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Article

Reframing Vulnerability through an Embodied Theological Lens: Towards Ethical Engagement in a Globalized Context

by
Carolina Montero Orphanopoulos
Egidio Viganò Institute of Theology, Silva Henriquez Catholic University, Santiago 8330226, Chile
Religions 2024, 15(7), 766; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15070766
Submission received: 21 May 2024 / Revised: 20 June 2024 / Accepted: 20 June 2024 / Published: 24 June 2024
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Vulnerability in Theology, the Humanities and Social Sciences)

Abstract

:
This study examines the evolving concept of human vulnerability within the context of globalization and contemporary societal complexities. Its aim is to provide a comprehensive understanding of vulnerability’s proposed definition and its ethical relevance, particularly through an embodied ethical–theological lens. The research argues that this anthropological category when approached from an interdisciplinary perspective, reveals nuanced ethical dimensions essential for addressing contemporary challenges. Through the synthesis of insights from various disciplines, the study delineates the intricate interplay between corporeal experiences, affective states, and ethical considerations in understanding vulnerability. Interdisciplinary research methods were employed, drawing from theology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy. Grounding the inquiry in human experience and dialogues within different disciplinary narratives, the study explores vulnerability’s multifaceted nature and its implications for ethical engagement. The conclusions underscore the imperative role of theology in fostering ethical responses to contemporary dilemmas. By reframing vulnerability within an interdisciplinary and embodied framework, the research enriches ethical reflection and praxis, promoting human flourishing in a globalized world.

1. Introduction

In the contemporary era, our planet is intricately implicated within networks of interdependence, a reality shaped significantly by the widespread influence of globalization. This phenomenon has profoundly altered human interactions across various societal domains. Some examples of this are the unprecedented level of awareness regarding individual rights among both women and men, underscored by the proliferation of global movements advocating for minority groups through widespread protests. The increasingly pervasive discourse surrounding environmental consciousness and climate justice as many nations incorporate considerations of environmental stewardship into their cultural values and ethical frameworks.
On the other hand, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic illuminated numerous insights, notably demonstrating the capacity for various facets of daily life to persist amidst stringent confinement measures. Telecommuting, online education, artificial intelligence, and remote commerce have rapidly become ubiquitous in response to these circumstances. Concurrently, rising rates of migration compel states to formulate public policies and embrace cultural diversity within traditionally homogeneous societies.
Moreover, social sciences are addressing many features of life through the framework of diversity. These pertain to the societal utilization of the body, which is perceived both as a consumable commodity and a symbolic entity, along with the language inherent in bodily expressions. Additionally, there is an expanding social discourse concerning the future trajectory of human bodies, particularly in light of the profound influence wielded by advancements in science and technology. This discourse delves into how these advancements contribute to the formulation of novel perspectives on the body, life, and mortality (A. M. Barreiro 2004).
Globalization implies the imposition of neoliberal hegemony and the universalization of exacerbated vulnerability, favoring the weakening of bonds, the rise of individualism, and the consequent languishing of solidarity (C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022). The vulnerability experienced represents an intensified manifestation of this inherent human trait, stemming from a social process that impacts individuals but also originates from external sources. This process refers to an intangible reality, ubiquitous and comprehensive, and inherent within all social structures in which individuals are embedded.
Furthermore, the very process of modernization has led to human-made risks that are now beyond our control. The consequence of these manufactured risks, such as climate change or nuclear threat entails radical changes in the political, social, and cultural structures of nations. The uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability inherent in social, political, and economic processes, coupled with the rapid pace of technological and cultural change, weaken social and intersubjective bonds. This results in the failure of postmodernity, or “reflexive modernity” (U. Beck 2009), to offer new and adequate forms of support for citizenship.
This society has been called a “risk society” (U. Beck 2009).1 Life is experienced as danger and daily uncertainty, provoking a growing sensitivity to the subjective dimension of risk. Sociologists such as F. Furedi and Z. Bauman have highlighted the current state of modernity as marked by anguish and insecurity. Bauman (2007) emphasizes the current diminished sense of self, the fragility of its bonds, the fragmentation of communities, and the chronic need to be therapeutically sustained. U. Beck approaches the notion of individualized biographies which, on the one hand, are linked in their structures to self-fashioning and, on the other hand, are open to the almost limitless. This results in the strange combination of individualization experienced as both standardized institutionalization and biographical emancipation (U. Beck 2009).
The resulting paradox is that the individual, thus atomized, lives the experience of continuous isolation and fragmentation amid the rise of social networks. Individuals construct “biographies at choice” (Cohen and Méndez 2000, p. 180), an exhausting personal task, with the obligation to permanently choose how to act and how to be. One of the most dramatic manifestations of the above is the growing sense of being ill, with the therapeutic discourse of trauma, stress, burnout, and anxiety becoming commonplace in our societies (F. Furedi 2004).
On the other hand, the sociology of countries in the Global South, particularly those in Latin America, emphasizes the concept of social vulnerability as an emerging theoretical framework. This framework aspires to provide a synthetic, multidimensional interpretation of the phenomena of inequality and poverty worldwide (L. González 2009). It underscores that the fragility of impoverished human settlements is intrinsically linked to the surrounding social and political processes. These processes relate to the diminished susceptibility or resilience of individuals or groups exposed to threats, given the persistent violation of their dignity and rights.
In previous epochs of human history and within the Catholic Church, during times characterized by uncertainty and perceived threats to individuals and societies, there has been a temptation within theological ethics to adopt a rigid system of social and individual morality. This system seeks to address pervasive uncertainties by offering the apparent security of unmistakable and universally applicable norms. The underlying necessity is to receive and to dictate clearly what is to be done and thus give a secure meaning to life.
In some situations, or sectors of ecclesial discourse this seems to be the case today. However, the reality of globalization renders this approach inadequate. Moreover, the ongoing global ecclesial crisis, sparked by revelations of sexual abuse, exploitation of conscience, and abuses of authority perpetrated by members of the hierarchy, clergy, and religious has severely eroded the moral authority and trustworthiness traditionally associated with ecclesiastical institutions. As a result, there has been widespread questioning of the validity and credibility of their teachings. This crisis has engendered profound disillusionment among the faithful and the broader public, challenging the very foundations upon which these institutions have historically rested.
As a result, the Church cannot be a credible witness to the Good News of Jesus while simultaneously repeating old formulas or teachings. Christian ethics, like all theology, must assume the imperative exhorted by Pope Francis (Evangelii Gaudium 2013, n° 43): not fearing renewal but embracing the risk of discernment and the recreation of the enduring redemptive message of the Gospel. The aim is to proclaim this Good News in a language that is intelligible and meaningful, effectively reaching all peoples and circumstances.
Vulnerability is essential to an intricate and comprehensive understanding of contemporary human experience. With it, we are dealing with a disciplinary concept that is only fifty years old, and still lacking a clear or universally accepted definition. As a category of sustained expansion, the status quaestionis orbits around basic content that is as diverse as it is extensive.
This article proposes the substantive contributions theological ethics offers toward refining the conceptual framework of vulnerability, particularly when examined through the lens of embodiment. The term “embodied perspective” denotes an approach emphasizing the interplay between corporeal experiences, affective states, and ethical considerations in the understanding of vulnerability.
This exploration is conceived as an interdisciplinary endeavor, recognizing the intrinsic need in theology for a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of human existence. It is argued that by synthesizing insights from diverse disciplines—including but not limited to psychology, sociology, and philosophy—within the theological discourse, a more nuanced comprehension of vulnerability and its ethical dimensions can be attained. Furthermore, it is maintained that the relevance of theology hinges upon its capacity to engage with the lived realities of individuals and communities. Thus, grounding theological inquiry in human experience and different disciplinary languages is imperative for fostering resonance and efficacy in addressing contemporary challenges and promoting human flourishing.
The purpose of this endeavor is to underscore how theological ethics, when approached through an embodied lens and in interdisciplinary dialogue, provides profound insights into the essence of vulnerability and its ethical pertinence, thereby enriching ethical reflection and praxis.

