Akkirmânî’s Occasionalist Approach to the Neuroscientific Research on the Human Will

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the problem of human freedom and responsibility in light of current neuroscientific research, particularly focusing on Libet-style experiments. Beginning with a review of significant experiments on the nature of human will, starting with Libet’s influential series from the 1980s, I survey various interpretations of these experiments including those that pose challenges to concepts of human freedom and responsibility. Subsequently, I introduce the perspective of Mehmed Akkirmânî (d. 1760), an Ottoman scholar who advocates for a libertarian view of human freedom within an occasionalist framework and constructs sophisticated arguments against theological determinism. Akkirmânî’s analysis of human will delineates different aspects such as inclinations, intentions, and decisions, positing that humans possess freedom solely in their conscious decisions, thereby suggesting a limited scope of free will. I argue that Akkirmânî’s views are remarkably consonant with contemporary scientific findings and align with some libertarian positions. His occasionalist perspective offers an alternative model to contemporary naturalist physicalism in elucidating the connection between mental and neurophysical states.

1. Introduction

One of the oldest theistic responses to the problem of moral evil invokes the concept of free will. It is common to hear news of murder, torture, robbery, and other such acts. The free will theodicy acknowledges that God knows of and permits these phenomena but does not hold God responsible for them. Instead, it is humans, who commit these acts through their free will, who are held accountable. According to this view, God has endowed humans with free will, enabling them to choose whether to commit these acts or refrain from them. Consequently, responsibility for these actions rests with humans, not God.

However, this theodicy faces a significant challenge from the concept of determinism. If either physical or theological determinism holds true, then it would appear that humans, as part of a deterministic universe, do not possess free will. In such a scenario, if human will and actions are dictated by prior physical conditions or by God, then humans would resemble puppets controlled by external forces, lacking any genuine capacity to alter their will or actions. This longstanding philosophical issue is known as “the problem of free will” and raises profound questions about the fairness of holding humans accountable for their actions.

The deterministic challenge to human responsibility has been further detailed through recent experiments in neuroscience, notably the Libet experiment and its subsequent variations. These studies are often interpreted as evidence that human will is determined. This issue is no longer just an abstract tension between determinism and free will; neuroscience has begun to outline a more detailed form of determinism that specifies the mechanisms and conditions shaping human will.

As a result, several perspectives have emerged within the current intellectual landscape. Some have fully embraced determinism and rejected the notion of human free will; these are known as “hard determinists”. For hard determinists, appealing to the free will theodicy is no longer an option. Others, known as “compatibilists”, accept that determinism and human free will, along with responsibility, can coexist. However, their concept of human will diverges from the traditional, commonsensical notion of free will, which allows one to genuinely choose among various alternatives and influence the course of world history in distinct ways. According to compatibilists, human will is shaped by prior conditions, leading to a predetermined path for world history. The assertion that human will in this framework is free and that individuals are responsible is highly contentious and, to my view, amounts to little more than lip service that masks deeper philosophical issues. Thus, maintaining the free will theodicy through a compatibilist lens is fraught with problems. The final group, known as “libertarians”, rejects determinism and staunchly affirms that human will enables one to choose among multiple options. In this view, world history is not predetermined but could branch off at each point of genuine human decision, suggesting a dynamic and open-ended universe influenced by free human actions.

In this paper, I explore whether and to what extent Libet-style experiments can be interpreted in a manner that aligns with the libertarian view of human will. To this end, I present and discuss the occasionalist approach to libertarian free will as defended by Mehmed Akkirmânî (d. 1760), an Ottoman scholar from the eighteenth century. The structure of the paper is as follows: Firstly, I introduce the Libet experiment and its subsequent variations. Secondly, I examine various major interpretations of these experiments. Thirdly, I discuss Akkirmânî’s occasionalist and libertarian perspective on human will. Finally, I argue that Akkirmânî’s insights are remarkably consistent with contemporary scientific findings and align with some libertarian positions, providing an alternative and plausible model to naturalist physicalism, particularly in clarifying the relationship between mental and neurophysical states.

2. Neuroscientific Experiments on Human Will

Since the 1980s, neuroscience has intensely explored the nature of human will. Several pivotal experiments have led some scholars to propose that human free will might be illusory (Wegner 2002; Harris 2012). According to this perspective, the gist of the argument is that these studies have demonstrated that our conscious choices are preceded by unconscious brain processes, detectable as neural activity. Thus, our conscious decisions have an unconscious origin in the brain, even predictable in advance. In this section, I will now review these key experiments, and in the next section I assess how strongly they support the claim that free will is merely an illusion by indicating alternative interpretations in the literature.

2.1. Libet’s Experiments

In the early 1980s, Benjamin Libet and his colleagues conducted pioneering experiments designed to investigate the timing of brain activity related to voluntary actions. These experiments focused on a specific type of brain activity known as the “readiness potential” (RP), previously identified as linked to voluntary movements (Kornhuber and Deecke 1965). Libet’s objective was to determine whether RP precedes the conscious intention to act. To do this, participants were connected to EEG and EMG devices, which measured their brain’s electromagnetic activity and muscle movements, respectively. They were seated before a specialized clock featuring a rotating dot on its dial, enabling precise timing in milliseconds. During these experiments, participants were instructed to flex their wrists spontaneously at random intervals and to record the exact moment they felt the urge to move (noted as W) by observing the clock position.

The results demonstrated that the readiness potential commenced about 350 milliseconds before the participants consciously perceived the urge to act. Furthermore, this conscious urge preceded the actual physical movement by approximately 200 milliseconds. The RP here is indicative of brain activity underlying spontaneous, unplanned voluntary actions. Libet also differentiated between two types of readiness potentials: Type II RPs, which are associated with spontaneous, unplanned actions, and Type I RPs, linked to actions that involve some degree of preplanning. Type I RPs typically emerge around 1050 milliseconds before the motor action, suggesting a more deliberate preparatory phase compared to the more spontaneous Type II RPs (Libet et al. 1983).

Although Libet’s experimental design has faced scrutiny from various perspectives and sparked controversy over its conclusions, subsequent experiments have continued to affirm the unconscious neural origins of conscious intentions with increasingly complex and perplexing results.

2.2. Haggard and Eimer Experiment

Patrick Haggard and Martin Eimer built upon Libet’s seminal work by introducing both a fixed-movement and a free-choice condition in their experiment. In the fixed-movement condition, participants were required to use the same hand throughout a series of trials, promoting consistency in motor action. Conversely, the free-choice condition offered participants the autonomy to select either their left or right hand for each trial, adding a layer of spontaneity to their actions.

During the experiment, participants watched a clock on a computer screen—similar to the one used by Libet—and were instructed to note the moment they felt an urge to move their hands. They recorded this perceived initiation time after completing their movement. The study not only employed the readiness potential (RP), a measure used by Libet to demonstrate that unconscious brain processes precede conscious decisions to act, but also incorporated the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). The LRP provides a more targeted measure of motor preparation, specifically indicating which hand is being prepared for movement. This is discerned through the LRP’s differential negativity in the brain area opposite (contralateral) to the active hand compared to the same side (ipsilateral) of the body.

