Theōria as Cure for Impiety and Atheism in Plato’s Laws and Clement of Alexandria

Abstract

The article examines the impact of Plato’s views on atheism and impiety, relayed in the Laws, on Clement of Alexandria. Clement employed the adjectives godless (atheos) and impious (asebēs) often in his writings as accusations against pagan philosophers and/or heretics, but also in his defence of Christians against the very charge of atheism on account of their rejection of pagan gods (Stromata 7.1; cf. Tertullian’s Apologia 10). I argue that Clement, perceptive of Plato’s defence of philosophical contemplation (theōria) and its civic benefits in the Laws, reworked the latter’s association of disbelief with excessive confidence in fleshly pleasures (Leges 888A) in tandem with his stipulation of virtue as the civic goal of his ideal colonists of Magnesia who ought to attune to the divine principles of the cosmos. Thus, Clement promoted the concept of citizenship in the Heavenly kingdom, secured through contemplation and its ensuing impassibility. For Plato and Clement, atheism was the opposite of genuine engagement with divine truth and had no place in the ideal state. Although Clement associated the Church with peace, his views were adapted by Firmicus Maternus to sanction violent rhetoric against the pagans in the fourth century when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire.

Introduction

This article examines Plato’s views on atheism and impiety,1 as expounded in the Laws ([ed. Bury (Loeb)] 888A–D), and their reception by Clement of Alexandria whose theological legacy (using edns. from Sources Chrét.) shaped the early church and remains important to the Orthodox tradition to this day (cf. Yingling 2009, p. 93). I argue that Clement drew on Plato’s Laws to defend Christians from the accusation of atheism that was allegedly levelled at them during the early days (Stromata [hereafter Str] [ed. Boulluec] 7.1.1.1–2).2 Influenced by the civic context in which Plato rejected atheism,3 Clement emphasized faith in the Christian God as a key credential for gaining entrance in the Heavenly kingdom. While Clement did eventually refer to pagans as atheists (Protrepticus [hereafter Protr] [ed. Mondésert] 10.93.1–2),4 his refutation of their error remained a dialectical exercise of moderate tone (Str 4.1.2.3), typically urging the “ignorant” and “unjust” to convert to the Christian God. Clement’s argument, in line with his own experience of the persecution of Christians at Alexandria under Septimius Severus, is nonviolent (Protr 10.93.1–2, with Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6.1).5 By the fourth century, however, Christian thinkers, likely inspired by the newly-found proximity of state and religion promoted under Constantine and his sons, employed explicitly violent language against the heterodox as a means of safeguarding the Christian faith (Van der Heever 2018, p. 302; Drake 2011; Whitmarsh 2015, pp. 163–70). Thus, in the final section of this essay, I discuss the adaptation of Clement’s Plato-inspired views on impiety by Firmicus Maternus, a Christian polemicist who urged the emperors Constantius and Constans to stamp out paganism completely (Marcos 2013, pp. 9–10; Rüpke 2014, pp. 192–200). His aggressive language, however, did not necessarily aim at instigating physical violence; when placed in context (Van Nuffelen 2020, pp. 517–19; cf. Mayer 2013; Bremmer 2014), Firmicus Maternus’ opinions seem to be inspired by contemporary political realities, primarily by his need to command the attention of the emperor(s).

1. Defending Contemplation: Impiety and Atheism in Plato’s Laws

In earlier dialogues, especially the Euthyphro6 and the Apology,7 Plato comments on Socrates’ indictment for impiety and his subsequent execution in 399 BCE.8 Plato spoke of the gods in abstract terms, promoting Socrates’ daimonion and often citing tales about the traditional gods as examples of people’s misapprehensions regarding what constitutes piety and/or impiety. In the late Laws, however, written in the shadow of his failed involvement in Sicilian politics (Brisson 2020; cf. Anagnostou-Laoutides 2020a), Plato unequivocally admitted the existence of gods, stating that “god controls everything, and alongside god, chance and occasion control all human affairs” (Leges [hereafter Leg] 709B7–8: Ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρός, τἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι σύμπαντα). Further, he acknowledged the traditional pantheon (745B–E; 771D; 828B–D; 848D; 920D–921D; 946A–E), the gods of the Underworld and Moira (799D), as well as the cults of ancestors and heroes, all of which ought to be diligently honoured in the proposed colony of Magnesia. In the Laws, Plato described at length the legal code of the colony’s constitution—a second model of the ideal city next to the Kallipolis of the Republic (hereafter Resp] [using ed. Shorey])9 and its day-to-day application(s), designed to support the educational model of the city and its goal of enabling its citizens to attune to the divine principles of the cosmos.10 Education in Magnesia relied on music as a main means of dispensing civic ethical training (Anagnostou-Laoutides 2022, pp. 12–13, 17). Since nomos meant both law and song/musical genre (Anagnostou-Laoutides 2022, p. 19, with n. 72) harmony, infused through civic education, should be also reflected in the laws of the city. Thus, the legal code of Magnesia was underpinned by profound belief in the existence of gods whose virtue the citizens ought to emulate (Leg 906A3–B4):

