Cognitio Dei Experimentalis—Experimentalis et Vera Sapientia Bonaventure on the Experiential Knowledge of God in the Commentary on the Sentences and in De scientia Christi

Abstract

This article examines the distinctive characteristics of Bonaventure’s interpretation of the experiential-sapiential knowledge of God based on some selected texts from his Commentary on the Sentences and De scientia Christi. In the first part, after having taken stock of the multiple meanings of experience in Bonaventure’s theology, we turn our attention to distinction 35 of the third book of the Commentary on the Sentences, where the Seraphic Doctor uses the phrase “cognitio Dei experimentalis” to describe the experience of God of contemplative and holy people. In the second part, we will examine the sense in which Bonaventure accounts for the experiential dimension of the knowledge of God in Christ’s human soul. Here we will deal with his work De scientia Christi, questions 6 and 7, which discuss the way in which the human soul of Christ knows “per excessum”, the uncreated Wisdom united with Him and the infinite things in the eternal Wisdom. At the end, we will briefly compare the basic claims of both works regarding the experiential knowledge of God made by contemplatives and by Christ.

1. Introduction

The literature on the Bonaventurean interpretation of the experience of God, the mystical theology of the Seraphic Doctor, its sources, anthropology and grace theology, is immense. We will mention only a few of them. Karl-Heinz Hoefs devoted his 1989 monograph Erfahrung Gottes bei Bonaventura specifically to the question of the experience of God, which deals with the subject by focusing on the Commentary on the Sentences, and within it mainly on the analysis of the spiritual gift of wisdom (Hoefs 1989). Marianne Schlosser discusses the question of the experience of God on a broader horizon, by examining the Bonaventurean understanding of cognition and volition in her book Cognitio et amor (Schlosser 1990). Katherine Wrisley Shelby and Robert Glenn Davis interpret Bonaventure’s theology and the meaning of the experience of God in it from a specific perspective regarding a key concept (Shelby 2023; Davis 2017). The former sees the concept of “hierarchy” and the latter the notion of “affectus” as the focal point that fundamentally determines the Seraphic Doctor’s theological approach. Both authors place great emphasis on demonstrating the extent to which his sources—Dionysius the Areopagite, Thomas Gallus and Alexander of Hales—have determined Bonaventure’s thinking and the specific, original features of his reflection. Of course, the theme of the experience of God is also addressed by those authors who analyse Bonaventure’s interpretation of the ‘spiritual senses’ (sensus spirituales), since, alongside ‘experientia’ (experiri), ‘sensus’ (sentire) is another key concept in the vocabulary of the experience of God. Here, it is sufficient to refer to the works of a few scholars, such as Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Fabio Massimo Tedoldi and Gregory F. LaNave (von Balthasar 1982; Tedoldi 1999; LaNave 2012; Puskás 2024). The authors mentioned so far have explored the Christological dimension of the Bonaventurean interpretation of the experience of God to varying degrees and depths. Meanwhile, for example, in the reflections of Rahner or Karl-Heinz Hoefs, the Christological aspect plays little or no role at all; it is of central importance in the approaches of Balthasar and LaNave, but also receives increased attention from Shelby. What is most lacking in the research, however, even among authors who have developed a Christological dimension,1 is an examination of the possible connection between the experiential knowledge of God in contemplative people (the righteous, the saints, the spiritual people) and the knowledge of God in Christ with the characteristics of experience.

Bonaventure, in his use of the vocabulary of experience in the context of the knowledge of God (experiri, experientia, experimentum, experimentalis), is joining the intellectual heritage of the eminent representatives of 12th and 13th century monastic theology, and especially of the school of St. Victor. The terms “experiri” and “experientia” were used to describe the knowledge of God and divine realities by authors such as William of Auxerre, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of St. Victor, Richard of St. Victor, Thomas Gallus and Alexander of Hales (Coolman 2004, 2017; Rorem 2009; Porwoll and Orsbon 2021; Gavrilyk and Coakley 2011). The role of experience is also crucial in the theology of Bonaventure, so much so that the Seraphic Doctor speaks explicitly of “the experiential knowledge of God”. According to some scholars, the formula “cognitio Dei experimentalis” was first used by Bonaventure (Boeckl 1931). Even if we cannot be absolutely certain, it is undoubtedly a formula that expresses the specificity of Bonaventure’s theological approach, which seeks to synthesize mystical-spiritual and academic-scholastic theology (Delio 2014). In the thought of the Seraphic Doctor, the three ways of doing theology, going back to the distinction of Dionysius Areopagite, form an integral whole: symbolic, proper and mystical theology. Symbolic theology interprets the sensuous things of the created world as signs pointing to God. Proper theology (theologia proprie) reflects on the truths of faith and the content of revelation in an argumentative, discerning, conceptual and propositional way, with an understanding illuminated by faith. Mystical theology is about the experiential knowledge of God, about union with him, and leads the person who cooperates with divine grace to this (LaNave 2014, p. 82). However, this threefold dimension of theology is expressed with different emphases in Bonaventure’s oeuvre. During the years of his teaching at the University of Paris (1252–1257), when he had to teach in an academic setting and in accordance with the specific characteristics of scholastic theology, the role of argumentative-examining proper theology is dominant, although the other two dimensions of theology are not entirely absent. In any case, at that time, experiential-mystical theology was still in its infancy. After his election to the position of the Minister General (1257), in his second creative period (1257–1274), when he had to govern and lead the Franciscan order in a spiritual sense, symbolic theology and even more mystical-experiential-spiritual theology played a decisive role, although argumentative proper theology was not absent. As LaNave puts it, Bonaventure is, in a sense, writing as if he were a magister (LaNave 2014, p. 82). Already in his first creative period, the work of Dionysius Areopagite, Mystical Theology, was an important reference point for the Seraphic Doctor’s experiential theology, and the Franciscan magister at the University of Paris was already fundamentally committed to an affective reading of Dionysian mysticism rooted in the particular interpretation of Hugo of St. Victor, Richard of St. Victor and Thomas Gallus (Rorem 2015; Shelby 2023, pp. 29–47). In his second creative period, the mysticism of the Areopagite completely permeates and defines the experiential-mystical theology of Bonaventure, who at the same time adds new and original dimensions to the affective interpretation of Dionysian mysticism: he associates the ecstasy of love leading to union with God with the transit of Christ crucified and sees it exemplified in the figure of St Francis of Assisi (Rorem 1993, p. 220; Tobon 2022, p. 363). The subject of experiential knowledge of God is approached from different perspectives in two different periods of the Seraphic Doctor’s life. In his second creative period, as Minister General, his fundamental aim is to lead his Franciscan friars to a contemplative life, to the cultivation of the spiritual senses and to an experiential knowledge of God. In this way, St Francis, the “vir hierarchicus”, is the outstanding example for the friars. In this context, the role of an investigative-argumentative theology is clearly subordinate. Here, the investigative-argumentative theology is integrated into the experiential-mystical theology. By contrast, in his first creative period, as a magister teaching at the University of Paris, his fundamental task is to cultivate a scientific-investigative theology, and within this framework he must treat of the experiential knowledge of God. The challenge here is to integrate in some way elements of experiential-mystical theology into the discourse of theologia proprie.

In this paper, we will examine the Bonaventurean understanding of the experiential knowledge of God. We seek to clarify what is meant by “cognitio Dei experimentalis” in the framework of speculative theology. In this context, we focus on two questions in particular. One of the questions we seek to answer is the following: what is the function of experiential-mystical theology and how does it fit into argumentative-investigative theology. The second question we are concerned with is whether or not, in the context of speculative theology, Bonaventure accounts for the experiential dimension of Christ’s knowledge of God and sees a connection with the saints’ experience of God. To examine and respond to these questions, we have chosen two works of Bonaventura, written during his first creative period, at the very beginning of his teaching career at the University of Paris. The first is the Commentary on the Sentences, because it is Bonaventure’s first, most detailed and comprehensive work, a masterpiece of high speculative theology. It was here that the question of the function of experiential-mystical theology and how it could fit into a systematic-scholastic theological work seemed to be worth exploring. De Scientia Christi was chosen because it is also a masterpiece of speculative theology, in which, moreover, experiential-mystical theology appears even more strongly, and in a specific sense, as a question of Christ’s experience of God. Bonaventure here applies, in a quite original way, the mystical theology of Dionysius Areopagite.

For the purposes of our investigation, we will consider as key texts those passages in which key expressions related to experience appear in a concentrated way. On this basis, we have chosen for analysis those passages from the above-mentioned works in which the typical vocabulary of experiential knowledge of God appears in the context of investigative-argumentative theology: texts III Sent d. 14, 16, 35 and ScienChr q. 6–7. The key terms and key texts will be interpreted, not in a historical-diachronic way but in a synchronic way, focusing on the internal context of the writings of Bonaventure under study. The methods of conceptual analysis, close textual reading and systematic reflection will be used. We do not aim to analyse the sources of the Seraphic Doctor, to explore the historical context in detail, to compare with the thought of contemporary authors of the 13th century, or to examine the history of influence. Since we are concerned with Bonaventure’s early works from his first creative period, in which the author does not explicitly mention the name of St Francis of Assisi, we do not reflect on the extent to which the Seraphic Doctor’s thinking on the experiential knowledge of God may have been influenced by the figure of Francis during this period. It cannot be ruled out that, when the Franciscan magister uses the phrase “viri contemplativi et sancti” in the Commentary on the Sentences, he is thinking primarily of St. Francis. This, however, cannot be confirmed, and can only be assumed.