The results of the experiment conducted by Haggard and Eimer were notably differentiated based on subjects’ timing of awareness of their intention to move, categorized into early and late awareness groups. They observed that the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) appeared earlier for the group with early awareness of intention (early W) and later for those with late awareness (late W), indicating a covariance between LRP onset and the timing of W. Conversely, the readiness potential (RP) showed an inverse pattern: it occurred later in the early W group and earlier in the late W group, demonstrating that RP and W do not share a covariant relationship. According to Haggard and Eimer, these findings suggest that RP may not cause the awareness of intention (W), but the LRP could be considered a probable cause (Haggard and Eimer 1999, p. 132).

Haggard and Eimer highlighted that, generally, the onset of RP preceded the onset of LRP. Specifically, the mean LRP onset in the free-choice condition was identified at 795 milliseconds before the motor action, while in the fixed-movement condition, it was at 895 milliseconds before the action (Haggard and Eimer 1999, p. 130). Notably, the LRP consistently preceded the conscious urge to move (W). However, Haggard and Eimer emphasized that the temporal gap between LRP and W was smaller than that between RP and W. They cautioned that the actual value of this discrepancy heavily depends on the criteria used to detect LRP onset. They also suggested that some of this discrepancy might be explained by errors in cross-modal matching, reflecting a more cautious approach to the hypothesis that conscious decisions originate unconsciously (Haggard and Eimer 1999, p. 132). Overall, their findings support the idea that the specific action of using either the left or right hand can be predicted before the subject consciously decides, although the temporal gaps involved are smaller than those posited by Libet.

2.3. Haynes Experiment

John-Dylan Haynes and his colleagues conducted a groundbreaking experiment using advanced techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In this study, subjects look at a screen that displayed randomly flashing letters, changing every 500 milliseconds. They had two buttons placed in front of them, corresponding to their left and right index fingers. Participants were instructed to press one of these buttons whenever they chose and to verbally report the letter on the screen at the exact moment they made their decision. The fMRI was crucial for detecting real-time brain activity as participants decided which button to press.

Remarkably, while the participants’ conscious decision to press a button occurred about one second before the action, brain activity that could predict this decision was detected up to seven seconds beforehand. This predictive activity was primarily located in the frontopolar cortex (specifically Brodmann area 10) and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex. These regions showed distinct activity patterns depending on whether the participant chose the left or right button, allowing researchers to predict the chosen button with about 60% accuracy based on the brain activity seven seconds before the conscious decision (Haynes 2011; Soon et al. 2008).

Haynes’s experiment underlines that the brain activity concerning specific decisions and actions takes place much earlier than conscious awareness of these decisions. While Libet’s RP takes place approximately 550 milliseconds before the action and is located in the SMA and pre-SMA areas of the brain, the brain activity measured by Haynes starts long before (up to 7 s) the act and is located in some other parts of the brain. This suggests that the process of willing an action involves a complex, multi-regional neural pathway that begins much earlier than previously assumed. This pathway includes Libet’s readiness potential (RP) as one of its stages.

However, it is important to note the differences in the timing of the onset of conscious decisions as measured by Libet and Haynes. While Libet’s findings suggest that the conscious urge to act occurs approximately 200 milliseconds before the action, Haynes’s measurements place this urge about one second prior. Additionally, Haynes’s predictions of the chosen action, which are 60% accurate, only exceed chance levels by 10%, casting some doubts on the reliability of these results.

2.4. Fried Experiment

Itzhak Fried and his colleagues conducted an experiment in which participants with pharmacologically intractable epilepsy underwent a clinical procedure involving the implantation of depth electrodes to monitor their neuronal activity. These electrodes recorded neuronal activity from the supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Participants engaged in a task that required them to press a key whenever they chose to do so, while observing an analog clock displayed on a screen. They were instructed to note the exact moment they felt the urge to act, referred to as “W”. Of the participants, nine used only their right hand to press the key, while the remaining three used either their left or right hand.

The study showed that neuronal activity can not only predict the timing of the conscious urge to move (“W time”) but also indicate which hand will be used. Specifically, the firing rates of certain neurons exhibited significant changes up to several seconds before the self-reported W time. Researchers identified two distinct patterns of neuronal behavior: one pattern showed a progressive increase in firing rate, while the other exhibited a decrease as the W time approached (Fried et al. 2011, p. 550).

Using a linear decoding algorithm, the study found that these changes in neuronal activity could be detected up to 500 milliseconds before participants reported their decision in 90% of the trials, and up to 1000 milliseconds before in 70% of the trials. Moreover, the effectiveness of this prediction varied depending on the brain region analyzed. For example, activity from the supplementary motor area (SMA) allowed for over 80% prediction accuracy 500 milliseconds prior to W time using data from 256 SMA neurons. In contrast, when analyzing the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the prediction accuracy was 70% again 500 milliseconds prior to W time using the same number of neurons. The accuracy diminished to 70% even with SMA neuronal data when predicting 980 milliseconds in advance (Fried et al. 2011, p. 553).

Additionally, certain neurons responded differently depending on the hand chosen by the participant, typically showing a stronger response when the contralateral hand to the electrode’s hemisphere was selected. By training a classifier with neuronal responses from trials where subjects chose one hand and testing it on trials where the other hand was chosen, researchers were able to predict the chosen hand with a success rate “well above chance levels”, as noted by Fried (Fried et al. 2011, pp. 553–54).

2.5. Tse and Schlegel Experiment

Peter UlricTse, Arthur Schlegel, and their colleagues aimed to replicate the findings of the Eimer and Haggard experiment with a larger sample size of twenty-one participants. Due to a computer program error, one participant only completed half of the experiment, and another’s data were discarded because of excessive noise. They note that the paradigm used by Eimer and Haggard did not allow them to measure the exact onset of RP and LRP but confirmed that RP onset precedes LRP onset, both occurring before the conscious awareness of intention (W), which is, on average, 196 milliseconds before the motor action (i.e., pressing a key).

The primary objective of Tse and Schlegel was to determine whether the timing of RP or LRP correlates with W within subjects. Their findings revealed that neither RP nor LRP covaried with the moment of conscious intention (W). This led them to conclude that neither RP nor LRP is causally linked to conscious will. Instead, their results suggest that RP and LRP are more likely indicators of general preparatory processes rather than direct reflections of the neural mechanisms underlying conscious intention (Schlegel et al. 2013).

3. Various Interpretations of These Neuroscientific Experiments

Neuroscientific research on the human will, which began with Libet’s experiments, challenged the common-sense notion that human will is free. Libet’s experiments suggested that conscious will has an unconscious origin in brain activity, as evidenced by the readiness potential (RP) starting before subjects become consciously aware of their intention to act. Libet himself expressed this puzzlement: “If the brain can initiate a voluntary act before the appearance of conscious intention, that is, if the initiation of the specific performance of the act is by unconscious processes, is there any role for the conscious function?” (Libet 1985, p. 276).

