A Comparative Study of Shame as Denoted by Hrī, Apatrāpya, and Xiuwuzhixin
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThis article represents an important contribution regarding the differences between the Buddhist and Confucian understandings of shame. The article is clearly written and well-structured. Nonetheless, in several places there are some formulations which could potentially lead to inaccuracies or misunderstandings, and there are also places where providing more explicit explanations could be helpful. These have been highlighted below.
You begin your article with mention of Ruth Benedict’s 1946 book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. Not all readers will be familiar with this study, so it would be good to provide a brief summary of this book and background information on how it was written and why it is controversial.
Moreover, you passingly mention ‘odd backwater and boomtown’ as self-evident categories of comparison; again, this would need to be explained.
Throughout, please note that your use of en-dashes (–) to connect two word-elements to create a compound is contrary to normal usage, where this function is taken by hyphens (-).
One example to illustrate, but this applies throughout the article: subject–subordinate should be subject-subordinate.
On the other hand, to connect date or number ranges, the en-dash is the correct choice.
p.5 and p.7: Aside from Engle’s translation, you might also consult the one by Anacker >> Anacker, Stefan, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, The Buddhist Psychological Doctor, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008.
Beal 1862 >> You would do well to include reference to more recent translations: e.g., Sharf, Robert H., ‘The Scripture in Forty-two Sections’, in Religions of China In Practice, Ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp.360–364.
Heng-ching Shih (tr.), ‘The Sutra of Forty-two Sections’, in Apocryphal Scriptures, Berkeley, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2005, pp.31–42.
On p.5 you quote Sartre as advocating that shame is driven by external factors, and you say that in this respect he contradicts (unspecified) ‘Western scholars’. Then, on p.6, you quote Aristotle as similarly upholding that shame is connected to an awareness of the dishonour brought about by reckless behaviour. So, why does Sartre contradict the earlier trend among Western scholars, given that Aristotle himself also emphasized external factors? Or who are the Western scholars that Sartre contradicts?
l.219: mind and mental concomitants >> here you might add ‘and the nature of reality’ (since that is what ‘thatness’ refers to in Buddhism)
ll-227–229: External and internal duality >> This sentence needs to be reformulated as it gives the mistaken impression that Buddhism promotes an inherently dualistic perspective between the (external) world and the (internal) mind. Such an impression would be incorrect, given that Yogācāra philosophy in particular promotes instead the idea that all appearances are creations of the mind. Even the basic teaching of the five aggregates emphasizes the interplay between external and internal factors rather than an inherent duality.
Therefore, I suggest reformulating the sentence as follows: “Unlike the interaction between internal and external factors in the interplay of mind and mental concomitants in the Buddhist concept of shame, …”
l.274: which comes from the understanding of the world >> This is not entirely true, and such a statement cannot be left to stand unqualified.
The Buddhist perspective is certainly not that good and bad deeds can be judged as such solely on the basis of worldly conventions. Buddhist ethics is based on the principle that wholesome or virtuous deeds generate good karma or merit, whereas unwholesome deeds generate negative karma or demerit. In other words, this is connected to the way things are, the nature of reality or thatness, with wholesome behaviours being better aligned to thatness than unwholesome ones. Whereas neither good nor bad karma can in themselves lead to liberation but merely to higher or lower rebirths within cyclic existence, it is held that positive, virtuous deeds create favourable conditions that indirectly support spiritual practice and hence liberation. Moreover, from the perspective of advanced Buddhology and the notion of the various buddha bodies, the result of merit accumulated on the path in the form of virtuous deeds is the form body (Skt. rūpakāya).
So I think you will need to reformulate the above statement to avoid giving a misleading impression regarding Buddhist philosophical formulations on this point. While the Buddhist psychological understanding of hrī and apatrāpya involves concomitant internal and external factors in resisting the impulse to perform unwholesome deeds, it does not follow therefrom that Buddhist culture as a whole merely emphasizes ‘the understanding of the world’, as apparently suggested above. As you rightly write lower down (l.324, l.329), the Buddhist notion of shame involves both internal and external constraints, so it’s merely the case of reformulating the above sentence in line with that.
ll.357–370: This is a very important paragraph to understand the relationship between the Buddhist concept of thatness and the Confucian notion of rightness. However, the paragraph is extremely dense and would really benefit from some additional explanations to spell out the full implications of this relationship and the way you envisage its repercussions on the discussion as a whole.