As a first step in the first part of our reflection (Section 2.1), we will examine the different layers of meaning and scope of the concept of “experience” (experiri, experientia, experimentum, experimentalis), i.e., the various and analogous uses of the term in the Commentary on the Sentences. This serves as an introduction to the meaning of the word “experiential” in the formula “experiential knowledge of God”. In the next step (Section 2.2), we turn our attention to the third book of the Commentary on the Sentences, distinction 35, and interpret the text by close reading, after briefly sketching the context in which the work was written. In the text under analysis, the Seraphic Doctor, in discussing the spiritual gift of wisdom, uses the phrase “cognitio Dei experimentalis”, but also other key terms related to experience, such as gustus interior, delectatio, experimentum divinae dulcedinis, excessus, ecstasis, raptus. He uses this vocabulary to describe the experience of God made by contemplative and holy people. In Section 2.3, we will examine, on the basis of III Sent d. 16, the experience of Christ as mediator of divine things. In Section 2.4 (Respondeo dicendum), a retrospective reflection is carried out. First, we answer the question of what is the function of experiential-mystical theology in the context of argumentative-examining theology, and then we formulate a hypothetical conclusion as to whether or not, in light of the text of the Commentary on the Sentences d. 34 and what we read in d. 35 about the experience of God made by contemplative people, can be applied to Christ. We see this conclusion confirmed by III Sent. d. 16.

In the second part of our reflection (Section 3), we will examine the theme of Christ’s experiential knowledge of God in the Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi (1254–57). After briefly sketching the context (Section 3.1), we will analyse questions 6 and 7 (Section 3.2 and Section 3.3), which discuss the way in which the human soul of Christ knows the uncreated Wisdom (Word) united with Him and the infinite things (infinita) in the eternal Wisdom (Word). After the textual analyses, we will again engage in a retrospective reflection (Section 3.4: Respondeo dicendum). The reason for our choice of these passages from De scientia Christi is that, unlike the reflections on the knowledge of Christ in the Commentary on the Sentences,2 in them, in relation to the knowledge of the human soul of Christ, Bonaventure uses the terms applied to the knowledge of God by experience, including excessus, experientia, experimentalis. Moreover, he himself parallels Christ’s knowledge “per excessum” with the saints’ experiential knowledge of God. On the other hand, we have chosen these passages of De scientia Christi because, in our opinion, research on the Bonaventurean interpretation of the experience of God has not paid sufficient attention to these texts.3 Finally, a further reason for our choice is that, in both the third book of the Commentary on the Sentences, distinction 35, and in the two questions of De scientia Christi mentioned above, the concept of sapientia plays a prominent role, albeit in different respects, in relation to the experiential knowledge of God. At the end of our reflection (Section 4), we will summarize the results of our investigations and briefly compare the basic claims of both works regarding the experiential knowledge of God made by contemplatives and made by Christ.

2. The Experiential Knowledge of God in the Commentary on the Sentences

2.1. Experiential Knowledge

For Bonaventure, the general concept of “experiential knowledge” has a very broad and rich meaning. The verb “to experience” (experiri) can have many different objects, modes and subjects, and accordingly to the noun “experience” (experientia, experimentum) can be assigned different meanings. The objects of external, sensory experience are the bodily, material things that we perceive through our five external senses (cognoscere per sensibile experimentum).4 The objects of internal experience are the events that take place in the soul, the acts and faculties of the soul, during which the human soul experiences itself from different perspectives by experiencing, by being present to itself (Bonaventura 1887, II Sent d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, concl.). He who loves knows by experience what it is to love; he who lives knows by experience what it is to live (Bonaventura 1882, I Sent d. 17, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 4, concl.). In the same way, the soul can experience in itself its readiness to believe and to love, as well as the act of believing and loving as its own human act.5 In both these cases, the object of experience is present here and now, for the experiencing subject, the external or internal individual perception of the external or internal object is actualized. Different from the above is the broader meaning of experience, which is knowledge that is the sum of skills and lessons learned through repeated external or internal experiences in the past, in a learning process. In this case, it is not a matter of a current perception of objects present in the here and now, but of knowledge summarising the lessons of previous perceptions, which presupposes the retention of previous perceptions in memory (Bonaventura 1887, II Sent d. 23, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 4). Such acquired experiential knowledge can apply to external sensory objects, to our fellow human beings, but also to ourselves and to spiritual beings. According to Bonaventure, it is not only we humans but also spiritual beings who possess this mode of experiential cognition acquired through learning (Bonaventura 1885, II Sent d. 11, dub. 2, resp.).6 Finally, the verb “to experience” (experiri) also very rarely has the meaning “to try, to prove”, especially in connection with the experience of temptation (Bonaventura 1885, II Sent d. 21, a. 2, q. 1, contr). In the cases mentioned above, Bonaventure obviously uses the concept of experience in an analogous sense, which includes the elements of both similarity and difference. Despite the differences, in all four cases it is a matter of cognition in which the subject of cognition is in direct contact with the object of cognition, does not receive his knowledge from others (report, reading, hearing) and does not accept it on the basis of the authority of others. In addition to a high degree of immediacy and personality, sensory and inner experience also have in common the idea that the object of experiential cognition is actually present to the subject, who cognizes it not by inference, abstraction or judgment, but by the simple perception of its presence.

Bonaventure also likes to use the vocabulary of the concept of experience in connection with the cognition of God: the verb to experience (experiri), the noun experience (experientia, experimentum), and in compound expressions the adjective experimental (experimentalis) or the adverb ‘having experienced’ (experimentaliter). He also has the formula “cognitio Dei experimentalis”—experiential cognition of God—which later became established in spiritual theology as the term applied to the mystical cognition of God (Hoefs 1989, pp. 2–3).7 When the Seraphic Doctor speaks of the experiential cognition of God, he is in fact speaking of a further analogical application and extension of the experiential cognition characteristic of sensory and inner perception, which involves moments of great immediacy and actual presence. It is a cognition of God that is based, not only on external testimony, authority, nor even on abstract conceptualisation, judgement and inference, but also on the perception of God’s presence. Despite the similarity, however, there are also obvious differences between the external-sensory experience, the internal-spiritual experience and the experience of God, which result from the differences in the object and principle of cognition. In the case of sensory experience, the object of cognition is the material-physical world of beings, and the means of cognition is natural external perception. In the case of inner-spiritual experience, the soul experiences itself from some aspect, on the basis of its own natural faculties. In the experience of God, the soul experiences God’s presence, his good deeds, his love, his goodness, his grace, his help, his action, the fulfilment of his promises, the content of the truths accepted by faith and the spiritual attitudes that follow: consolation, sweetness (dulcedo, suavitas), joy (delectatio), salutary sorrow and overflowing love for God (excessus amoris), and the means of cognition is the grace of God (Hoefs 1989, pp. 18–34). In a total of two passages, Bonaventure uses a formulation in which the grammatical object of experiential knowledge is God himself.8 Although, in these texts, God is explicitly mentioned as the grammatical object of experience, the content of this experience, the experiential knowledge of God, is not necessarily different from the experience of divine sweetness or goodness, that is, the experience of God’s grace in his actions and good deeds. The experience is directed towards God; the soul experiences something of him more or less, and it experiences the sweetness of God’s presence, which makes it happy. Bonaventura’s formulations on the content of experience are complementary. The same thing that he calls “the experiential knowledge of divine goodness and sweetness” from the point of view of subjective experience and attunement, he calls “the experiential knowledge of God” from the point of view of the ultimate orientation and purpose. The intentional object of all experiences of grace is God, who is the source, the worker and the goal of these experiences. The formula “cognitio Dei experimentalis” formulates the content of the experience of grace in terms of its intentionality: an experiential cognition directed towards God and culminating in union with him. It is an experience of grace that goes beyond mere knowledge of faith; in a way, it is a foretaste of, but not identical to, the ultimate beatific vision (Hoefs 1989, pp. 34–41).9 This experiential knowledge can be freely bestowed by God and is usually bestowed by God on duly prepared believers (the righteous, the saints, the spiritual people), though not necessarily to the same degree. Rooted in love, experience is deepened, but the sinner is deprived of it.

2.2. The Experiential Knowledge of God and the Spiritual Gift of Wisdom—III Sent d. 35

2.2.1. The Context of the Question: Theology as Science and Wisdom

The emergence of the whole of Aristotle’s philosophical corpus in the West in the 13th century posed a powerful challenge to theology. Contemporary theology had to respond, among other things, to the rise of the Aristotelian notion of science (Hayes 1992, pp. 22–25; Leinsle 1995). The theologians teaching at the University of Paris also had to answer the question of whether or not theology was a science (scientia) and, if so, in what sense. Related to this was the other important question of whether or not theology was wisdom, and if so, in what sense in relation to philosophical wisdom. In his first systematic theological work, the Commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure reflects on these questions in the most detailed way, especially in the introduction (Prooemium). His reflection seeks to satisfy both the criteria of the Aristotelian conception of science and the patristic and monastic conception of theological wisdom. He sees theology as science and wisdom and seeks a synthesis of the two. He does this by joining, in the interpretation of wisdom, the affective reading of Mystical Theology by Dionysius Areopagite, which developed and was alive in the school of St. Victor from the end of the 12th century onwards. His epistemological reflections on theology, which are relevant to our topic, are expressed primarily in his questions on the formal and final cause (causa formalis et finalis) of theology (Prooemium 2 and 3 quaestio). His reflections on the nature and kinds of theology, as expressed here, are important for our topic because they provide the framework within which the theology of the experiential knowledge of God, experiential-sapiential theology, also takes its place. His reflections on the spiritual gift of wisdom in III Sent d. 35 are closely related to his reflections on the science of theology as an affective habitus of wisdom in I Sent Prooemium.