Since we have agreed among us that heaven is full of many good things, but also of their opposites, and that the not good things are more numerous, we say that such a battle is immortal, and needs incredible alertness (φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη); for the gods and daemons are our allies (σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν) and we the possession of the gods and daemons (ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖ κτῆμα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων); and injustice and insolence combined with folly destroys us (φθείρει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀφροσύνης), but justice and thinking soundly saves us combined with the wisdom (σῴζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως) which resides in the animate powers of the gods (ἐν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐμψύχοις οἰκοῦσαι δυνάμεσιν), while some small trace of them may be clearly seen here as also residing in us.

Plato’s statement accords with his definition of the human mission to become as godlike as possible, as famously expounded in the Theaetetus (176B2–3),11 but in the Laws Plato’s conviction about the existence of the gods links human nature with political rule more explicitly, since the city-state provides the context in which citizens are required to nourish the divine elements of their souls. Thus, in Leg 712B5–8 Plato invoked “the presence of the God in the establishment of the state (Θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατασκευὴν ἐπικαλώμεθα), so that he may hearken, and hearkening he may come, propitious and kindly to us, to help us in developing the state and its laws” (ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέν τε, καὶ ἀκούσας ἵλεως εὐμενής τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι συνδιακοσμήσων τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους), while in 713A2–5 he added: “… if the State ought to be named after any such thing, it should be given the name of the God who truly rules over those who are sensible” (τὸ τοῦ ἀληθῶς τῶν τὸν νοῦν ἐχόντων δεσπόζοντος θεοῦ ὄνομα λέγεσθαι).

Accordingly, Plato famously referred to impiety as a disease dangerous for the city (888B10: ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες), arising from “greed for pleasure” (888A4: ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς) and corrupting the minds of those suffering from it (888A7: τοῖς οὕτω τὴν διάνοιαν διεφθαρμένοις). Plato distinguished three types of impious men:12 atheists who deny the existence of gods altogether and hardly ever maintain their youthful delusion until later in life (888C2–3: τὸ μηδένα πώποτε λαβόντα […] ταύτην τὴν δόξαν περὶ θεῶν, ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, διατελέσαι πρὸς γῆρας μείναντα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διανοήσει); those who believe that gods exist but do not care about men (888C5–6: τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι μέν, φροντίζειν δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων); and those who undermine the gods by thinking it is easy to bribe them with offerings (888C7–8: ὡς φροντίζουσι μέν, εὐπαραμύθητοι δ’ εἰσὶν θύμασιν καὶ εὐχαῖς). Total denial of the gods is less common compared to the other two types of atheism. Importantly, the debate about the existence of the gods ought to be entrusted to the legislator (888C10–D6).13

Furthermore, Plato compares the lawgivers with musicians, and therefore with philosophers, whom he claims, were skilled in “the greatest form of music” (Phaedo [hereafter Ph] [ed. Fowler] 61A4–5; cf. Resp 591C1–D3; Laches 188D3–9; Anagnostou-Laoutides 2021a; 2022, p. 19 and n. 73; 2023). Plato was adamant that before becoming absolutely god-fearing (Leg 967D4–5: βεβαίως θεοσεβῆ), people ought to be convinced of two truths: first, “that the soul is oldest of all things that partake of generation” (967D6–7: ψυχή τε ὡς ἔστιν πρεσβύτατον ἁπάντων ὅσα γονῆς μετείληφεν), “and is immortal and rules over all bodies” (ἀθάνατόν τε ἄρχει τε δὴ σωμάτων πάντων); second, that “reason controls what exists among the stars” (967D10: τόν … ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις νοῦν τῶν ὄντων), and that “the connection of these things follows the principles of music” (967E2: τά τε κατὰ τὴν μοῦσαν τούτοις τῆς κοινωνίας) which societies should “apply by fitting together moral practices and customs” (967E3–5: χρήσηται πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμιμα συναρμοττόντως), “while being able to give a rational explanation of all that admits of rational explanation” (ὅσα τε λόγον ἔχει, τούτων δυνατὸς ᾖ δοῦναι τὸν λόγον). Earlier in the dialogue Plato had noted that legislating the use of such music “would be the task of a god or godlike man” (657A10–11: τοῦτο δὲ θεοῦ ἢ θείου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς ἂν εἴη: cf. 669C–673D; 799A–B). Thus, Magnesia’s legislators were also envisaged as philosophers since they were expected to engage in what philosophers typically dedicate their lives to—becoming godlike.