Ll.383–384: However, a fundamental difference exists in the understanding of good and evil between the Indian Buddhist culture and the Confucian culture of Mencius. >> Here it would be good to summarize for the benefit of readers what this fundamental difference is.
l.391: in traditional and present-day contexts >> your study focuses on traditional contexts, with only a brief passing mention of modernity. I therefore, suggest that you remove the reference to present-day contexts in the conclusion.
More minor points
l.4: significantpoint >> space
l.80: remove unwanted full stop
l.175: these internal driving force >> forces (plural)
l.176: shame >> conscience [(a) to avoid repetition of shape in previous line and (b) because conscience is the precise word in English that renders this internal driving force]
l.255: prevalent modern society >> prevalent in modern society
l.255: (believing in Buddhism) >> (i.e., believing in Buddhism)
l.256: may not have contemporary moral attributes >> may not have the same contemporary relevance in moral terms
l.261: remove unwanted ‘p.’
l.283: humaneness[ren >> space
l.321: correspond to >> are the antitheses of
l.357: the thatness >> remove ‘the’
l.366: collapse >> add ‘the’ (i.e., the collapse)
Conclusions >> the title needs to be emphasized more typographically >> speak to editors
l.375: two shames >> two distinct types of shame
l.380: influence of external rightness >> influence of external factors
note i: characters >> character
Comments on the Quality of English Languagel.4: significantpoint >> space
l.80: remove unwanted full stop
l.175: these internal driving force >> forces (plural)
l.176: shame >> conscience [(a) to avoid repetition of shape in previous line and (b) because conscience is the precise word in English that renders this internal driving force]
l.255: prevalent modern society >> prevalent in modern society
l.255: (believing in Buddhism) >> (i.e., believing in Buddhism)
l.256: may not have contemporary moral attributes >> may not have the same contemporary relevance in moral terms
l.261: remove unwanted ‘p.’
l.283: humaneness[ren >> space
l.321: correspond to >> are the antitheses of
l.357: the thatness >> remove ‘the’
l.366: collapse >> add ‘the’ (i.e., the collapse)
Conclusions >> the title needs to be emphasized more typographically >> speak to editors
l.375: two shames >> two distinct types of shame
l.380: influence of external rightness >> influence of external factors
note i: characters >> character
Author Response
Comments 1: This article represents an important contribution regarding the differences between the Buddhist and Confucian understandings of shame. The article is clearly written and well-structured. Nonetheless, in several places there are some formulations which could potentially lead to inaccuracies or misunderstandings, and there are also places where providing more explicit explanations could be helpful. These have been highlighted below.
Response 1: I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your overall endorsement and the detailed feedback provided below. I particularly appreciate you supplying direct answers and an extensive bibliography, from which I have gained a great deal. I have carefully read through each of your comments and have fully incorporated your suggestions. The specific revisions made are as follows.
Comments 2: You begin your article with mention of Ruth Benedict’s 1946 book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. Not all readers will be familiar with this study, so it would be good to provide a brief summary of this book and background information on how it was written and why it is controversial.
Response 2: I took your advice and have now included a brief introduction to the book and the background of the controversy in the paper. Here’s what I’ve added:
Benedict’s proposition in his book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, where he posits that “guilt” is emblematic of Western culture and “shame”of Eastern culture, has sparked remarkable controversy regarding the categorization of moral sentiments (Heller 1985, p. 1).
Comments 3: Moreover, you passingly mention ‘odd backwater and boomtown’ as self-evident categories of comparison; again, this would need to be explained.
Response 3: I took your advice and have provided additional explanations, as follows:
The discussion gained traction as emotion studies became popular, and relevant research achievements have also been transformed from “odd backwater” to “boomtown” (Hutchinson 2008, p. vi), reflecting the transformation from relative obscurity to widespread popularity in the field of emotion studies.
