The Growth of Korea Soka Gakkai International (KSGI) and Its Civic Engagement in the Socio-Historical Context

Abstract

This paper examines how and why Korea Soka Gakkai International (KSGI) has grown rapidly in the Korean religious market. Although Soka Gakkai was introduced to Korea as a Nichiren Shoshu lay community in the 1960s, KSGI has achieved remarkable growth without the structurally covert and organizationally authoritative control typical of traditional elite Buddhism. This fact is significant in both theory and practice, as lay movements have historically not been very successful in Korean religions. Focusing on the paradoxical affinity between secular civic movements and religious lay movements, this paper explains why and how KSGI had to combine the two movements in a socio-historical context different from that of its Japanese partner, which established a public political party, the Komeito, and formed a coalition government with other parties. As a result, this paper reveals the following findings: first, KSGI’s nonpolitical civic engagement led to a more effective growth strategy tailored to the Korean socio-historical context. Second, the Korean government’s policy of opening up to Japanese culture since the 2000s played a significant role in the growth of KSGI. Third, the spread of civil movements in Korea contributed to enhancing KSGI’s social adaptability and credibility.

1. Introduction

Although KSGI has grown rapidly to become the second-largest membership of SGI worldwide since Ikeda Daisaku, the third president of Soka Gakkai (the Nichiren Shoshu lay community), launched it in Japan in 1975, its exact situation in Korea remains largely unknown to both domestic and international scholars of religion. It was not until 2000 that KSGI could be registered as a religious corporation, as the Korean government had maintained political and social distance from religious organizations originating in Japan. Despite its relatively short history in Korea, KSGI has become a nationwide religious organization, managing about 260 local centers, owning two high-rise buildings (its headquarters and the Ikeda Exhibition Hall) in downtown Seoul, operating training centers and a natural park, and regularly publishing newspapers, magazines, and books.1

A few scholars have attributed KSGI’s success to a religious innovation in doctrine and practice (K.-t. Park 2001; S. Park 2007, 2008, 2017), while almost all Japanese sects introduced into Korea typically maintain small groups and fail to grow (H. Kim 2022, p. 300). Even a Protestant theologian suggests that Christian missionaries in Japan should learn from Soka Gakkai’s missionary strategies that appeal to the Japanese public (H. Y. Kim 2003a, 2003b, pp. 559–69). However, these existing studies have significant limitations in two aspects. First, they do not consider the many differences and similarities between Korea and Japan from a cross-cultural context. Second, they fail to explain various socio-historical factors that elucidate how and why KSGI is more successful than other lay movements in Korean society (H. Kim 2022, p. 301). In short, they tend to oversimplify KSGI’s connection to the complex environment of the Korean religious market in a civic society.

This paper first analyzes the main theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between religion and civic engagement in Korean civil society. Second, it explains why KSGI was able to grow into the most significant Buddhist sect in a relatively short period in Korea, comparing it with the growth pattern of lay movements within mainstream Buddhism. Third, it focuses on certain specifications of KSGI’s civic engagement, which has developed in a different context from Soka Gakkai in Japan, even though both refuse to comply with the hierarchical authority of clergy both doctrinally and organizationally. Some socio-historical conditions that produced these specific situations and features will be considered more carefully and intensively, focusing on why KSGI had to conduct civil movements free from political ideology and secular political parties. Finally, this paper concludes that the unique growth pattern shown by KSGI is more closely related to strategic flexibility, intentional or unintentional, adaptable to the Korean context, than to the egalitarian spirituality and relationships inherent in lay movements that are overlooked by previous studies.

