When Politics and Religion Fuse: The Nature and Implications of the Meskel Square Controversy in the Ethiopian Media

Abstract

Using space as a conceptual framework, this paper analyzes the nature of a controversy that arose in Ethiopia when the government and three religious groups—the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC), Protestants and Muslims—clashed over claims to Ethiopia’s most famous square, Meskel Square. Critical discourse analysis of the media content of the controversy revealed that the EOTC sees the square as inherently religious and claims to use it exclusively for worship. The controversy, on the other hand, allowed the government and the other two groups to redefine the space as a shared avenue for “everyone”. The clash became a symbol of the power struggle between religious groups in Ethiopian politics. While the conflict was overlooked by the mainstream media, individuals from different political–religious orientations debated the issue in greater depth and detail through social media. The controversy has long-term implications for EOTC-related religious spaces in Ethiopia.

1. Introduction

Space is an important dimension in examining religious competition, conflict or tension in a given context (Kong and Woods 2016). The importance and attachment that religious groups assign to the space they use for worship, and the extent to which it represents their belief system, symbols and religious practices, is relevant in this regard. In some contexts, contentious spaces may be shared by different religious groups (Burchardt and Giorda 2022). In other contexts, such practices are not acceptable, and spaces are considered unshareable among them (Hassner 2003; Olsen 2019). The seizure or loss of religious spaces serve as expressions of symbolic power, in addition to issues of resource scarcity and territorial expansion, and thus such spaces generate competition and conflict, as some groups seek to maintain the status quo and others seek to change it (Hayden 2002; Kong and Woods 2016). Power relations between different religious groups, thus, play a tangible role in determining the meaning of religious spaces and their use (Shmueli et al. 2014).

Managing conflict and also violence in relation to religious spaces involves understanding the nature of the conflict by identifying the identity and intentions of the conflicting parties in relation to the underlying hidden patterns of power that go beyond the expansion or restriction of mere physical territorial boundaries (McAlister 2005). This process is in fact highly political, involving one or more of three intentions: territorial expansion, altering the social networks and identities of religious groups and agentic control over territory and people (Hervieu-Léger 2002).

In recent years, the field of study of religious space has grown tremendously with experiences from different countries and contexts (Knott 2010; Kong and Woods 2016; Shakhanova and Kratochvíl 2022). This paper is a contribution to the field of space-related religio-political tensions disseminated through the media. Using the case of a controversy that arose over Ethiopia’s historic and largest square, Meskel Square (Aragaw 2011), this paper looks at the nature and implications of the conflict between the Ethiopian government and three religious groups: namely the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, Protestant and Muslim groups.

The controversy began when the government suddenly embarked on a renovation project in agreement with the Chinese construction company CCCC (Misikir 2020). The EOTC claimed ownership of the space as it is where it celebrates its annual public religious holiday, from which the square takes its name, and as it claims legal ownership of the place. Meskel Square means “The Square of the Cross”. The holiday, called Meskel itself, is celebrated to commemorate the finding of the True Cross (Meskel) by St Helena—mother of Constantine the Great—in the 4th century; and the bringing of this cross from Egypt to Ethiopia by Ethiopia’s Emperor Dawit II (1382–1412), who died on his way back, and his youngest son Emperor Zera’a Ya’ikob (1434–1468), who completed this mission by placing it on a cross-shaped mountain in Ethiopia (Book of Tefut 2014).

This holiday is celebrated every year on Meskerem 17 (27 or 28 September, during the leap year). There is evidence that Meskel was celebrated in the capital, Addis Abeba, even before it became the capital in 1886 (Addis Maleda 2021). Except for a few interruptions during the communist period, which banned public religious expression and renamed the square “Revolution Square”, the square has been used to celebrate this religious holiday since the 1940s (Tesfaye 2021).

However, in January 2019, the Ethiopian government fenced off the area suddenly without any public notification or discussion and began digging it up. The reason given later was to renovate the place and to make it more appealing and functional for entertaining more people at a time (Hailu 2021). At the time, the EOTC claimed ownership and the government temporarily resolved the dispute by apologizing and allowing an EOTC monitoring team to be set up so that the site would not lose its religious significance. However, the controversy grew over time and by 2022, when it was completed, the site was being used for worship by Muslim and Protestant groups as well. In this period, many conflict situations arose between the EOTC on the one hand and the two religious groups and the government on the other. This conflict has involved various actors, including religious (the EOTC, Ethiopian Muslims and Protestant), political (within and outside the government) and professional (journalists, lawyers, tourism experts) groups. This paper aims to assess the nature and implications of the confrontation over Meskel Square by combining an analysis of emic indivisible sacred space perspectives, which view the holiness of the site as given and non-negotiable, with an etic, relational view of space from a social constructionist perspective that deals with the controversy (Kong and Woods 2016). This is achieved by collecting reports of the controversy from Ethiopian conventional and social media platforms. In this manner, this paper specifically aims to answer the following questions:

(1)

How did the Ethiopian media report on the controversy over Meskel Square?