Comments 4: Throughout, please note that your use of en-dashes (–) to connect two word-elements to create a compound is contrary to normal usage, where this function is taken by hyphens (-).
One example to illustrate, but this applies throughout the article: subject–subordinate should be subject-subordinate.
On the other hand, to connect date or number ranges, the en-dash is the correct choice.
Response 4: Thank you for your detailed explanation; it has been immensely helpful for my writing. I've taken your advice and now I'm using hyphens to replace en dashes in the compound words throughout my paper.
Comments 5: p.5 and p.7: Aside from Engle’s translation, you might also consult the one by Anacker >> Anacker, Stefan, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, The Buddhist Psychological Doctor, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008.
Response 5: Thank you very much for providing the new translation. After reading it, I agree that it is more accurate, so I have decided to include it in my references and replace the old translation in my paper.
Comments 6: Beal 1862 >> You would do well to include reference to more recent translations: e.g., Sharf, Robert H., ‘The Scripture in Forty-two Sections’, in Religions of China In Practice, Ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp.360–364.
Heng-ching Shih (tr.), ‘The Sutra of Forty-two Sections’, in Apocryphal Scriptures, Berkeley, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2005, pp.31–42.
Response 6: I am very grateful for the two references you provided. After reading them, I found their translations to be more accurate, so I have decided to add them to my bibliography and replace the old translations in my paper.
Comments 7: On p.5 you quote Sartre as advocating that shame is driven by external factors, and you say that in this respect he contradicts (unspecified) ‘Western scholars’. Then, on p.6, you quote Aristotle as similarly upholding that shame is connected to an awareness of the dishonour brought about by reckless behaviour. So, why does Sartre contradict the earlier trend among Western scholars, given that Aristotle himself also emphasized external factors? Or who are the Western scholars that Sartre contradicts?
Response7: I greatly appreciate your critical feedback, and I apologize for the misexpression in my thesis. What I intended to convey was that Mencius emphasized intrinsic motivation, which contrasts with early Western scholars' tendency toward extrinsic motivation. I have now revised my thesis as follows:
In contrast to “hrī” and “apatrāpya,” “xiuwuzhixin” emphasizes ethics as the primary internal driving force. This weakens and even eliminates the possibility that external driving forces can increase the sense of shame. Contrary to some Western perspectives on shame, which hold that shame is fundamentally an externally driven emotion, as argued by scholars such as Sartre deny the independence of transcendental and primitive shame and believe that shame is inevitably driven by others (Zahavi 2014, p. 238–240). Mencius’ perspective on shame emphasizes the inherent nature of primitive shame and reduces the possibility of shame being driven by external forces, as illustrated in the following example:
Comments 8: l.219: mind and mental concomitants >> here you might add ‘and the nature of reality’ (since that is what ‘thatness’ refers to in Buddhism)
Response 8: I've followed your suggestion and included the ‘thatness’ content in my work.
Comments 9: ll-227–229: External and internal duality >> This sentence needs to be reformulated as it gives the mistaken impression that Buddhism promotes an inherently dualistic perspective between the (external) world and the (internal) mind. Such an impression would be incorrect, given that Yogācāra philosophy in particular promotes instead the idea that all appearances are creations of the mind. Even the basic teaching of the five aggregates emphasizes the interplay between external and internal factors rather than an inherent duality.
Therefore, I suggest reformulating the sentence as follows: “Unlike the interaction between internal and external factors in the interplay of mind and mental concomitants in the Buddhist concept of shame, …”
Response 9: I have taken your advice, and your explanations help me avoid unnecessary ambiguity. Thank you very much.
Comments 10: l.274: which comes from the understanding of the world >> This is not entirely true, and such a statement cannot be left to stand unqualified.
