Morocco’s Distinctive Islam at a Crossroads: The State’s Support for Sufism

Abstract

In the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the Moroccan state emphasized, through official public discourse, the components that constitute “official Moroccan Islam” to combat extremist ideologies. These religious elements include Mālikism in jurisprudence, Ashʿarism in theology, and the Sufism of Imam Al-Junayd (d. 298/910), all balanced by the pledge of allegiance to King Mohammed VI (a descendant of the Sharifian lineage), the constitutionally designated Commander of the Faithful and sole religious leader. Since the reform policy initiated in 2004, the Moroccan state has constructed a narrative on the distinctiveness of Moroccan Islam—moderate and tolerant—and promoted it among its own citizens and beyond its borders. However, while the Moroccan state claims to have a unique form of Islam, controversial arguments have been raised questioning the nature of the state’s purported Islam. Other criticisms include investigating the state’s endorsement of Sufism and its broader policy of institutionalization. Yet, this article argues that the state supports any form of Islam, not necessarily Sufism, that aligns with its religious and political leadership. Like other Arab and Muslim states, Morocco’s religious policy is impacted by the global context, where Salafism is now perceived as a threat to established worldviews. In addition, this article argues that Morocco’s support for Sufi Islam is based not merely on its perceived political passivity, but because it complements the state’s policies and gains advantages from this support. It concludes that the official narrative of Moroccan Islam, which emphasizes a Sufi-oriented approach to counter extremism, is open to question, particularly given that Salafism was the state’s preferred form of Islam in post-colonial Morocco. This highlights the complex and often conflicting relationship between political actors and religious leaders in shaping Morocco’s religious discourse.

1. Introduction

Following the 2003 Casablanca bombings, debates about Morocco having “its own form of Islam” to combat religious extremism began to dominate official discourse and scholarly discussions. The need to redefine Islam in Morocco and revive its teachings in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks became the state’s priority. In the Throne Speech, King Mohammed VI (King 2003) “underscored Morocco’s historical commitment to the Mālikī school of thought, highlighting its flexibility, moderation, and openness to other cultures and civilizations.” This emphasis not only reminds Moroccans of their cultural heritage and religious identity but also subtly indicates that Islamic schools and sects1 not approved by the state should be avoided. Three years after this speech, in which the monarch promised to restructure the entire religious narrative by implementing an integrated, comprehensive, and multidimensional strategy, the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs published a book titled Al-Dalīl (The Guide). The latter serves as an official reference for imams and religious personnel throughout the kingdom. Its purpose is to reaffirm what “Moroccan Islam” is and to address theological and social matters in a moderate fashion.

Currently, for the state, “official Moroccan Islam” is characterized by adherence to Mālikism, Ashʿarism, and Imam al-Junayd’s Sufism, unified by loyalty to King Mohammed VI. These elements were identified by the Moroccan Sufi scholar ʿAbd Al-Wāḥid ibn ʿĀshir (d. 1631) in Al-Murshid al-muʿīn (The Guiding Helper). “Afterwards, (I ask) help from God Almighty in structuring these metered verses, which are beneficial to (even) the illiterate to learn tenets of belief about the al-Ashʿrīte theology, the jurisprudence of Imam Mālik, and the Tasawwuf of al-Junayd al-Sālik” (‘Abd al-Wāḥid Ibn ‘Āshir 1904, p. 2). These verses constitute a foundational argument for what the state refers to as “Moroccan Islam” today, and they form the basis of its reform strategy. According to Ahmed Abbadi, Secretary General of the Mohammedia League of Moroccan ʿUlamāʾ, “Morocco regards Ash‘arism as a moderate theological school of thought that values human reason while maintaining respect for the traditional foundations of Islam, namely the Quran and the Prophetic Sunnah” (Rerhaye 2013). Similarly, for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the Mālikī school of jurisprudence is renowned for its moderation (Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs 2007, p. 54), a characteristic that resonates with Islam as practiced in a context marked by social and religious diversity. Regarding Sufism, Aḥmad Toufīq, current Minister of Islamic Affairs, confirms that accepting the idea of Sufism involves striving for perfection that integrates religion and its essence into a spiritual life, manifested in moral behavior, love of creation, and building a relationship of love with the Creator, emphasizing that Sufism derives its origins from the Qur’an and Sunnah and is a treasure that scholars should protect and defend (Jabour 2017). These testimonies embody the official religious discourse that the Moroccan state seeks to regulate as part of its counter-terrorism strategy, prompting leading scholars to offer different perspectives on Morocco’s form of Islam.

Broad concepts such as ”moderation”, ”tolerance”, ”openness”, ”cultural coexistence”, and ”reconciliation” became part of the lexicon of the official discourse about what Islam is in Morocco (Hmimnat 2009). Some of these values have been frequently highlighted by observers of the country’s religious landscape. Wainscott (2017) believes that:

One thing that is distinctive about Morocco, in the regional context, is its well-developed theological machinery. While other states in the region have forms of ‘official Islam’, only Saudi Arabia and Iran have similarly well-developed doctrines. Among these three, Morocco is unique for its consistent and self-conscious emphasis on ‘moderation,’ which gave it an advantage in the context of the War on Terror.