2. Socio-Historical Background

The history of KSGI began in the late 1950s through Koreans who experienced Soka Gakkai in Japan or in publications. In 1964, the Korean government prohibited the assembly and propagation of this religion on the suspicion that it was a religion pursuing Japanese interests, arresting some members for violation of the Foreign Exchange Management Act. In 1966, however, the Supreme Court finally granted religious freedom to this religious organization. In 1975, it strengthened its internal integration as a Korean organization of Soka Gakkai International and began civic activities to help rural farmers, promote environmental conservation movements, and campaign to clean up the country. Since the 1990s, it has been more systematically organized along with the instruction and support of Soka Gakkai in Japan, and has become the fastest growing Buddhist new religious movement in Korea. Above all, it adheres to the optimistic and egalitarian doctrine based on the Lotus Sutra that the Buddhist ideal society can be realized in this world and there can be no difference in awakening to Buddha-nature, emphasizing non-violent pacifism such as anti-nuclear movements and environmental movements as religious practices.

Since Alexis de Tocqueville applied it to democracy in the United States in the 19th century (Tocqueville [1835] 1969), considering the social or political significance of civic engagement as a social foundation to support the democratic system of modern civil society has become a theoretical norm (Schwadel et al. 2016; Smidt 1999; Bellah 1967; Casanova 1994; Habermas 2006). In the sociology of religion, the positive relationship between religious commitment and civic participation has been reported as a typical pattern of the socialization of religions in North America (Schwadel et al. 2016; Smidt 1999), while it has become more notable in Korea since the COVID-19 pandemic (Yoo 2022c; Kim and Jo 2020). Unlike the existing context of Christianity or religious majorities, this paper focuses on the civic engagement of KSGI, which has rarely been discussed in previous studies, identifying its unique features in terms of the Buddhist lay movement and religious minorities in several dimensions:

First, Buddhist lay movements began to play a significant role in popularizing Korean Buddhism when civic democracy had firmly settled in Korea in the late 1980s (Chung 1997, p. 11). They aimed to cultivate and educate lay Buddhists outside temples, focusing on a flexible religiosity that could accept the secular civic virtues necessary for maintaining civic democracy. Especially when the long-standing power struggle within the Jogye Order (曹溪宗) entailed physical violence in 1998, its lay believers came to establish the Buddhist Solidarity for Reform (BSR) in 1999 to launch a sweeping reform of the largest Buddhist order in Korea. It is apparent that these changes in the mainstream Buddhism of Korea had in common a socio-religious motivation by which Daisaku Ikeda, the third president of SG, decided to break from Nichiren Shoshu, whereas both presented a clearly different strategy on how lay Buddhism should coexist with the politics of civic democracy. Above all, the education-oriented KSGI encourages its members to cultivate a new citizenship compatible with civil democracy to the extent that mainstream Buddhism like the Jogye Order has never tried before, although there was still social discrimination and prejudice against religious minorities, unofficial religions, and new religious movements in Korea.

Second, there is an innovative characteristic in that SGI, including KSGI, rejects doctrinal and personal control based on the organizational hierarchy of sangha, focusing on the teaching from the Lotus Sutra, “teachers and disciples are not two (師弟不二)”. This equal relationship between monks and lay believers has socio-political implications, as it emerged from below due to checks and reactions to the privatization of religious power (Son 1997, p. 18). Meanwhile, the lay movement of the Buddhist majorities like BSR in Korea takes it for granted to conform to the religious authority of sangha, adhering to the traditional hierarchy between the two groups.

Third, KSGI’s rapid growth needs to be explained from the perspective of global citizenship. While SGI has achieved great success in various countries (Hammond and Machacek 1999; Wilson and Dobbelaere 1994), traditional Buddhist organizations in Korea have experienced a continual reduction in membership since the 1990s (MCSTK 2018, p. 85). This different trend in growth has significant theoretical implications for how faith-based civic engagements like KSGI could contribute to intensifying the identity of lay believers at the global level over the last decades (Yoo and Kim 2023). Thus, this paper tries to analyze civic activities of KSGI such as the anti-war and anti-nuclear weapons movement, indoctrinated as a major practical means to make this world more peaceful and happier. It is especially different not only from the nationalistic trends of the majority of Korean Buddhism, but also from the party politics of SG in Japan, in that it pursues an international solidarity based on the nonpolitical citizenship (Yoo 2022a, p. 191).