The Buddhist perspective is certainly not that good and bad deeds can be judged as such solely on the basis of worldly conventions. Buddhist ethics is based on the principle that wholesome or virtuous deeds generate good karma or merit, whereas unwholesome deeds generate negative karma or demerit. In other words, this is connected to the way things are, the nature of reality or thatness, with wholesome behaviours being better aligned to thatness than unwholesome ones. Whereas neither good nor bad karma can in themselves lead to liberation but merely to higher or lower rebirths within cyclic existence, it is held that positive, virtuous deeds create favourable conditions that indirectly support spiritual practice and hence liberation. Moreover, from the perspective of advanced Buddhology and the notion of the various buddha bodies, the result of merit accumulated on the path in the form of virtuous deeds is the form body (Skt. rūpakāya).
So I think you will need to reformulate the above statement to avoid giving a misleading impression regarding Buddhist philosophical formulations on this point. While the Buddhist psychological understanding of hrī and apatrāpya involves concomitant internal and external factors in resisting the impulse to perform unwholesome deeds, it does not follow therefrom that Buddhist culture as a whole merely emphasizes ‘the understanding of the world’, as apparently suggested above. As you rightly write lower down (l.324, l.329), the Buddhist notion of shame involves both internal and external constraints, so it’s merely the case of reformulating the above sentence in line with that.
Response 10: I fully agree with your suggestion. The original phrasing was indeed unclear, so I have further revised the text and added some necessary information to prevent any misunderstandings. Here is the updated version:
In Yogācāra, “hrī” and “apatrāpya” place greater emphasis on cognition itself compared to ethical content, as it pertains not only to understanding the world but also to cultivating virtuous actions that lead to good karma, thereby fostering conditions conducive to spiritual practice and ultimate liberation.
Comments 11: ll.357–370: This is a very important paragraph to understand the relationship between the Buddhist concept of thatness and the Confucian notion of rightness. However, the paragraph is extremely dense and would really benefit from some additional explanations to spell out the full implications of this relationship and the way you envisage its repercussions on the discussion as a whole.
Response 11: I have taken your advice and further developed this section of the text. Here are the specific changes I made:
Although “xiuwuzhixin,” “hrī,” and “apatrāpya” all possess the connotation of goodness and can potentially prevent evil behavior, they have completely different structural systems. “Hrī” and “apatrāpya” emphasize that the overpowering nature of the wrong understanding (i.e., “shamelessness” and “absence of abashment”) temporarily defeats the right understanding (i.e., shame and abashment) in the struggle between the two strands of mental concomitants. Conversely, Mencius emphasizes the absence of “xiuwuzhixin.” The former struggle is a contest between two opposing strands of mental concomitants. The dichotomy between the absence and contest structures is central to understanding the fundamental differences between the Confucian and Buddhist ap-proaches to shame. In the Buddhist framework, “hrī” and “apatrāpya” are conceptualized within a structure of mental concomitants where the presence or absence of shame and abashment is seen as a dynamic interplay between right and wrong understanding. This dynamic is not merely a static state but rather an ongoing struggle where shamelessness and absence of abashment can temporarily overpower their counterparts. The Buddhist perspective acknowledges the existence of both positive and negative forces within the human mind and emphasizes the cultivation of the former to overcome the latter. In contrast, the Confucian concept of “xiuwuzhixin” takes a different approach by empha-sizing the absence of shame rather than its presence as a competing force. According to Mencius, the absence of the heart of shame is not due to a struggle between opposing forces but rather a lack of the very conditions that give rise to shamelessness. This missing structure does not allow for the existence of evil as a separate entity to be fought against; instead, it posits that evil is simply the absence of the proper moral disposition.
To elaborate in detail, we can examine the relationships between "hrī," "apatrāpya," and thatness, as well as "xiuwuzhixin" and rightness.The theoretical structure of mind and dharma is based on understanding thatness. Hence, dharma can be classified as different or even opposite understandings of good and evil. Good and evil also emphasize the properties of general ethics and morals, but the fundamental principle is thatness. Thus, the struggle between good and evil does not affect the establishment of thatness. In the relationship between Mencius’ concepts of shame and rightness, there can only be an absence of rightness, while the absence of evil cannot be allowed. This is the inevitable result of the basic provisions of moral law initiated by rightness as a shame. The struggle affirms the existence of evil. Therefore, evil will become the basis of evil behavior, which will inevitably lead to the self-cancellation of rightness and the collapse of secular society. Different from the “xiuwuzhixin,” dharma does not directly dictate behavior but the understanding of the content of the world. This understanding constitutes the fundamental law of thatness. Therefore, rightness can be placed at the level of thatness to establish the structure of absence; however, rightness should not be derived from the perspective of mental concomitants.