(p. 71)

The quote is situated within the context of Morocco’s position as a leading state, particularly in West Africa, in promoting its balanced religious model to combat doctrinal extremism. Likewise, Honerkamp asserts that:

For more than 1400 years, Moroccan culture has exemplified its commitment to moderation through a pragmatic yet spiritual path within its Islamic religion. Morocco’s unique spirit of tolerance is rooted in its historical heritage, authentic values and principles of open-mindedness and concord, and cultural enrichment through the mutual exchange among individuals, communities, and civilizations.

(Honerkamp and Michael n.d.)

These statements confirm what the King asserts in the Throne Speech on restructuring the religious narrative that re-enforces the nation’s commitment to building a modern society that retains its rich religious heritage. In the context of the bombings, Howe (2005) stresses that Moroccans would continue to believe that their country was an exception, immune to the fanatical deviations of Islam, until 16 May 2003 (p. 124). The bombings challenged ordinary Moroccans and their state, questioning the belief that their country’s Islam is distinctively moderate and immune to the religious extremism found in the East.

Other scholars, on the other hand, interpret the discourse on Moroccan Islam and its religious reforms from various perspectives. A decade ago, Burke (2014) affirmed that there was no such thing as Moroccan Islam:

It was constructed under the auspices of French colonial scholars in the early twentieth century. Its creation made possible the transformation of a fragile precolonial Moroccan monarchy into a modern state … Today, almost alone among Muslim countries Morocco is known for its national form of Islam, ‘Moroccan Islam’. Yet there is little evidence that pre-colonial Moroccans thought of themselves as having a distinctive style of Islam. Indeed, since Islam is a universal religion, the existence of recognized national versions is not recognized.

(pp. 1–3)

Burke rejects Morocco’s claim to have a distinctive national Islam used to fight religious extremism. He believes that French colonialism portrayed pre-colonial Moroccan culture as dominated by superstitious beliefs and practices to justify its colonization. Burke’s denial of Moroccan Islam aligns with some Salafists who believe in the universality of Islam, noting that Mālikism, Ashʿarism, and Sunni Sufism, the components of Moroccan Islam nowadays, originated in the East and are, therefore, followed by most of the Muslim countries. “Thus, discussing ‘Moroccan Islam’ is complex, as its elements can be strongly contested by arguments affirming that Islam is one. What is perceived as Moroccan peculiarity is merely Sunni Islam found in both the Maghreb and the East. Therefore, the notion of ‘Moroccan Islam’ seems meaningless, appearing to be an intellectual heresy that must be confronted” (Maḥfūd 2021). During my visits to Morocco, I have consistently encountered identical responses from Salafis when discussing the notion of Moroccan Islam.

While Burke’s agreement with Salafists on the universality of Islam doesn’t seem problematic, his full reliance on French sources is. Faitour (2024) believes that Morocco’s claim of having its own form of Islam does not negate the religion’s inherent universality. The modality through which Islam is practiced within Morocco, and its integration into both the legal framework and social mores, endows it with a unique identity termed as Moroccan Islam (p. 77). Faitour, however, questions Burke’s overdependence on the “Archives marocaines”, which consists only of French ethnographic writings from pre- and during the 1912 Protectorate. Burke argues that these French sources provided the authority on which the discourse of Moroccan Islam was constructed. Overlooking Morocco’s deeper history without consulting Arabic and Amazigh sources by Western scholars, especially Americans, is a language deficit that the Moroccan historian Laroui (1996) pointed out (pp. 28–29). Additionally, in confirming the existence of Moroccan Islam, Montasser (2014) emphasizes the notion of religious distinctiveness in Islam as practiced across various Muslim countries, noting terms such as ”Arab Islam”, ”African Islam”, ”Turkish Islam”, and ”Indonesian Islam” (p. 23). In other words, according to Montasser, the religiosity of Muslims—without altering the foundational tenets of Islam—varies across different regions of the world and influences how Islam is practiced, thereby determining this religious distinctiveness.

This questioning of Moroccan Islam’s existence is especially relevant in the context of Morocco’s religious institutionalization. Tozy opposes the state’s reform policies, linking it to concerns about religious and personal freedoms and state control. Unlike Burke, Tozy “confirms the existence of Moroccan Islam. He believes it is up to historians to explain what Moroccans have done with Islam yet maintains that Moroccan Islam cannot be institutionalized”(Tozy 2007). For Tozy, institutionalizing religion doesn’t only kill it, but it also represents the legacy of the Protectorate era, in which the state controls religious practices. Likewise, Sparkes (2022) maintains that political instrumentalization and co-optation of Sufism by modern nation-states can be traced to the colonial practices of figures such as Lyautey (p. 14). Promoting three components of Moroccan Islam implies restrictions on other Islamic schools, which appears to contradict the spirit of moderation and openness that the Moroccan state advocates in its religious model (Faitour 2024, pp. 214–15). Critics of the state’s religious policy often cite the story of Imam Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 795 CE), who rejected the request of the second Abbasid caliph, Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr (d. 775 CE), to standardize his Ḥadīth collection, al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, for distribution across the Abbasid Caliphate as the sole official source of Islamic law.2 The scholar’s refusal to promote solely his Mālikī readings of the sacred text has been used as a central argument to defend religious freedom and pluralism, as well as to challenge the state’s position. Maghraoui (2009) confirms that the state has an official Islam, but it is completely controlled not only by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs but also by the Ministry of Interior, which imposes constraints on religious and liberal freedoms. These include a crackdown on Shiism, Salafism, Wahhabism, and Christian Proselytizers, as well as preventing the rights of prostitutes and homosexuals (pp. 196–97).