(2)

How were the meaning and significance of the space for the government and the three contending religious groups reflected in the Ethiopian media?

(3)

How did the struggle for symbolic power in the relationship between religious groups and the government over Meskel Square play out in the media?

(4)

How was the space controversy managed by the contending parties as reported in the media?

2. Critical Discourse Analysis in This Work

In order to answer the questions raised above, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is used as a method to analyze the speeches and writings on the space controversy by political, religious and professional actors whose voices are heard in the Ethiopian mainstream and social media. CDA is an interdisciplinary method with diverse applications in different fields of study (Wodak and Meyer 2009; Foucault 1975; van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 2013). However, CDA is commonly understood as an approach that sees the use of language in speech and writing “as a form of social practice” that creates a dialectical relationship “between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) that frame it” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, p. 258). In this paper, the speeches and texts of Ethiopian politicians, religious leaders and professionals such as journalists and lawyers are analyzed according to the claims and counterclaims they made in relation to the controversy that arose after the Ethiopian government began a renovation project at Meskel Square. Discourse has the potential to either maintain (reproduce) the status quo or transform it, depending on the power dynamics between different groups in a contested situation (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). As such, CDA “aims to explore how language can be used to impose and maintain power and social inequalities in society” (Clark et al. 2021, p. 492). In addition to the power dynamics and social inequalities implied in the speeches and texts regarding the space controversy, photos from before, during and after the renovation project along with the discursive practices are used. These are taken from secondary sources.

This paper also analyzes the power dynamics and social inequalities that are evident in this scenario. The speeches and texts are all taken from the websites of Ethiopian newspapers (Addis Zemen, Addis Admass, Addis Fortune, Addis Maleda, and Ethiopian Reporter), a magazine (Addis Standard), YouTube videos and Facebook posts of prominent religious and political figures mentioned in one of the newspapers. To find articles on the issue, the researcher searched each media’s website using the term “Meskel Square” in Amharic, as this is the language of most of the media, and in English for a few of them (Fortune, The Ethiopian Reporter, and Addis Standard). The search includes articles published between September 2019, six months before the start of the project, and October 2022, after the end of the project.

The selection of texts and speeches on the discourse of the definition and use of Meskel Square is based on the criteria set out by Phillips and Hardy (2002, p. 75). These include the following questions: “What texts are most important in constructing the object of analysis?” “What texts are produced by the most powerful actors, transmitted through the most effective channels, and interpreted by the most recipients?” The researcher selected the most important texts relating to the positions of the various actors in the controversy. Such texts are circulated and re-circulated via both social and mainstream media. The researcher also considered the degree of topicality of the issue raised by prominent political and religious actors in social media.

3. Religion and Politics in Ethiopia

In the current socio-political and religious context of Ethiopia, the power relations between the different religious groups and the government play a palpable role in causing the dispute over Meskel Square. The EOTC, which was the state church until 1974, has been at the centre of physical and ideological attacks in recent decades (Ademe 2021). Fearing that the EOTC might regain the status of a state religion, successive governments have strategically and systematically weakened the Church (Aregawi 2008; Abbink 2003). Nevertheless, some scholars still consider the Church to be an oppressive, dominant force in Ethiopia (Østebø 2023). In contemporary Ethiopia, however, ethnic challenges orchestrated by systemic governmental pressures have placed the Church under existential threat (Moa 2023). In terms of population, the EOTC declined by more than 10 percent between the two censuses of 1984 and 2007 (Central Statistical Authority 1991; Population Census Commission 2008). Protestant groups, on the other hand, increased by more than 13 percent between the two censuses. Currently, Protestant groups dominate political positions in Ethiopia, and the openly Pentecostal Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been accused of promoting a political system that aims to Pentecostalise Ethiopian politics (Lefort 2020). The arrival of Abiy Ahmed at the political forefront seems to satisfy the yearning for a “born-again political saviour figure” for Pentecostal groups who previously wished for “the spiritual transformation” of Ethiopia through proselytization for the cause of “better politics” (Haustein 2022, p. 6). Islam, which makes up almost one-third of Ethiopia’s population, is increasingly influencing the dynamics of Ethiopian politics. In recent years, it has demonstrated its political power by mobilizing the population to peacefully demonstrate against the government’s religious intervention (Mohammed 2016). Currently, Islam is officially recognized by the Ethiopian parliament as equal to the EOTC, a status enjoyed by the EOTC since Emperor Haile-Selassie. This status is also extended to Protestant groups. Muslim-dominated regions, which previously played a marginal role, are being allowed to move to the political centre by the Prosperity Party-led government (Mohammed Jemal 2023). In recent years, there have been frequent disputes between the EOTC and the Ethiopian government, and it is common to hear EOTC leaders, including the Patriarch, claim that the EOTC is under existential threat due to state interests and intervention (EOTC TV 2023a, 2023b). This context is relevant for understanding the nature of the controversy under consideration and how the dispute is covered in the media.

