Is Emptiness Non-Empty? Jizang’s Conception of Buddha-Nature

Abstract

Jizang (549–623) is regarded as a prominent figure in Sanlun Buddhism (三論宗) and a revitalizer of Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamaka tradition in China. In this essay, I argue that Jizang’s concept of non-empty Buddha-nature is compatible with the idea of universal emptiness. My argument unfolds in three steps. First, I argue that, for Jizang, Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (zhongdao 中道), which signifies a spiritual state that avoids the extremes of both emptiness and non-emptiness. Next, I explore how and why Jizang believes that Buddha-nature is eternal. I examine Jizang’s notions of intrinsic eternality (dingxing chang 定性常) and conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常), aiming to demonstrate that his understanding of Buddha-nature as eternal can be framed within the concept of conditional eternality, where Buddha-nature is seen as the objective manifestation of the dharma body. Since this type of eternality aligns with the principle of universal emptiness, Jizang’s assertion that Buddha-nature is eternal is thus compatible with the notion of universal emptiness. Furthermore, I illustrate that Jizang’s theory of eternal Buddha-nature carries practical implications, suggesting that this assertion serves as encouragement rather than being merely an ontological claim.

1. Background

Jizang 吉藏 (549–623) is regarded as the representative of Sanlun Buddhism (三論宗) and the revitalizer of Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamaka tradition in China.1 He was ranked side by side with the master of Daśabhūmikā school (dilun shi 地論師), Huiyuan 慧遠, and the master of the Tiantai school (tiantai zong 天台宗), Zhiyi 智顗. These two scholars together with Jizang are known as the three greatest Buddhist monks in the Sui Dynasty; see Liao (2001, p. 111). However, in Jizang’s later years, sūtras advocating eternal Buddha-nature became popular. Chinese scholars shifted from studying theories of emptiness to the investigation of eternal Buddha-nature. Moved by the trend, Jizang gradually came to appreciate the doctrine of Buddha-nature, shifting his interests to the popular sūtras at that time. Although Jizang is the representative of the School of Three Treatises, he is also fond of The Lotus Sūtra (Miufa Lianhua Jing 妙法蓮華經), The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra (daboniepan jing 大般涅槃經), The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa (weimojie suoshuo jing 維摩詰所說經), and The Mahāvaipulya Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra (Dafang Guangfo Huayan Jing 大方廣佛華嚴經). These scriptures contain the idea that Buddha-nature is not empty (foxing bukong 佛性不空) and the doctrine of One Vehicle (yicheng 一乘). Surprisingly, Jizang believes that scriptures that preach these are superior to those without these. In A Commentary On the Lotus Sūtra (Fa Hua Xuan Lun 法華玄論, CLS), Jizang writes the following:

It is already stated in The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Boruo Jing 般若經, PPS) that the Buddha vehicle is real. However, it does not state that the two other vehicles are merely conventional teachings (upāya). Based on this, PPS is inferior to The Lotus Sūtra. … PPS does not explicitly state that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature. For instance, it is not clearly stated that the two other vehicles eventually will convert into the vehicle towards Buddhahood. Therefore, The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra is inferior; The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra (Daboniepan jing 大般涅槃經, MMS) wins.2^,3

In the above quotation, it is astounding that Jizang places so much emphasis on the idea of Buddha-nature. Jizang, being regarded as the master of the School of the Three Treatises and The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Boruo Jing 般若經, PPS), should have regarded the theory of emptiness, not that of Buddha-nature, as the backbone of his school of thought. This surprising phenomenon attracts criticism from contemporary scholars such as Yang Hui-nan 楊惠南 (Yang 1989, 2012), Yin Shun 印順 (Yin Shun 1992a, 1992b), and Liu Chia-ch’eng 劉嘉誠 (Liu 1999, 2000). They critique Jizang’s inability to stick to his original doctrine, leading to the decline of the School of the Three Treatises after a short period of time. Nevertheless, as a prominent Buddhist scholar, Jizang must have recognized the apparent tension between the theory of emptiness and the concept of non-empty Buddha-nature. How does he reconcile these two theories? Does he attempt to harmonize them, or does he simply shift his position from advocating universal emptiness to endorsing non-empty Buddha-nature? Furthermore, is Jizang’s notion of non-empty Buddha-nature compatible with the principle of universal emptiness?

These are the questions I aim to address in this paper. Numerous contemporary scholars have explored Jizang’s concept of Buddha-nature, including Shunei Hirai 平井俊榮 (Hirai 1976), Liao Ming-Wood 廖明活 (Liao 1985, 2001), Hua Fangtian 華方田 (Hua 1995), Hiroshi Kanno 神野 浩 (Kanno 2000, 2002), Shi Changqing 釋長清 (Shi 2004), Dong Qun 董群 (Dong 2008), Yang Hui-Nan 楊惠南 (Yang 1989, 2012), and Shih Heng-Ching 釋恆清 (Shih 2021, chp. 3). Additionally, a group of prominent Buddhist scholars has focused on Jizang’s notion of emptiness and his ontology, including Liu Chia-ch’eng 劉嘉誠 (Liu 2000), Jin Wanchuan 萬金川 (Jin 2008), Chen Pingkun 陳平坤 (Chan 2009, 2013), Yasuo Deguchi (2015), Ho Chien-Hsing 何建興 (Ho 2014, 2024), Hans Rudolf Kantor 康特 (Kantor 2021a, 2021b), and most recently, Lee Sangyop (Lee 2023) and Graham Priest (2023). However, there has been limited discussion regarding whether Jizang effectively addresses the apparent tension between the doctrine of universal emptiness and the concept of non-empty Buddha-nature. To bridge this academic gap, this paper aims to investigate the compatibility of Jizang’s idea of Buddha-nature with the principle of universal emptiness by closely examining his idea of Buddha-nature. In this paper, I study Jizang’s notion of Buddha-nature, focusing on Jizang’s descriptions of the Buddha-nature found in The Treatise on the Essentials of Mahāyāna (Dacheng Xuan Lun 大乘玄論, TM), The Treasure Cave of the Śrīmālā Sūtra (Sheng Man Bao Ku 勝鬘寶窟, TSS) and A Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra (Fa Hua Xuan Lun 法華玄論, CLS), supplemented by other works by Jizang. I aim to show that his notion of Buddha-nature is in fact compatible with the idea of universal emptiness.