Comments 12: Ll.383–384: However, a fundamental difference exists in the understanding of good and evil between the Indian Buddhist culture and the Confucian culture of Mencius. >> Here it would be good to summarize for the benefit of readers what this fundamental difference is.
Response 12: I have taken your advice and added the following paragraph to clarify the difference between them.
However, a fundamental difference exists in the understanding of good and evil between the Indian Buddhist culture and the Confucian culture of Mencius. In Indian Buddhist culture, good and evil are framed within the context of religious practice. Good actions are those that positively contribute to the realization of thatness, while actions that hinder this pursuit are considered evil. In contrast, Confucianism, as exemplified by Mencius, defines good and evil based on the standard of rightness. An action is deemed good when it aligns with the appropriate and balanced state of rightness, and it becomes evil if it deviates from this standard either by excess or deficiency.。
Comments 13: l.391: in traditional and present-day contexts >> your study focuses on traditional contexts, with only a brief passing mention of modernity. I therefore, suggest that you remove the reference to present-day contexts in the conclusion.
Response 13: I have taken your advice and removed the term 'present-day' from my paper.
Comments 14: More minor points
l.4: significantpoint >> space
l.80: remove unwanted full stop
l.175: these internal driving force >> forces (plural)
l.176: shame >> conscience [(a) to avoid repetition of shape in previous line and (b) because conscience is the precise word in English that renders this internal driving force]
l.255: prevalent modern society >> prevalent in modern society
l.255: (believing in Buddhism) >> (i.e., believing in Buddhism)
l.256: may not have contemporary moral attributes >> may not have the same contemporary relevance in moral terms
l.261: remove unwanted ‘p.’
l.283: humaneness[ren >> space
l.321: correspond to >> are the antitheses of
l.357: the thatness >> remove ‘the’
l.366: collapse >> add ‘the’ (i.e., the collapse)
l.375: two shames >> two distinct types of shame
l.380: influence of external rightness >> influence of external factors
Conclusions >> the title needs to be emphasized more typographically >> speak to editors
note i: characters >> character
Response 14: I sincerely thank you for your careful reading and detailed suggestions for revisions. I have made all the corrections according to your feedback, and I extend my most genuine gratitude to you.
Author Response File: 
Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThank you for this engaging paper. Your analysis of Buddhist sources in paragraphs 3 and 4 is particularly good as it is text-based. However, there are several formal aspects that need refinement to enhance the clarity and accessibility of your work, especially if you intend to be read by non-Chinese audience.
1.Your thesis presented in the introduction should be more explicitly stated, particularly in the third paragraph. The introduction would benefit from providing a clear outline of the paper's structure at the end of it. Currently, it plunges the reader into complex questions without sufficient context or preparation (you can use Chen Shaoming's article, see after).The purpose in comparing these two cultures should be clarified: what is your goal, what do you hope to achieve, and how are you going to do it? This should also be indicated more clearly at the end of your introduction and at the beginning of your conclusion to guide the reader effectively. It took me time to understand that you were comparing Indian Buddhist culture and the Confucian culture of Mencius, and that western ressources (Aristotle and Zahavi) were there only to facilitate this process.
2. I recommend incorporating the following article into your introduction, first section and conclusion: Chen Shaoming, A Phenomenological Analysis of Shame, https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2017.1435930. This would help in defining key notions and contextualizing them within your framework. This would also help to build a more engaging conclusion and show what does discussing shame brings on the table nowadays in cross-cultural contexts.
Along your work, you engage western and eastern ressources, but you do it in a linear way, without explaining and recontextualizing them. For example, Aristotle's quotes and mentions are too much out of context and from an out-dated translation (1926!). Why do you refer to him, what does it bring in your argumentation? You are just picking up a line from it: this is not fair to the author.