4. Ethiopian Media Reporting of Religious Controversy

Following the religious turn under the leadership of the incumbent Ethiopian Prime Minister against the strict secular line drawn by the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) (Haustein and Feyissa 2022; Haustein 2022), religion became a hotspot in Ethiopian society. Unlike in previous years, when religion was a neglected topic in both the state and private press (Sileshie 2018), religion has become one of the most important topics in the Ethiopian media (Moges and Skjerdal 2024). While the state media remain loyal to the government and its objectives and report on religion based on official instructions, some private media organizations and social media are taking a proactive role in disseminating information on religious tensions and conflicts (Moges and Skjerdal 2024).

Some private media and the newly growing genre of religious media in Ethiopia also take supportive and critical positions on religious conflicts and violence. The commercial media in particular operate in a polarized state. For example, at the time of the recent conflict, in which dozens of EOTC supporters were killed by government security forces in their efforts to protect the EOTC synod from the threat of an ethnically motivated split, one of the private television stations in Ethiopia, Prime Media, spread politically and ethnically motivated hateful words and false allegations against the EOTC and religious leaders (Moges 2024). In its coverage of the issue, while Prime Media portrayed the splinter group as freedom fighters for the ethnic Oromos and other ethnic minorities (referred to as “nations and nationalities” in the FDRE constitution) in Ethiopia, another private TV station, ESAT, described the same group as an “illegal”, “rebellious” group that wanted to dissolve the church for no real reason (Moges 2024, pp. 44–48).

5. Contestations Between Political and Religious Groups over Spaces

Building on Kong and Woods’ (2016) argument that “using space as a main conceptual framework for understanding religious competition, conflict and violence” is not only desirable, but also an essential element, this paper seeks to extrapolate the nature of the controversy arising from the Ethiopian government’s renovation of Meskel Square, the complaints and claims of the EOTC and the subsequent counterclaims of the space by Protestant and Islamic religious groups in Ethiopia covered by the media. It also seeks to understand whether and how the Ethiopian media cover the conflict.

Over the past two to three decades, scholarship on religious space has revolved around its meaning, function and significance to religious groups and its management and occupation by the secular state (Kong and Woods 2016; Olsen 2019). Often, claims to the same space lead to conflict and violence between religious groups, within religious groups or between religious groups and the secular state (Kong and Woods 2016). Similarly, violence or conflict can result from tensions between a particular religious group and a secular state dominated by another religious group.

Generally, scholarship on the meaning of space presents two main views on the importance of space in religion. The first view asserts that space has an inherent quality that distinguishes it from the surrounding spaces because special events that take place in these spaces make them “holy” (Otto 1950), “real”, “sacred” or “divine” (Eliade 1959), thus distinguishing such places from the surrounding mundane or profane spaces. These places attract believers because of their specifically assigned religious functions (Preston 2015). To keep the places sacred, believers restrict access to everyone by fencing off these areas and building churches, mosques and temples with religious symbolism that give the places specific religious functions and meaning (Olsen 2019). These spaces are difficult to share, divide or replace because they are seen as part of the sacred belief system. Hassner (2003, p. 3) refers to this as the “indivisibility” of sacred spaces. Historically contingent conditions may also reinforce the indivisibility of sacred spaces, thereby contributing to the creation and management of conflicts over sacred spaces (Hassner 2003).

The second view comes from an outsider perspective, looking at space from outside of a religious group that sees such spaces as sacred (Kong and Woods 2016). Scholars in this camp view that space as processual and “socially constructed, reproduced and transformed” (Burchardt and Giorda 2022, p. 15). They argue that space is made “religious” through “economic, social, cultural, psychological and political processes” and by different actors—religious or secular (Olsen 2019, p. 30). Until then, space is seen as “an empty signifier, devoid of any meaning” and left to different interpretations by different groups (Olsen 2019, p. 30). According to the social construction approach, the power to define—or claim and counter-claim—the meaning, importance, ownership, use and management of sacred spaces rests on the interactions of different religious, socio-cultural and political groups (Olsen 2008). Scholars in this group see space as something defined in terms of a relationship rather than being ascribed as holy. In line with this, Høeg (2023, p. 132) argues that the meaning of space is created through “a set of relationships”, which offers the chance to investigate the social processes of the actors involved. This process leads to different groups contesting the meaning and use of religious spaces.