2. A First Approach to the Concept of Vulnerability

The ubiquity and elasticity of the term “vulnerability” generate a perception of familiarity and common sense, fostering an assumed understanding that obscures its diverse uses and varied conceptual dimensions. These dimensions depend significantly on the disciplinary contexts and theoretical foundations from which the term is employed. While the malleability of “vulnerability” can lead to a confused sense of understanding, some scholars argue that its ambiguous boundaries render it suitable for reflecting on a wide range of human experiences of adversity (Brown et al. 2017).
I argue that human vulnerability embodies the fundamental state of openness inherent to human existence, positioned between the finite and the transcendent, thereby subject to the inscrutable subjectivities—both internal and external—and reliant on others for shaping identity and pursuing autonomous agency. This condition, fraught with risks, delineates vulnerability as a transcendental phenomenon, simultaneously universal and individual, emerging from the intrinsic human condition. Consequently, vulnerability manifests as a relational, intersubjective concept, particularly, it is evident in lived experiences.
We say vulnerability because it is the possibility—not the fact—of being wounded. Vulnerability is a latent condition, always present as a probability, although not always actualized. It is mainly in human relationships that this alternative becomes existent, becoming the vulnerable person. It is also possible that it becomes a condition of possibility for the flourishing of other potentialities proper to the authentic encounter between persons (C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022).
According to B. Hoffmaster, the insufficient theorization of the term is due to the fact that ethics historically had not paid attention to vulnerability for three reasons: (1) Because vulnerability is the antithesis of individualistic ethics and the exaltation of autonomy that predominates in Western societies; (2) Because moral philosophy has ignored the body; (3) Because ethics has been predominantly rationalistic and therefore no room has been given to emotions (Hoffmaster 2006, p. 43).
This phenomenon may be attributed to the intellectual imperative to comprehend and enhance moral principles, establishing human dignity upon rationality, as observed in the moral frameworks within the Western tradition of analytic philosophy. Consequently, the closer reason aligns with the logical and mathematical faculties, the greater scientific merit it is accorded.
The paradigm of this approach is Immanuel Kant, who has shaped the course of moral philosophy since 1785 when he published Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In his philosophy, Kant explicitly asserts that rationality endows human beings with their unique moral status and incomparable moral values (Kant 2003, p. 76). Since then, ethical paradigms as diverse in their presuppositions as neo-Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism have converged in similar representations of the moral subject, emphasizing rationality, autonomy, individualism, and self-sufficiency.
However, in the past three decades, a discernible shift in ethical discourse has emerged, characterized by what could be termed an emotional or sentimental subjectivist inclination, thereby fostering a more fluid alignment with the concept of vulnerability (De la Torre 2017). Within this paradigmatic evolution, exemplified by the scholarship of M.C. Nussbaum (2008), there arises a renewed assertion that moral significance is not solely vested in reason but also in emotions, demanding their consideration in the appraisal of moral judgments. It is within this contemporary cultural ethos that the proliferation and deliberation surrounding the concept of vulnerability find their context and justification.
Vulnerability is, therefore, understood here as a descriptive, normative, and moral concept with a fundamental role in general ethics and bioethics. Conceptualizing vulnerability as a guide to action in politics, moral philosophy, ethics, bioethics, and medical ethics is crucial for ensuring that everyone receives their due in society. In a descriptive sense, vulnerability characterizes human life as a fundamental fact. Contrary to some authors’ claims, this is not problematic; rather, it is constitutive of an individual’s sense of personal identity and agency (Straehle 2016).
As Hoffmaster has pointed out, we fear vulnerability most immediately because of the particular harms we seek to avoid. However, we fear vulnerability more deeply because of the “power we seek to retain” (Hoffmaster 2006, p. 41). This strong affirmation positions vulnerability as a relational, political, yet deeply personal concept. We need to feel our vulnerability to affirm our humanity. Recognizing the depth and breadth of our vulnerability reveals how much we need others—their protection and the openness and subjectivity that come from their vulnerability.
To be authentic is to be faithful or true to oneself, to one’s own being. If vulnerability is ontological and can be recognized in the vulnerability of others, then the vulnerability of others becomes a vehicle for authenticity. If we deny ourselves the opportunity to participate in the authentic exposure of vulnerability, we deny ourselves the opportunity to participate in humanity, which allows us to practice dehumanizing acts (L. E. Daniel 1998).
The paradox that this implies is what gives it its connotation of fragility. It is precisely because we are structurally open beings that we have the potential to encounter others. Because we depend on each other, we are capable of learning to relate to each other through care, tenderness, and solidarity. We live in the tension caused by our being “borderline beings” (E. Trías 2003, pp. 11–12) between the finite and the transcendent and the “non-coincidence” with ourselves (P. Ricoeur 2011, p. 21). We are not only capable of evil but also of glimpsing paths of reparation, growth, fulfillment, and communion with others.
According to this understanding, vulnerability is not an inevitable burden of our destitute humanity, an imperfection in the evolution of the species2, but rather a humanizing possibility for our anthropological condition. Vulnerability allows us to glimpse the horizon of our own life differently, for we can say with the psychiatrist Ignacio Boné Pina, “what human plenitude is, is recognized only by those who look towards the horizon of their vulnerability” (Boné Pina 2010, p. 214).
We can thus point out some initial premises (cf. C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022):
We are all vulnerable. Certainly, we all share a fundamental state of vulnerability. This condition derives from a triple source: firstly, the inherent subjectivity of human existence; secondly, the constitutive physical nature of humanity, inexorably bound to mortality; thirdly, the inherently social essence of individuals, which positions them inevitably within networks of interpersonal connections. These three facets, namely subjectivity, corporeality, and intersubjectivity, not only underpin vulnerability but also constitute foundational aspects of the human condition. Thus, vulnerability is not only pervasive but also ontological in nature, stemming from the very essence of what it means to be human.
Vulnerability as a constitutive and universal human reality. It is in itself neutral. Both the “kidnapping” of vulnerability, that is, its denial, and its idealization or absolutization end up distorting how the person positions him/herself before his/her own reality (I. Boné Pina 2010). Vulnerability may be inherent to human existence, yet it does not encompass the entirety of human essence. The significance of the experience of vulnerability, whether considered transcendental or experiential, is influenced by how individuals perceive and respond to it, both in relation to themselves and others, and the nature of the relationships that emerge as a result. This positioning holds profound significance, as evidenced in narratives concerning risk culture and therapeutic culture.
There are situations or contexts (vital, natural, socio-political, economic) that exacerbate the common anthropological vulnerability. Because we live exposed, and because of human lability (P. Ricoeur 2011, p. 21), the possibility of failure in the axiological project is real. There are social and personal realities that exacerbate vulnerability and lead us to be indeed vulnerated. As we can see throughout history, human vulnerability is both a cause of and opportunity for oppression.
One’s own and the other’s vulnerability calls for an ethical choice, and this is an indication of morality. The experience of vulnerability, whether inflicted by others or inherent within oneself, manifests as wounds and violations. Suffering emerges from perceiving and experiencing one’s fundamental vulnerability as a negative state of lack. Recognizing one’s own weaknesses and their potential implications for moral transgressions adds complexity to this challenge. In confronting such realities, any response becomes a deliberate choice, inherently laden with ethical implications.
This is completed by considering that human beings live not only based on what constitutes them but also based on what they are exposed to the variables that come from human history, from the nature in which they live, and from the others around them. Exposure to misfortune, to one’s own emotions (such as shame, love, and compassion) to contempt or false recognition, and to the vulnerability of others exacerbate the original constitutive vulnerability.