This paper is structured as follows. First, I examine Jizang’s critiques of the eleven definitions of Buddha-nature that were prevalent during his time. I demonstrate that Jizang posits Buddha-nature as the Middle Way, representing a spiritual state characterized by the wisdom of “neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness”. This perspective can be understood as a means of avoiding the two extremes of emptiness and non-emptiness. Second, I explore the questions of how and why Buddha-nature is considered eternal within Jizang’s framework. I illustrate that Jizang introduces two forms of constancy: intrinsic eternality (dingxing chang 定性常) and conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常). In this context, Buddha-nature is regarded as eternal through the lens of conditional eternality. This interpretation of Buddha-nature reconciles Jizang’s views by affirming that Buddha-nature is eternal as the enduring dharma body, while its manifestations are contingent upon causes and conditions. Thus, the eternality of Buddha-nature aligns with the principle of universal emptiness. Finally, I discuss the relationship between eternal Buddha-nature and the concept of the One Vehicle in Jizang’s writings. I illustrate that Jizang’s assertion of the eternality of Buddha-nature not only supports the equality of all sentient beings and encourages them to practice Buddhism but also serves to prevent harm among beings. Furthermore, it provides the ontological foundation for the path of the One Vehicle.

2. What Is Not Buddha-Nature?

I start with Jizang’s rejection of the eleven definitions of Buddha-nature. In TM, Jizang exemplifies eleven definitions of Buddha-nature at his time and criticizes them one by one. Jizang first criticizes the claim that the term “fo xing 佛性 (Buddha-nature)” refers to sentient beings by saying that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature. As Buddha-nature is something we have, it is thus wrong to say we are Buddha-nature:

If it is said that sentient beings have Buddha-nature, can it be said that sentient beings are Buddha-nature?4

For Jizang, Buddha-nature is an inherent quality that we possess; it is a characteristic that defines us. Jizang emphasizes that it is problematic to describe Buddha-nature as an entity or a collection of entities, such as the set of all sentient beings. This perspective highlights an issue with the Sanskrit nominal style, which has posed challenges for Buddhist scholars in East Asia when interpreting various concepts of Mahāyāna Buddhism (see Konrad Meisig (2010) and Jan Nattier (2005)).

Nominalization is the practice of converting verbs into nouns, often leading to more complex grammatical structures. A nominal is a word or phrase that functions similarly to a noun phrase. For example, the sentence “Amy is beautiful” can be nominalized as “the beauty of Amy”. This transformation frequently occurs when scholars translate Sanskrit into Chinese, resulting in a nominal style of expression. Rather than expressing a general idea such as “all sentient beings are empty”, the nominal style reformulates it as “emptiness is possessed by all sentient beings”. In this construction, emptiness can be easily misconstrued as an entity. Similarly, the term “Buddha-nature” is subjected to this nominalization, which renders it as an entity or a collection of entities. Due to the same reason, we cannot say that Buddha-nature is the six dharmas (sentient beings plus the five aggregates):

Moreover, it is said that (not apart from the six dharmas) is not identical to the six dharmas; therefore, the six dharmas are not Buddha-nature.5

Furthermore, for scholars of his time who think that “fo xing 佛性 (Buddha-nature)” refers to the mind, Jizang objects to them by saying that the mind is transient, but Buddha-nature is not. Thus, they are not identical:

The mind is impermanent, Buddha-nature is permanent, therefore the mind is not Buddha-nature.6

Moreover, Jizang challenges the assertions of Buddhist masters of his time who claim that Buddha-nature merely represents the characteristics of avoiding suffering and seeking happiness. He argues that, according to The Treasure Cave of the Śrīmālā Sūtra (Sheng Man Jing 勝鬘經), the tendencies to avoid suffering and seek happiness are functions of the mind, which are impermanent and therefore cannot be considered as Buddha-nature:

Since the claim that Buddha-nature is the mind is not established, all the functions of the mind—such as transmitting, immortalizing, seeking to avoid suffering, and pursuing happiness—are all equally destructible and thus cannot be regarded as Buddha-nature.7

For scholars who propose that Buddha-nature is the eighth consciousness (Sk. ālayavijñāna; Ch. alaye shi 阿頼耶識), which serves as the repository for karmic seeds and tendencies, Jizang objects by citing The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (She Dacheng Lun 攝大乘論). He argues that the eighth consciousness is fundamentally associated with ignorance, life, and death, and therefore cannot be considered Buddha-nature:

Even the eighth ālayavijñāna is not Buddha-nature. Therefore, as stated in The Mahāyānaśāstra, “It is the mother of ignorance, the root of birth and death”.8

Moreover, Jizang thinks that we should not regard Buddha-nature as the fruit or effect of practice as it is inherently present in every one of us:

The Buddha-nature is inherently present, like a treasure of a poor woman; why bother pointing to the fruit/effect as tathāgatagarbha?9

For Jizang, it is also problematic to regard Buddha-nature as the teachings of the Buddha as this would be to regard Buddha-nature as a cause. As Buddha-nature is inherently present, it should neither be a cause nor an effect. By the same token, he points out that the claim that Buddha-nature is the result of attaining the Buddha’s teachings is not supported by any sūtras and lacks credible transmission, making it a problematic claim:

Now the question arises: Which sūtra elucidates that obtaining the Buddha’s teachings is Buddha-nature-as-right-cause (zhengyin foxing 正因佛性)? Who is the transmitter of this doctrine?10

Jizang also rejects the idea that Buddha-nature is the ultimate truth (zhendi 真諦), saying that there is no source or transmission for this claim:

Question: The ultimate truth is Buddha-nature, which scripture does it originate from? Who is the transmitter of this doctrine? Without a source or an authoritative statement, it cannot be relied upon.11