Another example, when mentionning Scheele at the beginning of the first part, it is crucial to explain why he is relevant and the primary purpose of his research.
Besides, summarizing the main points at the end of each section would further aid the reader in following your argument. You need to pay more attention to formal transitions from one part to another.
3. Quotations: It is unnecessary to include the full Chinese quotations after the English translations. Only crucial key terms to your argument should be kept. But translations of key terms should be discussed.
4. Please reconsider or provide more justification for your translation choices, particularly with Zhu Xi's concepts. For instance, translating 理 as "essence" is problematic for a Western audience. Stephan Angle and Justin Tiwald's Neo-Confucianism: A Philosophical Introduction offers an excellent glossary of Zhu Xi’s philosophical terms in English.
5. When citing articles written in Chinese, please include the Chinese name of the journal following the English translation (e.g., 姚育松) and (張任之) articles.
Your strenght is to rely on Buddhist texts, in analyzing them and putting them into dialogue with the Mencius. But, you need to contextualize more the ressources you are employing and show why they do bring something on the table in contemporary reflections in ethics. This is a good base, 加油!
Author Response
Comments 1: Thank you for this engaging paper. Your analysis of Buddhist sources in paragraphs 3 and 4 is particularly good as it is text-based. However, there are several formal aspects that need refinement to enhance the clarity and accessibility of your work, especially if you intend to be read by non-Chinese audience.
Response 1: I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your endorsement and your suggestions for revising my paper. Your recommendations, including the references to several scholarly articles and the Confucianism translation handbook, as well as your explanation of why the paper should mention Scheele, have been particularly insightful. I offer you my deepest thanks. Here are the specifics of the revisions I have made to the paper.
Comments 2: Your thesis presented in the introduction should be more explicitly stated, particularly in the third paragraph. The introduction would benefit from providing a clear outline of the paper's structure at the end of it. Currently, it plunges the reader into complex questions without sufficient context or preparation (you can use Chen Shaoming's article, see after).The purpose in comparing these two cultures should be clarified: what is your goal, what do you hope to achieve, and how are you going to do it? This should also be indicated more clearly at the end of your introduction and at the beginning of your conclusion to guide the reader effectively. It took me time to understand that you were comparing Indian Buddhist culture and the Confucian culture of Mencius, and that western ressources (Aristotle and Zahavi) were there only to facilitate this process.
Response 2: I have taken your advice and now specifically outline the research objectives and the structure of the paper in the last paragraph of the introduction. Here are the specific changes I made:
“Xiuwuzhixin” is closely related to “hrī” and “apatrāpya,” suggesting that they belong to The Shame Family (Stoloro, 2010). Therefore, this article aims to compare the Mencius concept of “Xiuwuzhixin” with the Buddhist notion of “hrī” and “apatrāpya”, in order to clarify the similarities and differences in their conceptions of shame. The following sections of the paper will explore these similarities and differences from three perspectives: 'Subject boundaries that restrict shame to humans and the subject-subordinate structure,' 'Differences in internal and external driving forces,' and 'Evil resulting from deviation from shame and goodness ascribed to shame.' This study found that these concepts establish a subject boundary such that only humans can experience shame. Moreover, they also share a similar subject-subordinate structure and sources of internal or external motivation. Both affirm that deviating from shame leads to evil, indicating a shared understanding of the concept and its various implications. However, fundamental differences rooted in the consciousness and ethics functions of the two shame cultures highlight considerable differences within this shared understanding.
Comments 3: 2. I recommend incorporating the following article into your introduction, first section and conclusion: Chen Shaoming, A Phenomenological Analysis of Shame, https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2017.1435930. This would help in defining key notions and contextualizing them within your framework. This would also help to build a more engaging conclusion and show what does discussing shame brings on the table nowadays in cross-cultural contexts.
Response 3: Thank you for providing this article. I have read it carefully several times and gained a lot from it. Now I have included it in my references and cited several points that I strongly agree with.