Finally, as SGI tries to embody its Buddhist egalitarianism through a civic movement to realize true peace in this world and persist against inequality and injustice, its religious ideas inevitably intervene in secular issues and sometimes create tension with secular authorities. This approach tends to transgress and break down the traditional boundaries between religious and civic movements. It is not simply a functional substitute for Protestant ethics to justify a consumer capitalism in daily life, as argued in the estern context (Dawson 2001; Wilson and Dobbelaere 1994). Especially, as the transnational role of faith-based NGOs (non-governmental organizations) becomes more important in dealing with climate change, environmental–ecological problems, and human rights, their civic movements make the traditional dichotomy much more blurred over time.

This paper aims to identify the socio-historical features of KSGI as a lay movement by comparing it with mainstream Buddhism in Korea and its Japanese partner and further analyze how the affinity between social conditions and KSGI’s features relates to its growth in the Korean context.

3. Civic Engagement and Social Recognition

The rapid growth of KSGI has rarely received serious attention from sociologists of religion. Park’s outstanding research reveals how and why Soka Gakkai in Korea has frequently experienced significant division and conflict since its predecessors began their religious activities in the 1960s. These conflicts were influenced by the tensions between lay leaders and the monastic order in Japan (S. Park 2008, 2017). It was not until SGI declared its independence from the Nichiren Shoshu priesthood in 1991 that KSGI could integrate divided groups and reunite many sectarian offshoots. While this organizational integration laid an important foundation for growth, it alone does not fully explain KSGI’s rapid expansion in the highly competitive Korean religious market. KSGI’s growth trajectory is exceptional, suggesting that additional factors have contributed to its success (Jeong 2009, p. 47; Cha 2006, pp. 304–5), while other Buddhist orders and lay organizations relying on the Lotus Sutra, indigenous or imported, now face the threat of disappearance. The doctrinal emphasis on equal religious status for men and women, as well as clergy and laity, bears similarities to Protestant pietism or Catholic monastic models in terms of spiritual equality (Mitchell 1995, p. 252). However, the pattern and reasons for KSGI’s growth are distinct issues that cannot be explained solely by these doctrinal similarities. For a more comprehensive understanding, both internal and external factors need to be analyzed.

First, the doctrine of absolute equality among members and between clergy and laity in the pursuit of Buddhist enlightenment and happiness does not mean that KSGI lacks organizational management and control. As Park’s book, “Modern Korean Society and SGI” (2008), explains in detail, KSGI’s biggest challenge was overcoming organizational divisions and integrating sectarian members in Korea. The most controversial and problematic issue among its members was how to reestablish relationships with its Japanese partners, SGI and Nichiren Shoshu. As often seen in the history of Buddhist and Christian lay movements, the focus on equality among religious members tends to increase internal conflicts and makes it more difficult to manage and mobilize members efficiently (Mitchell 1995). However, when Daisaku Ikeda, the third president of SGI, began visiting Korea and encouraged KSGI to reorganize its members in the 1990s, the organization saw significant growth. KSGI’s regional units increased from 69 zones (圈, kwon) in 1995 to 101 in 1999, and further to 143 in 2010. Additionally, KSGI reported to the government an increase in religious facilities across the country, from 209 in 2001 to 365 in 2010 (MCSTK 2002, 2011).

In addition, the government’s acceptance of KSGI as a registered religious corporation in 2000 marked a significant breakthrough for its members. This recognition allowed them to clarify their religious identity as Buddhists and strengthen their religious commitment both internally and externally. However, there is no empirical research on what prompted this drastic change in governmental attitudes toward KSGI. Some argue that KSGI may have made an implicit deal with political powers during the 1997 presidential election, as the eventual winner, former President Dae-jung Kim, desperately needed support from KSGI members concentrated in Gyeongsang province (S. Park 2008, p. 284). Following this recognition, KSGI, as a religious corporation, could assert its legal and economic rights and responsibilities. This new status enabled the organization to establish mutually cooperative relationships with municipal governments nationwide and to launch its own peace and environmental movements in the public sphere.