In this section, I will examine major interpretations of Libet-style experiments, which range from views that consider human free will an illusion to those that still attribute genuine, albeit limited, free will to humans. This analysis will illustrate how these experiments have been philosophically interpreted in various, even opposing, ways. We will see how experimental data, when combined with additional assumptions, can lead to different conclusions, highlighting the complexity and variability in interpreting the relationship between neural activity and conscious intention.

The first and significantly popular interpretation is to consider human free will as an illusion. The idea of an unconscious origin of the human will lends support to this view. According to this perspective, human will seems to have an unconscious causal origin, meaning that our decisions and the timing of these decisions appear predetermined before we become consciously aware of them. As a result, our conscious intention seems more like an afterthought than a driving force. In sum, this interpretation challenges the traditional notion of free will by suggesting that our sense of conscious control over our actions is illusory, as the initiation of actions occurs unconsciously. Daniel Wagner and Sam Harris are examplary proponents of this view.

Daniel M. Wegner proposes that both conscious intention and motor action are effects of a common cause—neural activity that prepares the body for action. He suggests that conscious intention is not an active causal factor in the causal chain but rather an epiphenomenon (Wegner 2002, p. 318), a byproduct that does not influence other events, much like the whistle of a steam train which is caused by the steam engine, but does not influence, the train’s motion.

Similarly, Sam Harris ardently defends the view that human will is an illusion because of its unconscious origins as revealed by neurological experiments. He makes use of some of the previously mentioned neurological experiments in which specific motor actions are predicted albeit with imperfect accuracy to argue that the predictability of action undermines free will. He imagines a hypothetical scenario with a perfect neuroimaging device that could predict a person’s actions with 100% accuracy seconds before people even become consciously aware of them based on subtle brain changes. According to Harris, such a predictive device seriously challenges the notion of free will, even if individuals feel they are making free choices. Moreover, Harris extends his skepticism of free will beyond materialist or physicalist views. He suggests that even if one were to posit a soul independent of the brain’s neurophysical system, the unconscious operations of this soul would similarly challenge the autonomy of human will (Harris 2012, pp. 8–10). Thus, the debate extends into philosophical realms, questioning the very foundations of free will and autonomy in light of neurological findings.

The view that human will is an illusion is closely linked to the concept of causal agency. Wegner’s perspective, which regards human conscious intention as an epiphenomenon, effectively denies it any causal role. In the framework of reductive physicalism, which is likely the background philosophy of modern neuroscience, there is a tendency to dismiss the causal agency of conscious intentions or mental states, attributing the mechanics of actions solely to neural activity in the brain and physiological activity in the muscles (Haggard 2008).

Despite the popularity of the view that considers human free will an illusion following Libet-style experiments, various perspectives interpret the available empirical data in ways that recognize a role for conscious will in human actions. Here are some major views:

Robert Kane accommodates Libet’s findings within his libertarian conception of human will, which rejects determinism and ascribes genuine freedom to human volition. Kane believes that even if some decision-making processes are unconscious, conscious effort and choice still play a significant role, thereby preserving free will (Kane 1998, p. 232).

Peter Ulric Tse, based on his work with Schlegel et al., questions the causal link between readiness potential (RP) or lateralized readiness potential (LRP) and conscious will. Their experiments found that neither RP nor LRP covary with the moment of conscious intention, suggesting that these neural indicators are not directly tied to the processes underlying conscious volition. Tse proposes a physicalist libertarian view that ascribes genuine freedom to human will within an indeterminist framework. He argues that while conscious will is caused by prior neural states, it is not strictly determined by them, playing a significant causal role in decision-making processes (downward mental causation) (Tse 2013).

Interestingly, Benjamin Libet himself did not conclude that his experiments demonstrated that free will is an illusion. Instead, he argued for a model that includes a role for conscious will, particularly in the form of a “veto” power over unconscious intentions. Libet refrained from committing to either determinism or indeterminism (Libet 1985, 2004).

Similarly, Alfred Mele, without strictly aligning with either libertarianism or compatibilism, contends that Libet’s findings should not be interpreted as negating the role of conscious will in human actions. Mele argues that the experimental data can coexist with the notion that conscious will can exert a causal influence on actions, and he critiques interpretations that dismiss this possibility (Mele 2009, 2014, 2023).

These diverse interpretations highlight that while Libet-style experiments challenge the traditional notion of free will, they do not conclusively negate it, leaving room for ongoing philosophical debate and empirical inquiry. Let us now examine the significant interpretative points made by these scholars.

To effectively evaluate and analyze the skeptical challenge posed by Libet-style experiments on the freedom of human decision-making, Alfred Mele formalizes the following argument, which he calls the Decision-Focused Skeptical Argument (DSA) (Mele 2023):

• In Libet-style experiments, all the decisions to act on which data are gathered are made unconsciously.
• So probably all decisions to act are made unconsciously.
• No unconsciously made decision to act is freely made.
• So probably no decisions to act are freely made.

Regarding premise 1, Mele highlights the ambiguity in the term “decision”. The literature lacks a clear definition, leading to potential confusion. Libet himself employs terms such as “urge”, “desire”, “decision”, “intention”, and “will” interchangeably or with very similar meanings (Libet 1985, p. 530). However, there is a clear distinction between what happens before W (the moment the subject becomes aware of the urge to flick a finger or hand) and afterward. The process before W is unconscious, and if the terms “urge”, “decision”, and “will” refer to that unconscious process, then the first premise holds true. However, if “decision” is understood as a conscious state or if any phase of the decision-making process is considered conscious, then the premise becomes questionable (Mele 2023).

Mele defines “decision” as the momentary action of forming an intention to do certain things (Mele 2017, chap. 2; 2023). He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing decisions from urges. According to Mele, people can make decisions freely, while urges “normally come to us unbidden, like an urge to scratch an itchy knee”. He explains: “We can feel an urge to do something and decide not to do it. Consider ex-smokers with an urge for a cigarette. They can have an urge to smoke without deciding to do so; in fact, they can decide not to smoke. Decisions—not urges—lie at the heart of philosophical discussions of free will” (Mele 2023).

Ulric Tse also emphasizes the multidimensional nature of human will, which includes defining a problem, generating multiple solutions, evaluating them, selecting one, and deciding to execute it. He likens will to a complex process, like driving a car, involving “numerous procedures and nested subprocedures” (Tse 2013, p. 20). Some individuals may equate will with the capacity to freely choose a plan, while others might associate it with the effort required to execute that plan. This ambiguity can lead to confusion (Tse 2013, p. 21). The key takeaway is to use distinct terms for different brain processes and to clearly differentiate between various processes or stages within the same process.