While I believe that the state’s religious reforms embody a positive advancement and distinguish Morocco from the rest of the Arab and Muslim world, I argue that the state backs any version of Islam that corresponds with its religious and political agendas, not limited to Sufism. Despite the official and scholarly statements on the positive aspects of Sufism in counteracting extremist ideologies, questioning its endorsement becomes necessary to understand the state’s policies, especially since post-colonial Morocco tolerated radical Salafists and nationalist Islamists to address modern challenges. The objective here is not to take the state’s strategies at face value or to specifically target Sufism, but to critically question why Sufism is emphasized today. Muedini (2015, pp. 15–16) comments on this Sufi phenomenon, affirming: Today a favorite (and simplified) government policy is the promotion of Sufism…Yesterday it was often providing support for Islamists to counter the secularists who were a threat to a regime. What will a government’s policy be tomorrow? Will another political or religious group be a “favorite” for a government, which benefits from promoting said group(s)? Examining the state’s Sufi policy offers a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics between the state and various Islamic actors in Morocco.

I also argue that Morocco’s endorsement of Sufi Islam is not solely due to its perceived political pacifism as some might believe, but because Sufism aligns with the state’s policies and benefits from its support. Moroccan history is marked by the interconnected relationships between sultans and Sufi orders. Reviving such a strategic alignment suggests that the state’s promotion of Sufism is about both maintaining control and furthering its own agenda rather than genuinely addressing religious extremism. The Moroccan case also reflects the global trend of world leaders endorsing Sufism, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, as Salafism increasingly failed to align with contemporary worldviews.

In this article, I employ a comparative approach to examine the dynamics between the state and the Sufi and Salafist communities, focusing primarily on Morocco’s modern history, particularly the post-colonial period. This method allows for a nuanced analysis of how these two forms of Islam have been positioned and utilized by the state in different historical and political contexts. To deepen my understanding of the state–religion power structures, I also draw on earlier periods of Moroccan history, starting from the sixteenth century. This historical scope provides a long-term perspective, enabling me to trace the continuity and shifts in the state’s approach to religious actors. By comparing the state’s interaction with Sufi and Salafist groups across different periods, I aim to illustrate how Morocco’s religious policy has evolved and how these changes serve the state’s political objectives.

To balance this comparative analysis, I combine it with Foucault’s theory of power relations, allowing for a deeper analysis of the power dynamics between the Moroccan state and various religious actors in fulfilling both religious and political aims, both nationally and internationally. Foucault’s framework enables me to explore how the state exercises control over religious institutions and discourses, shaping them to serve its strategic interests. Foucault’s lens on power structures reveals how the Moroccan state and religious players collaborate to advance the state’s socio-political and religious goals.

Initially, I will investigate Sufism’s role as a global phenomenon in combating extremist ideologies, with an emphasis on its universal values and its relevance in the contemporary context. In the second section, I will proceed with the use of Salafism, not only in defining Morocco’s national Islam but also in encountering post-colonial challenges for the former regimes. Particularly, Salafism, with the help of the palace, was employed to challenge Sufism. Then, I will advance by highlighting the conflicting relationship between political and religious leaders, with Salafism as a case in point. In the third section, I will cover Morocco’s Sufi revival in its reform policy to fight violent Salafist tendencies and examine Sufism’s connection to politics to determine if this form of Islam is naturally politically passive. In the fourth section, I will provide a critical analysis of the state’s religious policies through the lens of Foucault’s theorical approach of power relations. Finally, I will conclude by emphasizing the article’s main arguments, proposing directions for future research, and contending that the dichotomy between Sufism and Salafism is an oversimplified view that fails to account for the intricate diversity within the Muslim world, particularly in Morocco.

2. Sufism in the International Setting

In a globalized context, Sufism, the spiritual dimension of Islam, is portrayed as the ideal alternative and the best remedy to counteract the perceived dangers of violent Salafism. Sufism has become a key tool for highlighting Islam’s tolerant message and flexibility, in contrast to rigid radical interpretations. These qualities make Sufism an attractive tool for religious reforms in Morocco (Maghraoui 2009, p. 206). Internationally, too, Sufism, which is widely viewed as less rigid and less prone to extremist tendencies, gained traction as a potential antidote within Islam itself to extremist ideology (Intissar 2021, p. 127). Akhlaq (2023) “sees that many of Sufism’s ethical aspects, such as sacrifice, forgiving, tolerance, humility, free consciousness, high aspiration, spontaneity, anti-idolatry, and selflessness, make it a plausible ally for pro-democratic and pluralistic systems.” Unlike Salafism, Akhlaq believes that Sufism, which does not impose religious values on people, is the right alternative form of Islam that is compatible with modern life. In contrast, Hamdi (2012) “argues that the current sponsorship of Sufism, particularly by the West, is due to its passive nature regarding predestination, which leads it to surrender to reality and accept the status quo, including the Western secular lifestyle.” Ashour “maintains that although Sufis not only accept their reality but also endorse it, this does not make them an alternative to Salafists. What makes the Sufis seem moderate is that they often promote the status quo. But the idea that they are more moderate than the Salafis is ridiculous. Both of them are regressive, anti-liberal, and, to a certain degree, anti-democratic”(Whitaker 2016). Ashour’s statement doesn’t question which form of Islam is moderate to promote. Instead, it addresses the broader issue of whether Islam can align with Western standards of liberal democracy.