3. An Interdisciplinary Synthesis of the Definition of the Concept of Vulnerability

“Vulnerable is the human being as a singular body open to wounding. There is, however, no necessity in the vulnus that the term mentions, but only the potentiality of the wound always imminent and linked to contingency (…) as a body, the vulnerable remains such as long as he lives, delivered, at any moment, to the vulnus. The same potentiality delivers him/her to the cure and to the relational ontology that decides the meaning. Irremediably open to the wound and to the cure, the vulnerable is completely in the tension of this alternative”.
With this quote from Adriana Cavarero (2009, p. 58), an Italian philosopher, I summarize in some way what we have been elaborating. Vulnerability is presented as an irremediably open human potentiality to wounding, healing, and relational ontology. It grants deep meaning and at the same time is rooted in the historical contingency of each human biography. I aim to move from the field of human sciences and bioethics in the evolution of the concept of vulnerability to an ethical and theological reflection that renews the discipline from the paradigm of vulnerability as a complex category.
Vulnerability entails embracing fragility and willingly exposing oneself to the potential for healing and acceptance. Thus, vulnerability should not be misconstrued as passivity; rather, it signifies an active openness to the prospect of meaningful encounters and communion with others. From this perspective, of vulnerability as a generative condition, we can say with J. De la Torre (2017) that vulnerability serves as a profound catalyst for change within the world. It embodies the capacity to receive the fundamental gifts bestowed by parents, elders, and society as an act of absolute acceptance that acknowledges one’s limitations as essential for personal growth. This transforming source of the world is in fact what connects us with our deepest humanity and allows us to expose it, to let it permeate us, and to welcome the vulnerable other. It humanizes our ethical disposition in the relationships we establish with the world, with others, and with ourselves.
Defined in substance and considering extensive multidisciplinary previous research (C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022), the category of vulnerability refers to the constitutive openness of human beings concerning their surroundings, the connections they establish, and the positions they adopt concerning their own subjectivity. It embodies the condition of being permeable, of being affected and transformed in the interaction with one’s environment, oneself, and others, and that which transcends the individual. This inherent open structure manifests prominently in the human body but also extends to its constitutive social condition and the necessity to adopt an extrinsic perspective about oneself (G. Stanghellini 1997).
The ontological vulnerability pertains to the inherent susceptibility of humans to be affected by their surroundings, constituting a fundamental aspect of the human condition characterized by openness to the world. This vulnerability underscores the potential risks associated with this openness and affectability (H. Haker 2020).
Specific or circumstantial vulnerability (H. Haker calls it “structural vulnerability”) encompasses specific conditions of susceptibility experienced by individuals or groups. Factors such as age, illness, disability, or similar circumstances heighten the likelihood of experiencing hardship, contributing to the ontological dimension of vulnerability. For instance, being born in a region prone to environmental hazards like earthquakes or flooding can perpetuate a pervasive sense of insecurity.
Moreover, states of vulnerability extend beyond natural risks to encompass socially imposed vulnerabilities arising from one’s socio-economic status, ethnicity, gender, or religion. These socially inflicted risks, often manifestations of structural injustice, result in discrimination or marginalization of particular groups (H. Haker 2020). Judith Butler (2004) refers to these conditions as “precarity”, distinct from precariousness, signifying a reduction in social agency and the denial of equal security, safety, and opportunities for social autonomy in public spaces compared to privileged groups.
Accordingly, human vulnerability acquires the meaning of the ability of each man and woman to be affected, bodily, mentally, emotionally, and existentially by the presence, being, or acting of someone or something, or other. In a general sense, it means openness, permeability, relationality, transformation, and communication. Its positive dimension is that of an invitation and a calling to responsible relationships: recognition, solidarity, protection, love, and respect for the vulnerable other. In its negative dimension, it is the inherent capacity of every human being to be wounded or rendered invisible, and finally, the possibility of someone or something taking our lives (S. J. Stalsett 2015).
Vulnerability is a relational and intersubjective concept, for because we are open, we have the capacity for potential encounters with others, and this encounter is always located somewhere along the continuum between the extremes of love and violence. Vulnerability is therefore a human characteristic and potentiality which gives meaning and is rooted in the historical contingency of each human biography. This is why it entails a generative possibility, of a humanizing character, for the human condition, and a destructive possibility, in violence, when in the situational it passes from potency to the act of infringement. I will return to this ambiguity.
In the thought of A. Gehlen (1980), the human being is defined as deficient, incomplete, and unspecified by nature. This same deficient condition implies and demands an openness to the world and to the task of constructing one’s own existence, the outcome of which is always uncertain, since it can be ruined in the attempt. For this author, as for F. Nietzsche, the characteristic of the human mammal in relation to other mammals would be its condition of “unfinished being” and the consequent instability that produces such incompleteness forces it into continuous dependence. This marks a vital necessity prior to any choice since only with cultural and social support will it be able to remain alive and develop.
Moreover, vulnerability constitutes a risk due to the possibility of failure—of both the individual and society—in the tasks of survival, development, and the flourishing of each human being (I. Boné Pina 2003). Many scholars have explored the notion of the human being as thrown into the world, placed on an existential trajectory where one must conduct their life project with the awareness of their fragility, the possibility of failure, and the certainty of eventual death (M. Kottow 2011). In this context, the concepts of dependence, fragility, and openness to others are inherently understood as integral to human existence. This perspective acknowledges the dynamic nature of human inquiry and desire, which are boundless in their exploration yet constrained by the finite nature of oneself, others, and the world (J. Masiá Clavel 1997).
This understanding of vulnerability aligns closely with biblical anthropology, where vulnerability is implicitly formulated as openness to both transformation and devastation. In this view, man and woman are understood as nefesh haya, an open throat that receives, and is sustained by the life-giving breath of the Creator. This emphasizes that the very breath of life of the human being is in continuous dependence on God, whose help is necessary for ongoing development. Consequently, the human being is conceived as embodying precariousness and openness, sustained permanently and unconditionally by a God who loves them (C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022).
Human nakedness, a symbol so often used by E. Levinas (1974), indicates in the Bible the position that the creature adopts in the face of this original exposure and precariousness. Nakedness is a biblical symbol of vulnerability because it embodies all the ambiguity of a human reality to which we relate with difficulty. The desert, another biblical symbol of vulnerability (C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022), portrays the ambivalence of the people of God in the face of this human reality. Both a metaphor of desolation and rebellion, but also of the exemplary time when the people’s deepest identity is fused in the wilderness, the desert is a privileged place for the revelation of God and an occasion to be sustained by another who is a life-giving bond of healing and transformation. It is, at the same time, the place of love (cf. Hos 2:14) and the occasion of suffering, betrayal, and destruction through exposure to the forces of nature and our own emotions and needs that overwhelm us and make us vulnerable.
The image of the Lamb, particularly the Lamb depicted as slain yet standing in the context of the Apocalypse, overtly signifies a readiness to embrace vulnerable states, pushing this susceptibility to its utmost tangibility. This imagery embodies the kenotic essence of God, portraying a deity who chooses not to shield Godself but instead upholds a radical openness as an expression of both complete humanity and divinity. By embracing vulnerability, Christ demonstrates an extensive receptivity to others, to the extent of offering his life entirely and engaging in relationships that involve the entirety of others’ lives and humanity. Even to the point of sacrificing his own life for their well-being. This decision, simultaneously divine and human, imbues paramount significance to historical events, human endeavors, and the justice of God. Through this act, God binds Godself to the extent of undergoing death for the sake of His people’s existence. The ultimate culmination of history lies in the definitive victory of God over sin, malevolence, and mortality. Consequently, God and His Lamb bring human history to its most profound realization (C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022).
The biblical understanding of the human being that we have outlined, as well as the understanding of God that is made vulnerable by entering into a relationship, is consistent with the Christian theology of the Trinity. A God who is conceived as communion, who is constituted as such through intra-Trinitarian relationships, is a God who is essentially open. On the other hand, it understands the creative act of the transcendence of God as making himself available and opening himself to relationships. In creating the universe, God generates space for something other than God, actively making available his divine being to relate to that which is different from Godself. Consequently, God voluntarily limits his absolute freedom by absolute love, letting go of absolute power, and opening himself to creaturely being (T. E. Reynolds 2008).
God’s creative and providential presence is vulnerable. Vulnerability, the ability to live with, love, and suffer the other, is an inescapable part of human bonds. When God becomes relationally open to the gift of his own creation and embraces his creatures as unique and valuable beings, he shows himself in his vulnerability, willingly self-limiting by creation, and being affected by it.
The apex of this openness is epitomized in the Incarnation, where God, in Jesus of Nazareth, relinquishes His divine essence to assume the vulnerabilities inherent in human existence (J. Silva Soler 1996). In Jesus, vulnerability transcends extraordinary events marked by risk, pain, and mortality, such as the flight into Egypt, the persecution by the Pharisees, and the crucifixion. Vulnerability permeates his daily endeavors, evidenced by his receptivity to the suffering and marginalized, his capacity to foster community to advance his mission, and his unwavering communion with the Father. The incarnation of God embodies a profound openness, willingly embracing various attachments and bonds, and assuming responsibility for them, thus affirming the interconnectedness of all existence.
In Sacred Scripture, God is not the Greek immutable divinity. He makes Godself vulnerable, to the emotions of love and betrayal, to the freedom of his creature, to the relationship of loving closeness with his people, and to the always manifest ambiguity of their fidelity to their God (C. Montero Orphanopoulos 2022). It is this characteristic ambiguity of vulnerability that we develop below.