In quaestio 3 of the Prooemium, Bonaventure distinguishes three ways of using the intellect theologically according to whether it is considered in itself or in relation to other faculties and according to the habitus that perfects it. To the three ways of theological use of the intellect, he assigns three types of theology. In the following outline, we can summarize this as follows:

• Intellect in itself—habitus of contemplation—properly speculative science;
• Intellect extended to work—habitus of becoming good—practical/moral science;
• Intellect extended to the affect—intermediate habitus between the purely speculative and the practical—wisdom. (Bonaventura 1882, I Sent Prooem., q. 3)10

The three theological uses of the intellect, the three corresponding habitus and the three types of theology are closely and dynamically related. Bonaventure seems to attribute a crucial role in establishing this interconnection to experiential-sapiential-affective theology. This decisive importance derives from the intermediate position of wisdom as a connecting link, for wisdom is, on the one hand, an intermediate habitus between the speculative and the practical, because it embraces both; on the other hand, it includes both cognition, embracing both speculative and moral cognition, and affect. The importance of sapiential-affective theology is emphasized once again in the conclusion by Bonaventure, who explicitly calls the science of theology (scientia theologica) an affective habitus (habitus affectivus). It occupies a middle place between the speculative and the practical habitus and, since it embraces and contains both the speculative and the moral habitus, it therefore realizes the goal of both speculative and moral theology: contemplation and becoming good.11 On the one hand, the most intrinsic characteristic of the theological knowledge that contemplates Christ (totum integrale), who integrates the truths of faith, is that it is a prerequisite for the movement of affect, for love of the content/person that is known. Thus, speculative theology, by the very nature of the object of its contemplation, organically attains its perfection in affective-sapiential theology. On the other hand, moral theology cannot truly achieve its goal—to be good—if it lacks the motivating force of affect, above all the example of Christ and love for Christ.12

Gregory LaNave, in his study of the theological method of the Seraphic Doctor, distinguishes three positions on what Bonaventure considers the purpose of theology. In Randolph Daniel’s view, the purpose of theology is beyond theology; theology is only a preparation for the attainment of that purpose (Daniel 1974). LaNave notes, in this regard, that in some of the works of Bonaventure—mostly writings with the structure of ascension (Itin., Hex) or emanation-return (ScienChr)—this is indeed the case: “Christian wisdom (Itin. 7), nulliform wisdom (Hex. 2), ecstatic knowledge (Scien. Chr., epilogue): all are states that are clearly beyond the scope of theological science, though that science in each case plays a role in preparation for the end” (LaNave 2014, p. 100). By contrast, in Charles Carpenter’s view, theology and spirituality have exactly the same purpose (Carpenter 1999). However, on the basis of the introduction to the Sentences (I Sent Prooem.) and the passage we are going to analyse (III Sent d. 35), LaNave takes a third position, according to which speculative theological knowledge is fulfilled in, and attains its perfection in, experiential-sapiential knowledge (LaNave 2014, pp. 100–1).13 For our part, we agree with LaNave’s position, which we believe is supported by a further passage from the Prooem. Bonaventure, in Proom. q. 2, where he discusses the formal cause (causa formalis) for theology, i.e., the procedure of theology, says: “the procedure of investigative research and argumentation is in accordance with this doctrine, because it is designed to refute the opponents of faith, to nurture the weak in faith, to rejoice the perfect”.14 Here, Bonaventure links the formal cause and the threefold purpose of theology, among which he mentions the experiential element of rejoicing in which the perfect share. He does not specify what he means by “perfectos”, but we may assume that he means those belonging to the group of “viri contemplativi”, who find joy in the search (perscrutatio) for the profound truths of revelation. This joy may be as much the joy of understanding truth as the joy of tasting the goodness of God. Both donum intellectus and donum sapientiae are ultimately gifts of the same Holy Spirit (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35. a. unicus q. 1 and q. 3). In our view, the reflections on the three types of theology in the Prooemium are in fact developed in detail in the reflections on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, wisdom, science and intellect in III Sent 35. The gift of understanding (intellectus) is related to speculative theology, science (scientia) to practical/moral theology and wisdom (sapientia) to experiential-sapiential-affective theology.

2.2.2. The Spiritual Gift of Wisdom and the Experiential Knowledge of God

Bonaventure, in his Commentary on the Sentences of Petrus Lombardus (1252/53), speaks most often of the experiential knowledge of divine realities and of God when he speaks of the most outstanding of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit: wisdom. In the first question of distinction 35 in his Commentary on Book III, he identifies the concepts of sapientia and cognitio Dei experimentalis almost by definition when he says: “sapientia (…) nominat cognitionem Dei experimentalem” (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. unicus, q. 1, concl.).15 In the same quaestio, other expressions of the vocabulary of experiential cognition of God appear several times, most often here in the Bonaventurean texts: “experimentalis boni et dulcis cognitio”, “excessus in experimento divinae dulcedinis” and “optimus enim modus cognoscendi Deum est per experimentum dulcedinis”. When, a little later, in the third quaestio, Bonaventure reflects on the distinction between the gifts of intellectus and sapientia, the vocabulary of experiential divine cognition appears again in the context of wisdom—“via ad gustum et experimentalem cognitionem divinae suavitatis” (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. unicus, q. 3, ad 1) and “cognitio experientiae” (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. unicus, q. 1, ad 3)—since one of the reasons for the difference between the two spiritual gifts is precisely the dimension of experience which is part of the use of the gift of wisdom. In addition to the presence of a rich vocabulary of experiential knowledge of God, the passage on the gift of wisdom deserves special attention because it offers, on the one hand, a basis for identifying the reasons that make possible the use of the experiential vocabulary and, on the other, for perceiving the traditional roots of the Bonaventurean position. On the other hand, the text sketches out the basic connections between the key concepts of Bonaventure mysticism, which also derive from tradition: cognitio experimentalis, sensus spiritualis, contemplatio, excessus.

The fundamental question of the first quaestio of the 35th distinction is whether the act of the gift of wisdom belongs to the cognition of the true or to the love of the good, whether it is an act of cognition or of love (actus cognitivus vel actus affectivus). After considering the positions of authorities from the Western and Eastern traditions (St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, Dionysius Areopagite, St. Bernard) and other arguments, the Seraphic Doctor concludes that, in the most proper sense, wisdom belongs to the affective. Bonaventure tries to find a balance between the seemingly contradictory opinions of the authorities and to develop his own position by distinguishing several layers of the concept of wisdom. He structures his thought accordingly: starting from the most general possible meaning, he clarifies the concept of wisdom, moving through the less general meaning, towards the more proper and then the most proper meaning, and thus, lastly, he lays down his own conception. Wisdom signifies most generally (communiter) the knowledge of things; less generally (minus communiter) the knowledge of eternal things; properly (proprie) the devotional knowledge of God, by the practice of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. After these brief definitions, he explains his position in two steps. First, he conceptually clarifies the meaning of wisdom as a special act of gift bestowed by the Holy Spirit in relation to cognition (cognitio) and love (affectus, affectio). He then argues in support of the position thus taken. The key passage reads as follows:

Quarto modo dicitur sapientia magis proprie, et sic nominat cognitionem Dei experimentalem; et hoc modo est unum de septem donis Spiritus Sancti, cuius actus consistit in degustando divinam suavitatem. Et quoniam ad gustum interiorem, in quo est delectatio, necessario requiritur actus affectionis ad coniugendum et actus cognitionis ad apprehendum, secundum illud Philosophi, qui dicit quod “delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti cum sensu eiusdem”, hinc est quod actus doni sapientiae partim est cognitivus et partim est affectivus, ita quod in cognitione inchoatur et in affectione consummatur, secundum quod ipse gustus vel saporatio est experimentalis boni et dulcis cognitio. Et ideo actus praecipuus doni sapientiae propriissime dictae est ex parte affectivae (…).

(Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. 1, q. 1)16

At least two considerations should be added to the passage quoted. The first is the following statement, which interprets the role and relation of knowledge and love in relation to wisdom as a spiritual gift: “the act of the gift of wisdom is partly cognitive and partly affective, in such a way that it begins in cognition and is completed in affectio”. What does this mean by part-part, or beginning and becoming complete? Does it mean that, chronologically, the act of wisdom is carried out by first cognition (cognitio) and then love (affectio)? Is it that the act of wisdom is completed in love, leaving cognition behind? Would “consummated” (consummatur) mean that cognition ceases in love? Or does consummation rather mean that in love cognition itself is also consummated, albeit in a new form, and thus the part-part does not indicate a chronological succession, or at least not exclusively so, but a simultaneous act of cognition and love in which the act of love determines the act of cognition?

In our opinion, the quoted passage can be interpreted rather in the latter way.17 This is confirmed by the answer to objection 5 and by some considerations of question 3 on the spiritual gift of understanding (intellectus). There is no doubt that, in the realization of the spiritual gift of wisdom, Bonaventure presupposes a dynamic in which affectus plays a decisive role. In the passage quoted, this is indicated by the distinction between “magis proprie” and “propriissime”, the phrase “in affectione consummatur” and the conclusion that “the special act of the gift of wisdom belongs to affectio”, which he supports by authoritative arguments, by the statements of St. Gregory the Great, Dionysius Areopagite and St. Bernard of Clairvaux. On the other hand, however, this wisdom, guided and shaped by affectus, does include cognition, that is to say, “experiential knowledge”; this is indicated by the formula “cognitio Dei experimentalis” and “experimentalis boni et dulcis cognitio”. In his answer to objection 5, Bonaventure accepts that love alone does not make one wise without knowledge. But he immediately adds that, in the love of God (in amore Dei), cognition (cognitio) is linked to the act of tasting itself. For the best way to know God is through the experience of sweetness; it is far more excellent, noble and pleasurable than that which is achieved through reasoning in research (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5).18 Inquiring intellectual cognition prepares the act of wisdom, and is thus an initial part of it, but experiential cognition in love surpasses it.