For Plato, the goal of becoming godlike during life involved limiting as much as possible the interference of the body in our perception of virtue as preparation for embracing the survival of the soul after death. Thus, philosophers, striving to exceed the confines of the senses so to “behold truth with the eyes of the soul alone” (Ph 66D10–E1: καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα; Anagnostou-Laoutides 2022, pp. 23–29, with ns. 38–39), posed as the antithesis of atheists whose error, according to Plato, is rooted in their misplaced belief in materialism (Leg 891C–892B). Through constant and systematic contemplation, the philosophers (Ph 68C6–D1),14 keen to participate in the politics of the heavenly city alone (Resp 592B),15 were uniquely placed to advise the city on its progress. In Magnesia, philosophical theōria16 would be practised by the Nocturnal Council and their designated theōroi. The members of the Council, we are told, would dedicate their lives to examining the ethical principles of law by studying the nature of virtue and its various manifestations, such as self-control, courage, justice, and wisdom (Leg 964B3–6; 965C9–D3; Anagnostou-Laoutides 2022, p. 18). Above all, the members of the Council would be responsible for debating theological matters, starting with the vexed question about the existence of gods and our ability to grasp their powers (Leg 966C1–D3), and moving on to the issue of the divine origin of the soul and the rational principle that brought about the order of the universe (966D10–E5).17 In addition, the Nocturnal Council would appoint citizens recognized for their wisdom as theōroi; the latter would be entrusted with tracing exceptional thinkers across good and bad cities for the privilege of conversing with them before reporting their opinions back to the Nocturnal Council for further deliberation (951B5-8). In essence, the theōroi would enable the regular reviewing of Magnesia’s constitution with the additional input of their external discussants. Plato deems this kind of reflection (theōria) as paramount for maintaining the perfect status of the city.18 Moreover, Plato made provisions for Magnesia’s average citizens to engage in theōria, not only through their musical education, as discussed above (and highlighted in Resp 349C5-D2), but also through the so-called Test of the Wine. Characterized as “Dionysus’ theōria” (650A1), the Test was designed to encourage citizens to continuously monitor their ethical development.19

Notably, Plato insisted on the importance of addressing those who suffer from the disease of atheism “mildly and dispassionately” (Leg 888A: ἐν πρᾳέσι λόγοις; 888A7-9: πρᾴως, σβέσαντες τὸν θυμόν), like a father or a teacher trying to admonish or teach a child (888A1: νουθετῶν ἅμα διδάσκειν; 888A10: Ὦ παῖ), aiming first and foremost at persuading them (890D). Nevertheless, he was conscious that provisions ought to be made for the punishment of obstinate atheists. Plato distinguished between atheists by nature and those whose atheism was the result of being enslaved to desires (899D–900C; cf. 864B). He deemed the damage inflicted by the latter as graver, since tyrants tend to rise from among this group of atheists: such examples result in weakening the cohesion of the citizenry, undermining its identity, and clouding its moral orientation. In his view, again, those who believe that the gods are indifferent to humans or easily bribed do so either out of folly or because they are evil. In all cases, however, convicted atheists should be removed from the civic group. First, they should be punished by imprisonment, while also closely coached by the Nocturnal Council that would oversee their progress, aiming at persuading them to change their minds and be rehabilitated in society. If, however, all else failed, atheists should be punished by death (908B1–910D). Hence, while not the preferred solution, Plato did allow for violence against atheists to be enshrined in the laws of Magnesia as the ultimate means of safeguarding the city against their insolence.

Clement, a thorough reader of Plato, further developed the civic framework of faith as analysed in the Laws, arguing that Christians ought to defend the law entrusted to them by God in anticipation of gaining citizenship in the heavenly Kingdom (Anagnostou-Laoutides 2022, pp. 26–27).

2. Plato’s Laws, Impiety and Atheism in Clement of Alexandria

Clement of Alexandria expanded on Plato’s rejection of atheism by developing the notion of the heavenly city and its connection to our inner constitution in ways that, in my view, had a profound impact on the concept of citizenship in Christ, as a projection of Christian collective identity. Clement undertook a painstaking study of pagan intellectual traditions, in which Plato features prominently, often claiming that Greek philosophy was a corruption or an offshoot of the Mosaic Law.20 The idea is introduced at the start of Clement’s Stromata/Stromateis, a title that alludes etymologically to the “layers” of meaning that he proposed to uncover for his discerning readers.21 According to Clement, “Moses was a prophet, a legislator, a military tactics expert, a war strategist, a politician, and a philosopher” (Str 1.24.158.1: Ἔστιν οὖν ὁ Μωυσῆς ἡμῖν προφητικός, νομοθετικός, τακτικός, στρατηγικός, πολιτικός, φιλόσοφος). His description aims to present Plato’s connection of legislation and civic religion, as we saw it in the Laws, as originating in Mosaic law. After comparing the wisdom that orders the divine things to the political skill that rules human affairs (1.24.159.4–5: τὰ μὲν θεῖα ἡ σοφία, τὰ ἀνθρώπεια δὲ ἡ πολιτική), Clement portrayed God as “a king who rules according to the laws and possesses the skill to rule over willing subjects” (1.24.159.5–6: βασιλεὺς τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄρχων κατὰ νόμους ὁ τὴν τοῦ ἄρχειν ἑκόντων ἐπιστήμην ἔχων). In a universe regulated by God’s kingly skill, passions can be mastered through virtue and reason: by acquiring “self-restraint and moderation with holiness and sound knowledge with truth” (1.24.159.3–4: ἐγκράτειαν καὶ σωφροσύνην μεθ’ ὁσιότητος καὶ γνῶσιν ἀγαθὴν μετ’ ἀληθείας), the faithful attain piety toward God (τὸ τέλος εἰς εὐσέβειαν ἀναφέρων θεοῦ). Despite claiming that the Greeks are but children compared to the wisdom of the Jews, Clement cited both the Statesman and the Laws (the latter is, in fact, cited six times by name in the Stromata) in praise of Plato’s appreciation that both natural and civic law derive from God.22 Importantly, like Plato, Clement was explicit that the law ‘attunes’ (recognizing the affinity of the legislator and the musician, see below n. 22) and further ‘conducts’ those who follow it to God.23 Accordingly, he explicitly compared a pagan city governed by law to the Church ruled by the logos, making reference to the Heavenly model that inspired Plato’s ideal state and (presumably) likewise the kingdom of God. Clement wrote (Str 4.26.172.2–3):