Viewing space not only as a sacred avenue where certain religious rituals or special events take place, but also as relational, provides an opportunity to examine the outcome of the contestation between different Ethiopian religious groups (the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC), Ethiopian Muslims and Protestants) and the government over the Meskel Square as space.

Scholars agree that space has much more abstract and nuanced meanings for religious groups and political actors than the mere occupation and preservation of physical territory (Knott 2005; Kong and Woods 2016). In this respect, space can reflect and (re)produce the intentions and power gains or losses of religious and secular groups in a given context (Knott 2005). According to Robert Hayden (2002), competition is a central factor that shapes the interaction of groups competing over religious spaces, and groups that emerge as dominant in the competition can express their influence or dominance over the other by controlling or destroying the sites. Power relations between different groups play an important role in shaping conflicts (Shmueli et al. 2014; Olsen and Guelke 2004). In their attempt to maintain and consolidate power over others, dominant groups define the meaning of places in ways that “justify and sustain their ideology” (Olsen and Guelke 2004, p. 503). New groups, on the other hand, seek to disrupt the dominant group’s established meaning of space. These processes can lead dominant groups to either “reaffirm or modify their position” (Olsen and Guelke 2004, p. 503). The process through which groups engage in contestation depends on their position in the socio-cultural and political context in which the space exists. In such a way, actors often use controversies over the space to promote a particular agenda or goal (Kong and Woods 2016). Here, the material and the ideological are co-constitutive (Jazeel and Brun 2009, p. 4). In this sense, space functions as a “medium, methodology and outcome” for actors in ongoing religious competition, violence and conflict (Knott 2005).

Kong and Woods (2016) identify three distinct and interrelated forms of claims arising from disputes or competition over religious spaces. The first is ownership claims, which happens when a religious place is redefined as a secular space by a secular group, such as the state, or by pressure from other religious groups. The second is authority claims, which occur when secular groups, usually the state, regulate religious activities in religious spaces. The third type of claim is the existence of competing claims for the same space by different religious groups (Kong and Woods 2016). Kong and Woods (2016) argue that the last case can lead to the most devastating conflicts.

This paper integrates both the indivisible sacred space perspective and the relational, social constructionist perspective to capture the nuances in the nature and implication of the Meskel Square controversy. The following sections present the findings, analysis and conclusions of the study.

6. Meskel Square in Photographs: Before, During and After Renovation

The following photographs, taken from Ethiopian media, show the state of the square before (Figure 1), during (Figure 2) and after (Figure 3) the renovation. The first picture (Figure 1) below shows the state of the space before the renovation project commenced.

The second picture (Figure 2) below is when the place was fenced off and suddenly dug up by the Chinese construction company, CCCC, without prior notice or discussion with the public. The news was first picked up by the Ethiopian Reporter newspaper, and it is from this publication that the photo was taken.

The third picture (Figure 3) was taken after the renovation project was over.

7. The Role of the Ethiopian Media in Covering the Meskel Square

Controversy

The way the media covered the controversy is an important aspect of the study. The state-owned daily newspaper Addis Zemen produced 12 articles that directly discussed Meskel Square between 28 September 2019 and 28 September 2022. Ten of the articles were produced after the start of the renovation project, while only two of the articles were published prior to the start of the project. The two articles published before the renovation project began focused on the history, name and meaning of Meskel Square and Meskel and its relationship with Ethiopia, Ethiopians and Ethiopianism, a concept that ties the nation Ethiopia with its people. After the renovation project and the controversy, this tendency was significantly minimized and only one article briefly dealt with the relationship between Ethiopians, nature and Meskel (Cross) (Dagim 2022). In recent years, reports have focused more on tourism (Dagim 2022), the “anti-peace” actors who want to use the square as a “cause to terrorise people” (Addis Zemen 2022), the importance of unity between different religious groups (Zelalem 2022), the successful completion of the project (Hailu 2021), and the meeting between the municipality and the EOTC Synod (Wubneh 2022). The newspaper also praised the government for renovating the square. One of its news articles reads as follows:

“The Addis Abeba City Council has understood the present and future importance of the Square. By rebuilding the square, it has created a space that can serve both present and future generations. It must be hailed as a great deed”.

(Hailu 2021)

Surprisingly, none of Addis Zemen’s articles dealt with the Meskel Square controversy. There was no information, no discussion, no comment and no investigation into the groups involved in the conflict, their respective positions or possible means of resolving these issues. It is as if the paper is trying to hide the obvious. Instead of addressing the tensions, controversies and conflicts caused by the renovation, use and ownership of Meskel Square, the paper has at times defended government officials who have been criticized for using their political power to side with certain religions. A case in point was when the mayor, Adanech Abiebie, was accused in social and commercial (private) media of siding with the Protestant groups after she attended a worship programme at Meskel Square and said on the same stage that “the square is for everyone because it was built with taxpayers’ money” (Tekuye 2022). Addis Zemen defended the mayor, quoting her as saying that “no one should use political responsibility to achieve religious goals” (Addisu 2022). This statement is a response to those who accuse her of taking sides and unfairly favouring her own religious group (Protestant). When government officials have been criticized, the paper has reported similar defences on their behalf.