4. Vulnerability as a Condition of Openness and the Experience of Ambiguity

The human vulnerability that we have called radical, sometimes also called ontological or general, is the abstract conception of a universal characteristic of every human being as openness and permeability. Being a constant in the life of every human being, it is a potential capacity for communion and solidarity in vulnerability. As B. S. Turner (2006) states, it is this common human vulnerability that gives rise to a universal formulation of human rights.
However, the concrete experience of vulnerability is always situational, changing, asymmetrical, singular, and contingent. Human vulnerability is not experienced in equal ways by all, nor is it objectively assessable as situationally comparable in different scenarios (M. A. Fineman 2004). The perpetual risk and reality of vulnerability is that it often leads to competition, conflict, inequality, and violence, rather than solidarity in recognition of the common destiny and mutual interests of the common good (S. J. Stalsett 2015).
Human vulnerability, whether radical or circumstantial, presents itself as both menacing and enriching, constituting an ambiguous facet of human existence. Its realization spans a spectrum wherein it can materialize as a looming threat, a source of unadulterated joy or confidence, or a complex amalgamation of both (H. Springhart 2017). Thus, what we have hitherto regarded as a neutral attribute of vulnerability when examined through an ethical lens, also assumes the quality of ambiguity. In the realm of lived experience, human vulnerability assumes an ambiguous nature, as it serves as both the catalyst and the context for the emergence of both love and violence. In this regard, human vulnerability emerges as a potent dimension, possessing the capacity to evoke both fear and fulfillment within the spectrum of human existence.
In diverse ways, some of us are, in certain circumstances, more vulnerable than others, perhaps living with a greater degree of exposure or precariousness, even though we all share in the common radical vulnerability. So, when we relate to another human being in varying levels of fragility or dependence, we confront in ourselves something of their need, which can be the beginning of moral conversion. Such conversion can guide us to attend more effectively to people according to their singular and unique needs, rather than according to generalized practices influenced by the cult of normality (T. E. Reynolds 2008). Sometimes perceived vulnerability generates violence, rejection, the unequal exercise of socio-political power, or indifference.
In the past years, Judith Butler has emerged as a prominent figure in the discourse surrounding vulnerability, with a primary focus on “affectability” (J. Butler 2015). Her stance has evolved over time, yet she maintains an ambivalent position regarding the distinction between vulnerability and violence. Butler’s critique centers on situations where individuals are effectively “subjected” to norms they have no control over but must internalize to achieve subjectivity. In such cases, she argues the emphasis on passivity and affectability in the process of individuation can render it inherently violent (H. Haker 2020).
An ethical–theological conception of vulnerability emphasizes the importance of presenting a realistic portrayal of this concept. This approach acknowledges the inherent ambiguity of vulnerability and seeks to appreciate it as an intrinsic aspect of human existence, while also recognizing its potential to incite violence. This conceptualization of vulnerability embraces the intricate tapestry of life and the multifaceted dimensions of human experience, spanning individual, social, and political realms. Neither a purely negative nor an exclusively positive perspective on vulnerability can fully capture its complexity. A realistic understanding of human nature, one that recognizes vulnerability as an inherent aspect of the human condition, must be capable of navigating its ambiguity, encompassing both its threatening aspects and its potential to enrich the human experience.
In theological terms, the ambiguity of vulnerability resonates with the notion of faith understood as venturing from vulnerability, opening oneself, towards the world and towards God. It is based on the awareness of the need for salvation and hope in that which fulfills this life and transcends it, in eschatological terms. But, it is also based on the experience of a relationship with the Other, who is always intangible and unknowable, as E. Levinas reminds us. Thus, vulnerability implies a risk: it calls into question the susceptibility of the integral human being to harm concerning all its dimensions and within systemic and social contexts. At the same time, vulnerability is a resource, it is the precondition and expression of trust, mutual respect, responsibility, and the possibility of love.