In the same way, Bonaventure argues for a connection between intellectual and experiential-sapiential knowledge of God when he compares the spiritual gifts of understanding (intellectus) and wisdom (sapientia) in quaestio 3, which deals with the spiritual gift of understanding (donum intellectus). He asserts both the continuity and the distinction between the two, thus once again elucidating the meaning of his earlier statement that wisdom “begins in cognition and is completed in affectio”. The difference is this: while with the spiritual gift of understanding (donum intellectus) we are concerned with eternal things with a view to the knowledge of truth on the basis of eternal causes, with the gift of wisdom (donum sapientiae) we are concerned with the knowledge of eternal things on the basis of eternal causes in such a way that they become the means of tasting and experiencing divine sweetness. In this case, the knowledge is related to the tasting (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1).19 The organic connection can be grasped in this way: the spiritual gift of understanding itself also contains a kind of pleasure, namely, pleasure above the knowledge of truth, but it is inferior to the pleasure of tasting the supreme divine sweetness. The act of the spiritual gift of understanding is the cognition that extends speculation, which is in some way on the way to savouring, as if it were paving the way to the delightful savouring of divine goodness in wisdom (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3).20

It is in light of these reflections that Bonaventure’s statement, referring to Dionysius Areopagite, that “love (affectio) rises higher than reason (ratio), and union (unio) than cognition (cognitio)”, should be interpreted (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. 1, q. 3, ad 5).21 In a particularly perceptible way, the Seraphic Doctor is here linked to the interpretative tradition22 which has been interpreting the work De divinis nominibus of Dionyius in light of his Mystical Theology, and has been reading the 7th chapter on divine wisdom of De divinis nominibus in light of the 4th chapter on divine love of the same work.23 The statement quoted illuminates again the connection and difference between the spiritual gifts of understanding (intellectus) and wisdom (sapientia), now with the image of ascension to God: what begins in the work of the intellect illuminated by the Holy Spirit is completed in the wisdom given by the Holy Spirit as an act of the gift of the delight-taste (gustus), imbued with love and formed by love, leading to union. Bonaventure here uses the term “cognitio” in a restricted sense, by which he means the cognition—in the investigative-argumentative mode—carried out by reason (ratio); this is what is presupposed, but also what is surpassed, by love and the union in love. The union in love, however, also has its own cognition of God, but this is a very particular form of “cognitio”, precisely the experiential-sapiential cognition that perceives God and divine goodness, and rejoices in it.

In order to elucidate the nature of this experiential-sapiential cognition of God and to support his thesis that wisdom is the “experiential cognition of God” (cognitio Dei experimentalis), Bonaventure uses the analogy of the sensory experience of “taste”, and applies the concept of “internal taste” (gustus interior). Its object is divine sweetness or goodness (degustando divinam suavitatem). This is matched, on the subject’s side, by the act of enjoyment (delectatio), which involves the conjunction of things which correspond to each other (coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti), the act of affectio (actus affectionis ad coniugendum) and the act of cognition (actus cognitionis ad apprehendum); this is nothing other than the perception of divine goodness/sweetness and the conjunction with it (cum sensu eiusdem). Just as the external perception of sweetness and goodness gives the correspondence and the delightful experience of this in love, so the internal tasting and perception of God’s goodness/sweetness, awakened by the Holy Spirit, gives the correspondence and the delightful experience of this in love. This inner taste (gustus interior) is nothing other than the experimental knowledge of goodness and sweetness (experimentalis boni et dulcis cognitio). Wisdom is a taste of divine sweetness, an inner taste that delights, that gives rise to delight (delectatio). Here, Bonaventure is clearly relating to and developing the traditional teaching (Origenes, St. Bernard of Clairvaux) on the five spiritual senses (sensus interiores/spirituales). Spiritual perception is nothing other than the emotional experience of the effect of divine grace, the sweetness of grace, the reception of the delights from God (suscipere a Deo delectationes). Spiritual taste can be understood as the experience of approximation to God. The fruit of the inward savouring of divine sweetness is delight (delectatio), in which both love to connect (actus affectionis ad coniungendum) and cognition to grasp (actus cognitionis ad apprehendendum) are active. Delight is born as the conjunction of the united by the perception of conjunction. For Bonaventura, spiritual taste (gustus) is the closest to spiritual touch (tactus), which is the most exquisite inner, spiritual perception. Spiritual touch, as an experiential act of ecstatic union with God (intima unio in ecstatico amore), is the most perfect and spiritual perception, the reverse of the order of bodily perceptions. Bonaventure uses the notion of spiritual touch to describe the experience of God in ecstasy (excessus ecstaticus). This is the culmination of contemplation (contemplatio perfecta), which takes place without the ordinary cognitive act of the intellect, at the apex of the affectus, as a perception of God in obscurity, in the ignorance of intellectual cognition (in caligine sentire Deum in se). Spiritual taste and touch both come about through the soul’s loving faculty (affectus, voluntas) receiving and exercising the divine virtue of caritas and living the gift of wisdom given to it by the Holy Spirit. The birth of spiritual touch also requires the realization of the beatitude of peace (Rahner 1975, pp. 149–52).

In the following passages of the text, continuing his response, Bonaventure no longer speaks at all of cognition in relation to wisdom, but instead speaks exclusively of the motive faculty, that is, of the love in which wisdom is fulfilled. Similarly, he does not use the terms “cognitio Dei experimentalis” or “cognitio experimentalis”. At the beginning of the second unit of text, he states that the special act of wisdom derives in the most proper sense from the affectus (affectus), and he then supports this thesis with a series of authoritative arguments (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35, a. unicus, q. 1, fund 1–4). In the third unit of text, Bonaventure argues for the special act of wisdom’s derivation from affectus, arguing that there can be no excesses in wisdom that could be harmful or damning. In contrast, in knowledge of divine things, destructive, harmful excess is possible. Consequently, the act of wisdom is accomplished in the pursuit of love. If the act of wisdom were to be fulfilled in cognition, then the possibility of harmful excess would have to be reckoned with. However, since it is fulfilled in love, there is no possibility of excessive, destructive excess in the act of wisdom. Moreover, excess in the experience of divine sweetness (excessus in experimento divinae dulcedinis) is rather praiseworthy, as is evident in the case of holy and contemplative people. As an example, Bonaventure mentions here people who have been raised to ecstasy or rapture by an experience of divine sweetness beyond measure, which happens to very few. For these climaxes of the act of wisdom, ecstasy and rapture in love, Bonaventure no longer uses the term “cognitio (Dei) experimentalis” but the very term “experimentum divinae dulcedinis”. In this way, he indicates that ecstasy and rapture are the highest realisation of the experiential knowledge of God.

2.3. The Experience of the Divine in Christ—III Sent d. 16

In the Christological section of the Commentary on the Sentences, we find another text that is relevant to the theme of the experience of God, but here it is the experience of Christ that is at issue. Bonaventure uses the verb “experiri” and its derivatives in the case of Christ extremely rarely outside the concept of sensual experience (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 14, a. 3, q. 1).24 One such exceptional passage is found in his Commentary on the Sentences, where, in discussing the Passion of Christ, he seeks to answer the question of whether or not the soul of Christ suffered according to the higher part of his intellect. In answering in the affirmative, the Seraphic Doctor explains that the suffering of Christ not only affected the senses, and not only the lower part of his intellect, but also extended to the higher part of the intellect. His whole soul suffered because of its natural connection with his body, so that by his suffering and pain he might heal the whole of man’s sinful soul. Thus, Christ experienced pain and suffering in the higher part of his intellect, however much the pleasure of contemplating the divine essence was in him. Reflecting on the paradoxical coexistence of pain and joy, he says:

Tertia suppositio est, quod Christus simul erat viator et comprehensor, ita quod viatoris cognitio non impediebat comprehensoris cognitionem, nec affectio affectionem; et illud fuit in Christo singulare propter officium mediatoris, quo debebat experiri et divina et humana. Unde sicut simul et semel poterat perfecte converti ad Deum et converti ad nos, ita quod una illarum conversionum alteram non impediebat nec retardabat; sic potuit secundum eandem partem animae simul et semel gaudere in Deo et compati corpori suo, ita quod nec dolor a gaudio, nec gaudium a dolore pateretur aliquam diminutionem sive remissionem.

(Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, concl.)25

Bonaventure does not seek to explain the paradoxical experience of the co-existence of joy and pain in Christ, since it is a singular experience, and singular is literally inexplicable. Thus, the Seraphic Doctor cannot but describe the incomprehensible experience by applying the negations of apophatic theology: the cognition and emotion characteristic of the wayfaring state do not prevent the cognition and emotion characteristic of the state of fulfilment; neither joy prevents pain nor pain prevents joy. Bonaventure, on the other hand, gives the reason for the inexplicable and unique simultaneous double experience which he identifies in the mediatorial office of Christ: “it was unique in Christ because of his mediatorial office, by virtue of which he had to experience both the divine and the human”. According to Bonaventure, mediation makes it indispensable that the human soul of Christ should be both in a state of glorious fulfilment (comprehensor) and in a wayfaring state (in via), possessing the modes of cognition and the emotions associated with both. Also, by virtue of his mediatorial office, both his joy and his pain must be comprehensive and complete. It is clear from the text that for the soul of Jesus “to experience divine and human things” at the same time means nothing less than “to rejoice in God and to suffer with his body”. According to Bonaventure, then, the experience of the divine in the soul of Christ is identical to the experience of rejoicing in God.

2.4. Respondeo Dicendum—Reflections on the Commentary on the Sentences

2.4.1. The Function of Experiential-Mystical Theology

The first question that we will try to answer here is as follows: what is the function of experiential-mystical theology and how does it fit into argumentative-examining theology in the above analysed distinction 35 of the third book of the Commentary on the Sentences? Gregory LaNave cites Bonaventure’s reflection on the spiritual gift of wisdom to show that investigative-argumentative theology in its specific sense is perfected in sapiential theology. He interprets the hierarchical order of wisdom in the text by identifying wisdom in the proper sense (sapientia proprie) with the wisdom of proper investigative-argumentative theology. This is the reverential knowledge (theosebia) of God (nominat cognitionem Dei secundum pietatem), the knowledge of God which includes the honour and praise given to him by the virtues of faith, hope and love. This theological wisdom, in the proper sense, is situated between philosophical wisdom and the gift of wisdom bestowed by the Holy Spirit.