This reinforcement of public legitimacy has led to a significant change in how KSGI members identify their religious affiliation both publicly and privately. KSGI and its predecessors have long suffered from an anti-Soka Gakkai campaign led by Korean mass media and the government, which stigmatized them as followers of a ‘pseudo-religion’ and ‘pro-Japanese collaborators’ linked to the Komeito in Japan (S. Park 2008, p. 79; Cho 2020, p. 166). Removing this artificially imposed imperialist or aggressive image remains a significant and urgent challenge for KSGI as well as SGI. Many members are still reluctant to disclose their religious affiliation at work, school, or in daily life, particularly because Christian groups, which dominate the Korean religious market, continue to label them as ‘heretics’ who threaten orthodox faith. Despite KSGI’s steady improvement in public recognition and its increasing membership, the Korean government has yet to include KSGI in the religious categories used to identify religious populations in the National Demographic Census (Yoo 2021, p. 241). Given that the NDC results, published every ten years, are considered highly reliable and frequently cited by both domestic and international scholars of religion, it appears that Statistics Korea, responsible for the NDC, is cautious about statistically revealing or supporting the nationwide influence of KSGI, which originated in Japan. Consequently, there is no official statistical data showing the exact scale and regional distribution of KSGI membership.

Second, it is noteworthy that the progress and maturity of Korean civil society provided a favorable environment for the growth of religious organizations with the start of civilian rule in the 1990s. The end of the military regimes, which had imposed a way of coercive and uniform thinking on general citizens, enabled an egalitarian and citizen-friendly spirit to flourish across all aspects of society, including the religious sphere. The Korean civic spirit, reborn through a modern history of resistance against military dictatorship, pressured religious organizations to redefine their beliefs and practices concerning equality and justice to align with the renewed sense of citizenship, although approaches varied among different religious groups. In the case of mainstream Buddhism, the launch of BSR (Buddhist Social Responsibility) was an exemplary attempt to address these new trends within the Jogye Order (曹溪宗), which had previously enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with the military regimes. Nonetheless, the BSR failed to introduce significant doctrinal and organizational innovations that would allow its lay movement to fully address Korean Buddhists’ civic spirit in relation to various political, economic, and social issues. The traditional and factional leadership of the Jogye Order, tacitly accepted by the BSR, struggles to coexist peacefully with the central values of civil democracy such as autonomy, equality, democracy, justice, and diversity.

Third, the NGO-oriented approach of SGI stands out as a distinctive feature that Korean Buddhist organizations had not previously adopted. While the importance of civic engagement through NGOs only began to be acknowledged in the Korean religious sphere in the 2000s, SGI had already established itself as an UN-affiliated NGO by 1983, focusing on anti-war and anti-nuclear movements. As an NGO with consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), SGI can participate in international conferences, make statements at these events, organize side events, access UN premises, and engage in networking and lobbying activities (UNECOSOC 2018, p. 17). In South Korea, the KSGI launched its peace campaign on university campuses called UNIPEACE in 1998, organized by its young members. This initiative demonstrates its commitment to engaging youth in peace-building efforts and aligns with its broader mission of promoting peace, culture, and education based on respect for human dignity (Yoo 2022a, p. 191).