5. Vulnerability to Love and Violence

In “The Fragility of Goodness” (Nussbaum 1995), M.C. Nussbaum delves deeply into the Aristotelian notion of philia, examining the essence of love and friendship. Of particular relevance to our discussion is her emphasis on a twofold understanding: love, or philia, intensifies human vulnerability, yet vulnerability is, an indispensable prerequisite for genuine love.
Love intensifies human vulnerability by subjecting individuals to the force of their emotions—including tenderness, passion, the fear of rejection, jealousy, and the uncomfortable acknowledgment of emotional dependence—as well as the risk of being hurt or unreciprocated. However, love also transcends a transactional mentality; what is given remains given, even if it may eventually be lost. Moreover, “(…) because of our bonds we risk losses that, strictly speaking, are not ours. The person without strong bonds only has to worry about his own health, his virtue, and his success. But he who loves another will be saddened by a double number of events and will make himself doubly vulnerable to fortune” (M. C. Nussbaum 1995, p. 450).
Conversely, love not only heightens the vulnerability of those engaged in mutual affection but also acknowledges it as a prerequisite for potentiality: “philia demands an openness and receptivity incompatible with fear” (M. C. Nussbaum 1995, p. 448). There is in love an unquestionable heightening of the awareness of vulnerability that we sometimes fear so much. Yet there is also a potential of such value for the good life, which moves Aristotle to say that it is “the most necessary thing in life” (Aristotle, Ethics to Nicomacheus, N, 1155ª28–32) and Nussbaum to complete the affirmation saying that it is “not only necessary but also intrinsically good and beautiful” (Aristotle 2004, p. 444).
Thus, love is in itself vulnerable, a potential that is at once humanizing, beautiful, and risky in human relationships. But in the age of globalization and individualization, we find that the very possibility of love is made vulnerable because there is a diminished emotional capacity. The ambiguity of modern society concerning commitments leads to the contradiction of a culture that maintains love as a cultural ideal but at the same time fears dependence (Z. Bauman 2007). The contemporary Korean–German philosopher, Byung-Chul Han, complements the above with the difficulty implicit in what love demands: to let the other be, effectively, the other. This would be the polar opposite of violence (Han 2019).
To exist as finite creatures is to be contingent and vulnerable. It is precisely this vulnerability that God embraces in Christ, entering fully into the fragility of the human condition, even to the point of violent death. Sharing the divine self in this way sends a distinctive message: God is in solidarity with humanity at its most fundamental level in vulnerability, openness, and brokenness. God reveals the divine nature as compassion not only by submitting to or suffering human vulnerability but also by bringing it to its fulfillment, raising it to God’s own being (T. E. Reynolds 2008). The logic here is paradoxical and subversive.
Love involves, fundamentally, welcoming another in a space of mutual vulnerability. It is the nature of a certain correlation between my being and that of another, a certain form of mutuality between the unclassifiable, in which we belong together. Moreover, love takes into consideration the other’s joy of living, respecting the other’s way of being, working to nurture the capacity for joy that it embodies, and remaining faithful to this in time.
As we can find in E. Levinas’ (1974, p. 180) approach to vulnerability, we discover ourselves incapable of being indifferent, neutral, and dispassionate observers, for in some way we become “hostage” to the other in the face of their exposed vulnerability. Someone has evoked with his presence, a metaethical level, which precedes freedom and moves to respond, to pay attention. In relation to the self, the other affirms a certain priority. We are called and attracted, involved in a relational event that is greater than the self and that occurs in the “in-between” that occurs in the relationship with the other. And this in-between zone is the dynamic and expansive space of reciprocity, of giving and receiving. It is the arc of human intersubjectivity (T. E. Reynolds 2008).
For Levinas, the face of the other, in its nakedness, is an imperative “thou shalt not kill me”, which in Levinasian language means “thou shalt make me live” (F. Guwy 2008, p. 22). There is a paradox in what we have just observed: the apparent weakness of vulnerability, in love, becomes a humanizing strength. Far from being just a liability that inhibits love—which it can be—vulnerability has the potential to allow us to establish the mutuality in the bonds that love embodies. Our human vulnerability opens us to others, enabling the possibility of love.
Violence, on the other end, and as defined by the American Psychological Association (APA), is characterized as “the expression of hostility and rage with the intent to injure or damage people or property through physical force, passion, intensity of emotions, or declarations”. It represents an unbridled eruption of hatred, rage, or sheer aggressive force, often stemming from ignorance or emotional imbalance. Its sole objective is to inflict harm, annihilate, and destroy. In its collective manifestation, violence indiscriminately ravages and vandalizes everything in its path—from traffic lights and buildings to stores and churches. On a more individual and interpersonal level, violence manifests as the degradation and humiliation of others, leading to a gradual erosion of dignity that may ultimately culminate in lethal outcomes (S. Dalla Piaza 2007).
In the first case, mass violence, what lies in the background is the deep discontent, the perception that the system is systematically unfair, that there is no recognition, and that those who do not have the means are treated as second-class citizens. What is expressed in violence is rage, impotence, and desperation. This is also a place, an extreme, of vulnerability. Vulnerability experienced as a place of oppression certainly generates violence.
In the latter scenario, individual and interpersonal violence becomes even more perplexing. Consider instances such as bullying experienced by a child, domestic abuse perpetrated by a father, violence against women, or the denigration of foreigners. What motivates such pervasive violence, and where does the underlying rage originate? In examining these situations, it becomes apparent that understanding violence requires acknowledging not only the damage inflicted upon victims but also recognizing the vulnerability of the perpetrators themselves.
In a third sense, as E. Levinas asserts, violence is not always manifested externally as physical aggression. Rather, it often resides in actions that disrupt the continuity of individuals’ lives, compel them to assume roles with which they do not identify, coerce them to betray not only their commitments but also their own essence, and compel them to engage in acts that undermine any potential for future action (E. Levinas 1974, p. 14).
Adriana Cavarero offers a distinctive perspective on contemporary violence in her work. Rather than focusing solely on the perpetrators of violence, she challenges the prevailing characterization of terrorism as the predominant form of violence in recent times. Instead, Cavarero introduces the term “horrorism” (Cavarero 2009) to emphasize the profound impact of violence on its victims. Furthermore, she explores the intricate relationship between violence and vulnerability, highlighting how acts of violence often exploit and exacerbate the vulnerabilities of individuals and communities.
“We are all vulnerable, that is, to the letter, woundable, because the vulnerability of our singular bodies, exposed to each other, constitutes the human condition that puts us in common, but leaves us distinct. The tragedy of our time lies precisely in the horrible circumstances that force us to perceive this condition under a specific form of outrage. Depending on the areas of the planet, such circumstances may be geopolitically diverse and variably intense, but the outraged human condition is nevertheless the same”. (A. Cavarero 2009, p. 14).
The philosopher Byung-Chul Han also highlights a crucial correlation between vulnerability and violence. He argues that a significant paradox arises when heightened capacities for violence are misconstrued as indicators of invulnerability. Consequently, acts of lethal violence, which entail complete annihilation, are often interpreted as a reduction in mortality (Han 2019, p. 35). Yet, this violence does not occur only in intersubjective relations. It also has a social, structural dimension:
“The situation in which a violent act takes place often has its origin in the system, in the systemic structure in which it is integrated. Overt and expressive forms of violence refer to an implicit structure, which the order of domination establishes and stabilizes, but which nevertheless escape visibility. Galtung’s theory of “structural violence” is also based on the structural mediation of violence. The structures established in the social system are concerned with the persistence of conditions of injustice. They fix unjust power relations and, consequently, differences in life chances, without manifesting themselves as such. Their invisibility means that the victims of violence do not become directly aware of the relationship of domination. Therein lies their effectiveness” (Byung-Chul Han 2019, p. 117).
Structures and systems are created by human beings, maintained by human beings, and also, at the same time, model human beings according to the structure. Some social structures or systems are themselves violent. For example, apartheid in South Africa was legal, but it was also profoundly violent. Racism and xenophobia, denial of women’s rights, child abuse, and so many other situations are violence that has become so naturalized that it seems to be part of the social structure. Quoting S. V. Wolputte (2004) “power and control are embodied as well. This is the politic body: the human body as a tool or weapon of domestication and disciplination and of identification, subjection, and resistance” (p. 254).
Hence, the spectrum of vulnerability, spanning from experiences of love to encounters with violence, stems from the innate openness and exposure inherent in human existence. This vulnerability extends to the emotions and actions of others, shaping and influencing individuals. While love, in its vulnerability, holds the potential for humanization, violence relentlessly seeks to dehumanize, diminish, and eradicate others. It is essential to acknowledge that systems or structures of violence, compounded by ongoing experiences of oppression, perpetuate these cycles of harm. Consequently, there exists a collective responsibility for all individuals to actively engage in dismantling these oppressive structures and fostering environments conducive to justice and equality.