Comments 4: Another example, when mentionning Scheele at the beginning of the first part, it is crucial to explain why he is relevant and the primary purpose of his research.
Response 4: I greatly appreciate your insight, which highlighted the importance of Scheele's focus on the Western tradition of shame in emphasizing the significance of the comparison between Confucian and Buddhist views of shame in my paper. I have now revised this section accordingly:
In Scheele’s research on shyness and shame, he emphasized that animals exhibit various emotions similar to humans (e.g., fear, disgust, and even vanity). However, studies have suggested that animals lack shyness and specific expressions of shame (Lu, 2018). Shyness and shame are thus unique to human beings. Scheele’s conclusions, based on the Western tradition of shame, have drawn my attention to the subject of Confucian and Buddhist shame. Interestingly, Eastern Confucian and Buddhist philosophies also emphasize the singular subjectivity of shame, but they tend to present a sub-ject-subordinate structure of shame. This will be discussed in detail below.
Comments 5: Besides, summarizing the main points at the end of each section would further aid the reader in following your argument. You need to pay more attention to formal transitions from one part to another.
Response 5: I greatly appreciate your suggestions. I have now added appropriate transitional content at the beginning of each section to connect with the preceding material, and I have also included summarizing content at the end of each section.
Comments 6: Quotations: It is unnecessary to include the full Chinese quotations after the English translations. Only crucial key terms to your argument should be kept. But translations of key terms should be discussed.
Response 6: I am very grateful for your suggestions. After considering the perspectives from several external reviewers, I have appropriately adjusted the English translation. However, to avoid any potential ambiguity, I have retained most of the original Chinese quotations.
Comments 7: 4. Please reconsider or provide more justification for your translation choices, particularly with Zhu Xi's concepts. For instance, translating 理 as "essence" is problematic for a Western audience. Stephan Angle and Justin Tiwald's Neo-Confucianism: A Philosophical Introduction offers an excellent glossary of Zhu Xi’s philosophical terms in English.
Response 7: I am very grateful for your suggestions and for providing this excellent English vocabulary list. I have included it in my references and made some modifications to the translations in my paper. For example, I have now translated 理 as pattern.
Comments 8: 5. When citing articles written in Chinese, please include the Chinese name of the journal following the English translation (e.g., 姚育松) and (張任之) articles.
Response 8: Thank you for your reminder; I have now added them.
Comments 9: Your strenght is to rely on Buddhist texts, in analyzing them and putting them into dialogue with the Mencius. But, you need to contextualize more the ressources you are employing and show why they do bring something on the table in contemporary reflections in ethics. This is a good base, 加油!
Response 9: I am deeply grateful for your endorsement; it gives immense encouragement to my academic pursuits. Please allow me to express my sincere appreciation. Additionally, I have revised some content in the background section to highlight the Eastern characteristics and cultural differences that the comparison between Confucian and Buddhist shame reveals, as well as some universal commonalities in the study of shame.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Round 2
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThanks for the corrections. In my opinion, there is till a need to make transitions from paragraph 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 smoother (summarizing what has been done, introducing the new paragraph, and explaining what does it bring in the global movement of the paper).
The translation of Li by pattern is much better, but I do not see a reference for the translation? is it yours? or Angle and Tiwald? you have to precise that because there is a on-going debate existing on how to translate Zhu Xi's terms in English.
Author Response
Comments 1: Thanks for the corrections. In my opinion, there is till a need to make transitions from paragraph 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 smoother (summarizing what has been done, introducing the new paragraph, and explaining what does it bring in the global movement of the paper).
Response 1: I am very grateful for your reminders and suggestions, and I have made some adjustments to the introduction of my paper. Now, the first paragraph focuses on the current state of shame research and introduces the issue of cultural differences in shame. The second paragraph builds on this by highlighting the growing interest in studying Chinese Confucian perspectives on shame within a comparative East-West cultural framework, and notes that there is relatively little attention given to comparative studies of Confucian and Buddhist concepts of shame. This sets the stage for establishing the value of our paper. The third paragraph outlines the structure of the paper and summarizes its main points.