We continue to agree with LaNave’s assertion that investigative-argumentative theology reaches its perfection in sapiential theology. For our part, however, we have a different understanding of the concept of a sapiential theology, and believe that, in the hierarchical order indicated in the text of distinction 35, it corresponds not to the concept of “sapientia proprie” but to that of “sapientia magis proprie”, which means the experiential knowledge of God. We shall try to prove this by the following arguments. (1) If the “sapientia proprie” immediately following the philosophical notion of wisdom (sapientia minus communiter: cognitio rerum aeternarum; cognitio causarum aeternarum) were identical to sapiential theology, it is not clear how it could be the perfection of the theology itself. What kind of theology would it perfect? Would it not rather only perfect philosophical wisdom? In our view, the notion of “sapientia proprie” can at most be identified with theological wisdom other than philosophical wisdom, but not with sapiential theology. (2) In I Sent Prooemium quaestio 3, Bonaventure clearly links the “habitus of sapientia” to the use of the intellect extended to affect, and states that sapientia embraces both knowledge and affect. In III Sent d. 35, the concept of affectus does not belong to “sapientia proprie”, but to “sapientia magis proprie”, as part of the experiential knowledge of God, a gift of the Holy Spirit, the act of which begins in cognition and is completed in affection (in cognitione inchoatur et in affectione consummatur).26 (3) If we take into account the passage on the spiritual gift of the understanding in question 3 of III Sent 35, we can, in our opinion, conclude that the relation between the gift of wisdom (sapientia) and the gift of understanding (intellectus) is equivalent to the relation between experiential-sapiential theology and speculative theology. This is also evident terminologically, since Bonaventure assigns to the notion of the gift of understanding (donum intellectus) the terms speculative cognition (cognitio speculationis) and contemplation in the light of reason (contemplatio in lumine rationis), while the spiritual gift of wisdom is understood as experiential cognition (cognitio experientiae) (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35. a. unicus q.3, ad 3, 5, 6). Speculative-contemplative cognition with the spiritual gift of understanding means understanding the contents of faith. Its primary object is the supreme, eternal and creative Truth; its secondary objects are spiritual creatures who reflect the eternal Truth. Contemplation of the Truth received by faith results in believing more devoutly and loving more ardently (devotius credatur et ardentius diligatur) (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 35. a. unicus q.3, resp.). As explained in the textual analysis, Bonaventure distinguishes this speculative-intellectual contemplation, which characterizes the spiritual gift of understanding, from the experiential-affective act of cognition by virtue of the spiritual gift of wisdom. At the same time, he sees a dynamic relationship between the two, insofar as the extension of the speculative contemplation of eternal Truth is already, in a sense, on the way to experiential-sapiential cognition, as he argued in quaestio 3 of I Sent Prooemium the relationship between speculative and sapiential theology. The spiritual gift of understanding is further perfected by the spiritual gift of wisdom; speculative theology attains its perfection in experiential-sapiential theology.

The term “mystical theology” (theologia mystica) does not appear in the Prooemium we have examined, or in III Sent d. 35.27 Bonaventure uses the term frequently in his later works.28 However, the content of mystical theology is present in the text of the Commentary on the Sentences we have analysed, albeit in a rudimentary and trace way, as indicated by the key terms excessus, ecstasis and raptus. The Seraphic Doctor refers explicitly to Dionysius Areopagite’s De mystica theologia. He joins the affective reading of Areopagite’s writings developed by the Saint-Victorians. Thinking about the spiritual gift of wisdom in the context of speculative theology, he does not interpret Dionysian mysticism in an analytical way, but rather uses it as a justification for his thesis that ‘the particular act of the gift of wisdom belongs in the most proper sense to the affective side’. It seems to us that, in Bonaventure’s system of defining the meanings of the concept of wisdom in a hierarchical way, the ‘sapientia propriissime dicta’ constitutes a separate and supreme category. In our view, it is distinct from and superior to the category of ‘sapientia magis prorie’. In content, it corresponds to the later concept of ‘theologia mystica’, whereas sapientia magis prorie means the experiential knowledge of God, which begins in cognition and is fulfilled in affection; sapientia propriissime dicta means this fulfilment itself. The experiential-sapiential knowledge of God typically involves the spiritual senses, of which the Seraphic Doctor mentions in this context the spiritual taste (gustus interior) of divine goodness and sweetness, while the meaning of ‘sapientia propriissime dicta’ includes the concepts of excessus, ecstasis and raptus. In this case, too, it is a matter of the experiential knowledge of God being fulfilled in mystical experience, with mystical theology perfecting experiential-sapiential theology. The organic transition between the two degrees is illustrated by the spiritual sense of touch (tactus), which means already excessus and unio.

To summarize the results of our reflection, we can say that the understanding of the relation between speculative and sapiential theology in the Prooemium of the Commentary on the Sentences is revisited, affirmed and applied in the discourse on the spiritual gift of wisdom. The meanings of the concept of wisdom show the following hierarchical order:

Common wisdom—philosophical wisdom—wisdom in speculative theology; theological wisdom—wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit; experiential knowledge of God; experiential-sapiential theology—wisdom in mystical theology.

The concept of wisdom has different levels of meaning which cannot be deduced from each other. At the same time, those that precede are fundamentally open to and prepare for those that follow. The latter surpass, and may correct or even fulfil, the former. This dynamic relationship can best be described by the Bonaventurean term ‘perfecting’. Using the tools of speculative theology, the Seraphic Doctor reflects on the notion of wisdom in an investigative-conceptual way, with a search for synthesis. In doing so, he achieves, in practice, within the framework of speculative theology, a synthesis between theology as science and theology as wisdom, and he does so by giving maximum effect to the claim of an experiential-mystical theology.

2.4.2. Christ’s Experience of God—Hypothetical Conclusion

The second question we need to answer concerns whether or not the text we have analysed offers any basis for learning something about the experiential dimension of Christ’s knowledge of God in relation to the experiential knowledge of God made by contemplative and holy people. At first sight, it seems obvious that our answer should be a resounding “no”; Bonaventure does not explicitly mention Christ or Christ’s experience of God in the 35th distinction we are considering, but speaks only of the experience of God of contemplative and holy people. In our view, however, it is still possible to conclude from the broader context, and in particular from distinction 34, that the statements about the experience of God of the saints can be applied to Christ. Distinction 34 discusses the gifts of the Holy Spirit in general terms, offering an introduction to the following distinctions, which interpret each spiritual gift separately and in detail. What Bonaventure states here about the gifts of the Holy Spirit in general terms is also valid for the individual gifts discussed in detail below. Now, the Seraphic Doctor repeatedly asserts in distinction 34 that the gifts of the Holy Spirit were perfectly possessed in Christ.29 He emphasizes that it was the possession of these gifts that made him perfectly willing to suffer for us. The gift of wisdom, for example, made him ready to find joy and delight (delectatio) in doing the will of the Father and in accomplishing the work of our redemption (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 34, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 concl.). Bonaventure also states that the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habitus are preserved and fulfilled in the heavenly home, but there they are realized by even more excellent acts than in the wayfaring state. He also supports this statement by saying that if, in Christ, who already lived in a state of perfected knowledge of God and love (comprehensor perfectissimus), characteristic of the glorious state on earth, all the gifts of the Holy Spirit were present, this is also true of the blessed who have attained heavenly glory (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 34, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 concl.). Now, if we read the 35th distinction of the Commentary on the spiritual gift of wisdom in light of these general statements, and take seriously the claim that in Christ all spiritual gifts, including the gift of wisdom, were perfected, it seems reasonable to assume that what Bonaventure says directly about the experiential knowledge of God in contemplative and holy men in distinction 35 applies indirectly and eminently to Christ. According to it, the “cognitio Dei experimentalis”, such as the interior taste of divine sweetness and goodness, the consummation of the cognition of the intellect in affectus, the excess in the experience of divine goodness and the elevation to ecstasy and rapture (raptus), were most exquisitely realized in the human soul of Christ.

2.4.3. The Experience of Christ the Mediator

As we have seen, in the text analysed in III Sent quaestio 16, the experience of “the divine and the human” at the same time for the soul of Jesus means nothing less than “to rejoice in God and to suffer with his body”. The content of this statement is in line with that of the above-quoted statement in III Sent 34. According to this, the spiritual gift of wisdom made Jesus ready to find joy and delight (delectatio) in doing the Father’s will and accomplishing the work of our redemption. From these two texts, then, we can draw the following conclusion: the content of the experience of divine things for Jesus is the joy of doing the Father’s will and accomplishing the work of our redemption. This experience is the result of the gift of wisdom bestowed upon the suffering Jesus by the Holy Spirit. We believe that the linking of the two passages confirms once again the hypothetical conclusion drawn in the previous chapter about the possible similarity between the experience of Jesus, filled with the fullness of the gift of wisdom, and that of the saints, endowed with the wisdom of the Holy Spirit, in terms of joy and delight. This analogy is not refuted by Bonaventure’s linking of the simultaneous experience of “the divine and the human” to Jesus’ unique mediatorial office, which has its ontological basis in the fact that Jesus is both “viator” and “comprehensor”. The ontological nature of Jesus (viator and comprehensor) is unique and his mediatorial office is unique, and to fulfil it he necessarily had to experience both the divine and the human. He experienced both pain and joy in the midst of his sufferings, with unique depth and clarity at the same time. This does not mean, however, that his followers, contemplative and holy men endowed with the wisdom of the Holy Spirit, cannot share in his experience as a grace. In the previous chapter, we inferred the possible experience of Jesus from the experience of the saints. But the reverse is also possible: an analogous participation in Jesus’ experience can also be inferred for spiritual people.