6. Human Beings as an Open Embodied Reality: The Notion of Spirit in K. Rahner

Theological anthropology serves as a conceptual framework that, from a standpoint of faith, enables a deeper understanding of a myriad of human experiences. This theoretical and conceptual field explores reflections on the human condition and provides insights into fundamental inquiries regarding the purpose of one’s existence and the pursuit of a virtuous life. While theological anthropology constitutes a distinct discipline within the theological realm, replete with its unique categories and methodologies, I particularly invoke it here in its most evident connotation—namely, the understanding of humanity as articulated by Christian revelation.3
The Christian tradition consistently portrays the human being as the image of God actively engaged in the new creation inaugurated by Jesus Christ. Within this horizon of Christian meaning, the intrinsic dignity of the human person emerges as the primary principle. This understanding of humanity is a direct consequence of faith in a personal God who participates in the creation, redemption, and fulfillment of humanity through an unmerited, gratuitous, and merciful act of self-revelation. From my perspective, even the central concept of human dignity is intertwined with the notion of vulnerability: human beings possess an open, vulnerable dignity (B. Villegas 2016). Thus, human dignity is not merely a universal abstract concept but is also understood as a vulnerable reality, inherent in the absolute singularity and unique mode of existence of each individual, both as individual subjects and within their social and systemic contexts, illuminated by religious insights.
A comprehensive anthropology endeavors to provide a nuanced depiction of the essence of womanhood and manhood, as it grapples with pivotal inquiries regarding the inherent goodness of human existence, its complexities, and the significance of vulnerability (H. Springhart 2017). From this standpoint, the anthropological query becomes: what does it truly mean to embody authentic humanity? More specifically, within the framework of theological anthropology, the exploration revolves around elucidating how the foundational concept of human vulnerability as openness can be understood within the context of faith.
Anthropology encounters the challenge that the intricate nature of human experience surpasses the depth and complexity inherent in the most intricately woven theories across disciplines. To address this challenge effectively, the discourse within theological anthropology must originate from and resonate within the realm of experienced reality. The suitable method involves embracing concrete human experiences, allowing them to interrogate the construction of conceptual reflections, ultimately giving rise to an anthropological conception of vulnerability.
The constructed concept of vulnerability we employ encompasses the multidimensionality of human existence, condensing experiences spanning joy, anxiety, violence, love, suffering, illness, and death. It comprehends humanity in its embodied-spiritual dimensions, actualized within diverse contexts including the social, political, regional, and religious spheres. This concept articulates vulnerability as a dynamic interplay of these dimensions, striving to articulate, describe, and appreciate the complex interweaving of these aspects.
In this analysis, my aim is to concurrently consider both radical or ontological vulnerability and situational vulnerability. Reducing vulnerability solely to its radical dimension would diminish its transformative potential and neglect the realistic acknowledgment of the intricacies of the human condition. Disregarding situational vulnerability implies a denial of the corporeal, concrete, and singular nature of human existence. Conversely, if vulnerability is exclusively reduced to its situational dimension, there is a discernible risk of it becoming a tool for discriminating against groups deemed “vulnerable”, viewing them through the lens of weakness and deficiency, and questioning their inherent value.
We have seen above that human vulnerability can be defined essentially as the constitutive openness of the human being to what surrounds him, to relationships with others and with himself, and to what transcends him. This anthropological perspective, derived from interdisciplinary dialogue, is not entirely novel within the theological domain. It has been previously developed by Karl Rahner (1904–1984), the eminent German theologian, who proposed a transcendental anthropological method.
Part of Karl Rahner’s significant contribution lies in his skillful synthesis of the prevalent emphasis on the subject during his era, often described as the “anthropological re-centering” of Christianity. Crucially, Rahner’s theological insight ensures that this movement does not represent a mere regression towards a self-centered anthropology. Rather, it becomes a profound recognition of the aspects within the subject that serve as the conditions for a radical opening to the infinite, to the entirety of being, and to the absolute being. Rahner’s theological profundity elevates this re-centering into an acknowledgment of the inherent capacity for profound openness to the boundless dimensions of existence (F. Berrios 2015).
In Rahner’s theological framework, the self-communication of God to humanity is intricately linked to the historical context and profoundly influenced by the Christ event, which serves as a pivotal axis. Rahner delineates the necessary conditions for this divine self-revelation to be perceptible. According to him, humans must inherently possess an inherent “openness” (offenheit) to God’s communication. This openness is deemed a priori, ensuring that if such a divine word is spoken, it can be genuinely understood and embraced by individuals (K. Rahner 1967).
Thus, in Hearers to the Word, Rahner elaborates a second part entitled The Openness of Being and of Man. And within it, in the fifth chapter, Man as Spirit, the theologian writes: “Man is the absolute openness to being in general, or, to put it in a single word: the human being is spirit. Transcendence into being is the fundamental constitution (Grundverfassung) of man” (Rahner 1967, p. 79). That is to say, the human being is defined, first of all, as spirit, an affirmation that in Rahner’s theological anthropology is equivalent to saying openness.
The spiritual essence of the human being, as defined by Rahner, is characterized as essential openness, serving as the a priori condition for the possibility of perceiving the self-revelation of God, the divine word spoken. We must not mistake his choice of the term “spirit” with the notion of “disembodiment”. As finite and contingent beings, humans are inherently predisposed to infinite and absolute transcendence through the embodied experience of life. In theological terms, we could assert that by virtue of creation, the human being is ontologically conceived as capax Dei (Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate XIV 2023, p. 8.11), meaning “capable of God”. This capacity is made possible through a constitutive structure imbued with inherent openness to that which surpasses it, constituting an unlimited aprioric horizon for human existence. Thus, the revelation of God must be manifested in such a way that the human being, in his openness or spirit being, can receive it.
The human being, as thus conceptualized, embodies a spirit of openness, not incorporeal or disembodied, but rather incarnated in history, actualizing the significance of existence through openness to transcendence. This conception does not represent a novel rendition of ‘fuga mundi’ “but, on the contrary, through a radical rootedness in the reality of history, assuming the challenges of this concrete here and now unavoidable, in which the definitive meaning of that same existence is prepared and anticipated” (F. Berrios 2015, p. 227). This implies the conviction that God fulfills and saves human beings always with the help of their historically situated freedom (K. Rahner 1998). From this perspective, the world and history are the space of human freedom, and in it, in the “sphere of praxis, the decisive point of salvation as an event of freedom is played out for Christians” (K. Rahner 1998, pp. 419–20).