With the exception of Addis Maleda, a weekly newspaper published every Saturday, the commercial media have refrained from clearly addressing the dispute. The Ethiopian Reporter newspaper, a biweekly publication, was the first to mention the start of the project in its issue published on 3 May 2020 (Henok 2020). The paper ran three articles on the issue—one when the project started (Henok 2020), one when the project ended and was inaugurated (Tesfaye 2021) and one when an agreement was reached between the EOTC and the municipality to resolve the controversy (Yonas 2022). However, the causes, nature and parties involved in the controversy were not discussed. Fortune newspaper, another weekly English paper, was the second to pick up on the stalemate with its headline “Public in dark as Meskel Square rehab commences” (Misikir 2020). However, the paper did not cover the rest of the controversy between the religious groups. Addis Admass, a weekly Amharic publication, only reported that the Church had asked the city administration for a certificate of ownership of the square (Alemayehu 2020). Addis Standard, a trilingual (English, Amharic and Afan Oromo) online and print media outlet, covered the issue of Muslims’ relationship to the square in an article on the subject (Bileh 2021). However, it did not go into detail about the controversy.

Addis Maleda newspaper, on the other hand, covered the issue in relatively greater detail. The newspaper published 10 articles covering the renovation project, the nature of the controversy, the parties involved and the positions of the various religious groups and the government, with the involvement of experts from different perspectives. Relatively, this newspaper covered the Meskel Square controversy in substantial depth.

In general, however, both the state and private media did not adequately cover the controversy. The Ethiopian media missed an opportunity to fulfil their responsibility to report on an important issue of immense significance to religious groups in Ethiopia. The state-owned daily publication Addis Zemen and the commercial weekly paper Addis Maleda gave a relatively better level of coverage than the rest of the Ethiopian media. While the state-owned Addis Zemen serves as the government’s agent, Addis Maleda tried to cover the issue from a different perspective, including a variety of voices, addressing the parties to the conflict and their intentions and going some way to assess whether each group’s claims were reasonable. It is the only newspaper that has invited experts from different religions and professions to provide some perspectives on the controversy. The rest of the mainstream media have either remained silent or recounted only the parts of the story that are seemingly uncontentious to all parties in the controversy.

This dearth of coverage has produced a vacuum in the mainstream media, forcing audiences keen to find out more and to stake their own claims to seek out alternative platforms. YouTube (Abayneh 2022; Binyam 2022) and Facebook were particularly prominent in this regard. Prominent religious leaders and politicians, including the mayor of Addis Ababa, used social media to present their perspectives. At times, the conventional media gleaned their information from social media posts (Bileh 2021; Selamawit 2021a). In conclusion, the role of Ethiopia’s secular mainstream media in the Meskel Square controversy was very limited. Social media, however, provided a platform for competing representations of the controversy, expanding the already growing polarization amongst religious groups.

8. The Meaning, Intentions and Importance of Meskel Square for Religions

The Meskel Square controversy, as observed in the media, can be characterized as articulating tensions between a particular religious group (the EOTC) on the one hand, and some Protestant and Muslim groups who, together with a state dominated by Protestants, support the idea of sharing the space for all religious groups and for secular functions on the other. As discussed in Section 2 above, the importance of religious spaces is mainly defined in two ways: inherent quality vs. relational quality. In the case of the Meskel Square controversy, both approaches have been used by different actors and religious groups. A prominent Ethiopian journalist, Solomon Shumye, who has recently become known for his YouTube political commentaries, argued in line with the inherent sacred quality of religious places (Shumye 2022). He argued that different religious groups should not use the same place for worship because “in a matter of religion, the sacred space of one is profane for the other”. According to him, the most important question behind the controversy is why followers of Islam and Protestantism suddenly want to use Meskel Square, when for so many years it has only been used by the EOTC to celebrate its religious rituals. He followed up this question by accusing the government of trying to pit different religious groups against each other for political gain.

Similarly, the EOTC claims that no other religious group should be allowed to worship at the site. For the EOTC, the site is claimed as its legal property, inherited from a nobleman named Ras Birru Wolde-Gebriel who died about a century ago (Wubneh 2022; Selamawit 2021a, 2021b). The Church supports its claim of ownership with reference to historical predicament (Hassner 2003), and claims that the site has been used to celebrate the finding of the True Cross for over half a century (Henok 2020). Addis Maleda newspaper, in its editorial, also emphasized that the EOTC is the legal owner of the Square (Addis Maleda 2021). The Ethiopian state media outlet, Adis Zemen, stated that the name comes from the location of the space in the city and its religious function: “In addition to the cross-like nature of the place, it is where the Meskel holiday is celebrated. For these reasons, it is called Meskel Square” (Addis Zemen 2019).