KSGI’s civic engagement as an NGO differs fundamentally from past faith-based labor movements that fought for the rights of factory workers and rural farmers during industrialization. While those movements often involved physical resistance and political criticism against secular authorities, KSGI pursues a thoroughly non-violent and non-political pacifist approach. Since the 2000s, NGOs have thrived across various sectors, reflecting an increasing diversity in civic engagement (Youn 2023, p. 98). This social environment has allowed KSGI to enhance its public image through social work, educational initiatives, and cultural activities nationwide. In addition, the Basic Act on Cooperatives (BAC), introduced in 2012, helped clarify and strengthen the legal status of NGOs as social cooperatives or enterprises. This legislation enabled faith-based NGOs to promote civic activities and organizations more actively and sustainably, with a focus on the environmental, ecological, and welfare sectors (Yoo 2022b, p. 97). The quantitative and qualitative growth of these voluntary associations has created a favorable socio-institutional foundation for KSGI’s civic movements, allowing for expanded activities and increased influence within the realm of civic engagement.

As a result, KSGI established a nationwide social welfare foundation called Mugunghwa Welfare World (MWW) in 2015 to enhance its civic activities. The foundation operates under the motto of protection, volunteering, sharing, opportunity, and environment, and identifies itself as a non-profit organization (NPO).2 This shift in self-identification demonstrates KSGI’s adaptability to Korean civil society. NPOs typically maintain closer relationships with municipal authorities and communities compared to NGOs, enabling them to achieve their public purposes through educational, cultural, environmental, and socio-economic cooperation.

Fourth, the South Korean government’s attitude toward Japanese popular culture became more liberal and flexible following two key events: the 1998 Joint Declaration of Partnership between Korea and Japan, signed by former President Kim Dae-jung, and the 2002 Korea-Japan Joint World Cup. Since Kim Dae-jung recognized cultural policy as one of the most important policy goals to overcome the IMF financial crisis then, the government authorized the legal importation of Japanese movies, videos, and cartoons in the name of enhancing cultural competitiveness to counter the neoliberal international order (Nam 2024, pp. 273–74; Han 2023). Subsequently, it fully opened the fields of movies, music records, and games to Japanese imports in 2003. The expansion of Japanese popular culture in Korea facilitated KSGI’s public educational and cultural activities. It is apparent that this change in cultural policy led general citizens to a better understanding of KSGI’s civic activities based on its Buddhist philosophy of pacifism and happiness. Specifically, KSGI’s teachings on pacifism relate to civic virtues in the public sphere, while its teachings on happiness address the personal justification of consumption in modern capitalist society (Wilson and Dobbelaere 1994).

Given that both Korean Buddhists and Christians are known for their worldly religiosity, which often includes the pursuit of wealth and health, KSGI’s flexible and expansive interpretation of happiness—encompassing both worldly and otherworldly contexts—aligns well with Koreans’ traditional religious sensibilities. In this sense, KSGI’s discourse on happiness provides its members with a faith-based consumption ethic while also allowing ample room to reinterpret traditional religiosity within the modern Korean context. This explanation is supported by a recent empirical survey on KSGI members’ life satisfaction. The survey found that 97.3% of KSGI respondents reported feeling ‘very happy’ or ‘somewhat happy’, indicating a higher level of life satisfaction compared to members of major religious groups such as Buddhists, Catholics, and Protestants (Je 2022, p. 359).

The significant factors mentioned above primarily address the domestic conditions surrounding KSGI and its rapid growth. This is noteworthy considering that KSGI is one of the religious groups that has faced severe social, historical, and political prejudices as a religious minority in Korea. Consequently, this paper will examine the distinctive characteristics of KSGI in comparison to its Japanese partner to provide a more comprehensive understanding of its development and position in Korean civil society.

4. Comparative Analysis

The comparison between KSGI and Japanese Soka Gakkai is essential for understanding the competitive structure of the religious market and the importance of religious growth strategies, but it has been largely overlooked in previous studies. Given that continuous or rapid growth of new religions in Korea is very difficult and rare, the KSGI case needs to be investigated to analyze how and why its growth strategy differs from that of Japan’s Soka Gakkai, its origin. The rapid growth of KSGI as a religious minority in Korea’s oligopolistic religious market is intrinsically linked to its religious motivation, justification, and limitations of civic engagement. This connection becomes more apparent when comparing KSGI’s approach to its Japanese partner or other SGI branches worldwide.