7. Vulnerability as an Ethical-Theological Category

Twenty-six years have passed since, J. D. Kemp, P. Rendtorff and twenty other European bioethicists signed the Barcelona Declaration (1998) that proposed four new principles to guide Bioethics: dignity, autonomy, integrity, and vulnerability. These scholars conceived vulnerability as ontologically prior to other principles, since it expresses an anthropological attribute that precedes any norm. Following J. Habermas (2000), they argued that vulnerability is the origin of moral dynamism, fundamental to the notions of respect, care, and ethical concern for the other. Moreover, it is a human characteristic that carries within it the potential capacity to bridge gaps between moral strangers and to function as an effective regulating principle in a pluralistic society. Thus, it is a core biopolitical principle of the modern welfare state.
They argued that these basic principles not only form the anthropological premises for the legal respect of each person but are also ethical symbols and primordial values, as they concern the humanity we aspire to be. These elements encompass a teleological perspective on human existence, legal principles, and tangible norms that interweave the concepts of social justice, solidarity, and responsibility. Notably, vulnerability, as a constitutive aspect of the human condition, is not axiologically neutral in its situational specificity. Given its latent or conditional nature, interacting with vulnerability entails a corresponding responsibility for those involved.
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO 2005) reflects what, in my view, was a prophetic step in the formulation of a more humane ethics, ratifying in its eighth article the respect due to the universal vulnerability of every person and demanding protection for specific or situational vulnerabilities. It thus constituted, in its descriptive (universal vulnerability) and normative (specific vulnerability) dimensions, a concept of vulnerability of a dual nature, adjective, and substantive. Recognizing the inherent anthropological nature of general vulnerability points to the need to identify the sources of specific vulnerability, the duties of protection owed to those in this situation, and the circumstances under which vulnerability can be reduced.
In the more than two decades since the inception of European principlism, contemporary societies have witnessed the emergence of a heightened cultural awareness toward human vulnerability. This awareness has sparked discussions and debates surrounding the ethical implications of this concept. Intuitively, as mentioned earlier, the term vulnerability today appears to capture something morally significant concerning the characteristics of individuals and their life situations, necessitating a thoughtful response. Once again, Habermas offers a clear articulation of this intuition, emphasizing that any insights guiding us on the optimal behavior to counteract, through care and respect, the profound vulnerability of individuals are inherently moral (J. Habermas 2000).
In our exploration of the perspective put forth by P. Kemp and J. D. Rendtorff (Rendtorff and Kemp 2020), the ethical consideration of vulnerability transcends mere legality or the duties of protection in response to specific or situational vulnerability. Instead, it fundamentally delves into the question of the kind of humanity we aspire to cultivate. From an ontological standpoint, the moral discourse of norms and rules assumes a secondary role compared to the essential reality of human interaction and communication concerning the flourishing of human life.
Christian ethics too addresses moral norms derivatively. Primarily, Christian moral discourse highlights the transformed existential state of human freedom and made achievable through God’s self-communication. Being in Christ, employing the Pauline expression, serves as the ontological foundation for the ability to act in a manner aligned with Christ. This concept was a distinctive contribution of the Second Vatican Council to moral theology. The Council emphasized the significance of a biblical comprehension of the moral life, thereby transcending the scholastic interpretation of natural law, which had been strongly influenced by the epistemological assumptions of modern rationalism and the scientific ideal of demonstrable ethics (R. Dell’Oro 2006).
Each moral claim expresses the autonomy and vulnerability of the moral agent: the person is in itself by nature but becomes itself through the exercise of freedom constructed with others. Ricoeur approaches exactly this matter in Le Juste 2 (Ricoeur 2001). Autonomy or freedom is an abstract assumption contained in the definition of the human, which becomes a task to be performed. H. Haker develops this understanding in her proposal for “vulnerable agency” (Haker 2020).
Moral capacity is a potentiality that takes shape and evolves within the framework of sustaining social relations. Consequently, moral experience should be perceived as the journey toward achieving one’s full self. In Christian ethics, this process of “becoming fully” finds expression as a potentiality for individuals within the person of Jesus Christ (Gaudium et Spes 1965, p. 22). This is precisely what is meant when suggesting the potentiality of a more humane ethics: an ethic that not only realizes the inherent potential of each man and woman but also envisions its ultimate horizon in the complete humanity exemplified by Jesus.
In summary, human vulnerability is approached as an ethical–theological category with various forms and levels. Firstly, it is seen as a universal condition necessitating ethical engagement and decision-making in relation to oneself and others, originating from vulnerability itself. Secondly, human interdependence and connection to the created world introduce challenges in power dynamics, leading to ethical responsibilities. Here, vulnerability is intertwined with awareness of responsibility, shaping moral actions and responses to others. Lastly, acknowledging human vulnerability is crucial in studying modern societies, serving as a foundation for pursuing relevant knowledge and informing social policies to address contemporary vulnerabilities.
In essence, human vulnerability serves as both the starting point of moral life and the normative principle within Christian ethics. As a persistent and defining trait of theological anthropology, as previously explored, human vulnerability poses to individuals the fundamental question of understanding its nature and how to navigate their openness to the world, others, and God in a more authentically human manner. These inquiries inherently fall within the domain of ethics at large and, more specifically, moral theology.