For a city is an important thing (σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἡ πόλις), and the people a decorous body (καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἀστεῖόν τι σύστημα), and a multitude of men regulated by law as the Church by the Word (καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον, καθάπερ ἡ ἐκκλησία ὑπὸ λόγου)—a city on earth impregnable, free from tyranny (ἀπολιόρκητος ἀτυράννητος πόλις ἐπὶ γῆς), a product of the divine will on earth as in heaven (θέλημα θεῖον ἐπὶ γῆς ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ). Images of this city the poets create with their pen (εἰκόνας τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ κτίζουσι γράφοντες). For the Hyperboreans, and the Arimaspian cities, and the Elysian plains, are polities of just men (αἱ γὰρ Ὑπερβόρεοι καὶ Ἀριμάσπειοι πόλεις καὶ τὰ Ἠλύσια πεδία δικαίων πολιτεύματα). And we know Plato’s city placed as a pattern in heaven (ἴσμεν δὲ καὶ τὴν Πλάτωνος πόλιν παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ κειμένην).

Thus, Clement wishes for the spirit of Christ to transport him to the heavenly Jerusalem (Str 4.26.172.2: ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν εὐξαίμην τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ πτερῶσαί με εἰς τὴν Ἱερουσαλὴμ τὴν ἐμήν). According to Clement, Plato’s aspiration of becoming godlike was perfectly compatible with Scripture and the Mosaic Law (2.19.100.3–4; 5.14.94.3–95.20), and a sound way of achieving piety to the true God.24 Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere (Anagnostou-Laoutides 2022, pp. 26–27), Clement believed that the true gnostic (that is the wise Christian) would be conducted to the Heavenly kingdom through persistent practice of contemplation (theōria), which would act as purification from the senses, leading to impassibility.25 Although Christian theōria ought to be mediated by faith,26 the gnostic conducts himself like Plato’s philosopher in the Phaedrus27 and the Phaedo (Anagnostou-Laoutides 2021b, pp. 219–24; 2023, pp. 29–33). Thus, through theoria he is able to reach better places and perfect his citizenship in God (Str 4.25.155.2).28 Plato had reiterated this idea emphatically in the Laws, where he asserted that “when the soul achieves union with divine virtue (ὁπόταν μὲν ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμείξασα), it becomes eminently virtuous (γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη) and moves to an eminent region, transported by a holy road to another and better region” (διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλεν τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον, μετακομισθεῖσα εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον; Leg 904D8–E1). Similarly, Clement affirmed in Str 7.3.13.1–2 that:

the gnostic souls (τὰς γνωστικὰς ψυχάς) which surpass in the grandeur of contemplation the mode of life of each of the holy ranks (τῇ μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ τῆς θεωρίας ὑπερβαινούσας ἑκάστης ἁγίας τάξεως τὴν πολιτείαν), are assigned by lot among whom the blessed abodes of the gods (καθ’ ἃς αἱ μακάριαι θεῶν οἰκήσεις διωρισμέναι διακεκλήρωνται), reckoned holy among the holy (ἁγίας ἐν ἁγίοις λογισθείσας), transferred entire from among the entire (μετακομισθείσας ὅλας ἐξ ὅλων), reaching places better than the better places (εἰς ἀμείνους ἀμεινόνων τόπων τόπους ἀφικομένας), embracing the divine vision (τὴν θεωρίαν ἀσπαζομένας τὴν θείαν) […] in the transcendently clear and absolutely pure insatiable vision which is the privilege of intensely loving souls (ἐναργῆ δὲ ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα καὶ ἀκριβῶς εἰλικρινῆ τὴν ἀκόρεστον ὑπερφυῶς ἀγαπώσαις ψυχαῖς ἑστιωμένας θέαν), holding festival through endless ages (ἀιδίως ἀίδιον εὐφροσύνην ἀκόρεστον καρπουμένας), remain honoured with the identity of all excellence (εἰς τοὺς ἀτελευτήτους αἰῶνας ταὐτότητι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἁπάσας τετιμημένας διαμένειν). Such is the vision attainable by the pure in heart (αὕτη τῶν καθαρῶν τῇ καρδίᾳ ἡ καταληπτικὴ θεωρία).