In summary, Jizang critiques the views on Buddha-nature held by the eleven schools, categorizing them into three groups. The first group, comprising the first and second schools, relates Buddha-nature to sentient beings and the five aggregates. Jizang argues that since all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, Buddhat-nature should be seen as an attribute of sentient beings rather than referring to the sentient beings themselves. The second group, including the third to seventh schools, associates Buddha-nature with the mind, defining it as storehouse consciousness or a function of the mind. Jizang challenges this view by asserting that Buddha-nature is permanent, while the mind and its characteristics—such as the tendencies to avoid suffering—are transient. Thus, none can be considered Buddha-nature. The third group defines Buddha-nature as causally related to attaining Buddhahood, suggesting it is either the cause (like the Buddha’s teachings) or the result of Buddhahood. Jizang dismisses these claims as lacking textual support and argues that viewing Buddha-nature as a cause or effect contradicts the notion of its inherent presence. Therefore, none of these interpretations of Buddha-nature are correct.

3. Buddha-Nature and Emptiness

After rejecting these claims about Buddha-nature, Jizang finally asserts something positive about Buddha-nature. The eleventh claim takes the supreme truth of emptiness (diyiyi kong 第一義空) as Buddha-nature. Jizang rejects this claim by pointing out what is stated in MMS, according to which “neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness” is named Buddha-nature:

If according to The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Buddha-nature is the supreme truth of emptiness, then when the subsequent text speaks of emptiness, neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness is termed “Buddha-nature”. Therefore, it is known that Buddha-nature is the Middle Way, not emptiness.12

Jizang says, “neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness are termed ‘Buddha-nature’”, in which “not seeing” describes a spiritual state that one achieves or wisdom related to the spiritual state. Thus, it can be concluded that Jizang’s notion of Buddha-nature is a spiritual state of wisdom, in which one neither sees emptiness nor non-emptiness. We can infer that Jizang adopts a spiritual perspective on Buddha-nature (zhijing pai 指境派), a name dubbed by the contemporary scholar, Lu Cheng 呂澂 (Lu 1982, pp. 132–33):

Emphasizing Buddha-nature on the spiritual state of reality, specifically on the true aspect of phenomena and the nature of phenomena, is the derived meaning of Buddha-nature pointing to the spiritual state of reality.13

Lu’s interpretation is reasonable, as Jizang explicitly states that “neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness” is the spiritual state of the enlightened. In TM, we can find Jizang’s statement that Buddha-nature is wisdom (zhi 智) of the supreme truth of emptiness, which is a spiritual state (jing 境):

Good men! Buddha-nature is the supreme truth of emptiness, and the supreme truth of emptiness is named “wisdom (zhihui 智慧)”. This is the same, that the supreme truth of emptiness is Buddha-nature, and again, the supreme truth of emptiness is wisdom. But don’t they have different meanings? Here it means only the state is wisdom, and wisdom is a state.14

From the above, Jizang thinks that Buddha-nature is a spiritual state (jing 境) of wisdom (zhi 智). What is wisdom (zhi 智) according to Jizang? In TM, he defines it as prajñā:

Wisdom is prajñā. “Crossing over” refers to pramitā.15

In CDS, Jizang presents several definitions of prajñā as discussed by earlier Buddhist scholars of his time:

Prajñā is a foreign term. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa contains two statements: the first states, “Prajñā, in the Qin (Chinese) language, means wisdom”, emphasizing its beneficial use. The second statement says, “prajñā is profound and heavy, while wisdom is light and superficial; one cannot measure profound prajñā with superficial wisdom”. Master Zhuangyan explains that prajñā encompasses five meanings, while wisdom is just one aspect and is not a complete translation. However, the understanding of wisdom varies among different scriptures and texts. The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa interprets it in two parts: understanding the thoughts of sentient beings, as appropriate for teaching the dharma, which arises from the practice of wisdom; not clinging or rejecting, entering through the door of oneness, which arises from the practice of insight.16

Jizang explicitly states that “zhi 智” is synonymous with prajñā (波若), a Sanskrit Buddhist term that signifies a profound form of wisdom, distinct from the secular, practical wisdom encountered in everyday life by ordinary individuals. According to Jizang, prajñā encompasses two aspects: the first involves understanding the thoughts of sentient beings and teaching Buddhism in accordance with their backgrounds and knowledge. The second aspect pertains to entering the quality of oneness or perceiving reality as undifferentiated. Since I will elaborate on the concept of the oneness of the dharma body in the following section, I will not discuss it in detail here. Nonetheless, it is essential to recognize that “zhi 智” can be understood as the comprehension of reality without succumbing to erroneous views.

What, then, is this spiritual state of wisdom exactly like? Jizang states in TM, when interpreting MMS, that it is the state of neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness:

Therefore, “the emptiness discussed here is neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness”. Accordingly, the wisdom discussed here is neither seeing wisdom nor non-wisdom. That is, “not seeing emptiness” discards emptiness, and “not seeing non-emptiness” discards non-emptiness, discarding wisdom and also non-wisdom. Staying away from two extremes is called the Middle Way.17

Therefore, it is now clear that the supreme truth of emptiness is called “Buddha-nature”. It does not see emptiness or non-emptiness, nor does it see wisdom or non-wisdom. Denying the view of constancy and denying the view of nihilism are referred to as the Middle Way. This alone is considered the Middle Way of Buddha-nature.18

For Jizang, “not seeing” is a way of explaining the ultimate truth through denial. Not seeing emptiness is to discard one’s attachment to the notion of emptiness, such as the nihilistic view that nothing exists and thus that we should do nothing; not seeing non-emptiness is to discard one’s attachment to the notion of non-emptiness, such as the problematic view that there exist unchanging, persisting substances such as selves to be eliminated through Buddhist practice. Jizang’s spiritual state of wisdom describes the two-layered elimination of attachments.

