ interpretation of The Analects, which summarize Confucius’s doctrine of benevolence into two aspects, self-cultivation and loving people, confirms the correctness of Bernier’s understanding of Confucius’s thoughts (Guo 2024, pp. 101–8).

5. Conclusions

While the Western tradition strongly associated politics with religion, and the State with the Church, in contrast, the Jesuits presented China as being founded on the morality of Confucius, and even though the morality of Confucius is not opposed to God, the Chinese State is not based on religion but on morality. The Jesuits praised Confucian morality but they still had the project of supplementing it with Christianity and re-founding the Chinese State on the Christian religion. Bernier’s modernity is, on the contrary, to dissociate politics from religion. As a libertin with a skeptical and critical spirit and as an oriental traveler who had lived in India for many years, Bernier completely stepped out of the religious perspective and looked at Confucius’s doctrine, especially his morality and politics, from a secular perspective. China offers Bernier a model for thinking about the constitution of a secular state, and in this sense, Bernier precedes the ideas of Voltaire. But of course, Bernier was not against monarchy, and he rejects Machiavelli’s option, which dissociates politics from morality. The prince must take the Confucian sage as a model; he must seek popular support and fame, but he must be virtuous so that appearance meets reality. He must also develop the economy and taxes, finding more glory in industrial production than in military exploits; he must create a strong army to protect the country.

From the title of the book he translated, we can see that he hoped that the education to be received by French monarchs would first be a moral education, and this morality was not Christian morality, nor metaphysical morality, but a more practical morality. For Bernier, the teaching of Confucius is more political than individual. He is not primarily interested in individual happiness but in the happiness of the people, because it is only by constituting a stable state governed by reason and virtue that individuals eventually may be happy.