Interestingly, two feature articles in the state-owned newspaper Addis Zemen also addressed the inherent, transcendent meaning of the Meskel celebration in Meskel Square and its relationship to the concepts of Ethiopia, Ethiopian and Ethiopianism (Dagim 2022; Tsegereda 2019; Zelalem 2022). According to one of the articles, “Ethiopians do not celebrate Meskel alone; the plants, the animals, the land, the sky also celebrate with the people” (Dagim 2022). Dagim presented three pieces of evidence to support the claim that nature in Ethiopia celebrates Meskel with Ethiopians. The first is the attachment that Ethiopians have to their domestic animals. When Ethiopians name their cows or oxen, which are completely black but have white on their foreheads, they call them cruciform, he writes. The second example he gives is how people in the Tigray region refer to the spring flower (Adey Abeba), i.e., Gelgel Meskel (Meskel’s companion). This means that the flower exists to accompany the cross and that the flower appears during the Meskel season. The third is the theme of the endemic Ethiopian bird known as the Meskel bird (Ye Meskel Wof). This type of bird also appears in Meskerem (September), the first month of Ethiopia and the month in which Meskel is celebrated (Dibaba 2022).

In explaining the celebration of Meskel at Meskel Square and its relationship with Ethiopianism and Ethiopia, the senior researcher at the Addis Abeba City Administration Culture and Tourism Office for Intangible Cultural Resources—Mekbib Gebre-Mariam—argued that Meskel is seen as symbolizing and embodying the country, a religious holiday and something beyond what human beings can understand. It is argued that it is strongly associated with Ethiopia and Ethiopianism. Based on Mekbib, the author emphasizes that “Ethiopia and Ethiopianism cannot be researched; if they are researched, it is impossible to draw a consistent formula for them and reach their depth” (Tsegereda 2019). Messay (1999) calls this an “enigmatic presence”. Mekbib used a poem by the late prominent Ethiopian poet, Mengstu Lemma, to explain the interconnectedness and abstract nature of the meaning of the relationships between the religious ceremony, the land and the people of Ethiopia. The original poem (in Amharic) is presented below, followed by the researcher’s translation:

• የመስቀል ወፍና የአደይ አበባ፣
• ቀጠሮ እንዳላቸው መስከረም ሲጠባ፣
• ማን ያውቃል?
• The Cross bird and spring flower,
• Whether they appoint to meet in September,
• Who knows?

The poet asks a question that is difficult, but clear, to answer: who knows whether the arrival of the endemic bird (ye meskel wof or The Cross Bird) and the blooming of the spring flower every September (Meskerem), the first month of the year in Ethiopia, are scheduled by the two? The journalist argues, “as the great poet Mengstu Lemma said in his poem, Meskel is the only land and holiday where nature meets according to its scheduled appointment” (Tsegereda 2019). In conclusion, Mekbib is quoted as saying that “the act continues to happen by God’s will because it is a natural process” (Tsegereda 2019).

All of the above views can be incorporated into the inherent, sacred perspective of religious space. Muslims and Protestants, on the other hand, see Meskel Square from a different angle—from a relational perspective. For Muslims, it is a casual place like other places, but worshipping there is seen as an important marker of success. They offer several justifications for using Meskel Square for their religious purposes. The first is that the place has always been used for other secular functions, such as musical events, military parades, political events, demonstrations and farewells to celebrities after their deaths. Therefore, using the place for Islamic worship should be seen in the context of using the place for one of those services (Tekuye 2022). The second argument is that the government is constitutionally the owner of the land, and it is the government that must decide how it is used, not a particular religious group (Tekuye 2022). Some prominent Muslim figures also argued that the use of the land was a matter of equal treatment with other religions. Ahmedin Jebel, who is now an advisor to the chairman of the Ethiopian Supreme Islamic Affairs Council (Mejlis), demanded after being denied street iftar by the municipality that the authorities “stop treating Muslims as second citizens” (Selamawit 2021a). The denial of the space is thus interpreted as symbolic of second-class citizenship, the first being reserved seemingly for members of the EOTC, which had been the only group previously using the space for worship. A Muslim expert, Binu Ali, argued that the square was built with taxpayers’ money regardless of religion, and therefore its name should not imply affiliation with any religious group, and he preferred to use the previous name of the square in his interview with Addis Maleda, i.e., Revolution Square (Selamawit 2021a). Addis Maleda stated in the same article that there were some people who used the banner Id Square as an attempt to change the name of the square (Selamawit 2021a). Therefore, the meaning of the space for Muslims has more to do with dignity, equality and the claim to power, and it goes as far as changing the name of the space from one with an Orthodox Tewahedo-Christian connotation to an Islamic one.