KSGI strictly limits its civic engagement to avoid political intervention, while SG in Japan has actively participated in secular politics, as evidenced by the establishment of Komeito in 1964 and New Komeito in 1998 (Metraux 2003, p. 148). Despite this difference, both groups share similar interpretations of doctrine and rituals. Nichiren’s Risshō ankokuron (1260), based on his “unique and limited” interpretation of the Lotus Sutra (Jeong 2009, p. 53), is considered an important scripture by both organizations. Risshō ankokuron explains why shogunate leaders should rule according to the dharma revealed in Tiantai Buddhism teachings, attributing national disasters and crises to the followers of Pure Land Buddhism (S. Kim 2020, p. 245). This original teaching on the relationship between secular rulers and Buddhism underlies the citizenship of SGI members in both Korea and Japan. Makiguchi, SG’s founder, emulated Nichiren’s admonition to the Kamakura regent when he refused a governmental plan to merge all Buddhist denominations in 1941 (McLaughlin 2020, p. 43). In a similar context, patriotic and nationalistic Buddhism has remained an influential tradition throughout Korean Buddhist history, supported by monks and lay believers in doctrine and practice (S. S. Kim 2012; Y. T. Kim 2012; Ryu 2010, p. 85).

KSGI has never attempted to engage in party politics, unlike its Japanese counterpart, though it does not prevent its members from participating in secular politics. The Komeito, systematically and organizationally supported by SG members, has been a power-oriented balancer capable of forming coalition governments with the Liberal Democratic Party or the Democratic Social Party (Nakano 2016; Metraux 2003, p. 136). Unlike the close relationship between the Komeito and SG in Japan, KSGI has been very cautious about political engagement or intervention, as if such participation is incompatible with SG teachings and practices.

However, this extremely restrained attitude toward secular politics can be interpreted as KSGI’s most distinctive growth strategy customized to the Korean situation. KSGI continues to emphasize political disconnection from the Komeito and keep its distance from socio-political issues because it considers it more urgent and necessary to eliminate the stigma of being a new Buddhist movement based on Japanese nationalism, as Nichiren’s thoughts show clearly (Jeong 2009, p. 52). The socio-historical conditions and prejudices surrounding KSGI are obviously critical obstacles harmful to market entry, competition, and growth. There is no doubt that social trust in religious minorities and new religious movements like KSGI is promoted not by political struggle against the established powers, but by non-violent and non-political civic activities in the public interest. Thus, this growth strategy depending on socio-cultural conditions is neither surprising nor creative, but a flexibility and continuity underlying the strategy seems like a Japanese business mind that is difficult to expect from mainstream Korean Buddhism.

The nonpolitical civic engagement of KSGI demonstrates the need to analyze the relationship between civic engagement and religious attendance in a context distinct from Christianity. Some studies in Canada and the USA have shown strong connections between church attendance, religious tradition (especially mainline Protestant), and civic engagement or social trust (Smidt 1999, p. 190), and another finds out that Catholics in the United States, unlike Canadian Catholics in Quebec, are more active in civic engagement to adapt to the more democratic and even populist American culture (Uslaner 2002, p. 243). However, the KSGI case presents a different perspective. KSGI members exhibit high levels of participation and consciousness in civic engagement, primarily focused on environmental–ecological issues within a cooperative religious governance framework, rather than political struggle or resistance (Yoo and Kim 2023). This suggests that the socio-political conditions surrounding civic activities may be more influential in determining members’ engagement levels than religious attendance alone.