Today, within this universal trend, Morocco emphasizes its identity as a Sunni Muslim state with deep-rooted Sufi traditions that have profoundly shaped the country’s political, social, economic, and spiritual systems. Toufīq (Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs 2007) believes that Sufism has effectively contributed to shaping the religious, moral–ethical conscience of Moroccan Muslims, along with their social and national commitments. This is a well-established historical fact that cannot be changed (p. 29). Vincent Cornell (1998) maintains that Sufism seemed first to be present in Morocco in the beginning of the eleventh century (p. 4). Its presence has at times fostered both harmony and tensions between the sultans and the religious leaders. Intissar (2021) confirms that the often inextricable and fluid relationship between Morocco’s sultans and Sufi leadership has run the gamut from key political partnerships to outright antagonism and open conflict (p. 121).

Historically, some Sufi leaders and marabouts played a crucial role in providing political support to ruling dynasties, especially the Saʿdīs during the maraboutic crisis. However, Abū ʿAlī Al-Ḥassan Al-Yūsī (d. 1691), a controversial Sufi shaykh, “first a pilgrim, then a rebel, and finally a saint” (Geertz 1968, p. 31), challenged the religious and political authority of the ʿAlawite Sultan, Ismāʿīl Ibn Sharif (d. 1727). Therefore, Al-Yūsī became a significant threat to the ruling class. Nowadays, while generously supporting Sufi orders like the Tījānīyyah, Qādirīyyah-Butshishiyyah, Al-ʿĪsāwīyyah, and Al-Ḥamdashīyyah, the state conflicts with Jamāʿt al-ʿAdl wa al-ʾIḥsān (Justice and Benevolence Organization). Despite its Sufi heritage, moderate stance, and rejection of violence, the group is excluded from political participation due to its challenge to the religious and political authority of the former regime, Hassan II, reflecting the broader struggle over defining Morocco’s religious identity.

Morocco’s current religious policy, particularly toward Sufism, raises questions about which aspects of Sufism the state opposes. Why are some Sufi orders, such as those mentioned above, supported, while others, like the al-Sharqāwīyyah, al-Ṭaybīyyah (al-Wāzzanīyyah), and the order of ‘Abd al-Kabīr al-Kattānī (d. 1927), were rejected? It can be argued that the disobedient nature of certain Sufi orders is the primary reason for their exclusion by the state. In contrast, Sufi groups supported by the Moroccan state are those that align with its religious and political authority. Thus, groups that endorse the state’s discourse are embraced, while those that challenge its policies are marginalized.

3. Salafism as an Alternative to Morocco’s Post-Colonial Challenges

Morocco’s modern history marked an era in which the state used Salafism as the country’s official form of Islam. In post-colonial Morocco, Salafi nationalists shaped the discourse on formal Moroccan Islam as they united with Sultan Muhammed V and King Hassan II. At this point, “Salafism combines reformism and sharifism together” (Maghraoui 2009, p. 199). “El Fassi (nationalist leader) and other Salafists, recognized the popularity of the Sultan Mohammed V, and supported him as the Commander of the Faithful and leader of the jihad against French and Spanish occupation to recover Moroccan independence” (Howe 2005, p. 125). Therefore, under the protection of Sultan Mohamed V and King Hassan II, Sufi brotherhoods faced challenges and neglect. Salafists opposed Sufi practices as archaic innovations (bidʿah) and criticized their lack of defense for the country, as well as their collaboration with colonial powers.

Today, within the context of the “war on terror” and with the ascent of King Mohammed VI, Sufism has been revived not only as part of the state’s official Islam but also as the most effective tool to combat creedal extremism. The state has sought to destigmatize Sufi practices and interpretations, while rebuilding the monarchy’s links to prominent Sufi zawaya and communities of adherents (Intissar 2021, p. 122). This situation underscores the adversarial relationship between Morocco’s ruling class and religious leaders, as noted by Geertz (1968, p. 72): “Sultans collected anti-Sufis around them as they collected Sufis, anti-legists as they collected legists, reformers as they collected anti-reformers, playing them off against one another and attempting to keep them all centered on his, the Sultan’s person as the First Muslim of the country.” Integrating various religious and ideological factions to strengthen the Sultan’s control highlights a sophisticated governance strategy. Thus, observing Morocco’s post-colonial policy and the state’s 2004 reform strategy confirms Geertz’s conclusion.

After Morocco’s independence in 1956, Salafism, both political and radical, grew in popularity as it was portrayed as the ideal solution to modern challenges such as Nasserism, Marxism–Leninism, and Revolutionary Shiism, which posed threats to the previous regime. To counter these dangers, King Hassan II placed Salafism at the center to curb their influence. As Howe (2005) puts it:

Islamism first appeared in 1960s, essentially in opposition to Socialist nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was encouraged by the palace. Morocco turned to Saudi Arabia for help in facing the challenges from the Left, influenced by Nasserites and Marxist-Leninists. In return, Saudis were given free rein to introduce Wahhabism to Morocco, through preachers, publications, audiocassettes, and generous monetary contributions.