Similarly, Protestants raise the issue of using the square for worship, although this was not the practice in the past. They give similar reasons for the secular functions of the square (Tekuye 2022). They claim that “similar to what others do in preparing different programmes, we can also use it for prayer and fundraising for the displaced” (Tekuye 2022). Accordingly, the Protestants call on their respective followers to meet in Meskel Square, saying, “We will meet on 9 January 2022 at 3 p.m. and we will have a great worship and thanksgiving” (Tekuye 2022). In addition, the Addis Maleda newspaper cites a remarkable example of a pastor calling on Protestants to gather from the surrounding area and “inherit” the square (Addis Maleda 2022). The pastor has indeed issued a call (Tsewa’e 2022) to Protestant worshippers, saying the following:

We must all come to Meskel Square, all of us. I will not explain to you what it means to inherit the square. Those of you who are in and around Addis Ababa will gather and meet at Meskel Square from 3 o’clock. We offer great worship and thanksgiving. It is the time of work where we manifest in one body.

Like the Muslims, the Protestants see Meskel Square as an ordinary place used for both secular and religious functions and argue that it cannot be claimed by the EOTC alone. Rather, these groups intend to use, if not control, the space, implying an intention to exercise power.

Similarly, for the Ethiopian government, the space can be defined, redefined or changed according to its interests and those of other religious groups. Firstly, the government made an agreement with the Chinese construction company, CCCC, to have the area fenced off, and the company suddenly started digging up the area without publishing the plans anywhere and without any input from public consultations or discussions (Misikir 2020). Secondly, when the Muslims asked to use the area for their Street Iftar event, the government allowed them to do so (Selamawit 2021a). When the EOTC complained that the government could not allow a place owned by the Church to be used by another religious group, the government denied the space to the Muslim organizing group. Muslims were furious and took to social media to criticize the government. The government immediately apologized and promised to fund the event after two days on the square. The EOTC complained again, but to no avail. The Muslim event went ahead. This anecdote shows that the government was not consistent in its position, and Addis Maleda reported the sequence of events (Selamawit 2021a). The same newspaper seriously criticized the government’s wavering position in its editorial (Addis Maleda 2021). Finally, the government made its position clear by saying that no one can say that the square is “ours” or “yours”, emphasizing that the square belongs to everyone (Selamawit 2021a). This shows that for the government also, Meskel Square is a space that must be shared and to which access must be negotiated, first with themselves and secondly according to the interests of the various religious groups.

In summary, while some journalists and the EOTC argued that the space should continue to function as a “holy” place used only by the Church, the government and the other two religious groups argued that the space should rather be redefined and used by all groups for religious and secular reasons. This illustrates the contestation over space between the dominant and new groups discussed by Olsen and Guelke (2004). While the previously dominant EOTC sought to justify and maintain the use of the space according to its previous function, the new groups (the government and the two religious groups) strove to disrupt the established meaning of the space, forcing the EOTC to “modify” its position.

This experience showcases that the space controversy is a symbolic conflict in which the newly powerful and growing groups (the Muslim groups and the Protestant groups, both supported by the government) seek to seize or use the space to demonstrate dominance or control over the old (Hayden 2002), i.e., the EOTC. The contesting groups did not raise the issue of territorial scarcity, but rather concentrated more on status and position in the country. The control and use of the space for worship is interpreted as a sign of equality with the EOTC, of being respected and feared and of being dominant and visible as citizens in the country, as noted by Muslim cleric Ahmedin Jebel, rather than focusing on finding a place for fulfilling worship.