3. Christ’s Experiential Knowledge of God in De Scientia Christi

3.1. Context

From the end of the 12th century onwards, the question of Christ’s knowledge increasingly came to the fore of theological reflection and was articulated as a question in its own right. Hugo of St. Victor in De sapientia, Hugo’s circle of disciples in Summa Sententiarum and Petrus Lombardus in Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, the most important work for scholastic education, took a stand on questions such as the following: Did Christ have human knowledge other than the Word? How did the Word affect the knowledge of Christ’s human soul? What was the content and extent of Christ’s human knowledge? Did the knowledge of the human soul of Christ increase? What did sensual knowledge mean to Christ? These questions were already addressed by Bonaventure in his first systematic work, his Commentary on the Sentences (1252/1253), but also in his early Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi (1254),30 and in his Breviloquium (1256–1257), written a few years later and intended as a theological compendium (Bonaventura 1891a, Brev. IV,6). In answering questions, the Seraphic Doctor often follows the solutions of his mentor, Magister Alexander of Hales, including in distinguishing between the habitus and the act of knowing Christ as a human being, but also in emphasizing the redemptive importance of the sense knowledge of Christ (Hayes 1992, pp. 37–39). De scientia Christi is an outstanding example of speculative theology and is Bonaventure’s most extensive and complex work on the subject, in which metaphysical, epistemological, theological and Christological reflection are most closely interwoven.31 Bonaventure discusses the subject of Christ’s knowledge on the basis of the hypostatic unity of the divine and human natures in Christ, and builds his work on this basis. The first three questions (q. 1–q. 3) discuss the question of Christ’s knowledge from the perspective of Christ’s divine nature, as the divine knowledge of the incarnate divine Word, which is infinite knowledge according to the infinite spiritual nature of the Word. The middle question, question 4, examines the question of how the eternal Word or Wisdom in Christ affects the human nature united with him, and gives the answer by means of the philosophical theory of illuminatio. The last three questions (q. 5–q. 7) discuss the human knowledge of Christ from the other side of the unio hypostatica, from the point of view of the finite human nature of Christ, which is unique because of the gratia unionis, but which nevertheless has its limits because of the finitude of human nature. Embedded in this speculative theological-Christological reflection, using Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysical and epistemological considerations, is the mystical theology that appears in the last two questions (q. 6 and q. 7), inspired by Dionysius Areopagite’s De theologia mystica. In the next two chapters, we will reconstruct and analyse the ideas of these texts that are relevant to our topic.

3.2. Christ’s Knowledge of the Uncreated Wisdom per Excessum—De Scientia Christi q. 6

Bonaventure, in his Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi (1254–1257), written a few years after the writing of the Commentary on the Sentences (Schlosser 2014, pp. 21–22), uses the characteristic terms of experiential cognition in discussing the knowledge of the human soul of Christ concerning the eternal Wisdom united with him and things contained in the eternal Wisdom as an expressive pattern (exemplar expressivum seu repraesentativum). In chapter 6 of the book, he examines the question of whether or not the soul of Christ comprehends (comprehendat) the uncreated Wisdom itself with a comprehensive and complete understanding. In his answer, the Seraphic Doctor first of all states as a general principle that the uncreated and infinite Wisdom, that is, the divine Word, cannot be comprehended (comprehendendo) with comprehensive and complete understanding by any finite creature, not even by the human soul of Christ in personal union with the eternal Wisdom, because the illuminating light necessary for this and emanating from the infinite Wisdom is itself created and is therefore finite and limited. No creature, including the created human soul of Christ, can comprehend infinite Wisdom by comprehensio, for this would presuppose that it would understand the infinite Wisdom united with it in its totality and totally (totum et totaliter), that is, in all possible aspects (Bonaventura. 1891b, Scien.Chr. q. 6, concl., resp.).32 The difference between the infinite and the finite, however, does not make this possible. Bonaventure lays down as a second general principle that the intellect and the affectus of the human soul never rest in anything but God and the infinite good, for nothing is sufficient for the soul, only that which exceeds (excedat) its capacity. Though the created and finite soul cannot have a comprehensive and complete understanding (comprehensio) of infinite Wisdom, both the affect and the intellect of the intelligent soul are elevated into infinite good and infinite truth. Bonaventure distinguishes the following six ways of ascending to infinite good and truth: faith (credendo), reasoning (ratiotinando), wondering (admirando), contemplative vision (contuendo), exceeding (excedendo) and comprehensive understanding (comprehendendo). The first mode of cognition is imperfect, that of the wayfaring state; the last mode is absolutely perfect, that of the eternal and infinite Trinity. The second and the third modes characterize the progress of the wayfaring state. The fourth and the fifth are characteristic of the fulfilment of the heavenly home. In the wayfaring state, we can contemplate the divine immeasurability with reason and admiration (ratiotinando et admirando); in the heavenly home, however, we can contemplate it in the mode of contemplative vision (contuendo), when we become in the form of God (deiformes effecti), and in the mode of exceeding (excedendo). To this exceeding cognition, Bonaventure links the joyful experience of full spiritual inebriety (et excedendo, quando erimus omnino inebriati), which he interprets with the thought of St. Anselm: “we enter into divine joy rather than divine joy enters into our hearts” (Bonaventura. 1891b, Scien.Chr. q. 6, concl., resp.).33 At the end of his reflection, he draws the following conclusions from the above considerations concerning the way in which the human soul of Christ comes to know the divine Wisdom united with him:

Et quoniam anima illa Verbo unita et magis est deiformis effecta et magis inebriata propter gratiam non tantum sufficientem, sed etiam superexcellentem; ideo contuetur divinam sapientiam et contuendo excedit in ipsam, licet non comprehendat eam. Et pro hac causa admiratio non tantum habet locum in via, verum etiam in patria; non tantum in Angelis, verum etiam in anima assumpta a Deo.

(Bonaventura 1891b, Scien.Chr. q. 6, concl.)34

Above all, it appears from the passage quoted that the Seraphic Doctor applies the term “excedit” to the human soul of Christ, when he asserts that the soul of Christ, having known the divine Wisdom united with it by contemplative vision, transcends itself and enters into the divine Wisdom contemplated. This is a novelty compared to the chapters of the Commentary on Sentences concerning the knowledge of Christ, where the vocabulary “excedendo, excedit, excessus” does not appear in this sense, but where Bonaventure simply states that the knowledge of the human soul of Christ of divine Wisdom is not a comprehensive understanding (non comprehensivus), but that it exceeds (excedit) all other creaturely knowledge (Bonaventura 1887, III Sent d. 14, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4).35 We further observe that, of the six ways of knowing the divine Wisdom listed earlier, Bonaventure omits the triad of faith (credendo), reasoning (ratiotinando) and comprehensive and complete understanding (comprehendendo) for the soul of Christ and employs only the following three: contemplative vision (contuendo), exceeding (excedendo) and wondering (admirando). It is also noteworthy that, whereas in the previous enumeration he assigned admiration to the wayfaring state, here he extends it to the consummate state of the heavenly home, precisely because it was and is characteristic of the soul of Christ. In contrast to faith and inferential thinking, he considers admiration (admiratio) as a perfection that remains in consummate form in the glorious mode of being and knowing. Although the Seraphic Doctor does not use the term experience itself (experiri, experientia), he does use the terms spiritual inebriety, wonder and exceeding to in fact describe the experiential cognition of the human soul of Christ. All three terms are used to describe a joyful transcendence of self. While the soul of Christ, with contemplative vision (contuendo) and wonder (admirando), comes to know the divine Wisdom united with it, it exceeds itself (excedendo), rises into the divine Wisdom and, forgetting itself, is filled with joy (inebriata).36

3.3. Christ’s Knowledge of the Infinite Things Contained in Uncreated Wisdom per Excessum—De Scientia Christi q. 7

The characteristic vocabulary of experiential cognition, including the verb “experiri”, appears prominently in the next and concluding question 7 of De scientia Christi. Bonaventure here examines the question of whether or not the soul of Christ comprehends, with a comprehensive and complete understanding (comprehendendo), all that the uncreated Wisdom comprehends comprehensively. In his reply, the Seraphic Doctor explains that the soul of Christ ascends to divine Wisdom in two different ways of cognition (Bonaventura 1891b, Scien. Chr. q. 7, concl.). Inasmuch as divine Wisdom is a creative pattern (exemplar factivum), the intelligent soul of Christ ascends to it in a comprehensive and complete mode of understanding (comprehendendo), since finite things are those which the creative and dispositive pattern (in exemplari ut factivo et dispositivo) contains in itself, and are therefore comprehensively and completely comprehensible (comprehensibilia). Inasmuch as, however, divine Wisdom is an expressive or presentational pattern (exemplar expressivum seu repraesentativum), the soul of Christ rises to it, not in a manner of comprehensive and complete comprehension (comprehendendo) but in a manner of excess (excedendo), given that, in divine Wisdom as an expressive and presentational pattern, there are an infinite number of things which are incomprehensible to finite substance (incomprehensibilia). Therefore, the soul of Christ, being a finite creature, however united with Wisdom, does not grasp infinite things. Hence it does not grasp them in all their aspects (omnimode), but rather is grasped by them, and therefore does not enter into them in the mode of comprehensive understanding, but rather in the mode of excessus. This does not consist in the cognizer exceeding (excedat) what is cognized, but in the cognizer rising into the object that exceeds him (in obiectum excedens) in some way of transcendence (excessivo quodam modo), rising above himself (erigendo se supra se ipsum) (Bonaventura. 1891b, Scien.Chr. q. 7, concl. resp.).37 At this point in the reflection, Bonaventure quotes Dionysius Areopagite’s De divinis nominibus, in which the author suggests that there is a union, which transcends the nature of the intellect and by means of which we are connected with and come to know the divine things that are beyond us.38 The Seraphic Doctor identifies this mode of cognition with the concept of excessus presented above, and then proceeds to consider it in this way:

Hic autem modus cognoscendi per excessum est in via et in patria; sed in via ex parte, in patria vero est perfecte in Christo et in aliis comprehensoribus; sed in aliis est coarctate tum ex parte mensurae propriae gratiae, tum ex parte voluntatis divinae, quae non se cuilibet offert in omnimoda familiaritate; sed in anima Christi est liberalissime, tum quia ab ipsa habet gratiam implentem omnimode capacitatem suam, tum quia speculum aeternum praebet se ei manifestabile secundum familiaritatem omnimodam.