(p. 126)

Between the 1970s and 1990s, Morocco witnessed the rise of radical religious discourse led by various imams and preachers. There was a rise in the number of Islamist groups, which included the violent Chabiba Islamiyya (Islamic Youth) (Pruzan-Jorgensen 2010, p. 8). As a result, in 2003, Casablanca experienced multiple suicide bombings, marking an unprecedented attack in the country’s history. M’daghri (2011), the former Minister of Islamic Affairs, asserts that Morocco’s Ministry of Interior protected the Wahhabi movement for geopolitical and personal motives. State officials and some scholars from the Moroccan League of ʿUlamāʾ requested protection from King Hassan II for prominent Salafi scholars like Taqī al-Dīn al-Hilālī. Consequently, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs could not intervene in Wahhabi affairs due to this private protection (p. 66). M’daghri’s statements are a direct response to accusations of his leniency towards Wahhabism and its promotion in Morocco. Following the 2003 bombings, he was heavily criticized for allowing Wahhabi and violent Salafi ideologies to be preached within Morocco’s religious institutions during his tenure as Minister of Islamic Affairs.

To emphasize the Salafi legacy, Moroccan Salafists contend that the country’s Islam has been inherently Salafist since its introduction to North Africa in the seventh century by the first three generations3 of pious Muslims. This tradition continued to spread through Morocco’s succeeding dynasties, including the current ruling al-ʿAlawīt dynasty. Thus, returning to Salafi roots in the eighteenth century with the advent of Wahhabism is viewed as a return to the pure origins of Islam for Moroccan Salafi advocates. Boutalib (2010) states that Morocco is a country of Salafism, always eager to return to the pure essence of the faith, which is strongly linked to the history of Morocco, as it has been understood in its simple and straightforward form (p. 22). This historical attachment is reflected in the adoption of Salafism by some Moroccan sultans. According to Boutalib (2010), the Sultan Muhammad ben Abdullah was a great Salafi who described himself as Mālikī in jurisprudence and Ḥanbalī in creed, and who rejected Ashʿrite theology. He advocated for taking the apparent meaning of the Qur’an and Sunnah without interpretations, in line with the doctrine of the Salaf (p. 23). The Sultan embraced Wahhabi Salafism, actively promoting it while combating the unacceptable forms of Sufism.

A fundamental aspect of Salafism is countering Sufi deviation, a trait shared by Moroccan Sultans who embraced Salafism, including Mohammed ben Abdallah. When Salafism is accepted by ruling elites, its primary religious duty is to purify the faith from the ”shirk” (polytheism) of Sufism. Similarly, when Wahhabism allied with the Al Saud family, they began to purify Islam from Sufi and Shīʿī “un-Islamic practices.” Sultan Sulaymān (d. 1822) also used Salafism against Sufism, but in a different manner:

He denounced aspects of the conduct of some brotherhoods but did not reject Sufism in principle. The doctrine turned out to be politically useful to him because it enabled him to criticize the brotherhoods threatening his authority, such as the Sharqawiyya and the Tayyibiyya—allied to Berber tribes that the [Makhzen] could not control—and the Darqawiyya, which represented a real challenge to the Sultan.

(Zeghal 2008, p. 17)

The quote demonstrates that Sultan Sulaymān was not against Sufism per se, but the rebellious side of it. Al Jabri (1998) believes that Sultan Sulaymān’s sympathy with Wahhabi Salafism didn’t prevent him, for political reasons, from positively interacting with some Sufi orders like the Tījānīyyah, which was embraced by great men of his court. Not only did the Tījānīyyah order disapprove of grave worship, like the Salafists, but its followers in Algeria were also against Ottoman rule (p. 195). For Sultan Sulaymān, choosing to support a specific Sufi group was a matter of political priority, especially during a time when Morocco was striving hard to avoid falling under Ottoman rule. This distinction is crucial in understanding the state’s modern stance towards Sufism and how it has been used as a political strategy.

4. The Nature of Sufism in Connection to Morocco’s Current Politics

Integrating Sufism into Morocco’s 2004 reform policy has been a controversial matter, especially regarding the essence of this form of Islam and its ties to politics. Opinions have been split on whether Sufism is politically active or passively accepts the status quo. This section affirms that Sufism, like other forms of Islam, has not only been politically involved in different stages of Morocco’s history, but its involvement has included either supporting the decisions of ruling elites or rebelling against them. This dual role illustrates the complexity and adaptability of Sufism in the political sphere. For the state, endorsing Sufism not only promotes social cohesion and stability, but it can also be employed simultaneously to exert total control over the religious narrative.

Sufism has consistently played an active role in Morocco’s political landscape. Recent evidence of this is the political participation of the most influential Sufi orders in the country, the Tījānīyyah and Qādirīyyah-Butshishiyyah, in supporting King Mohammed VI’s decision in the proposed referendum on the 2011 modified constitution. Hundreds of thousands of Sufi members voted ”yes“ for the newly edited constitution, not only to demonstrate their support for the royal institution but also because they considered their political move a religious duty to stand with the Commander of the Faithful in running the country’s affairs. Leaders of the Tījānīyyah order called on their members and fans to vote ”yes“ for the 2011 constitution in order to protect the nation’s sanctities. In an official statement, the Tījānīyyah scholars expressed their honor in supporting Morocco during these political times, stating: “The Kingdom of Morocco, unique in its adherence to the Grand Imamate and the legitimate pledge of allegiance, proves once again that the Commander of the Faithful is the guarantor of its unity, protector of its religion, and guardian of its safety” (Assahraa 2011) Similarly, in 2011, head of the Qādirīyyah-Butshishiyyah, Shaykh Ḥamza bin al-ʿAbbas, “invited his disciples to both vote ”yes“ for the project of the ”new constitution” and to participate in a grand march organized by his Sufi order in Casablanca in 25 June 2011.” (Hespress 2011)