Mele also critiques the second premise for making a sudden jump from “some decisions” to “all decisions”. He emphasizes that some decisions are indeed preceded by conscious reasoning, challenging the broad applicability of the premise (Mele 2023).

In other words, it extrapolates a universal statement about human will from a relatively narrow set of neuroscientific experiments. These studies typically involve simple motor tasks such as moving a wrist or selecting which finger to move—actions that are fundamentally different from more complex decisions that require deliberate thought and weighing of pros and cons. For instance, consider deciding whether to travel or study during a weekend. This situation might present compelling reasons for both options, such as needing a break from work or preparing for upcoming exams. In such scenarios, individuals often engage in careful deliberation, evaluating the consequences of each choice before making a decision. This type of decision-making, which involves conscious reflection and choice between alternatives, contrasts sharply with the simple response of moving a wrist on impulse.

In more complex situations, individuals do not merely act on urges, whether conscious or not, but rather actively deliberate between available options and make considered choices. This distinction is crucial in discussions of free will. These decisions made in these complex scenarios are known as “torn decisions” (Kane 1998; Balaguer 2014). Thus, conscious will might be more relevant and applicable to torn decisions that involve significant deliberation and choice, rather than to simple motor actions.

Deliberation between choices can indeed occur even with seemingly simple acts, such as deciding whether to flex a hand or press a key with the left or right finger. In these cases, while there may not be a need to weigh reasons pro and con extensively, individuals can still consciously consider each option before finalizing their decision. This aspect of choice was evident in some of Libet’s experiments, where participants reported feeling an urge to flex their hand but chose to refrain from acting on it immediately, later performing the action at a different time.

This observation led Libet to design a subsequent experiment where he instructed participants to prepare to flex their wrists but to stop themselves at the last moment. Even though participants were preparing to stop, the readiness potential (RP) in their brain activity still manifested, initially increasing as usual but then decreasing after a certain point. From this, Libet concluded that there is a small period of time between the conscious urge to act and the actual onset of action during which individuals can veto their actions. (Libet 1985, pp. 538–39).

By introducing the ability to veto conscious urges to act, Libet aims to address criticisms targeting the concept of free will. He argues that, although voluntary actions have an unconscious neural origin, there is still room for conscious control over actions that have already begun. He states: “Free will does not initiate a volitional process; but it can control the outcome by actively vetoing the volitional process and aborting the act itself, or allowing (or triggering) the act to occur” (Libet 2004, p. 143).

Libet also considers the possibility that the conscious veto itself may have its origin in preceding unconscious processes. In his view, if this were the case, it would undermine this limited version of human freedom. However, Libet does not believe that the conscious veto has an unconscious origin for several reasons. First, he notes that such an unconscious origin has not been shown empirically. Second, he argues that there is a distinction between the conscious urge to act and the conscious veto to act. He states: “The conscious veto is a control function, different from simply becoming aware of the wish to act” (Libet 2004, p. 146). Therefore, what applies to the conscious urge to act (having an unconscious neural origin) does not necessarily apply to the conscious veto to act. The key difference lies in the latter’s role as a control function.

This distinction is important because, despite Libet’s loose usage of terms like “will”, “decision”, and “urge”, he recognizes a significant, perhaps categorical, difference between the conscious urge to act at W and the conscious veto that may occur between W and the point of no return (i.e., the point beyond which conscious veto is ineffective in preventing the action) before the motor act starts. Mele’s emphasis on distinguishing between “urge” and “decision” is echoed in this context within Libet’s own framework.

Subsequent empirical studies, however, have investigated the neural correlate of the conscious veto. Peter Haggard and M. Brass identified the brain regions activated when subjects consciously veto an urge toward an action in controlled experiments. They found activation in the dorsal fronto-median cortex (dFMC; Brodmann’s area 9), the left and right anterior ventral insula, and the right superior temporal sulcus (STS) during trials where subjects vetoed intended actions, compared to trials where subjects followed through with the intended actions (Brass and Haggard 2007, p. 9142). These areas are located in more anterior regions of the brain and are associated with higher-order intentionality (Brass and Haggard 2007, p. 9143).

Since Haggard and Brass claimed to have identified the neural correlate of the veto phenomenon, they speculated about its unconscious origin, stating “Because the initiation of action is unconscious (Libet et al. 1983), the initiation of inhibition may also be unconscious” (Brass and Haggard 2007, p. 9144). However, this conclusion seems premature. First, they do not provide any definite measurement of the temporal extension of the neural activity related to the veto.

Unlike the readiness potential (RP) or lateralized readiness potential (LRP), their results do not show any temporally extended electrical potential specifically linked to the veto. They acknowledge this limitation, stating “The poor temporal resolution of fMRI means we cannot yet judge whether the inhibitory process could operate in the seemingly brief interval between the time of conscious intention and the point of no return for motor output” (Brass and Haggard 2007, p. 9144). Second, identifying a neural correlate is insufficient to establish a causal link between neural activity and mental phenomena without additional assumptions. Thus, the available empirical data are not yet convincing enough to challenge Libet’s interpretation of human freedom as it relates to the conscious veto.

Although Libet does not commit to determinism or indeterminism, Robert Kane integrates the concept of the conscious veto into his libertarian account of human freedom, which allows for indeterminism in the physical world. Kane summarizes Libet’s position by suggesting that “the role of consciousness in voluntary activity and other mental activity is that of ‘oversight’ with possible ‘veto’ power over final outcomes after the initial onset of readiness, but before consummation” (Kane 1998, p. 232). For Kane, this perspective aligns well with his theory, which posits that conscious decision-making and the ability to veto align with a libertarian understanding of free will.

To sum up, Libet argues that even in the context of simple motor tasks, there is a certain scope for conscious decision-making, challenging the notion that our actions are merely automatic responses. The capacity to veto—consciously choosing not to act on an impulse—introduces a level of control that complicates the assertion that free will is an illusion.

While it is evident that we often operate on autopilot, especially in routine tasks, this does not negate our ability to make free and conscious decisions in certain situations. According to Ulric Tse, the key to understanding this aspect of human will is attention. In our daily routines, we may drive automatically without consciously deliberating on how to open the car door, start the engine, or steer the wheel. However, if something unusual occurs, like seeing a clown in the middle of the highway, we immediately direct our attention to it and start making conscious decisions about what to do. Similarly, when we face conflicts or significant problems, we focus our attention on them and begin making conscious decisions (Tse 2013, chap. 3, chap. 10).

One final point concerns the predictability of human actions based on neural activity in the brain before individuals become aware of their intentions. Ulric Tse argues that imperfect predictions from some experiments do not demonstrate that our decisions are strictly determined before we become conscious of them. Instead, these experiments suggest that “some neuronally realized preconscious patterns of activity play some role in how we will make subsequent simple actions” (Tse 2013, p. 179). This is akin to unconscious biasing factors that may influence conscious decisions, such as a person with a negative bias toward women discriminating against female candidates in a hiring process. However, these biasing factors do not determine actions; one can consciously choose to act differently.