As Jizang repeatedly reiterates in TM, the supreme truth of emptiness (diyiyi kong 第一義空) is Buddha-nature, and Buddha-nature is also called “the Middle Way (zhongdao 中道)”, which can be understood as the wisdom of staying away from two extremes of emptiness and non-emptiness:

Therefore, it is known that the Middle Way is the Buddha-nature, and it is not emptiness that is the Buddha-nature.19

Neither seeing wisdom nor ignorance is also like this. Therefore, the Middle Way is regarded as Buddha-nature.20

Someone might ask how Buddha-nature can both be a spiritual state of wisdom and a truth, namely, the supreme truth of emptiness (diyiyi kong 第一義空). The phrase “the supreme truth (diyiyi 第一義)” is a translation of the Sanskrit term “paramārtha-satya”, which implies being the highest truth. Western logicians and philosophers, such as Bernard Bolzano ([1837] 2014) and Gottlob Frege (1948), argue that propositions are entities that serve as primary bearers of truth-value and are composed of entirely abstract, mind-independent constituents. Truth, for them, is a property of a proposition. As abstract entities, propositions do not occupy physical space or undergo changes over time. Some philosophers thus regard propositions as eternal. If the supreme truth of emptiness is a true proposition, then it can be regarded as eternal. How, then, can Buddha-nature both the eternal supreme truth of emptiness, and at the same time, a spiritual state of wisdom?

In response to this question, it is important to note that, for Jizang, the supreme truth of emptiness should not be viewed as a true proposition that is an eternal, abstract entity. In contrast, Jizang clearly states that the supreme truth of emptiness is wisdom:

[T]he supreme truth of emptiness is named “wisdom (zhihui 智慧)”. This is the same, that the supreme truth of emptiness is Buddha-nature, and again, the supreme truth of emptiness is wisdom.21

As discussed, the supreme truth of emptiness is equivalent to the spiritual state of wisdom of neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness. In Jizang’s TM, the definition of the supreme truth of emptiness as the spiritual state of wisdom repeatedly appears.22 Therefore, the right interpretation of Jizang’s notion of the supreme truth of emptiness should be the spiritual state of wisdom of neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness instead of an eternal and abstract proposition.

It is important to highlight that Jizang’s concept of the Middle Way serves both as a spiritual state of enlightenment and as an ontological description of reality. In terms of the ontological understanding of the Middle Way, Shi Changqing 釋長清 and Huang Guoqing 黃國清 (Shi and Huang 2006, pp. 192–98) have provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between the two truths and the ontological implications of the Middle Way in Chinese Buddhism. However, when Jizang characterizes Buddha-nature as the Middle Way, he appears to emphasize its expression as a spiritual state. As will be demonstrated later in this essay, the notion of Buddha-nature as a spiritual state of wisdom is closely linked to the idea of dharma body, which is an ontology of the Middle Way.

Let us return to Jizang’s criticism of the eleventh claim, where he criticizes the claim that “Buddha-nature is the supreme truth of emptiness” as problematic. In the paragraph, he explicitly states that Buddha-nature should not be regarded as emptiness, which seems to imply that Buddha-nature cannot be any kind of emptiness, including the supreme truth of emptiness.23 Nevertheless, Jizang also explicitly writes that Buddha-nature is the supreme truth of emptiness, especially when one understands the supreme truth of emptiness as “neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness”.24 In my opinion, Jizang’s rationale for this approach is to distinguish himself from the Moheyan school of the north (beidi moheyan shi 北地摩訶衍師) which asserts that Buddha-nature is the supreme truth of emptiness:

To take the supreme truth of emptiness as the major cause of Buddha-nature is the perspective used by the Moheyan school of the North. Now, I ask: if we follow the teachings in The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, which state that the supreme truth of emptiness is Buddha-nature, the following text indicates that emptiness is defined as neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness as being Buddha-nature. Therefore, it is known that the Middle Way is the Buddha-nature, and it is not emptiness that is the Buddha-nature.25^,26

The discussion reveals two distinct interpretations of emptiness. The first interpretation contrasts emptiness with non-emptiness, leaning towards nihilism, which Jizang rejects. The second interpretation transcends the two extreme views of emptiness and non-emptiness, referred to as “the supreme truth of emptiness”, which Jizang effectively equates with Buddha-nature. While Jizang suggests that Buddha-nature should not be classified as emptiness, he ultimately supports the notion that Buddha-nature can indeed be understood as the supreme truth of emptiness, which exists beyond the limitations of the two extreme views of emptiness and non-emptiness. His denial of Buddha-nature as merely emptiness underscores the distinctiveness of his theory and serves to differentiate his views from those of other scholars of his time.

In summary, Buddha-nature, for Jizang, is the spiritual state of wisdom of neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness, which is the Middle Way and also the supreme truth of emptiness. In this context, I am skeptical of Tang (1992) suggestion that Jizang defines Buddha-nature as a principle of Buddhahood, which serves as a means to attain higher truths from the mundane:

This Buddha-nature exists in this path; it is neither in the subject or within, nor in the objective or external; it is neither in the mundane nor the ultimate but is a “way” that “resides in the midst, moving from within to without, from the lower mundane to the higher truth”.27

Tang’s interpretation of Jizang’s concept of Buddha-nature appears to be inconsistent with Jizang’s assertion that Buddha-nature is defined as “neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness”. This state of neither seeing emptiness nor non-emptiness does not align with the notion of a rule or a pathway from the mundane to the transcendent. Instead, it is more accurately understood as a spiritual state of wisdom.

There is one potential objection to Jizang’s proposal. Given that the spiritual state of wisdom is what one attains during enlightenment, situating Buddha-nature as a spiritual state is tantamount to regarding it as the fruit or the achievement of one’s practice. One might ask whether Jizang’s claim that Buddha-nature is the spiritual state of wisdom is the same as saying that Buddha-nature is the fruit of Buddhahood (dangguo 當果), as advocated by the third group of scholars. If this is so, why does Jizang criticize the definition of Buddha-nature proposed by the third group? What is the difference between Jizang’s view and that of the third group?