8. Embodiment, the “Place” of Our Common Vulnerability

While sociobiology views the body as having “a biological and pre-social foundation upon which the superstructures of the self and society are constructed” (Shilling 1993, p. 41), constructivist thinkers such as Douglas, Foucault, Goffman, and Turner conceive of the body as culturally situated rather than biologically determined. From this standpoint, the body is culturally interpreted universally, implying that biology is not separate from culture but rather integrated within it. The assumption that biology exists outside of culture was for a significant period a rationale behind the neglect of the body as a subject of study by social theorists (A. M. Barreiro 2004).
On the other hand, from a philosophical point of view, human subjectivity cannot be fully understood without considering the corporeal aspect of the subject The importance of the body in shaping human experience, perception, and understanding of the world is part of the “embodied turn”, a pivotal shift in twentieth-century philosophy. That is: “the positioning of (human) corporeality as a relevant theme of reflection and theoretical and even socio-cultural proposals. This meant a true philosophical revolution, as far as the paradigm of consciousness (of the ‘soul’) as the center and privileged referent of thought and, particularly, of the understanding of the human being, ended” (M. T. Ramírez Cobián 2017, p. 51).
One of the most eminent figures in this shift is Merleau-Ponty, who, while developing a theory of subjectivity, emphasizes the integration of corporeality with consciousness. From this viewpoint, the body is not merely a material entity but rather the embodiment of the self in the first-person perspective. According to this perspective, bridging the gap between the self and the world occurs not only through consciousness but also through corporeal experience (Teo 2017).
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty was not alone in this endeavor. During the 1940s and 1950s, French philosophers like Gabriel Marcel and Michel Foucault shifted the focus to the body, marking the beginning of the bodily turn. Subsequently, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a surge in the development of theories on the body in social life. By the 1980s, various movements and events, including feminist theology, black theology, liberation theology, queer theories, and the HIV/AIDS epidemics, all underscored the centrality of the body in human existence, leading to significant religious, political, and cultural implications (J. Meiring 2015).
The experience of every human being is that his or her subjectivity is given in a body, a fragment of ambiguous space, where spatiality, desire, and language are the limits of his or her finitude (A. Oliva Portolés 2015). The same spatiality, desire, and language are what facilitate the encounter between two bodies, between groups of bodies, which are subjects, which are persons. The permeability of the human body is also its vulnerability, its capacity for affectation in the “objective”, the body of the poles of violence and love, encompassing the full range of possible intermediates. As S. V. Wolputte (2004) affirms, “the body emerges as a changing relationship that, at the same time, unfolds as an ethical horizon and challenge for the (un)making of self, identity, and belonging” (p. 251).
The body transcends mere physical morphology; it shares an intimate connection with subjectivity (G. Cachorro 2008). This intangible concept sparks imagination and stimulates our auditory senses. Subjectivity, devoid of material form, finds expression through individuals and their bodies. Thus, subjectivity can be envisioned and inferred from bodily expressions. Imagination is complemented by description, with body and subjectivity, description and imagination being two facets of the same entity.
Observing external features provides a glimpse into a person’s physical presence, yet this observational knowledge is limited in capturing the depth of bodily understanding. While we can identify organs, take samples, and note surface characteristics, certain aspects of bodily knowledge such as subjectivity, sexuality, and individual relationships with the body remain beyond description. This knowledge is subjective and relational, shaped by unique life experiences. Subjectivity necessitates nuanced interpretations, as it is intricately linked with bodily desires, pleasures, and passions, which vary among individuals. (G. Cachorro 2008).
Returning to Merleau-Ponty, the most relevant and decisive aspect of his philosophy of the body is the insistence on recognizing human corporeality, all that is corporeal, as an original and originating instance. Corporeality is a mode of being in its own right, which rebels against any reduction of the corporeal to its physical–spiritual aspect and which also completely distinguishes itself from the world of consciousness. The body is subject and object at the same time; it is a subject-object (M. T. Ramírez Cobián 2017). The point for the French phenomenologist is that “the body is the ‘being’ of subjectivity, the ‘being of thought’; and it is, at the same time, the mode in which we access being or, rather, the mode in which we reveal to ourselves the pre-eminence of being over ourselves (that is: over our purely reflexive, intellective, and cognitive consciousness) (M. T. Ramírez Cobián 2017, p. 51).
These interpretations have strongly influenced both Christian and gender interpretations of cultural representations of the body. They force the integration of affectivity and sexuality but also recognize the social representations of the body and subjectivity to establish relationships in the experience of the individual and his or her own identity, corporeality, or corporal subjectivity.
Hence, the body should be considered a moral category within an ethics of vulnerability. This perspective transcends its traditional role in regulating sexuality or reproduction, as often prescribed by religious doctrine, to encompass corporeality as an integral aspect of human existence. This involves cultivating awareness of one’s surroundings, fostering connections with others, and fully inhabiting time and space, which serve as the framework for decision-making and action. Corporeality, like other facets of humanity, embodies vulnerability, openness, susceptibility to harm, capacity for connection, and propensity for error. It encompasses the entirety of human traits explored extensively within the realm of vulnerability.
It is worth noting that there have been efforts within the magisterium to develop “theologies of the body” as well. A notable example is Pope John Paul II, who sought to emphasize the greatness of human dignity, marriage, and the family. He conducted six cycles of weekly catechesis on human love in the divine plan from 1979 to 1984. This elaboration of a theology of the body has had a significant impact, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, where various authors have furthered the development of his ideas (e.g., J. B. Nelson 1978; B. Ashley 1985).
In his final catechesis on 28 November 1984, John Paul II emphasized that the theology of the body extends beyond the topics he covered to include other relevant aspects, many of which he would address in subsequent documents such as Familiaris Consortio (1981), Salvifici Doloris (1984), Mulieris Dignitatem (1988), and Evangelium Vitae (1995). This theology focuses on fallen nature, anthropological unity, the spousal and unitive significance of man and woman in the communion of persons, sexuality, and the resurrection of the flesh.
Whilst the effort and the intuition are to be commended, in my judgment this Theology of the Body is quite disembodied, not to mention the series of gender-sensitive subjects it overlooks. More straightforwardly, John Paul II’s vision of the role of the woman in the family and in society relies on traditional gender roles and their implications for reproductive rights and sexual ethics that are patriarchal and narrow. Furthermore, his role in the sexual abuse crisis that began to explode in his time, is highly problematic.
The phenomenology of the body I propose here, along with its ethical implications and its pertinence to theological ethics of vulnerability, diverges from the perspective advocated by John Paul II. Instead, it aligns more closely with the imperative to incorporate corporeality comprehensively. In this framework, corporeality encompasses not only the physical body but also openness to the world and others, the spatial-temporal embodiment of being, and the inherent vulnerability that accompanies it. In ethical contemplation, the human being is perceived as a complex and situated entity intimately interconnected with the world. The body is not merely a passive material vessel for consciousness; rather, it serves as the visible manifestation of the self, expressed through its concrete and unique presence.
The aforementioned necessitates not only a new anthropology but also a novel epistemology of corporeality, requiring a reimagined approach to comprehending the body. This involves transcending essentialist definitions that have conventionally framed our understanding of the body and embracing the concept of corporeality as a dynamic entity that evolves in space, time, and linguistically in interaction with other bodies. The body is not static but rather a permeable and porous boundary, shaped by socio-cultural influences.
Corporeality serves as the locus of our shared vulnerability. As a category within the ethics of vulnerability, it must be examined as the multifaceted reality that it is: a biological phenomenon and a socio-cultural, affective, and sexual construct, a site of exposure and recognition, integral to one’s identity and its ongoing construction. Within the human experience, corporeality presents opportunities for both tenderness and harm, for expressions of love and instances of violence. In our current context, it is our contention that ethics aimed at fostering greater humanization cannot overlook the significance of embodiment.

9. Conclusions

The exploration of vulnerability through an embodied theological lens not only underscores the importance of corporeal experiences in shaping ethical engagement but also contributes to a broader understanding of human existence within a globalized context. By synthesizing insights from various disciplines, including sociology, philosophy, and theology, this study elucidates the multifaceted nature of vulnerability and its ethical implications.
The recognition of the body as a central aspect of human subjectivity challenges traditional dichotomies between mind and body, highlighting the inseparability of corporeal and cognitive dimensions of experience. From sociobiological perspectives to philosophical inquiries into the embodied self, scholars have increasingly emphasized the significance of corporeality in shaping human identity and social relations.
The embodiment of vulnerability transcends mere physical morphology, encompassing affectivity, sexuality, and individual relationships with the body. As such, corporeality serves as a moral category within an ethics of vulnerability, demanding a comprehensive understanding that goes beyond regulatory frameworks to encompass the full range of human experiences and expressions.
Furthermore, embodiment complicates traditional notions of agency and responsibility in ethical discourse. Human bodies are both sites of agency, where individuals exercise their capacity to act in the world, and sites of vulnerability, where they are subject to external forces and influences. Understanding the interplay between agency and vulnerability is essential for crafting ethical responses that empower individuals while recognizing the structural constraints that limit their choices and opportunities. Within this framework, theological reflections on vulnerability offer unique insights into the ethical dimensions of human existence. By embracing vulnerability as a shared aspect of the human condition, theology can contribute to ethical reflection and praxis that promote compassion, justice, and solidarity in a globalized world.
Moving forward, it is essential to continue exploring the complex interplay between corporeality, vulnerability, and ethical engagement. By cultivating awareness of the embodied dimensions of human existence and fostering connections with others, we can work towards a more compassionate and inclusive ethic that honors the dignity and worth of every person, regardless of their vulnerabilities. Ultimately, it is through an embodied understanding of vulnerability that we can strive towards a more just and equitable society for all.
Thus, an embodied theological approach to vulnerability enriches ethical reflection and praxis by centering the embodied experiences of individuals and communities. By embracing vulnerability as a shared aspect of human existence and attending to the embodied realities of diverse social groups, we can cultivate a more compassionate, just, and inclusive ethic that honors the dignity and worth of every person.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Notes

1
Byung-Chul Han calls it “burnout society”, as an expression of the positive violence that eats away and exhausts individuals, where the imperative of performance transforms freedom into self-imposed coercion and self-exploitation. Cf. Byung-Chul Han (2019). He has also called it the “society of transparency”, whose panoptic control through the network leads to self-enlightenment or permanent exposure of the sphere of the private, as an economic imperative.
2
It is interesting, from this point of view, the approach to tenderness as an “indispensable factor in the process of hominization”, in N. Martínez-Gayol (2005, pp. 280–85). Here it is stated that vulnerability is the condition of possibility of the process of hominization that has led to the human species.
3
It is important to emphasize that such an understanding of the human being is not given once and for all but is part of the historical nature of revelation itself. For this reason, both the form and the content of theological anthropology remain constantly open to the task of new reinterpretations. Cf. R. Dell’Oro (2006, p. 19).

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Montero Orphanopoulos, C. Reframing Vulnerability through an Embodied Theological Lens: Towards Ethical Engagement in a Globalized Context. Religions 2024, 15, 766. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15070766

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Montero Orphanopoulos C. Reframing Vulnerability through an Embodied Theological Lens: Towards Ethical Engagement in a Globalized Context. Religions. 2024; 15(7):766. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15070766

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Montero Orphanopoulos, Carolina. 2024. "Reframing Vulnerability through an Embodied Theological Lens: Towards Ethical Engagement in a Globalized Context" Religions 15, no. 7: 766. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15070766

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