As we have seen, there are various interpretations of the Libet-style experiments, and it would be unjustified to easily conclude from these experiments that humans lack free will. Both determinists and indeterminists may accept the findings of these experiments, and both defenders and skeptics of free will may recognize their validity. The differences lie in the additional assumptions they make, many of which are deeply philosophical and concern foundational beliefs about the nature of reality. Determinism and indeterminism are such beliefs. A common core belief shared by most parties in this debate is naturalism or physicalism. Whether one rejects free will or not, the usual approach to defending a view in this context is to remain within the boundaries of naturalism or physicalism.

I must underline that framing the causal mechanisms behind human actions strictly within the bounds of physicalism is more a philosophical stance than a scientific one. Neuroscience primarily focuses on identifying correlations and patterns among the human brain, mind, and bodily actions. Determining the true efficient causes behind these correlations and patterns extends into philosophical territory, which goes beyond what can be empirically confirmed or refuted.

Even widely accepted philosophical positions like contemporary physicalism—whether in its eliminative, reductive, or property dualism forms—encounter challenges and sometimes serious conceptual issues. Some scientists and philosophers acknowledge the difficulty of maintaining this assumption, especially regarding the nature of mental causation. For instance, Ulric Tse states “How a propositional conclusion, such as ‘I need to go to the store to buy cranberry sauce’, is translated into motor plans and actions is not yet known” (Tse 2013, p. 237) and refers to the physical realization of mental phenomena as mysterious (Tse 2013, p. 245).

Robert Kane also candidly acknowledges this mystery:

One of these problems is “the mind/body problem”, including at its core the “problem of consciousness”: how can thoughts, perceptions, and other conscious experiences—including efforts of will—be brain processes? But this is a problem whether you are a compatibilist or incompatibilist, libertarian or non-libertarian. It is no less mysterious how neural firings in the brain could be conscious mental events if they are determined than if they are undetermined, or if they involve undetermined chaotic processes than if they do not.

(Kane 1998, p. 148)

The mystery in question traces back to Cartesian substance dualism, which has largely been abandoned today. However, the mind–body problem formulated within this framework still constitutes the main background for the aforementioned mysteries.

In Cartesian substantial dualism, the body is conceived as an extended, non-thinking substance, entirely distinct from the mind which is a thinking, non-extended substance. Despite having nothing in common, these two substances seem to interact. For example, when a person has the mental state of willing to perform a physical act, such as typing on a keyboard, that person can execute this action effortlessly. Similarly, when the body is physically impacted by an object, the person can feel pain, which is a mental state.

Substantial dualists struggle to convincingly explain how these mental and physical states correlate so seamlessly. When they propose causal links between physical and mental states, they face the challenging task of explaining how these two fundamentally distinct substances can interact—an explanation that is not readily forthcoming. This difficulty underscores one of the primary critiques against substantial dualism and highlights the conceptual challenges it faces in explaining mind–body interactions.

Physicalism denies the existence of the soul or mind as a distinct substance from the body, claiming to have avoided the traditional mind–body problem. If there is no separate mind, there is no causal interaction between mind and body. While the mind–body problem as formulated by Cartesians may disappear within the physicalist framework, new versions of this old problem still arise. Different forms of physicalism encounter different challenges, highlighting that the issues are far from resolved.

Eliminative physicalism takes a radical stance by dismissing the reality of mental phenomena. This view faces the problem of explaining away the obvious mental phenomena experienced daily, especially the paradoxical situation where this version of physicalism is proposed by conscious subjects. Reductive physicalism, on the other hand, seeks to identify mental phenomena with neurophysical states, processes, and networks in the brain. In either framework, the only acknowledged reality is that of neurophysical states within the physical brain, rendering mental states either illusory or remnants of folk psychology.

The problem for these views is accounting for the apparent distinction between physical and mental phenomena. Given the complex nature of consciousness, David Chalmers refers to the challenge of explaining it within physicalism as the “hard problem of consciousness”. This problem is not easily addressed by merely identifying the neural correlates or mechanisms of certain mental phenomena or consciousness. It is “hard” because conscious experience seems fundamentally different from these neural correlates (Chalmers 1996, pp. xi–xii).

Within physicalism, there is another group motivated by the hard problem of consciousness that admits a distinction between mental phenomena and neurophysical phenomena in the brain. Known as property dualists, this group acknowledges a single type of substance—physical or material—but accepts that two types of properties, mental and neurophysical, can coexist within this substance.

However, how can these two distinct types of properties causally interact? Questions about how human consciousness or will can be influenced by or influence neurological states revive a modern iteration of the Cartesian mind–body problem. Thus, while property dualism avoids outright reductionism or eliminative physicalism, it still confronts the complex task of elucidating the causal relationships between mental states and physical processes.

I do not mean to imply that these problems are unsolvable within the limits of naturalist physicalism. I highlight them to counter the impression that naturalist physicalism has definitively solved the mind–body problem and is the only or perfect philosophical theory capable of explaining and making sense of cutting-edge scientific research.

In the next section, I introduce an alternative to mainstream naturalist physicalism: Akkirmânî’s occasionalist model of human will. This model relies on a fundamentally different picture of reality—occasionalism—and presents a libertarian view of human will that is neither caused nor causally efficacious. Remarkably, it also aligns well with the findings of neuroscientific research.

4. Akkirmânî’s Occasionalist Perspective on Human Will

I will now explore Akkirmânî’s perspective on the nature of human will. Subsequently, I will interpret contemporary neuroscientific findings on human will from his viewpoint and discuss to what extent these findings align with his approach. Akkirmânî framed his ideas within the context of occasionalism, a theory that denies efficient causality to natural entities, attributing it solely to God. In its full-fledged form, occasionalism posits that divine power is responsible for the continuous creation of every object and event in the universe. According to this view, God is the direct cause of all natural phenomena, acting without the mediation of any finite beings (Fakhry 1958; Nadler 2011).

Most Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn) and some early modern philosophers like Géraud de Cordemoy and Nicolas Malebranche endorsed this view. These thinkers did not undervalue the order in the universe but maintained that this order did not stem from natural causality but from God’s volition and direct creation. For the Muslim occasionalists, God operates according to a self-imposed habit (‘adah) or custom (sunna). For instance, al-Ghazālī used the example of fire and cotton to illustrate this concept: God consistently creates the burning of cotton when it contacts fire. This occurs not because fire has any inherent power to cause burning, but because God has chosen to create regularly the effect of burning in the presence of fire. While He could have chosen water to be the means of burning cotton, He did not. Thus, we do not expect the burning of cotton when it is wet (Al-Ghazālī 1962, pp. 97–98). Similarly, Malebranche saw natural phenomena as occasions for divine action. He agreed that God is the immediate and sole efficient cause of effects in the world, asserting that the creation of these effects is not random but follows a divine order. For example, in the case of fire and cotton, fire serves merely as the occasion upon which God creates the burning, thus fire acts merely as “an occasional cause” as termed by Malebranche without any causal power of its own (Malebranche 1997, p. 448).