During the Protectorate period, however, ‘Abd al-Kabīr al-Kattānī (d. 1927), a distinguished Sufi leader, was very vocal against both the French colonial authorities and the Sultan. Therefore, ‘Al-Kattānī was accused of heresy in 1896, and in 1909 was arrested, and eventually died under custody (Muedini 2015, p. 69). One reason why this order was seen as a major threat to the political authority in Morocco was because it claimed to be “descendants of the Prophet Muhammad” (Bazzaz 2010, p. 11). This rebellious face of Sufism is intolerable to the Moroccan ruling elites and is therefore destined for exclusion—not for its jihadist stance against colonizers, but for its opposition to the state’s policies. In illustrating the dual role that Sufism plays, Sparkes (2022) presented an image highlighting its involvement in the religious, social, and political lives of the Moroccan people:

Sufis dedicated themselves to ascetic practices and spent long periods in isolation, but many also tried to contribute to their community as compassionate servants and tough critics of injustice. This worldly engagement frequently led to tensions between Sufis and the political, economic, and religious elites they tended to criticize … Anti-colonial struggles led by Sufis began in the fifteenth century, in present-day Morocco, from where they slowly spread across Northwest Africa following the pace of the invaders.

(p. 13)

While these examples challenge the widely held assumption that Sufism is politically passive—demonstrating instead that it can be a significant political force—they also illustrate how the Moroccan state has historically perceived Sufi orders: those that align with its religious and political authority are embraced and promoted, while those that challenge its authority are marginalized or suppressed. By promoting Sufism, particularly orders that support the monarchy, the state is able to maintain religious legitimacy while suppressing dissenting voices.

These Sufi incidents prompted critics to question the nature of Sufism to understand whether Sufism, traditionally perceived as a spiritual practice, could have significant political impact. Generally, Al-Ashraf “believes that the absence of political ambition among Sufi groups has made them the Moroccan government’s way of choice to fight extremism.” Some think that the notion of obedience, which centralizes the relationship between the Sufi shaykh and his disciples, is evidence that Sufism is a passive form of Islam that encourages its followers to obey the commands of the master. Lauzière (2010) sees Sufism as cultivating passivism, discouraging Muslims from becoming active in the public sphere, and even preventing them from accepting modern scientific advances and technologies (p. 95). In this regard, Tozy (1999) sees the relationship between the king and his subjects as parallel to that of the master–disciple relationship in the Sufi context, and the king’s role mirrors that of the Sufi saint with intercessory powers, in particular with regards to his status, authority, and role vis-à-vis the parliament. In contrast, for some, the essence of Sufism is its detachment from all worldly affairs, including politics. Harrous “believes that early ascetics abandoned luxury, worldly needs, and political conflicts to focus on worship and detachment from psychological and material concerns. Despite historical exceptions, Sufism has remained faithful to this initial tendency” (Hafid Harrous n.d.). Whereas these perceptions make it challenging to understand the nature and role of modern Sufism in Morocco’s reform policy, it is evident that the employment of Sufism and its mutual connection with the state aim to depoliticize and contain it, not only through the state’s unconditional support for Sufi orders but also by monitoring the king’s religious policy actions. In other words, the mutual benefits between the two actors are what govern this connection.

While Zawaya generally provide spiritual, religious, and social services to their adherents and constituents (Intissar 2021, p. 123), the Qādirīyyah-Butshishiyyah order, in particular, has made significant contributions to the state in various ways. It has effectively been the state’s means of backing and influencing its religious policies. Bekkaoui and Larémont (2011) assert that “the Budshishia order has offered many advantages to the state, including[:] Wide membership, nationally and internationally[;] Recruits from middle-class and high-profile intellectuals and social elite[;] Influence in both rural and urban areas throughout the country[;] Stricter adherence to the Sharia and Sunni Islam [;] [as well as] [i]ts youth membership” (p. 35). Thanks to the comprehensive assistance of the Butshishiyyah order, the state was able to promote its moderate religious model and show commitment to modernization and democratization while preserving religious traditions. The Butshishiyyah order, the state’s current face of Sufi Islam, has become the state’s preferred Sufi group, particularly because it helps in promoting universal values such as religious tolerance, interfaith dialogue, flexibility, open-mindedness, and love through the Fez Festival of Sacred Music, enhancing Morocco’s international image in the eyes of the West. As a reward, King Muhammed VI and his government offer unlimited support and privileges to this Sufi community.

Regarding the continuous sponsoring of Sufism, Lakhal maintains that “mutual interests exist between the zawiya (Butshishiyyah) and Morocco’s political system, including providing services to the zawiya’s followers such as employment, administrative promotions, judicial interventions, and military appointments (as cited in Bin Taher 2013).” The king has provided extensive financial support through donations to Sufi orders (Al-Ashraf 2010). Mohammed VI “has brought together local Sufi leaders [in Morocco] and offered millions of dollars in aid to use as a bulwark against radical fundamentalism” (US News and World Report 2005, in Muedini 2015, p. 76). “The reported spending on zawaya in 2017 exceeded $16 million” (Al Araby al Jdid 2018). King Muhammed VI also demonstrates moral support with Sufi orders in his speeches. In 2007, while addressing the Tijānī order, he stated: “you can count on Morocco’s support in your effort to disseminate [the Tijani] radiant message and expand its scope for the sake of Islamic, Maghrebyan, and African solidarity. We want the Tarīkah Tījānīyyah [Tijani order] to emerge as a pillar of African unity.” These moves represent the king’s official stance in endorsing Sufi Islam and highlights his various strategies to shape the country’s religious field. Through generous spending and moral support, the king is able to strengthen the influence of moderate Sufi leaders and reinforce his control over religious and political affairs in Morocco.