My reply is as follows. According to Jizang’s assertion concerning “the state as wisdom, and wisdom is a state”,28 the practitioner’s spiritual state is not only manifested by subjective wisdom, but it also reflects objective reality. Jizang describes the non-duality between essence (ti 體) and function (yong 用) of Buddha-nature in TM:

The essence serves as the function, and the function serves as the essence. The equality of essence and function in the non-dual Middle Way is the true Buddha-nature.29

All teachers explain the meaning of Buddha-nature in various ways; some say that Buddha-nature is the cause and not the effect, while others say it is the effect and not the cause. This reflects the dual meanings of cause and effect, which do not pertain to Buddha-nature.30

From these passages, it is evident that Jizang considers it problematic to position Buddha-nature as either the cause of enlightenment (yindi 因地), such as sentient beings or the mind, or as the effect of enlightenment (guowei 果位), such as the supreme truth of emptiness. Situating Buddha-nature as the cause would be to focus on the function (yong 用) rather than the essence (ti 體) of Buddha-nature. On the other hand, situating Buddha-nature as the effect would be to emphasize only the essence, but not the function, of Buddha-nature. This is further emphasized by the contemporary scholar Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (Mou 1993, p. 196), who presents a twofold understanding of Buddha-nature:

The objective meaning of Buddha-nature can be called “dharma Buddha-nature” (note: it can also be referred to as “dharma nature”), while the subjective meaning of Buddha-nature can be called “awakened Buddha-nature”.31

In Jizang’s view, both sides neglect the non-duality of the cause and effect of Buddha-nature. Buddha-nature would then be segmented and cannot be the Middle Way. To further explain the non-duality of state and wisdom, cause and effect, and essence and function, I now proceed to the next section where I discuss why Buddha-nature, as seen by Jizang, is eternal.

4. How and Why Is Buddha-Nature Eternal?

After having comprehended Jizang’s concept of Buddha-nature, the next step is to examine how and why Jizang’s describes Buddha-nature as eternal (chang 常). As we can see, Jizang repeatedly describes Buddha-nature as eternal in The Treasure Cave of The Śrīmālā Sūtra (Sheng Man Bao Ku 勝鬘寶窟, TSS), occasionally quoting descriptions of eternal Buddha-nature from MMS:

Understanding that one has Buddha-nature within oneself, which is called “eternal”.32

How do we understand the eternality of Buddha-nature? In the following discussion, I will explore how the non-duality of the subjective spiritual state of wisdom and the objective dharma body (Sk. dharmakāya; Ch. fashen 法身) reinforces the concept that Buddha-nature is eternal. First, in TSS, Jizang introduces two kinds of constancies: intrinsic eternality and conditional eternality.

Question: nirvāṇa is actually eternal. Perceiving it as eternal should be the right view. Why is it said to be an extreme view? Answer: Although nirvāṇa is indeed eternal, it is conditionally eternal, not intrinsically eternal. Considering it as intrinsically eternal is thus an extreme view.33

Jizang does not explain what intrinsic eternality (dingxing chang 定性常) and conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常) are, and why “conditional eternality” is a kind of eternality. In my view, as the term “ding xing 定性” describes the fixed (ding 定) nature (xing 性) of things, the term “intrinsic eternality (dingxing chang 定性常)” coined by Jizang refers to unchanging, permanent existences that possess a fixed nature, existing independently of other entities and remaining unaffected by external factors. On the other hand, the Chinese “yinyuan chang 因緣常 (conditional eternality)” describes eternal appearances that are subject to causes and conditions (yinyuan 因緣). In my view, conditional eternality can be considered a form of eternality as it describes an existence that is perpetually present without necessarily possessing a fixed nature or remaining unchanged. Additionally, entities that are conditionally eternal are subject to causes and conditions, as their designation implies. What are the entities that according to Jizang possess the characteristic of conditional eternality? Jizang provides no examples of instantiations of conditional eternality other than nirvāṇa, as indicated in the previous quotation. Within the context of ontology, Jizang identifies nirvāṇa with the dharma body:

Initially, the One Vehicle is equivalent to enlightenment; next, enlightenment is equivalent to nirvāṇa; and finally, nirvāṇa is equivalent to the dharma body.34

Moreover, Jizang uses the phrase “the ever-present sea of storehouse consciousness (cang shi hai chang zhu 藏識海常住)” in The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra to describe the nature of the world of phenomenon as eternally appearing:

According to The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the sea of storehouse consciousness is ever-present, while the winds of the external environment cause it to change. Various forms of consciousness surge and transform, like waves rising in the ocean. It is neither the same nor different. Buddha-nature is likewise so. The mind arises in harmony and combination; it is also neither the same nor different.35

As we can see, the term “eternality (chang zhu 常住)” describes the ocean of the arising and ceasing of the myriad entities, which is derived from the storehouse consciousness (cang shi 藏識). The ocean of the arising and ceasing of the myriad entities is always there and can be regarded as eternally present, although it is subject to causes and conditions (yinyuan 因緣) and is always changing due to the winds of the external environment. Hence, it is suitable to be regarded as possessing conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常).

My above interpretation matches Jizang discussion of the two meanings of conditional eternality in TSS. According to Jizang, conditional eternality, on the one hand, describes the not exterminating of all phenomena, which means that everything appears within the manifestation of the dharma body. On the other hand, conditional eternality also means the non-grasping of nirvāṇa for the enlightened beings:

There are two meanings of (conditional) eternality. One is the non-extinction of all phenomena. This understanding helps us eliminate the views of nihilism. The second is not grasping the unconditioned nirvāṇa. This is due to the eternal view concerning the Buddha’s dharma body, …Because the Buddha’s dharma body is eternal, the arising of thoughts of eternality towards the Buddha’s dharma body is called the right view.36

The first meaning of conditional eternality describes the non-extinction of all phenomena. This pertains to the status of the existence of all phenomena. As indicated, this understanding aids in dispelling nihilistic views, preventing the misconception that phenomena do not exist or that nothing exists at all. The second meaning of conditional eternality involves the concept of Buddha’s dharma body (Sk. Buddha dharmakāya; Ch. fo fa shen 佛法身). To investigate the idea of Buddha’s dharma body, Jizang illustrates in A Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra (Fa Hua Xuan Lun 法華玄論, CLS) that Buddha’s dharma body is like space that is ubiquitous and responds to everything and manifests itself like the image of the moon reflected in water:

The Samantabhadra Meditation Sūtra states, “Shakyamuni is named “Vairocana”, pervading all places. … Vairocana is the dharma body…37

Therefore, it is said that the true dharma body of the Buddha is like empty space. It manifests forms according to conditions, like the moon in water.38

The above quotation states that the dharma body is ubiquitous, pervading all places, and manifesting various forms according to conditions.