There are some limited versions of occasionalism as well. For example, a modified form of limited occasionalism accepts that while physical matter lacks efficient causality, finite minds or spirits—alongside divine causality—can possess it. Arguably, Alvin Plantinga has recently adopted this view (Plantinga 2016). One of the main concerns for adopting this form of limited occasionalism is to account for human responsibility. The underlying assumption in this context is that individuals can only be held accountable for their actions if human will possesses causal efficacy.

However, Akkirmânî as a full-fledged occasionalist rejects the idea that efficient causality extends even to human will. Despite this, he maintains that humans are responsible for their decisions and actions. He grounds responsibility in the concept of human free will, asserting that the will does not need to be causally efficacious to be free and to bear responsibility. This perspective allows him to uphold the notion of accountability without contradicting the occasionalist view that all causality ultimately resides with the divine. Let me explain this view in detail now.

Akkirmânî addresses the nature and constraints of human will within the framework of theological determinism. He considers divine knowledge, will, and power to be potential sources from which theological determinism may arise. Concerning the issue of divine knowledge and will, fatalism seems to appear in the following way: if God is omniscient, knowing all events including future human decisions and actions, does this not imply that such actions are predetermined? In response to this dilemma, Akkirmânî draws a critical distinction between knowledge and determination. He argues that knowledge does not equate to determination; rather, knowledge is dependent upon what is known. In this context, divine knowledge of human actions is predicated on the actions themselves, which are based on human choices and decisions. This relationship is not causally dependent, underscoring that while God’s knowledge encompasses human choices, it does not dictate them. Neither do human choices causally affect God. God knows them as they are; this is what the concept of knowledge implies. Consequently, human actions are not dependent on divine knowledge; instead, it is divine knowledge that is based on the free choices made by humans. Concerning the interaction between divine will and knowledge, Akkirmânî suggests that because God knows the specific choices humans will make, the divine will aligns with these choices, facilitating their occurrence without enforcing them. This framework preserves human freedom and responsibility, avoiding fatalistic implications (Akkirmânî 1866, p. 23).

In discussing divine will and power, Akkirmânî adheres to the principles of occasionalism and explores how divine will and causality might coexist with human free will. He references the Qur’anic verse “You cannot will, unless God wills” (81:29) as a key scriptural basis. Here, “you” refers to humans, and one interpretation of this verse suggests a form of fatalism where human will is entirely contingent on divine will. To Akkirmânî, this interpretation is often supported by Ashʿarite scholars within Islamic theology (kalām). However, he rejects this fatalistic reading and offers an alternative interpretation, which he claims to be aligned with the Māturīdite school of Islamic theology (kalām). In Akkirmânî’s view, human will does not have the inherent capability to create or cause its intended outcomes. Instead, these outcomes only manifest if God wills and enacts what human will intends; thus, God’s will and power are essential for the actualization of any voluntary action. While God retains the omnipotent ability to create anything, it is His habit to consider human will as a precondition for creating voluntary actions as intended by humans (Akkirmânî 1866, p. 25). Therefore, according to Akkirmânî, the Qur’anic verse does not necessitate a fatalistic interpretation. Instead, it highlights a dynamic interplay between divine omnipotence and human agency, where God generally considers human will as a precondition for His creative action, preserving a space for genuine human freedom and responsibility.

Akkirmânî suggests another interpretation of the verse in question, which involves a deeper analysis of the human will. He identifies four main parts for any voluntary action:

• Having an idea or representation of the voluntary action.
• Having a desire (şevk) toward the action.
• Deciding to act.
• Moving the limbs of the body (tahrîk-i âzâ).

God creates voluntary actions following this order as a result of His self-imposed habit. The initial stages of ideas and desires that precede decision are created by God. Ideas about specific actions may emerge in the human mind suddenly or without any deliberate process. As individuals focus on these ideas, their desires can intensify. Conversely, if attention towards these ideas wanes, the corresponding desire may diminish. Desire, also created by God, serves as a factor that inclines individuals towards a particular action (Akkirmânî 1866, p. 26).

Echoing Leibniz’s principle of “inclination without necessitation”, Akkirmânî proposes that while desire inclines, it does not compel the subsequent action. Ultimately, it is up to the individual to decide whether to act on these desires. A positive decision triggers the movement of the bodily parts, and thus the action takes place. It is only to this decision that human free will applies. This framework maintains that while God creates the preconditions for willing as well as the action itself, human free will determines the final outcome, reflecting a nuanced interaction between divine influence and personal autonomy. Given that God creates the preconditions necessary for human will—without which humans would be incapable of making a decision—it remains accurate to assert that humans cannot will unless God wills. God chooses to instill specific ideas and desires related to particular actions, and only after this divine intervention can humans decide whether to act upon them.

What is interesting in this view is that Akkirmânî considers the element of decision, which he identifies with human free will, to be not created. Let me explain the extent human will is free in the following way: freedom relates only to saying “yes” or “no” to specific actions proposed by ideas and desires. These “yes” or “no” decisions are the foundation of human free will, also termed as “particularized will” (irâde-yi cüz’iye). Particularized will consists in simple affirmations or rejections of intentions concerning actions. I use the term “intention” as a complex mental state that involves representations of specific actions as well as inclinations concerning them. People may have positive intentions, which have desires that incline them toward certain actions. They may also have negative intentions, which involve aversions (nefret) that incline them to refrain from certain actions. Typically, we may desire to drink water after eating a hot meal. We may also disgust and avoid drinking human urine. However, desires and disgusts (aversions) are not the same as decisions and choices. Despite finding it disgusting, we may decide to drink urine. Conversely, despite being thirsty, we can choose not to drink water.

Without explicitly stating it, Akkirmânî appears to follow the Māturīdite scholar Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa (d. 1346), viewing human particularized will as a type of state (hāl). The term “state” can be ambiguous, but in this context, it refers to relational or relative states, which will be explained shortly. These states belong to a specific ontological category considered neither “existent” nor “non-existent” (Akkirmânî 1866, pp. 21, 27). This conception has been criticized as violating the principle of excluded middle and may seem paradoxical (Koca 2020, p. 248). However, the apparent paradox resolves when we understand that the “non-existence” referred to here should not be taken as the logical negation of existence. “Existence” refers to the category to which causality applies. However, it is possible to speak of relative or relational states that are not absolutely non-existent but also do not enter into causal relationships. The logical negation of existence encompasses not only non-existence but also these relative or relational states. When we say, for instance, “The smart phone is on the left of the laptop”, we imply that both the smart phone and the laptop exist and, because they can engage in causal relationships, they have been created by God. However, the condition of “being on the left” arises relative to the smart phone and the laptop and does not possess existence like the phone and the laptop do. Once the phone and the laptop exist, their positional relationship is identified as a relative and relational condition, which cannot simply be referred to as “nonexistent”. Although the phone and the laptop are created beings, the smart phone being on the left of the laptop is a relative condition and does not fall into the category of causality, nor can this condition be said to be created. Otherwise, it would be a category mistake, similar to the mistake we make when saying “Black numbers cause bad luck”.