In one incident, the king stressed that Sufi communities should remain politically detached. At the Sidi Chiker National Gathering of Sufi Partisans, the king made his message clear:

It is important to stress, in this respect, that Sufi zawiyas should seek to remain true to the concept of purity upon which they are based. They should forego earthly pursuits. Sufi disciples should steer away from acts and attitudes which do not become them, give up any quest for worldly rewards and, instead, seek higher, loftier goals.

(Agence Maghreb Arabe Presse 2008, in Muedini 2015, p. 80)

In a similar instance, Toufiq reinforced the rhetoric that it is not the role of Sufi orders to engage in political affairs. In an interview with the independent Moroccan newspaper Hespress, the Minister of Islamic Affairs stated: “We support the spiritual dimension of religion as we inherited it because experience has shown that members of Sufi orders do not wish to disrupt political actors in running the country’s political affairs. That’s why they remain in the corner (zāwīyyah), working towards the common good by fostering ethical behavior and creating individuals who function properly within society.” (Hespress 2017a).

Sufism, as reflected in these official statements, has become a crucial tool for the palace and state officials, with the king directly, and the Minister indirectly, instructing its followers to avoid political involvement. Despite the king and the Minister of Islamic Affairs emphasizing that Sufi Muslims should avoid political involvement in their religious practice, some observers may view these statements as contradictory. This is because thousands of Sufi members were mobilized to vote ”yes“ for the king’s proposed constitution and marched in solidarity with Morocco over the Western Sahara issue. Yet, these statements versus the political reality of Sufi members confirm the strong mutual links between the state and Sufism and make one question how genuine the calls of the monarch and the Minister are in keeping Sufis politically passive. Mounir al-Qadiri, son of the Shaykh of the Qadiriyya Boudchichiya Zawiya, comments on their support of the king’s 2011 constitutional referendum: “The Zawiya has national roles, and its emergence in 2011 is a national duty, to prevent strife and protect the interests of the country and its people. We make sure to do all we can to preserve the country’s security, stability and constants, because ‘love of the homeland is part of faith’”. (Hespress 2017b) In addition, even though King Mohammed VI is the overseer of several religiously active Sufi orders in the country and prohibits them from political participation, he heavily relied on them to overcome the winds of the Arab Spring that are still affecting Arab regimes. Lkhal (cited in Al-Amri 2012) “confirms that the Sufi orders adopted a political guise after the Arab Spring revolutions to create a balance within Morocco’s political system, enabling it to withstand pressure from the Moroccan public, which was demanding radical reforms.” The Boudchichiya’s current involvement in political affairs is a revival of an old practice that governed the relationship between political leaders and Sufi orders.

The king’s endorsement of Sufism for benefits is not a new manifestation; the mutual relationship between Sufis and the ruling elites has deep roots in Morocco’s politics. Historically, Sufi orders were a crucial aspect of tribal conflicts and political struggles in Morocco, playing significant roles in mediating disputes, influencing tribal alliances, and shaping the socio-political landscape through their spiritual and social authority. Intissar (2021) comments on this relationship as follows:

An important example in Moroccan history of a Sufi order that played a prominent political role is the Zawiya Nasiriya. This Sufi order had a mutually beneficial relationship with the Alaouite dynasty, which has claimed control of Morocco since the 1600s and to which the current monarchy still belongs. The Zawiya Nasiriya facilitated trade and, by supporting the dynasty’s territorial and political expansion, carved out a lucrative arrangement for itself.

(p. 124)

As the quote demonstrates, the Nasiriya, like many Sufi orders in Moroccan history, including the contemporary ones, benefited from its contribution to the state. Financial support, economic gains, and other privileges remain essential motives behind the strong ties between the state and some Sufi orders. “As zawaya provided religious legitimacy to political actors, in turn these political alliances allowed certain zawaya to expand their own influence” (Intissar 2021, p. 124). This alignment between the ruling class and Sufi orders is also part of King Mohammed VI’s broader strategy to maintain his religious and political authority. Darif (as cited in al-Baqali 2010) “underscores that this symbiotic relationship is deeply rooted in Moroccan history, where Sufi orders have played significant roles in supporting the state since the sixteenth century”.

5. Moroccan Islam beyond Religious Reform Policies and Sufi Sponsorship

By promoting a unique, Sufi-focused form of Islam, Morocco employed a strategic method to balance religious and political authority in response to a shifting global environment. While the state has successfully introduced and promoted its moderate and balanced religious model as a tool to curb extremist ideologies, the tension between promoting a Sufi-oriented Islam and the lingering influence of Salafism underscores the complexities of Morocco’s religious landscape and the contradictions within its religious policies. This reflects the broader challenges in maintaining the state’s official discourse on Moroccan Islam. Morocco’s official Islam is at a crossroads, shaped by complex international dynamics and modern political challenges that will continue to influence its future direction.