So far, I have introduced three concepts employed by Jizang to describe the conditional eternality of the dharma body: (1) eternality (chang zhu 常住), (2) the non-extinction of all phenomena (bumie yiqie zhuyouxing 不滅一切諸有行), and (3) ubiquity (bian yiqie chu 遍一切處). These concepts require careful explanation.

The first term, “eternality (chang zhu 常住)”, describes a state as being without beginning or end, referring to the duration of the phenomena described. It may also suggest continuity without interruption. However, for Jizang, it does not imply a constant, unchanging entity that can exist independently of other things. As we have discussed, the idea of conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常) indicates that phenomena are influenced by causes and conditions (yinyuan 因緣) and, as a result, undergo changes. The second phrase, “the non-extinction of all phenomena (bumie yiqie zhuyouxing 不滅一切諸有行)”, emphasizes the status of phenomena as non-extinct, indicating that emptiness should not be misconstrued as a form of nihilism, which posits that nothing exists. The third phrase, “ubiquity (bian yiqie chu 遍一切處)”, refers to the spatial occurrence of the dharma body, suggesting that it is manifested in all locations.

In summary, we can characterize the conditional eternality of the dharma body as (1) occurring at all times, (2) being ubiquitous in all places, and (3) not to be understood as non-existent. Consequently, we can deduce that the dharma body encompasses all phenomena at all times. We can find supporting descriptions in Jizang’s TSS that reinforce this idea:

From the Buddha’s perspective, they are not different: the six realms are the eternal dharma body; from the perspective of conditions, they are not the same: the dharma body is always the six realms.39

From the above quotations, the dharma body, from the Buddha’s perspective, encompasses everything within the six realms as manifestations of eternal purity and happiness. Conversely, from the perspective of causes and conditions, the dharma body cannot be perceived by the unenlightened; instead, they experience only the six realms of suffering. Consequently, the dharma body can be understood as the totality of the six realms.

One might further inquire about the nature of the totality of the six realms, specifically whether they are derived from the mind. Is the mind a fundamental existence, while all other myriad entities are merely products of the mind? We find Jizang quoting The Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ (唯識二十論) in TM:

The Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ states, “Only consciousness exists; there are no external realms. Mountains, rivers, and all plants are merely manifestations of the mind. Outside of the mind, there are no other phenomena”.40

Is the dharma body produced by, or the manifestation of, the mind? Jizang does not advocate for this claim himself. Instead, when discussing whether plants and tress possess Buddha-nature, he references The Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ (唯識二十論), according to which everything is merely the manifestation of the mind. Jizang maintains that, from the perspective of the Yogācāra school, everything should possess Buddha-nature. It appears that Jizang is willing to endorse this idealistic ontology although he does not appear to be an enthusiastic defender of the consciousness-only ontological framework. Furthermore, in TM, he supports the view that Buddha-nature has different names, one of them being “tathāgatagarbhatha as the self-natured pure mind (rulaizang qingjing zixing xin 如來藏自性清淨心)”:

Therefore, in The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, it is referred to as Buddha-nature. In The Mahāvaipulya Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra, it is called the dharma realm. In The Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra, it is referred to as tathāgatagarbhatha as the self-natured pure mind.41

Once again, this passage suggests that Jizang is open to the view that the dharma body is either produced by or manifested through the mind. Nevertheless, according to Jizang, the most accurate description of reality is not to regard the mind, but the Middle Way, as the foundational essence:

Scholars of Mahāyāna-samgraha state, “The transformed realm of consciousness is the pure land, with the mind as its essence”. There are three types: the pure land of the dharma body, which has the Middle Way as its essence; the pure land of the body of bliss (sambhogakāya), which is characterized by the seven treasures; and the pure land of the transformation body (nirmanakaya), which is based on the responsive form. When considered collectively, they all share the essence of the Middle Way.42

Therefore, according to Jizang, the nature of the dharma body is best described as the Middle Way. My response to the question of whether Jizang considers the dharma body to be produced by, or the manifestation of, the mind is thus sophisticated: while Jizang is willing to endorse such a view, he is not an enthusiastic proponent of it. Nevertheless, he asserts that the most accurate description of reality does not focus on the mind, but rather on the Middle Way as the foundational existence or essence.

After examining whether the dharma body is produced by, or the manifestation of, the mind, we will explore another important aspect of the dharma body: its oneness or undifferentiated nature. In addition to the idea that the dharma body is the totality of reality, Jizang also explains in TSS that the dharma body is “one (yi 一):”

When we speak of the same meaning, the tathāgata’s dharma body, the dharma body of the hearers, and the dharma body of the Pratyeka Buddhas all refer to the same dharma body. Therefore, the three vehicles share the same name as One Vehicle, which is why it is referred to as one.43

For unenlightened sentient beings who have not transcended differentiations—such as those between subject and object, as well as various entities—the concept of an eternal dharma body as undifferentiated remains incomprehensible. Therefore, for them, Buddha-nature is hidden, secret, and unknowable, which is why it is named tathāgatagarbha (the embryo of the tathāgata, Ch. rulai zang 如來藏). Jizang explains this idea in CLS:

The hidden is called Buddha-nature, while the manifest is called nirvāṇa; it is also referred to as tathāgatagarbha when hidden, and when revealed, it becomes the dharma body. …However, Buddha-nature has never truly been hidden or revealed; it is considered hidden because sentient beings do not understand it. Once one attains realization, it naturally reveals itself.44