Interestingly, KSGI members view participation in secular civic activities as a religious duty, despite their adherence to a form of Buddhist fundamentalism centered on the Lotus Sutra and the chanting of Na-mu-myoho-renge-kyo as Nichiren claimed (S. Kim 2020, p. 236; Miyata 2002, p. 128). This contrasts with Protestant fundamentalism, which often distances itself from secular civic activities, as Uslaner (2002, p. 239) puts it. The KSGI case highlights the importance of considering diverse religious contexts when examining the relationship between religious participation and civic engagement. It demonstrates that religious groups can promote civic involvement in ways that differ from traditional Christian models, emphasizing the need for a more nuanced understanding of this relationship across various religious traditions and cultural contexts.

A more strategic consideration of KSGI’s nonpolitical civic participation is crucial for understanding its survival and growth in South Korea. Given that Buddhism, Protestantism, and Catholicism account for 98% of the religious population in Korea (MCSTK 2018, p. 85), KSGI’s approach to limit its civic engagement to nonpolitical spheres appears to be an efficient strategy. This approach helps reduce potential conflicts with the dominant religious groups and overcome social discrimination and prejudices. KSGI’s flexible growth strategy contrasts with the more aggressive “Shakubuku” (“break and subdue”) method of conversion still employed by Soka Gakkai in Japan. The organization’s adaptability to local society and culture, similar to its approach in Britain, where reading and discussion play significant roles in meetings (Wilson and Dobbelaere 1994), has likely contributed to SGI’s rapid global expansion (Dawson 2001).

Meanwhile, KSGI’s passive attitude toward political participation, despite being a growth strategy, clearly demonstrates its lack of social confidence and limitations as a religious minority. Although political participation in this world is encouraged in its doctrine, controlling its members from expressing their political voices inside or outside the organization also reflects an inconsistency between doctrine and practice. In addition, despite KSGI’s substantial human and material resources, its participation in the internationalist civic movements pursued by SGI is notably limited (Yoo 2022a). Thus, KSGI fails to contribute significant human and material resources to civic movement networks at the international level.

5. Conclusions

Unlike the first-generation members of KSGI, its young members recruited since the 2000s tend to participate more actively in gender equality and environmental–ecological movements such as SDG (Sustainable Development Goals) as well as anti-nuclear and anti-war campaigns (Yoo and Kim 2023). As KSGI keeps distance from Japanese nationalism and party politics, its young members now seem more sympathetic and attentive to faith-based civic activities which promote their religious identity at the global level like “ecological citizenship” (Dobson 2003). In fact, the role of civic engagement to be global citizens becomes more important to both religious and non-religious youth (Scott and Cnaan 2020). It is inarguable that its growth cannot be simplified to a natural result of its civic engagement. In this sense, the case of KSGI demonstrates the importance of adapting a growth strategy to reflect and customize a variety of religious needs in different contexts. Of course, this does not mean that an intentional and calculated strategy for the growth of a religion, especially a religious minority, is always more successful.

Rather, the success in the growth of KSGI leaves behind many theoretically controversial implications of how its growth is related to other religious or secular factors surrounding civic engagement, to Christian lay movements rarely popular in Korea, and to cross-national or transnational dimensions of SGI. Especially, further investigation is needed to understand how Korean religious minorities or new religious movements have participated in real politics and why the results have differently affected their religious growth over time. It should also include a more comprehensive study of faith-based civic movements through comparing various religious-ecological communities such as the Aga Garden and Hannong Restoration Society as well as pacifist religious groups like Jehovah’s Witnesses and Quakers in terms of the religious market and growth strategy. In this sense, this paper intensively explains a few socio-historical reasons for the growth of KSGI, a Buddhist lay movement originating in modern Japan, focusing on its specific characteristics revealed in terms of civic engagement in the Korean context.

Finally, the organizational identity of KSGI entails a more fundamental reflection on the concept of religion, putting aside the issue of its rapid growth, because its faith-based civic engagement blurs the clear boundary between religious activities and various civic movements, NGOs, or NPOs. This cross-border phenomenon between the sacred and the profane will likely occur more frequently due to the increase in transnational issues.