As Dominic O’Meara (2003, p. 162) notes,

To become members of the Church, the ‘initiated’ must receive instruction in the ‘divine way of life’ (ἡ ἔνθɛος πολιτɛὶα) so as to live this life, purifying themselves of the life of vice (ἡ ἐν κακὶᾳ πολιτɛὶα). They thus require teaching and a moral reform, followed by purification which leads to a contemplative mode of life exemplified at its highest level, in the order of the ‘initiated,’ by the rank of monks.

In this context, Clement defined the purpose of book 7 of the Stromata as demonstrating that “the gnostic alone is truly pious” (7.1.1.1: μόνον ὄντως εἶναι θεοσεβῆ τὸν γνωστικόν), a notion he reiterated a paragraph later, where we read that the true Gnostic “alone is holy and pious, and worships the true God in a manner worthy of Him” (7.1.2.1: … μόνον τὸν γνωστικὸν ὅσιόν τε καὶ εὐσεβῆ, θεοπρεπῶς τὸν τῷ ὄντι θεὸν θρῃσκεύοντα). Accordingly, Clement attacked pagan philosophers as “unworthy of partaking of the power of believing” (7.1.1.2: μηδέπω ἀξίους ἑαυτοὺς μεταλαβεῖν τῆς τοῦ πιστεῦσαι δυνάμεως παρεσχήκασι). He further added (7.1.4.3) that,

He … who is persuaded that God is omnipotent (ὁ τοίνυν θεὸν πεπεισμένος εἶναι παντοκράτορα) and has been instructed in the divine mysteries from His only-begotten Son (καὶ τὰ θεῖα μυστήρια παρὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς παιδὸς αὐτοῦ ἐκμαθών),” cannot be an atheist (πῶς οὗτος ἄθεος;). “An atheist is someone who believes that God does not exist (ἄθεος μὲν γὰρ ὁ μὴ νομίζων εἶναι θεόν) and is superstitious because he dreads the demons (δεισιδαίμων δὲ ὁ δεδιὼς τὰ δαιμόνια); it is him who deifies all things, both wood and stone (ὁ πάντα θειάζων καὶ ξύλον καὶ λίθον); and reduces to bondage spirit, and man who possesses the life of reason” (καὶ πνεῦμα ἄνθρωπον τὸν <μὴ> λογικῶς βιοῦντα καταδεδουλωμένον).

Clement employed the same rhetoric against those he regarded as heretics, such as those who followed Valentinus, Marcion, or Basilides, and many others (Str 7.17.108.1–2), whom he described as “mystagogues of the soul of the impious” (7.17.106.3: μυσταγωγοὶ τῆς τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχῆς). Their followers, he warned, will not enter the kingdom of God (7.17.106.1–2):

Those, then, who adhere to impious words (Oἱ τοίνυν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἁπτόμενοι λόγων) and dictate them to others (ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες), without applying the divine words correctly but erroneously (μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς θείοις, ἀλλὰ ἐξημαρτημένως συγχρώμενοι), neither themselves enter into the kingdom of heaven (οὔτε αὐτοὶ εἰσίασιν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν), nor allow those whom they have deceived to attain the truth (οὔτε οὓς ἐξηπάτησαν ἐῶσιν τυγχάνειν τῆς ἀληθείας).

Furthermore, Clement is of the opinion that the divine constitution (the entheos politeia) must be ruled by laws that aim to teach as much as to punish (1.27.171.1). Clement resorts once more to Plato and the Laws to support the view that “the unbeliever is one to whom voluntary falsehood is agreeable” (ὃ δὲ ἄπιστος, ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον; Str 4.18.1–2).29 Such men are senseless, faithless, and ignorant. Clement quotes Laws 730C4–7 (cf. 705A) where the Athenian Stranger claims that “the man who loves the voluntary lie is untrustworthy (ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον), while the man who loves the involuntary lie is senseless” (ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους),30 adding that “everyone who is either faithless or foolish is friendless” (ἄφιλος γὰρ δὴ πᾶς ὅ γε ἄπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής). Such men corrode the coherence of the civic group. Unlike them, Clement argues (Str 4.18.3–4),

those who believe in Christ both are and are called Chrestoi (good) (αὐτίκα οἱ εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν πεπιστευκότες χρηστοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ λέγονται), as those who are cared for by the true king are kingly (ὡς τῷ ὄντι βασιλικοὶ οἱ βασιλεῖ μεμελημένοι) … those who belong to Christ the King are kings, and those that are Christ’s Christians (ὡς γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ σοφίᾳ εἰσὶ σοφοὶ καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι, οὕτως οἱ Χριστῷ βασιλεῖ βασιλεῖς καὶ οἱ Χριστοῦ Χριστιανοί).