(Bonaventura 1891b, Scien.Chr. q. 7, concl.)39

In the passage quoted, Bonaventura broadens the horizon of his above reflections on the per excessum mode of cognition. He now applies it, not only to the knowledge of the soul of Christ but also to the knowledge of the souls of other men, and even extends it to the wayfaring state as well as to the state of heavenly glory. This is noteworthy because, in quaestio 6, in reflecting on the cognition of uncreated divine Wisdom in the soul of Christ, he still clearly and exclusively attributed the concept of “modus cognoscendi excedendo” to the state of heavenly glory. Compared with the concept of “excedendo” in quaestio 6, the concept of “per excessum” in quaestio 7 thus has a wider scope. At the same time, the Seraphic Doctor also makes it clear that there are substantial differences of degree in the ways of knowing “per excessum”. While in the wayfaring state it is only partial, in the heavenly home it is perfect; while in the Saints it is limited, in Christ it is complete. Bonaventura supports this completeness on three grounds: (a) in Christ the extent of grace is complete; (b) the intimacy of God’s will is fully realized; (c) the divine Wisdom united with Him as an eternal mirror is most manifestly revealed to him.40 In the following, Bonaventura compares in Christ the modes of comprehensive understanding (in comprehensivo) and the modes of exceeding cognition (in excessivo). The characteristic features of the latter are as follows. (a) It is not the subject who grasps (capit) the object, but the object takes the subject captive. (b) It is not the gaze of intelligence (intelligentiae aspectus) that is attained, but knowledge finds its goal in a desire of intelligence (intelligentiae appetitus). (c) The soul does not consider all that exists, but acquires a readiness to know. (d) The soul cognizes things that cannot be learned.

After answering the objections, in the last section of quaestio 7, which is also the conclusion of the book, Bonaventure summarizes the results of the considerations of quaestios 6 and 7. It is in this section that the notion of excessus is explicitly linked to the notion of experience (experientia) and experiential wisdom (experimentalis sapientia). On the other hand, he does this by juxtaposing the knowledge per excessum of the soul of Christ and of other created souls and saints concerning divine Wisdom and infinite things. He interprets the notion of excessus both in terms of biblical passages and in terms of Dionysius Areopagite’s Mystical Theology. In the last section of the book of the Seraphic Doctor, which is also the climax of his whole work, he puts it as follows:

Secundum statum viae et secundum statum patriae non solum requiritur lucis aeternae praesentia, sed etiam lucis aeternae influentia, non tantum verbum increatum, sed etiam verbum interius conceptum; quod cum sit finitum, nec anima Christi nec aliqua alia anima potest esse comprehensiva Verbi aeterni nec scibilium infinitorum, licet in ea ferri habeat per excessum; qui quidem excessus est ultimus modus cognoscendi et nobilissimus, quem in omnibus libris suis laudat Dionysius, et maxime in libro de Mystica Theologia. De quo etiam mystice quasi est tota Scriptura divina, et de quo Apocalypsis secundo (Rev 2:17): Dabo ei calculum et in calculo nomen novum scriptum, quod nemo scit, nisi qui accipit; quia istum cognoscendi modum vix aut numquam intelligit nisi expertus, nec expertus, nisi qui est in caritate radicatus et fundatus, ut possit comprehendere cum omnibus Sanctis, quae sit longitudo, latitudo etc.; in quo etiam experimentalis et vera consistit sapientia, quae inchoatur in via et consummatur in patria; ad cuius circumlocutionem magis sunt idoneae negationes quam affirmationes, et superpositiones quam positivae praedicationes; ad cuius experientiam plus valet internum silentium quam exterius verbum. Et ideo hic finis verbi habendus est, et orandus Dominus, ut experiri donet quod loquimur.

(Bonaventura 1891b, Scien.Chr. q. 7, concl.)41

In this passage, Bonaventure confirms the parallel established in the above quoted passage from quaestio 7 between the soul of Christ and the soul of other people in the ecstatic mode of knowledge of the infinite things contained in divine Wisdom. On the other hand, the Seraphic Doctor seems here to extend this parallel to the knowledge of eternal Wisdom,42 inasmuch as he states that both the soul of Christ and the souls of other men (saints) are raised per excessum into the eternal light of infinite divine Wisdom. This, of course, does not imply a denial of the essential differences of degree between the knowledge of Christ and that of other men, already indicated earlier in the same quaestio. It does, however, affirm definitely that the same kind of cognition, that is, per excessum, is involved.

The second novelty of this concluding passage is that the Seraphic Doctor calls this excessus the ultimate (ultimus) and noblest (nobilissimus) mode of cognition. He asserts that this knowledge of God is, for the created being the supreme, the unsurpassable climax, which begins on earth and is fulfilled in the heavenly home. This claim is rhetorically emphasised by the fact that he speaks of this ultimate mode of knowledge at the very end of his book. In his opinion, Dionysius Areopagite praised this cognition per excessum in his works, especially in his book Mystical Theology. This remark is noteworthy because, although Dionysius was keen to use the term “excessus” in his book De divinis nominibus and in several of his letters,43 the term does not appear once in his book Mystical Theology. In any case, Bonaventure sees in the work of Dionysius a dynamic of “per excessum” cognition, in so far as the path of ascent to God is here also a continuous exceeding: a transcendence of the ordinary work of reason, of assertions and denials, up to the inner silence and the experience of the presence of God beyond reason.44

The third novelty of the concluding passage is the interpretation of the event of excess described above as an experience rooted in love and as experiential wisdom (experimentalis et vera sapientia).45 Bonaventure reads from the statement in Rev 2:17 that experience is the condition of understanding, since the biblical text does not speak of a general understanding open to all, but of an understanding that is personal and based on grace. For him, the text of Eph 3:17–19 is important because the Apostle Paul speaks of an understanding based on love, love that goes beyond understanding/knowledge.46 Bonaventure identifies this knowledge in excess, which is experiential, rooted in love and superior to knowledge acquired through reason, with experimental and true wisdom (experimentalis et vera sapientia), which begins in the wayfaring state and is fulfilled in the heavenly home.

3.4. Respondeo Dicendum—Reflections on De scientia Christi

Regarding the question of what is the function of experiential-mystical theology in De scientia Christi, we may briefly answer, in agreement with Zachary Hayes’ statement, that, in this case, mystical theology offers a solution to a speculative Christological question. Hayes rightly highlights the originality of this solution when he says: “In fact, the Questions seem to move in quite a different direction and offer a type of solution that seems to have no clear parallel in the literature up to this point. For at the decisive moment in the argument of the Questions, Bonaventure appeals to the mystical tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius in a way that lends a distinctive colour to the Christological question” (Hayes 1992, pp. 42–43). For our part, we would only add that we are not talking here about a “solution” that is completely unexpected and that is externally linked to the speculative discourse. Nor, in our opinion, is it a question of the rational-argumentative and epistemological-Christological speculations having run into an “aporia”, and of mystical theology leading out of this impasse. Rather, we see that speculative considerations have very well prepared the “solution” of experiential-mystical theology, and in this the notion of “excessus” plays a key role. Bonaventure begins the preparation already in quaestio 6, when he speaks of the paradoxical condition of man, that, although man is finite, he can fulfil his desires in that which is infinite: infinite Truth and infinite Goodness, which is God himself. The infinite desire of the finite creature for the Infinite already implies in its content the idea that man must transcend himself by some excess in order to fulfil his desire. Quaestio 7 continues the preparation by quoting from the speculative work of Dionysius Areopagite, De divinis nominibus (c. 7, p. 1), where it is said that there is a union with the divine beyond us in which we have a cognition beyond the capacity of the intellect. On this basis Bonaventure carefully elaborates the difference between the two kinds of cognition, comprehendendo and excedendo. This epistemological reflection is both a phenomenology based on experience and a speculative reflection. Having developed the theological concept of ‘excessus’ in this way, he then adds to it the experiential-mystical concept of ‘excessus’ on the basis of Dionysius’ De theologia mystica. He does this in such a way that the epistemological and mystical meanings of the concept of ‘excessus’ are mutually illuminating, speaking of the same event but from different perspectives. For the Seraphic Doctor, this procedure may be self-evident because it presupposes a similar relationship between the two works of Dionysius Areopagites: the union with God and the ascent to him in De mystica theologia describes the same experience as chapter 7 on wisdom in De divinis nominibus. It is the union in which the knowledge of the divine beyond us is understood as beyond the capacity of the intellect. Bonaventure, following the affective interpretive tradition of the Dionysian writings, understands this ‘union’ ultimately as a union in love. In the last two questions of De scientia Christi, then, the link between speculative and mystical theology is very complex and as close as possible. We can identify at least three functions of mystical theology. (a) Heuristic: it offers an interpretative possibility for answering a speculative Christological question. (b) Transcendental: it describes an event that goes beyond the understanding possible by the methodology of speculative theology. (c) Perfective: it fulfils the speculative theology’s quest for understanding and perfects the speculative notion of “excessus”.

In the above, we have already partially answered the second question posed in the introduction to our study, which concerns the experiential dimension of Christ’s knowledge of God. In agreement with Hayes’s statement, we have explained that this is precisely the originality of De scientia Christi: it interprets Christ’s knowledge of divine Wisdom and the infinite number of ideas contained in Wisdom “per excessum” from the point of view of mystical experience. To this we may now add that another remarkable originality of the Bonaventure interpretation is that it explicitly draws an analogy between Christ and the saints’ experience of God “per excessum”. On the one hand, in the speculative reflections of quaestio 7, he extends the knowledge of Christ “per excessum” to those in the wayfaring state and in the heavenly home. On the other hand, in the concluding section of quaestio 7, he applies the description of the experience of the Dionysian mystical theology of Moses and of contemplative men to Christ. In spite of the differences indicated, Bonaventure asserts a real similarity between the experience of Christ and the experience of the saints.