Here is the specific revised content:
- Introduction
Benedict’s proposition in his book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, where he posits that “guilt” is emblematic of Western culture and “shame” of Eastern culture, has sparked remarkable controversy regarding the categorization of moral sentiments (Heller 1985, p. 1). The discussion gained traction as emotion studies became popular, and relevant research achievements have also been transformed from “odd backwater” to “boomtown” (Hutchinson 2008, p. vi), reflecting the transformation from relative obscurity to widespread popularity in the field of emotion studies. At the turn of the last century, Gilbert explored various shame studies from two perspectives. The first is the theory of shame and its schools of thought, such as psychoanalytic theory, affective theory of shame, emotion-cognitive and cognitive-behavioral theory, and sociological and anthropological approaches. The second is the conceptualization of components and mechanisms (Gilbert 1998, p. 3–4). Recently, existing studies on shame by Lewis, Sartre, Strauss, Scheele, and so on have been explored (Zahavi 2014, p. 240). These explorations have strongly emphasized the cultural factors determining the richness and ambiguity of the definition of shame. Zahavi, for instance, proposed that “it is hardly insignificant that emotions like shame are more culture-specific than the basic emotions, and that a cultural perspective might indeed be indispensable for an understanding of the full complexity of these emotions.” Consequently, cultural comparison of shame has emerged as a research hot spot.
The comparative study of shame between the East and the West has garnered considerable attention among Chinese scholars. Scholars have critically examined Benedict’s inadequate use of the concept of “guilt” and “shame” in various cultures. This has led to further exploration of Chinese philosophy, particularly regarding Mencius’ concept of “xiuwuzhixin” (羞惡之心, The mind of shame) (Zhang 2017, p. 40; Yao 2019). In recent years, in their book Xiuwu zhixin: Duoweishiyexiade Rujia Gudianguannian Yanjiu 羞惡之心：多維視野下的儒家古典觀念研究 (Shame: A Study of Confucian Classical Ideas from a Multidimensional Perspective), Chinese scholars Lai, Chi-ping and Chen, Lisheng have compiled research achievements on the feeling of shame in China and worldwide，and the cultural differences and changes over time in relation to shame are emphasized (Chen 2006, p.106). However, few studies have compared Buddhist “hrī” (Can 慚, shame) and “apatrāpya” (Kui愧, abashment) and Mencius’ “xiuwuzhixin.” Such studies hold substantial value compared with domestic and international studies exploring the differences in the presentation and use of shame within distinct cultural contexts (Pattison 2000, p. 55). Given the close relationship between “xiuwuzhixin”, “hrī” and “apatrāpya,” all of which can be considered pardt of “The Shame Family” (Stoloro, 2010). Therefore, this article aims to compare the Mencius concept of “xiuwuzhixin” with the Buddhist notion of “hrī” and “apatrāpya”, in order to clarify the similarities and differences in their conceptions of shame. This aims to provide some cross-cultural comparative material for understanding cultural differences in shame, particularly focusing on the less examined differences between Confucian and Buddhist notions of shame. At the same time, parts of the limited local context reference Western shame culture for comparison.
The following sections of the paper will explore these similarities and differences from three perspectives: “Subject boundaries that restrict shame to humans and the subject-subordinate structure”, “Differences in internal and external driving forces”, and 'Evil resulting from deviation from shame and goodness ascribed to shame”. This study found that these concepts establish a subject boundary such that only humans can experience shame. Moreover, they also share a similar subject-subordinate structure and sources of internal or external motivation. Both affirm that deviating from shame leads to evil, indicating a shared understanding of the concept and its various implications. However, fundamental differences rooted in the consciousness and ethics functions of the two shame cultures highlight considerable differences within this shared understanding.
Comments 2: The translation of Li by pattern is much better, but I do not see a reference for the translation? is it yours? or Angle and Tiwald? you have to precise that because there is a on-going debate existing on how to translate Zhu Xi's terms in English.
Response2: Thank you for your recognition and reminder. Indeed, I used the translations by Angle and Tiwald, and I have now included them in the references. Additionally, I've added a footnote to explain their use upon first mention.
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