Clement cites here Plato’s authority once more to argue that “following the law” is a way to actively emulate God and achieve assimilation with him. Unlike the great natures that are free from passions and can immediately grasp the truth, average people must rely on observing the law. Furthermore, the divine law trains man especially to self-restraint, laying this as the foundation of the virtues (cf. Str 1.24.159.3–6 cited above).

Thus, Clement follows Plato in associating impiety with faithlessness and atheism (see Resp 580A),31 a heinous crime that lawgivers must eliminate from the ideal society, following the example of God who converts his enemies by chastising them. In Stromata 7.16.102.4–5 Clement insists that God, acting like a teacher or like a father (ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς τοῦ διδασκάλου ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς οἱ παῖδες), as we saw in Plato’s Laws, does not punish but chastises. For, while punishment is retaliation for evil (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ τιμωρία κακοῦ ἀνταπόδοσις), chastisement is for our benefit, collectively and individually (κολάζει μέντοι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς κολαζομένοις). Using Platonic vocabulary Clement explains that “the source of all transgressions are two, ignorance and weakness” (7.16.101.6: δύο εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ πάσης ἁμαρτίας, ἄγνοια καὶ ἀσθένεια; cf. 7.16.102.6), and God intervenes as a doctor to heal those willing to lend their ears to him. The unabashed, Clement comments, “have the penalties that are on record” (7.16.105.6: ἔγγραφα ἔχουσι τὰ ἐπιτίμια). Of course, Clement realizes that fear of punishment or hope for reward are not genuine enough motives for the true Gnostic who aims to practice piety for the sake of the good alone (4.22.145.2),32 nevertheless it is an efficient means of keeping the average Christian alert to the ever-lurking danger of sin.

Clement explicitly refers to fear of punishment as fundamental and deeply pedagogical (2.6.30.3–4),33 especially since the divine plan involves the salvation of both believers and unbelievers (7.2.6.6); punishment is, in fact, presented as the way to conversion which is preferable to death. Citing once more Plato’s Laws (=715E8–716A3), Clement further stresses the association of fear with the divine Law, referring to justice as the “avenger of those who rebel against the divine Law” (Str 2.22.132.2–3):

Thus, he says in the Laws (ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις·); God indeed, as per the ancient saying (ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος), occupying the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things (ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός … ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν τῶν πάντων ἔχων), brings them straight to their natural end while encircling them (εὐθεῖαν περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος)· and he is always attended by justice (τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ξυνέπεται δίκη), the avenger of those who rebel against the divine law (τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός). You see how he also associates fear with the divine law (ὁρᾷς ὅπως καὶ αὐτὸς εὐλάβειαν προσάγει τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ).

Furthermore, while persistently discussing Plato’s analysis of marriage laws, now elaborated with Scriptural examples, Clement summarizes the capital punishments for adultery, aimed at checking the impulsiveness of the passions (2.23.147.1: πρὸς ἀναστολὴν τῆς εὐεπιφορίας τῶν παθῶν), before concluding ominously that “the law is not at variance with the Gospel, but agrees with it” (2.23.147.2: οὐ δὴ μάχεται τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ ὁ νόμος, συνᾴδει δὲ αὐτῷ). Importantly, although in the Protrepticus Clement refers to the “peaceful soldiers of Christ” (Protr 11.116.3–4: τοὺς εἰρηνικοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ), in Stromata 3.4.32.1 we are assured that those who disobey the laws become hated both “to human lawgivers and to the law of God” (ἤδη δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις νομοθέταις καὶ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ ἀπεχθάνονται παρανόμως βιοῦν ἐπανῃρημένοι); Clement cites here the Old Testament Book of Numbers (25:7–14; cf. 25:17) where “the man who thrust his spear into the fornicator is evidently blessed by God” (Str 3.4.32.2: ὁ γοῦν ἐκκεντήσας τὸν πόρνον εὐλογούμενος πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ δείκνυται ἐν τοῖς Ἀριθμοῖς). Similar views are expressed in Clement’s fragments, for example his comments of the Epistle of Jude or the First Epistle of John 2.2, which at the same time illustrate the reception of his views in later Christianity; for example, Cassiodorus in the sixth century refers to Clement’s comments in his Adumbrationes in Epistolas Catholicas (Dainese 2016).