Paul Rorem, speaking of the influence of the life-work of Dionysius Areopagite, describes Bonaventure’s originality as follows:

“But here Bonaventure goes beyond his Victorine predecessors. When they encountered the loveless, mostly Christless Mystical Theology, they added love. Bonaventure’s use of The Mystical Theology adds not only love but also Christ, for in his reading the Dionysian darkness equals death and resurrection with Christ: ‘With Christ crucified, let us pass out of the world to the Father’. As he said at the outset, “there is no other path but through the burning love of the Crucified”. In sharing with Bernard and Francis a non-Dionysian devotion to Christ in the flesh, Bonaventure invoked the Areopagite’s authority only where it fit into his own tradition. Nevertheless, his creative work is the culmination of the Victorines’ integration of Dionysian darkness into the Western legacy of love for Christ crucified, and an echo of Paul’s original answer to the Athenians’ unknown God. It may seem incongruous to pair the Areopagite’s apophatic cloud with Francis’s ardent stigmata, but not to someone of Bonaventure’s synthetic genius”.

(Rorem 1993, p. 220)

We fully agree with Rorem’s statements, but we think that his statement should be supplemented by the elements of Bonaventura’s originality which we have set out above, in light of the analysis of De scientia Christi. The synthetic genius of the Seraphic Doctor is vividly attested, not only by his later mystical works, such as Itinerarium, but also by his early Christological work, which we have been examining.

4. Conclusions

At first glance, the reflections on the knowledge of the human soul of Christ concerning eternal Wisdom and the infinite things contained in Wisdom, which we highlighted in the previous chapter of De scientia Christi, questions 6 and 7 may seem surprising, especially when compared with Bonaventure’s reflections on the knowledge of Christ in distinction 14 of the third book of the Commentary on the Sentences. For in the latter, the Seraphic Doctor does not speak at all about the mode of knowing Christ per excessum, does not apply to it the vocabulary of experience and does not draw parallels with the saints’ experiential knowledge of God, although undoubtedly the other essential principles concerning the knowledge of Christ are the same in both works.47 On the other hand, it is also clear that there are substantial points of contact between the analysed ideas of De scientia Christi and the spiritual gift of wisdom in the Commentary on the Sentences. These can be summarised briefly as follows.

The notion of experimental and true wisdom (experimentalis et vera sapientia), which appears in the final part of quaestio 7 of De scientia Christi, shows a great degree of proximity in content, and can even be identified with the notion of wisdom in the more proper or most proper sense (sapientia magis proprie, propriissime dicta) in the Commentary on the Sentences, which means experiential knowledge of God (cognitio Dei experimentalis) as a gift of the Holy Spirit. In both cases, it is a knowledge of God which is possible only for a person touched by God’s love and living in love (caritas). The spiritual gift of wisdom is linked to the virtue of charity (caritas),48 it begins in the knowledge of understanding, but is fulfilled in affect, it belongs to affection in the most genuine sense, and in love of God it is linked to the inner taste itself (in amore Dei ipsi gustui coniuncta est cognitio). The experiential and true wisdom named in De scientia Christi also involves knowledge whose basis is charity.

In both cases, it is a matter of experiential knowledge. In his Commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure describes this experience as an inner savouring (degustando divinam suavitatem) of divine sweetness which gives rise to delight (delectatio). In De scientia Christi q. 6, he uses the terms admiratio (admiration) and gaudium (intrabimus in gaudium divinum) and the metaphor of inebriety (inebriata) to describe the experience; in q. 7, he uses the concept of experience (experientia, expertus) explicitly.

A further similarity is that, in both texts, the notion of excessus is prominent, for example, in the Commentary on the Sentences as excessus in the experience of divine sweetness (excessus in experimento divinae dulcedinis), whereby the extraordinary divine sweetness and goodness elevates those who share in the experience to ecstasy (ecstatis), or in a very few to rapture (raptus). This is not the contemplative man’s own achievement; rather, excess happens to him. In De scientia Christi, Bonaventura develops the notion of cognition by excess (excessivus modus cognoscendi) in contrast to comprehensive cognition. Excessus is necessitated by the paradoxical state of being, on the one hand, that the finite human soul (including the human soul of Christ) cannot comprehend infinite Wisdom (truth and good, God) with a comprehensive and complete understanding; on the other hand, the reason and loving aspiration (intellectus et affectus) of the human soul can only be at rest in that which exceeds its finite capacities, that is, only in God as infinite truth and good. In excessus, the human soul rises into the object that exceeds it (in obiectum excedens) in some way of transcendence (excessivo quodam modo), rising above itself (erigendo se supra se ipsum) and being taken by the object of knowledge contemplated. As in the Commentary on the Sentences, it is clear here that excess is not simply an achievement of the human soul itself, but rather an event that happens to it. This is also indicated by the passive forms of verbs (feruntur, capiatur).

A further similarity between the passages under consideration in the Commentary on the Sentences and De scientia Christi is that, in both of them, Bonaventure refers to Dionysius Areopagite’s Mystica Theologia and draws the same idea from it, for similar purposes. In the Commentary on the Sentences, he seeks to demonstrate that, in the use of the spiritual gift of wisdom, that is, in the experiential knowledge of God, the cognitive act of the intellect has a more initial role, while affect has a principal and fulfilling role. In support of this, he cites the idea in Dionysius’ work that in knowing God we make progress by denials rather than assertions. In the De scientia Christi, to prove that true and also that experiential wisdom is the ultimate and noblest cognition, achieved by excess, he quotes the same thought of Dionysius: denials are more suitable for describing this wisdom than assertions.

In addition to the points of contact indicated above, there are, of course, differences between the two texts under consideration in their approach to the experiential-sapiential knowledge of God. While in the Commentary on the Sentences the subject of experiential knowledge is generally God and God’s goodness and sweetness, in De scientia Christi it is primarily knowledge of eternal divine Wisdom. The Commentary on the Sentences describes the experiential knowledge of God as spiritual taste, but this aspect does not appear in De scientia Christi. While in the Commentary on the Sentences Bonaventure’s main subject of discussion is the relation between “intellectus” and “affectus” in the actualization of the habitus of wisdom, in which he emphasizes the decisive role of “affectus”, this aspect is only tangentially mentioned in the De scientia Christi. The Commentary on the Sentences treats created wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit, whereas in the De scientia Christi created wisdom is presented as a gracious effect of the uncreated divine Wisdom. The most fundamental difference between the two works is that, while in the relevant place in the Commentary on the Sentences Christ is not mentioned at all, but only the holy and contemplative men (viri sancti et contemplativi) are mentioned as subjects of the experiential-sapiential knowledge of God, in the De scientia Christi the human soul of Christ is the primary subject of the experiential-sapiential knowledge per excessum concerning the uncreated Wisdom (and the infinite things contained in Wisdom). This extension of the experiential-sapiential knowledge of God to the human soul of Christ and its parallel with the similar experience of the saints is indeed an original novelty which may be surprising in comparison with the approach of the Commentary on Sentences. At the same time, we have seen that, on the basis of III Sent d. 34, the statements on the experiential knowledge of God in distinction 35 can be applied by analogy to Christ.

In our paper, we have sought answers to two fundamental questions by discussing two of Bonaventure’s early systematic works, the Commentary on the Sentences and De scientia Christi. Regarding our question about the function of experiential-mystical theology in speculative theology, we have found, on the basis of selected passages from the Commentary on the Sentences, that investigative-argumentative theology reaches its perfection in experiential-sapiential theology. By examining the hierarchical order between the meanings of the concept of wisdom, we conclude that it is meaningful to distinguish between speculative theology, experiential-sapiential theology and mystical theology, although the latter term is not yet used here by the Seraphic Doctor. There is a dynamic relationship between these three forms of theology, which can best be described by the Bonaventurean term “perfecting”. These forms of theology cannot be deduced from each other, but they are organically linked. We have found that, in De scientia Christi, we can also observe the perfecting role of mystical theology in relation to speculative theology, but this is accompanied by the heuristic function of mystical theology. Speculative and mystical theology can mutually enlighten each other in the interpretation of the same event, the “per excessum” mode of cognition. In both of the works we are examining, Bonaventure’s ambition to synthesize theology as science (scientia) and as wisdom (sapientia), and speculative theology and experiential-sapiential theology, in the key phrase “perfecting”, is clearly evident. For our part, we consider Bonaventure’s endeavour to be exemplary for today’s systematic, speculative theology. A scientific theology that lacks the experiential-sapiential element, which also has a heuristic function, easily ends up in an empty rationalism. Just as a spirituality without serious theological-intellectual reflection can easily degenerate into a highly subjective experiential religiosity.

The second question of our paper, whether or not Bonaventure, in these two early systematic works, speaks of the experiential-mystical dimension of Christ’s knowledge of God and its relation to the experience of God made by the saints, is answered by the fact that, while in the Commentary on the Sentences he does not explicitly speak of this, at most we can only hypothetically infer it, in De scientia Christi the Seraphic Doctor discusses this topic in a quite original way. We have tried to highlight the creative Christ-centred interpretation of Bonaventure’s use of Dionysius Areopagite’s De theologia mystica in this work. We believe that the theme of the experiential knowledge of God could be pursued by further exploring Bonaventure’s early works written in the framework of speculative theology. The analogy between Christ’s experience of God and the experience of the members of the Church would be worthy of further investigation, as would the question of whether or not Bonaventure claims that the members of the Church share in the experience of Christ himself. The key text for this inquiry could be the passages in the Commentary on the Sentences on the grace of Christ as the head of the Church (gratia capitis: III Sent d. 13), with the guiding key concept of spiritual perception (sensus spiritualis).