Similar to states such as being on the left or being on the right, human particularized will is also a relational state. Let us reconsider Akkirmânî’s four-partite analysis of human action and analyze it. First, we conceive of something in our mind. For example, consider preparing the dinner. This thought is an existent mental state that is created by God. Following this conception, we may feel an inclination towards it or aversion from it. We might desire to undertake the action suggested by this thought, or we may dislike it and feel an urge to avoid it. Both the inclination and aversion that arise are existent mental states and also created. At this point, we begin to lean towards an alternative, providing us with the opportunity to choose whether or not to carry out the action. It is important to note that we are now engaging with at least two alternative thoughts that represent the action’s occurrence and non-occurrence. When we decisively choose one of these alternatives, the state of our will at this point of conscious and fixed decision is referred to as “particularized will”. This is a relational state because we are saying “yes” to one option and “no” to the other in our consciousness. The relationship established between our conscious will and the option of preparing the dinner, as well as not preparing in a negative sense, forms a modal relationship and underpins our freedom. In sum, considering options to choose and deliberating about them can be regarded as an act of the agent, which is created. However, the decisive choice or fixed decision is a state because it is instantaneous; it is not an act that has a temporal duration. This fixed decision still has a contingent aspect in that the agent might have a different choice.

One could level the following criticism at this approach: relational states, such as being on the left or on the right, depend entirely on the relata that exist in the world. Once God creates the smartphone and the laptop in certain spatial locations, the relational state of the smartphone being to the left of the laptop definitively emerges in that specific way, without any possibility otherwise. Therefore, the relational state is entirely determined by its relata. According to this perspective, there is no room for freedom (Koca 2020, pp. 247–48).

Let us reconsider our example involving the smartphone and the laptop. Both the smartphone and the laptop are material entities without free will. Once they are positioned by God in specific locations, the smartphone must be to the left of the laptop. This setup involves two relata (the smartphone and the laptop) and one relationship between them (the smartphone’s position to the left of the laptop). However, considering this scenario from a broader perspective introduces an additional relatum: God. God, as a free agent, chose the specific locations for the smartphone and the laptop. However, God could have placed these entities in different locations, potentially resulting in the laptop being to the left of the smartphone. Thus, while the relationship between the smartphone and the laptop seems fixed once they are placed, this spatial relationship becomes contingent when considering God’s involvement. Similarly, in discussing human agents, it is important to recognize their conscious and free agency in exercising their particularized wills. Free will stands in relationship with multiple options. Even though a chosen action must occur once God decides to create it in alignment with human choice, humans are not constrained to choose a particular action. Their will is not determined; they can choose from any available actions. This reflects the contingent nature of human decisions.

Human free will is not a necessary consequence that emerges inevitably after the existence of certain conditions, unlike the relationship of “being to the left” that appears between the phone and the laptop. Instead, it is a relationship that provides the foundation for our freedom. In any case, the relational state referred to as “particularized will” is not something to which causality applies; thus, it is not created. Since it is not created, it is not under the control or creation of God (Akkirmânî 1866, pp. 21, 27). The exclusion of this state from God’s creation is not because God lacks the desire to create it, despite having the capability. Instead, it is due to its unique ontological status, which makes it metaphysically impossible for any form of causality to apply to it.

Therefore, our particularized will (definite conscious choice or decision) is not something that emerges from a certain causality; it is merely a non-causal determination of our consciousness. Neither can it cause anything. God creates the necessary movements in our organs in accordance with our choice. We stand up, walk, go to the kitchen, and prepare the dinner. All these actions are created, but they are created by God in accordance with our choice. Since God creates people’s actions taking into account their choices, He ultimately holds them responsible for those choices.

5. Akkirmânî’s View of Human Will and Neuroscientific Experiments

Akkirmânî’s analysis of human will offers valuable insights that can enhance our understanding of current neuroscientific research on the topic. His model of free will aligns with some libertarian views and is particularly useful in addressing the deterministic challenges that use the aforementioned neuroscientific findings. By examining the neuroscientific experiments on human will through the lens of Akkirmânî’s model, we can gain a deeper appreciation of how traditional philosophical or theological frameworks can interact with and inform modern scientific inquiries. Let us explore how Akkirmânî’s view can be applied to interpret these contemporary studies and potentially reconcile the tension between free will and neuroscientific findings.

Recall that Libet employed the terms “urge”, “will”, and “decision” interchangeably in his studies. However, upon noticing that some subjects refrained from flexing their hands, he introduced the concept of “veto”, specifically related to canceling a particular action. Consequently, Libet’s experiments suggest that human will comprises distinct aspects. Alfred Mele, indeed, clearly identified some of these different facets, underlining the importance of distinguishing between urges and decisions.

Akkirmânî’s differentiation between inclinations and conscious decisions is consonant with Mele’s distinction and sheds light on a significant distinction within human will. Inclinations, whether desires or aversions, resemble urges and are associated with specific ideas regarding particular actions. The contemporary perspective that conscious urges are predetermined aligns with Akkirmânî’s notion that inclinations are determined and created by God. As an occasionalist, Akkirmânî would refute the notion that neuroactivity in the brain causes conscious urges. However, neuroscientific data do not mandate such a conclusion; they merely indicate that neuroactivity precedes the emergence of conscious urges. Certain brain potentials, such as general or lateralized readiness potentials, consistently precede specific mental states like conscious urges. What we observe or measure is merely a correlation between physical and mental states, not a direct causation. Hence, Akkirmânî need not deny this correlation; instead, he would interpret it as a divine pattern of creation. In essence, God regularly creates certain neurophysical states associated with particular mental states. Following Malebranche’s terminology, specific neural activity in the brain serves as an occasional cause for God’s creation of specific mental states, such as conscious urges or inclinations.

People may not always be aware of the distinction between conscious decisions and conscious urges or inclinations. This lack of awareness is understandable; if one typically acts upon their inclinations, distinguishing them from deliberate decisions can be difficult. However, when someone chooses not to act on an urge or inclination toward a specific action, then it is revealed that human will has an additional dimension beyond these impulses. Instances where individuals exercise their “veto power” illustrate this point. Another example is when people find themselves torn between conflicting inclinations, such as the desire to eat while fasting juxtaposed with a deep respect for the religious duty of fasting. In such scenarios, a person consciously decides between two or multiple options, affirmatively choosing one and rejecting the others.