3. Clement and the Violent Turn of Religious Rhetoric in Late Antiquity

Clement defined scepticism as the result of the “changeability and instability of the human mind” (Str 8.7.22.1–2: … ἓν μὲν τὸ πολύτροπον καὶ ἄστατον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης) in conjunction with “the discrepancy that exists in things” (δεύτερον δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διαφωνία). This is why, Clement argued, God, “having equipped some of the barbarians with the commandments and some with philosophy” (7.2.11.2: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐντολάς, τοῖς δὲ φιλοσοφίαν παρασχὼν), “he shut up on all sides the disbelief in his advent” (συνέκλεισεν τὴν ἀπιστίαν εἰς τὴν παρουσίαν), “on account of which anyone who does not believe is inexcusable” (ὅθεν ἀναπολόγητός ἐστι πᾶς ὁ μὴ πιστεύσας).34 Repentance is the only avenue Clement afforded to sinners to escape their predicament (Str 7.2.12.5). His position, embraced by members of his immediate circle such as his student Origen (Contra Celsum 1.71), was notably influential among Christian authors. Hence, Clement’s views are well-known to Eusebius, certainly the fifth book of the Stromata that focuses on faith and is excerpted in PE 13.13, but also to Athanasius35 and later to Cyril of Alexandria (Grant 1964). The latter adopts a notably hard line in his works, for example in his Commentary on John, determining that those who do not believe in Jesus are bound to “die in their sins”.36 Cyril’s language is, on this occasion at least (Crawford 2023), notably hostile and threatening against those who do not believe in Jesus, anticipating the violent expulsion of the Jews from Alexandria in 415.37 These were volatile times during which individuals and communities face numerous crises and feel the need to display their identities in dramatic ways (Anagnostou-Laoutides 2024). Furthermore, this is the time when Christianity, having found a champion in Constantine, is preoccupied with resolving its dogmatic disputes; the process left little room for the theological debates of the second and third centuries when Christianity posed as a philosophy, or rather as the “true philosophy” (Löhr 2010, pp. 168–70) and Christian teachers were confident in engaging with the intellectual traditions of the heterodox.38

In my view, these new circumstances that demanded of Christians to negotiate the ways in which the State would promote and even enforce Christianity dictate the style of Firmicus Maternus’ polemic Error of the Pagan Religions. However, although he draws as we shall see on Clement and ultimately on Plato’s views on atheism and impiety, Firmicus is more intent on attracting the attention of the emperors by using bold language. In his work, the philosopher assured the emperors that “ordered by the law of the Greatest God, your (i.e., their) severity should prosecute the evil deeds of idolatry” (29.1–2: hoc vobis dei summi lege praecipitur, ut severitas vestra idolatriae facinus omnifariam persequatur). Furthermore, closely paraphrasing the Book of Deuteronomy 13 on worshipping other gods39 he urged the leaders of the Byzantine theocracy to:

Hear and perceive with your holy senses what God commands you about this deed (de isto facinore): do not to pity either the son or the father, and through the loved members of a spouse, he thrusts the vindicating sword (Nec filio iubet parci nec fratri, et per amata coniugis membra gladium vindicem ducit). He also persecutes the friend with lofty severity and all the people are armed for breaking up the bodies of the sacrilegious (Amicum quoque sublimi severitate persequitur, et ad discerpenda sacrilegorum corpora omnis populus armature) (Errore 29.1 [ed. Oster, p. 133]).

The Old Testament God, Firmicus continues, further adapting Deuteronomy 13 (at 29.2 [p. 116])40 sanctioned even the extermination of whole cities when suggestions of worshipping new, unfamiliar gods were put forward:

killing (interficiens), you shall murder everyone who is in the city with a destruction by the sword (necabis omnes quiqui sunt in civitate caede gladii) and you shall burn the city with fire (incendes civitatem igni) and it shall be without habitation (et erit sine habitaculo) and nothing shall be built there forever (non aedificabitur in aeternum).

Notably, Clement, on whom Firmicus often relied (Turcan 1982, pp. 51–52; cf. Wagner 1971, p. 212, n. 5), quoted Deuteronomy 13:4 twice in the Stromata (2.19.100.3–101.1; 5.14.94.3–95.2), while discussing Plato’s views on our aptitude to become godlike. The difference in tone between the verses quoted by Firmicus and Clement is striking. Clement, in his usual style, weaved together pagan philosophical tenets (especially Platonic), with the Mosaic Law and Scriptural paradigms to defend the correlation of civic and divine law across intellectual traditions, with emphasis on the open-mindedness and peaceable nature of those perceptives of divine principles (Str 2.19.100.4):

For the law says (φησὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος), Walk after the Lord your God (ὀπίσω κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὑμῶν πορεύεσθε) and keep my commandments (καὶ τὰς ἐντολάς μου φυλάξετε = Deut. 13.4). For the law defines assimilation (i.e., the Platonic assimilation) as following (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξομοίωσιν ὁ νόμος ἀκολουθίαν ὀνομάζει)· and such following assimilates those who follow the law as far as possible (ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἀκολουθία κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῖ).41 Become, says the Lord, merciful and compassionate (γίνεσθε, φησὶν ὁ κύριος, ἐλεήμονες καὶ οἰκτίρμονες), like your heavenly father is compassionate (ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν).