There has been considerable discussion in the contemporary literature regarding Jizang’s concept of interdependence and the reliance of existence on other entities. As a prominent representative of the Sanlun school, Jizang offers innovative interpretations of the interrelationship between subject and object, which have drawn in-depth analyses from contemporary scholars such as Lin Chien-Te 林建德 (Lin 2013, chps. 3 and 4), Lin Chen-Kuo 林鎮國 (Lin 1998, pp. 194–98), Liao Ming-Wood 廖明活 (Liao 1985, pp. 128–33), and Yang Hui-nan 楊惠南 (Yang 1989, pp. 133–36). Given that this essay primarily focuses on the discussion of Buddha-nature, I will not elaborate in detail on the distinctions between subject and object or the interdependence of various entities. Briefly speaking, when one attains enlightenment, one eliminates the differentiation between subject and object and that of various entities. In the eyes of the enlightened, everything becomes one, and the undifferentiated dharma body manifests itself. As Buddha-nature is the spiritual state of wisdom, it is also the state of the manifestation of the dharma body. This is why Jizang states that “when enlightened, it naturally comes to manifestation”.45

Without the idea of the dharma body being undifferentiated oneness, there is no way that we can illustrate the interconnection between the state as wisdom, and the wisdom as a state. Under the lens of differentiation, the sage’s subjective spiritual state would always be their own state rather than the manifestation of the dharma body. The oneness of the undifferentiated dharma body explains why there is non-duality between the subjective spiritual state of wisdom and the objective manifestation of the dharma body. This point is further illustrated by Jizang in TM:

One’s wisdom does not arise alone but is accompanied by the state, thus, the state is the basis of wisdom. But the state is not independent, it has a name because of wisdom, thus wisdom is the basis of the state. … it cannot be said that the state comes before wisdom or that wisdom comes before the state. They also do not occur simultaneously. It can only be called the interdependent relationship between the state and wisdom.46

Wisdom here refers to the spiritual state of the wisdom of the enlightened, and the state represents the pervading appearance of the dharma body. Jizang again mentions in TSS that the dharma body can be described as eternal and is manifested through a spiritual state of wisdom:

The dharma body of the tathāgata is eternal. It manifests through a spiritual state so that the (pure) mind is manifested. Since the dharma body is eternal, our understanding of its being eternal is not wrong.47

In summary, for Jizang, Buddha-nature is both the objective manifestation of the dharma body and the subjective spiritual state of enlightenment. Moreover, his idea of Buddha-nature as eternal can be understood via the idea that Buddha-nature is the objective manifestation of the dharma body. Since the dharma body is ubiquitous and always there, it is regarded as eternal under the conception of “conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常)”. This interpretation of Buddha-nature effectively prevents any accusations of inconsistency against Jizang. For Jizang, Buddha-nature is eternal because the term denotes the ubiquitous and everlasting dharma body. However, the manifestation of the dharma body is always subject to causes and conditions. The notion that Buddha-nature is eternal, therefore, does not violate the principle of universal emptiness, according to which all the myriad entities, including Buddha-nature as the dharma body, are empty due to their being subject to cause and conditions.

5. Eternal Buddha-Nature and the Idea of One Vehicle

In what follows, I discuss the application of the idea that Buddha-nature is eternal and consider how this idea conveys the bodhisattva path as the only vehicle towards Buddhahood.48

As mentioned in TSS, for Jizang, the definition of Buddha-nature has practical applications. For instance, the enlightened would like to teach those with overweening pride that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature, such that these beings learn not to think of themselves as superior to others. Moreover, the doctrine that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature prohibits sentient beings from killing or hurting others:

As stated in The Lotus Sūtra, Sadāparibhūta Bodhisattva teaches those who are arrogant to awaken the Bodhi mind, as it is said that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature. This also allows sentient beings to know that within themselves, there is Buddha-nature, so they can generate the Bodhi mind and practice to become Buddhas. Thus, the doctrine of Buddha-nature is established. Furthermore, it helps sentient beings understand that all beings have Buddha-nature within their hearts and bodies, leading them not to commit the ten evil deeds such as killing.49

Jizang holds that the bodhisattva path is the only way to attain enlightenment, and there is an ontological ground for this claim: the practice of the bodhisattva path naturally comes from the comprehension of the eternality of Buddha-nature. To elaborate, if one sees reality as undifferentiated, one does not view oneself as separate from the rest of the world. Instead, one sees oneself as unified with the whole world and sharing one dharma body with all others. Everybody who realizes this will eventually follow the bodhisattva path. The implication is that the two Hīnayāna small vehicles would eventually lead to the bodhisattva path in that those following the two Hīnayāna small vehicles “convert” to the Mahāyāna. This idea is elaborated repeatedly in Jizang’s TSS:

According to The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa, the dharma bodies of the three vehicles are not different; therefore, the three vehicles enter One Vehicle together.50

When speaking of the same feature (lakṣana), the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa states,

“The three vehicles and the six realms all possess the true suchness of the dharma body”, which is why they are said to have the same features.51

For example, a hand cannot separate itself from the leg of the same body, as both are integral parts of that body. When one uses their hands to wear shoes, the hands do not perceive this as a deliberate act and do not harbor jealousy towards the feet for simply enjoying the benefits, because they belong to the same entity. This aligns with Jizang’s assertion that the concept of eternal Buddha-nature prevents sentient beings from pursuing the two Hīnayāna small vehicles, such as striving for pratyeka-Buddhahood, ceasing the activities of their five aggregates, and abandoning the rest of the world. More specifically, these two Hīnayāna small vehicles would eventually convert to the bodhisattva path because reality is such that there is only one dharma body that everybody shares. The notion of Buddha-nature as eternal encourages sentient beings to pursue the bodhisattva path instead:

[I]t is said to address the inverted beings of the two (small) vehicles. The practitioners of the two vehicles mistakenly perceive impermanence and the four inversions in the true suchness. In response to this, it is stated that true suchness is permanent and free from the four inversions.52^,53

In summary, the claim that Buddha-nature is eternal not only supports equality among sentient beings and prevents them from hurting others, but it also serves as the ontological ground for the idea of One Vehicle.