This type of decision-making, according to Akkirmânî, belongs to a different ontological category than that of inclinations. While inclinations and the ideas associated with them fall within an existential category that accommodates causal relationships, decisions belong to a relational category to which causality does not extend. Inclinations may be regarded as relational since they are oriented toward something as inclination to drink water is oriented toward realizing the conceived action of taking a glass of water and drinking it. However, this relationality stems from an external state like the conception of a definite act toward which the inclination is connected. However, inclinations per se, ontologically speaking, are not relations. It is within the relational mental state that human freedom is situated in a very limited way. Decisions may also have neural correlates within the physical existential category, but they are not identical. Humans are free only in their conscious decisions.

Thus, Akkirmânî proposes a libertarian interpretation of human will, suggesting that we can consciously and freely choose among genuine alternative options. However, our choices are neither caused nor causally efficacious. While many libertarians, including Robert Kane and Ulric Tse, attribute causality to humans in their decision-making process, some adopt a non-causal model of free will. These non-causal libertarians argue that people act for certain reasons freely, but these reasons do not play any causal role in the decision-making process (Goetz 1988; Wilson 1989; Ginet 1990). Akkirmânî’s libertarian model aligns more closely with those who defend the non-causal model. In Akkirmânî’s framework, desires, aversions, or inclinations can be seen as reasons people consider when deciding whether to act, yet they are causally inert. Furthermore, Akkirmânî discusses scenarios where individuals can consciously choose an option even if there is no compelling reason to choose one over the other. For instance, he describes a man running away from a predatory animal who reaches a point where he must choose between two identical paths. Akkirmânî notes that this individual can choose one path even without a reason to prefer it over the other (Akkirmânî 1866, p. 24). This example illustrates his assumption of the liberty of indifference, highlighting his belief in the freedom to choose without any deterministic constraints.

Recall that Akkirmânî locates the liberty of indifference in an agent’s decisive choices or definite decisions. Definite decisions are instantaneous states rather than acts that possess temporal duration. This view aligns with Brian O’Shaughnessy’s concept of “deciding-that”. O’Shaughnessy distinguishes between “deciding-whether” and “deciding-that”: The former refers to the ongoing activity of deciding while considering options or alternatives, also described as “trying to decide whether”. In contrast, “deciding-that” is “a distinct, discontinuous, essentially inactive event of cognitive crystallization” (O’Shaughnessy 2008, p. 544). This discontinuous cognitive crystallization is what Akkirmânî refers to as decisive choices or definite decisions. It is discontinuous and instantaneous for Akkirmânî, which is why I describe it as a state rather than an event.

In summary, according to Akkirmânî’s perspective, inclinations and the ideas associated with them are not under human control; they are predetermined. However, conscious decisions remain within human control and are not predetermined, even by God. Libet also acknowledges that humans have the ability to veto their urges, which provides a space for freedom, albeit not in the traditional sense of free will. Traditionally, human freedom was viewed as encompassing not just decisions but also urges and inclinations. However, Libet-style experiments cast serious doubts on this traditional model of free will, suggesting instead a more constrained form of freedom that closely aligns with Akkirmânî’s model.

Furthermore, contemporary arguments against free will, which are based on the predictability of human actions from neurological activity, do not pose a real threat from Akkirmânî’s perspective. First, current neuroscientific experiments enable scientists to predict specific human actions (such as using the left or right finger to press a computer key) with certain probabilities like 60% or 80%, but not with absolute certainty of 100%. This implies that under certain conditions, people can act contrary to what neural activity indicates before the action. This gap suggests that neural activities may at most incline people to act in certain ways but do not necessitate those actions. This viewpoint is consistent with Akkirmânî’s approach, as he recognizes the role of inclinations in human choices but does not view them as absolute determinants of human actions.

Second, even if human actions could be predicted with 100% accuracy, as suggested in the thought experiment by Sam Harris, this would still not undermine human free will in Akkirmânî’s view. Akkirmânî acknowledges that God certainly knows human choices and actions, which is analogous to predicting human actions with 100% accuracy. As Akkirmânî differentiates, knowledge of an action does not equate to determination of that action. In his framework, complete and accurate foreknowledge of human actions does not negate the fact that these actions depend on the free choices or decisions of human will.

I aim to open a new philosophical window to this old and intricate question, extending beyond the confines of contemporary physicalism. Within the framework of occasionalism, answering this question is straightforward because all causal power is attributed solely to God. In occasionalism, it is God who maintains the correlation between mental phenomena with neurophysical activity. This perspective eliminates the need to explain how the mental and physical realms causally interact, as they are not considered to interact causally at all.

The type of occasionalism that was emerged among the Cartesians like Cordemoy and Malebranche in the early modern period was initially criticized as an ad hoc solution to the mind–body problem, introducing God merely to resolve the problem of mind–body interaction. However, this critique does not fully account for the historical and philosophical depth of occasionalism, which has been supported by various independent arguments (Lee 2008; Nadler 2011). Its application to the mind–body problem is just one facet of this theory.

Moreover, it is important to note that occasionalism does not necessarily adhere to substantial dualism. Many occasionalists within Islamic theology (kalām) adopt a physicalist stance, viewing mental properties as accidents that inhere in material/physical atoms (Bulgen 2022). Thus, occasionalism can align with both substantial and property dualism, among other ontological frameworks. Its philosophical strength, especially in comparison to naturalist positions, lies in its ability to explain perfect correlations between mental and physical realms without involving causal interactions between them. Furthermore, Akkirmânî’s occasionalist model offers an additional advantage by providing an explanation for the freedom of human will. It posits that particularized human will (conscious human decisions) resides in a special ontological category to which no causality applies, thereby preserving the concept of free will within a world constantly created in a perfect order.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, I have tackled the complex issue of human freedom and responsibility in the context of contemporary neuroscientific research, with a particular focus on Libet-style experiments. Starting with a critical review of significant studies beginning with Libet’s seminal work from the 1980s, I have examined various interpretations including those that challenge traditional conceptions of free will and moral accountability.

Throughout this analysis, I introduced and integrated the perspective of Mehmed Akkirmânî, an Ottoman scholar from the eighteenth century who champions a libertarian view of human freedom within an occasionalist framework. Akkirmânî’s sophisticated arguments against theological determinism and his delineation of human will into inclinations, intentions, and decisions underscore his assertion that true human freedom resides solely in conscious decisions, presenting a nuanced view of free will. Akkirmânî’s perspective, particularly his occasionalist libertarian approach, aligns remarkably well with modern scientific findings. This alignment offers substantial advantages over naturalist physicalism by proposing a better explanation of the correlations between mental and neurophysical states.

By synthesizing the insights of the late Māturīdite school of Islamic theology with cutting-edge neuroscientific research, I highlight the enduring relevance of philosophical theology in contemporary scientific contexts. I advocate for a continued dialogue between science, theology, and philosophy, suggesting that understanding human will requires a multifaceted approach. This approach not only preserves but also enriches our conception of human freedom, ensuring that our scientific findings do not strip away the profound responsibility we bear for our actions.