Despite using Proverbs 2:21–22 to warn his readers that “the transgressors shall be rooted out from the earth” (2.19.102.2–3: οἱ δὲ παρανομοῦντες ἐξολοθρευθήσονται ἀπ’ αὐτῆς [i.e., τῆς γῆς]), Clement also insisted that it is “the image of God is really the man who does good” (2.19.102.2: τῷ γὰρ ὄντι εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος εὐεργετῶν). He also cited a prophecy according to which God ascertains that he will look “on him who is mild and gentle, and trembles at his words (2.19.101.2: ἐπιβλέψω … ἐπὶ τὸν πρᾷον καὶ ἡσύχιον καὶ τρέμοντά μου τοὺς λόγους). This assimilation, he continued, refers to people’s ability to approximate the mind and reason of God (2.19.102.6: κατὰ νοῦν καὶ λογισμόν), rather than His appearance, and is reflected both on doing good and, importantly, on ruling over others (2.19.102.6–7: ᾧ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ὁμοιότητα προσηκόντως ὁ κύριος ἐνσφραγίζεται). Clement concludes his chapter with a reference of notable Platonic hue to the contribution of holy men to the management of cities and households (2.19.102.7: βουλαῖς γὰρ ἀνδρῶν ὁσίων εὖ μὲν οἰκοῦνται πόλεις, εὖ δ’ οἶκος).

Clement also cited Deuteronomy 4:12 where Israel is reminded of their duty to be loyal to their God (Str 4.26.170.4):

now what does God your Lord require of you (νῦν, Ἰσραήλ, τί κύριος ὁ θεός σου αἰτεῖται παρὰ σοῦ) but to fear God your Lord (φοβεῖσθαι κύριον τὸν θεόν σου) and walk in all His ways (καὶ πορεύεσθαι ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ), and love Him (καὶ ἀγαπᾶν αὐτὸν) and worship Him alone? (καὶ λατρεύειν αὐτῷ μόνῳ).

However, not only did Clement cite here numerous additional paradigms from the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, and Plato (see Str 4.26.172.2–3 cited above), alongside pagan poets such as Euripides, always interspersed with examples from Scripture, but he insisted that it is Israel who has “the power of choosing salvation” (<τοῦτο> αἰτεῖται παρὰ σοῦ, τοῦ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντος ἑλέσθαι τὴν σωτηρίαν). Clement returned to the issue of free will in Book Five of the Stromata, claiming that faith is a choice: “for who is such a god-denier to disbelieve God and demand of him proof as from men?” (5.1.6.1: τίς οὖν οὕτως ἄθεος <ὡς> ἀπιστεῖν θεῷ καὶ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὡς παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀπαιτεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ).42 A few paragraphs later, Clement cited Deuteronomy once more, this time 6:4, reiterating to Israel that “God is one and you shall worship only Him” (Str 5.14.115.5: ἄκουε, φησίν, Ἰσραήλ, κύριος ὁ θεός σου εἷς ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις). But Clement, “a particularly irenic thinker, who affirms seeds of truth wherever he finds them” (Kovacs 2009, p. 263), would have never gone so far as to imagine the imperial army led by Constantine and/or his sons, as the extended hand of the Lord’s punishment against the heterodox (Gassman 2020, pp. 66–75). Unlike Firmicus Maternus who rejected vehemently philosophical allegories (Gassman 2020, pp. 57–61), intent “to develop a new approach to anti-pagan polemic, which treats Christianity and traditional cult as opposing theological and ritual systems” (Gassman 2020, p. 67), Clement repeatedly referred to Christianity as the “true philosophy” (Str 5.11.82.2).43 Thus, it seems, by the time of Firmicus Maternus there was need for Christianity to be translated into clear-cut dicta that emphasized its superiority and did not tolerate the interfaith erudition put on display by Clement and his followers.

Conclusions

As Socrates claims in the Apology (23D), people typically assumed that philosophers, too preoccupied with providing a rational explanation to everything and crafting fanciful arguments, “do not believe in gods” (θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν). Plato seems to respond to this accusation in the Laws where he defends the civic benefits of philosophical contemplation, now entrusted in the Nocturnal Council and their appointed theōroi. He went further by inviting the average citizens to engage in this kind of theōria through the practical Test of Dionysus which would allow them to monitor their ethical stamina, while urging them to contribute to the city’s goal of emulating the virtue of the gods reflected in the cosmic order.

Clement painstakingly employs Plato’s views to counter-suggest the Kingdom of God, the New Jerusalem, as the ideal state that Christians should aspire to, provided they followed the law of the Christian God and were willingly faithful to him. However, contemplation, philosophical or Christian, is an activity that accords with the educated elites that typically claimed senatorial positions. From this perspective, the crowds incited to violence by Firmicus Maternus—unlikely to be trained, interested, or trusted with deciphering philosophical allegories, appear to be pawns in a battle between Senate and Church representatives vying for securing influence on the emperors (Gassman 2020, pp. 116–17).