There are also practical applications of the assertion that Buddha-nature is eternal. In daily language, the notion of emptiness is frightening for some unenlightened beings, as they may think that the doctrine of universal emptiness implies that it is hopeless to become a Buddha: everything is empty, including any Buddhist practice. To encourage sentient beings to practice Buddhism, the idea that Buddha-nature is eternal emerges, with the word “eternality (chang 常)” meaning non-delusional and achievable. Jizang’s characterization of Buddha-nature also has this practical implication. For instance, in TSS, Jizang considers that Buddha-nature can be described as eternal as there are immeasurable merit in tathāgatagarbha:

In tathāgatagarbha, there are countless Buddha dharmas, all sharing the same essence. When discussing various virtues, it is referred to as “eternal”. Beyond all virtues, there is no separate eternal nature that can be obtained. Likewise, when discussing purity and similar qualities, it is the same. Furthermore, when discussing eternity, it is referred to as “liberation”. Outside of eternity and similar qualities, there is no separate inherent nature of liberation. The dharma body and wisdom are also the same.54

Furthermore, Jizang admits that Buddha-nature can be regarded as eternal as there are immeasurable positive qualities of Buddhahood:

[O]rdinary beings mistakenly believe in permanence, happiness, self, and purity within the conditioned phenomena. Therefore, I now speak of true permanence, happiness, self, and purity concerning the qualities of Buddhahood.55

Jizang also thinks that having faith in Buddhist teachings would bring immeasurable merit, which gives rise to the thought that Buddha-nature is eternal:

Since one has not yet realized the truth, one relies on the teachings to generate faith, which is called faith in the words of the Buddha. This gives rise to thoughts of eternity and similar concepts, which constitute the right view of the mind.56

Jizang’s claim that Buddha-nature is eternal is also taken as an encouragement that Buddhahood is attainable, as described in his A Commentary on the Diamond Sutra (Jingang Bore Shu 金剛般若疏, CDS):

Now, regarding the issue of emptiness: birth and death are illusory and can be considered empty; Buddha-nature is not illusory; therefore, it is not empty.57

The last sentence “Buddha-nature is not illusory (foxing feiwang 佛性非妄)” implies that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature and can attain Buddhahood, thus encouraging one to embark on the path to Buddhahood.

In summary, I understand Jizang’s notion of Buddha-nature as eternal from two aspects. First, Buddha-nature is the dharma body. For Jizang, the dharma body is described in various sūtras as eternal because the dharma body is ubiquitous and always there. Jizang uses the term “conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常)” to describe this type of eternality. Since this concept of eternality aligns with universal emptiness, Jizang’s assertion that Buddha-nature is eternal is therefore compatible with the notion of universal emptiness.

Second, Jizang explains the threefold practical considerations of the claim that Buddha-nature is eternal. To begin, describing Buddha-nature as eternal implies that every sentient being has Buddha-nature, and this can teach sentient beings not to think of themselves as superior. Also, this teaching prevents beings from hurting others. Moreover, the claim that Buddha-nature is eternal serves as an ontological ground that explains why the bodhisattva path is the only vehicle of enlightenment, which ensures that the three vehicles are heading towards the same destination. Finally, the claim that Buddha-nature is eternal can be taken as an encouragement that Buddhahood is attainable, which encourages beings to start Buddhist practice. Therefore, Jizang’s theory of eternal Buddha-nature has practical implications, indicating that this assertion functions as encouragement rather than being merely an ontological claim.

To reiterate, from a practical perspective, Jizang’s assertion that Buddha-nature is eternal and the general Buddhist idea of universal emptiness are complementary, supporting the core tenets of Buddhism by encouraging Buddhist practices and affirming the possibility of attaining Buddhahood.

First, the notion of universal emptiness suggests that all phenomena lack inherent existences; their being is contingent upon various causes and conditions. This understanding reinforces the idea of oneness and the undifferentiated dharma body. As previously discussed, this aligns with the notion of eternal Buddha-nature: Buddha-nature is eternal because it represents the undifferentiated dharma body that is ever-present. Consequently, the concepts of universal emptiness and eternal Buddha-nature collectively support the doctrine of the One Vehicle, which posits that the bodhisattva path is the sole path to enlightenment.

Second, the doctrine of universal emptiness conveys that all things are empty and transient, lacking fixed nature or characteristics, including those of sentient beings. This implies that even individuals who may have acted negatively in the past have the potential for complete transformation. The combination of this doctrine with the idea of eternal (non-illusory) and achievable Buddha-nature encourages a shift in perspective, enabling practitioners to recognize their unlimited potential, including the attainment of Buddhahood.

Lastly, the doctrine of universal emptiness, in conjunction with the concept of the undifferentiated dharma body, fosters compassion. Given that all phenomena are dependent existences and lack inherent existence, we are fundamentally connected as a single dharma body. This understanding inspires practitioners to engage in altruistic actions and cultivate loving-kindness towards all beings.

6. Conclusions

In this essay, I have presented several arguments regarding Jizang’s concept of Buddha-nature. First, for Jizang, Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (zhongdao 中道), which can be understood as a spiritual state that avoids the two extremes of emptiness and non-emptiness. Second, I argued that Jizang’s notion of eternal Buddha-nature can be understood through the idea that Buddha-nature is the objective manifestation of the dharma body within the framework of “conditional eternality” (yinyuan chang 因緣常). I demonstrated that this type of eternality is compatible with universal emptiness, thereby establishing that Jizang’s assertion of eternal Buddha-nature aligns with the concept of universal emptiness. Third, I illustrated that Jizang’s idea of eternal Buddha-nature has practical implications, such as encouraging sentient beings to follow the bodhisattva path. I further demonstrated that Jizang’s theory of eternal Buddha-nature serves as a form of encouragement rather than merely a philosophical assertion. This essay aims to show that Jizang’s theory of Buddha-nature is not only compatible with the notion of universal emptiness but also complements it in supporting the religious tenets of Buddhism by promoting Buddhist practices and affirming the possibility of attaining Buddhahood.