Analyzing Morocco’s present strategy of institutionalizing Sufism is critical, particularly when placed in the larger context of state–religion power structures. The state’s move can be interpreted as a step to maintain hegemony over the religious discourse. Sponsoring specific Islamic practices, such as Sufism, illustrates how the government exploits the religious narrative to reinforce its political and religious authority, closely monitoring and controlling religious institutions. This strongly aligns with Foucault’s theoretical approach to power relations, as illustrated in The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1978), where Foucault demonstrates how the state and its institutions collaborate to police and regulate sexuality through public and useful discourses (p. 25). Foucault interprets the state’s actions as a method of normalizing individual sexuality by exerting control through churches, hospitals, schools, and demographic studies. Similarly, Morocco’s enforcement of a particular religious narrative can also be understood as the state imposing and dictating the kind of religiosity Moroccan citizens should follow as a normalizing process. In other words, instead of relying solely on the repressive approach—arbitrary arrests, imprisonments, torture, and the enactment of anti-terror laws—the Moroccan state used the soft approach of institutionalizing the entire religious field. Consequently, these reforms to the religious field in Morocco are better understood as political opportunism (Wainscott 2017, p. 2). The reform must also be seen as serving political—as opposed to purely religious—goals; it is also aimed—implicitly—at strengthening the role of Morocco’s king as Commander of the Faithful, which has in the past been contested by some minority Islamic movements, most especially the Adl wa Al-Ihssan (El-Katiri 2013, p. 54). To reaffirm, Morocco’s endorsement of certain Islamic practices, whether Sufism or otherwise, is a political strategy designed to reinforce the monarch’s political and religious power and to help him counter potential threats to his authority. Therefore, religious leaders and Islamists who challenge the state’s religious policies, along with secularists advocating for the separation of state and religion, are well aware that the final say on religious matters rests with the king.

Also, understanding Morocco’s recent stance on Salafism as a threat is essential within the larger framework of international dynamics, where Salafism is increasingly viewed as a danger to national and international security. Moroccan policies cannot be analyzed in vacuum; they must be considered in the context of global trends. In the post-9/11 period, countries, including Morocco, began to question Salafi Islam in relation to religious security. Since these attacks, the teachings of Islam have become a major point of examination (Muedini 2015, p. 1). Salafism, once backed by the United States during the Cold War and supported by Saudi Arabia and Morocco, is now largely distrusted and rejected, increasingly linked to radicalism and extremism, despite previously being considered a prominent expression of Islam. These incidents had a profound impact on the religious policies of Muslim-majority states, including Morocco, and makes one doubt taking the governments’ religious policies for granted.

Seeking to uncover the deep and complex relationship between Sufi Islam and the state’s broader political objectives has been this article’s aim. Their intertwined relationship cannot be superficially understood as merely the state’s support for a passive form of Islam. Indeed, as this article has shown, Sufism can be a powerful political force capable of shaping public opinion in ways that serve the state’s ends. The advantages Sufis bring to the state guarantee them specific benefits and privileges, creating a mutually beneficial relationship. The Moroccan state’s strategic support of Sufism can be analyzed through the lens of Foucault’s theory of power relations, highlighting how the ruling class can manipulate religious institutions and religious groups to uphold its dominance.

6. Conclusions

What is termed Moroccan Islam today is a blend of various Islamic practices, including Salafism and Sufism, that reflect the country’s diverse historical, cultural, and political contexts. Two decades ago, the Moroccan state fashioned a discourse that emphasizes an open and balanced version of Islam, incorporating elements of Mālikism, Ashʿarism, and Sufism, and underscoring the importance of allegiance to the monarchy. This narrative has been promoted both domestically and internationally, particularly since the reform policies initiated in 2004. While it aims to counter extremist ideologies and maintain social cohesion, it also reveals tensions between different interpretations of Islam within the country. As such, Morocco’s approach to defining and promoting its national Islam continues to be a subject of debate and analysis, reflecting broader dynamics in the relationship between religion, state, and society.

Additionally, the global phenomenon of endorsing Sufism as the best version of Islam while rejecting Salafism is questionable, as it raises doubts about the states’ intentions in keeping Sufism apolitical and makes observers hesitant to take the states’ policies at face value. This is especially notable given that Salafists, once seen as ”good“ Muslims, are now perceived as ”bad”. Also, classifying Muslims solely by their religious affiliations (Sufi vs. Salafi) while ignoring economic, social, and political factors not only warrants more investigation but can also contribute to the stigmatization of Muslims who do not adopt Sufi Islam. This oversimplification overlooks the complexities and diversity within the Muslim world in general, and in Morocco specifically, and risks marginalizing communities based on an incomplete understanding of their beliefs and practices. Consequently, a more nuanced and comprehensive approach is essential to avoid reinforcing stereotypes and to promote genuine inclusivity and understanding.

A potential research topic for future study could focus on the socio-political impacts of the Moroccan state’s endorsement of Sufism on various Muslim communities (Justice and Benevolence Organization, Justice and Development Party, Salafists, and other Sufi groups) within Morocco. This research could investigate how these different groups perceive and respond to the state’s religious narrative, and whether this endorsement has led to tangible changes in social cohesion or exacerbated existing tensions. Another research project could also investigate the cultural awareness of Moroccan society regarding the state’s religious policies and assess their accessibility to all segments of the population, especially given the country’s 32 percent illiteracy rate (Amjad 2015).