9. How Do Power Relations Affect the Meaning of Space?

Since the 1970s, the EOTC has lost its former socio-political position, moving from being a state church to being one of many religious groups (Binns 2017). The EOTC has also suffered from epistemic and physical challenges ever since (Ademe 2021). Although the Church is still numerically strong (Diamant 2017), the other two religious groups have dominated socio-political dynamics and positions in recent years (Haustein 2013; Haustein 2022; Mohammed Jemal 2023). The Meskel Square controversy shows that the interests of the government and the other two religious groups have aligned, and they seem to agree on taking the space away from the EOTC and making it available to all. First, the government used its power to start construction (Misikir 2020). Second, the government did not keep its promise to the EOTC to resolve the issue through discussion. Instead, it used its power to allow first Muslims (Addis Maleda 2021) and then Protestants (Addis Maleda 2022) to use the space for worship. Speaking at the worship and thanksgiving service of the Protestant groups, the mayor of the capital city, Adanech Abiebie, proclaimed that the space belonged to everyone, regardless of religious orientation, because it had been renovated and rebuilt with taxpayers’ money (Addis Maleda 2022). As stated in Section 7 above, a similar analogy was made earlier by a Muslim expert interviewed by Addis Maleda (Selamawit 2021a). This shows that the changes in the recent politico-religious scenario, dominated and supported by the Protestant groups and to some extent by the Muslim groups, led to the EOTC being forced to share the space. The case also reveals that there are three types of claims identified by Kong and Woods (2016): ownership, authority and competition. First and foremost, the EOTC’s legal claim to ownership of the space is being disregarded by both the government and the two competing groups. The EOTC has lost the authority to allow or deny different groups the use of the space. This means that the case is also about claims to authority, as the church’s authority to make decisions about the space has been taken away. As different religious groups are fighting over the space, the case also involves competing claims between these groups. Some Protestant and Muslim groups demanded to share the place of worship with the EOTC as a symbol of equal recognition or of demonstrating and exercising power. On the other hand, the government denies the EOTC’s unilateral claim to ownership, authority (the right to decide what it is to be used for and by whom) and competing claims. The issue also involves “competing claims” involving all religious groups for different causes (Kong and Woods 2016). In sum, the case shows that the changes in the political dynamics of the country allowed the Muslim and Protestant groups to share a space with the EOTC, which was unlikely to happen without a shift in the power position that gave priority to some Muslim and Protestant groups with the help of the government.

One of the articles in the Addis Maleda newspaper extends the threat beyond Meskel Square, explaining that in recent years, Church properties have been confiscated by the government across the country for the purpose of building condominiums and markets and for other reasons, and it mentions a particular controversy in Hosaina, the administrative centre of the Hadiya zone in southern Ethiopia, where a long-standing Epiphany celebration site was confiscated (Addis Maleda 2022). In this way, the Meskel Square controversy has wider implications for the overall management of religious space in the country, and the EOTC appears to be at risk of losing similar properties elsewhere in the country.

10. Management of the Controversy

Several religious and governmental actors proposed different strategies for managing the use of the site. An emic perspective, which accepts the EOTC’s claim to the site as religiously sanctioned, advises that the square must be used independently by the EOTC. The perspective of Solomon Shumye, a journalist, suggests that Muslims and Protestants should find other places to meet and leave Meskel Square for the use of the EOTC. A similar claim of ownership was also made by a lawyer and historian named Alemaw Kiflie (PhD), who offered a simple analogy: “If you come and paint my house, and if you intend to live in the house afterwards, does that mean you own the house?”. He argued that the EOTC is the legal owner of the square, and no one else can take it or own it even after the “illegal” investment in the renovation. He also criticized the idea raised by some commentators, of claiming the use of the square because it was being used for secular purposes. He replied that it was up to the owner to decide what kind of activities they would allow, and that the government could not decide on the use of the space. This relates to what Kong and Woods (2016) identify as “authority claim”. Claiming sole ownership of the site and arguing that different religions should not worship in the same place, the EOTC also expressed reservations about sharing the site and conceding the authority claims. In line with this, an Orthodox youth group called on the Holy Synod of the EOTC to find an immediate solution so that the property of the Church is respected (Selamawit 2021b).

However, there are some voices in the EOTC that have reservations about this. The most prominent example is Megabe Haddis Eshetu Alemayehu—a well-known EOTC scholar and public speaker who has appeared on various stages. In a newspaper article, he is quoted as saying that this issue should be ignored because there are much more serious problems that the Church should prioritize, and he advises that a door should not be opened for those who want to use it from behind (Selamawit 2021a). By that, he means that the issue should be disregarded by the government and other religious groups as something that is trivial, as there are other more important agendas that they have to work on.

On the other hand, Muslims, Protestants and the government agree that the space must be shared because it is being renovated using everyone’s taxes, because the place is also used for other secular activities and because the land belongs to the government under the constitution (Selamawit 2021a, 2021b).

11. Concluding Remarks

This paper concludes that the controversy over Meskel Square reflects tensions created by contestation for the symbolic expression of power rather than a simple territorial expansion. By using the site for their religious rituals, the Muslim authorities want to show that they are on an equal footing with the EOTC, which claims sole ownership of the site by means of property rights, historically based justifications, and the sacred quality of the space. The Protestant authorities also claim to share the space with the EOTC and Islam. The government state that the square has been renovated and rebuilt with taxpayers’ money and belongs to everyone. Accordingly, it has claimed the right to decide the fate and use of the space. Considering the political pressure that has been exerted on the EOTC since the last century, this case shows that the Church is being forced to relinquish its dominant religio-political position by the two more growing and influential religious groups that seem to be working in line with the government. The implication of this is that religious spaces in other parts of the country that are owned by the EOTC seem to be under similar threat. The other important point is that the Ethiopian media shy away from religion and religious controversy, preferring to stay on the “safe” side of practicing journalism. This is very detrimental to journalism’s role of telling the truth to the public, and hence enabling full and informed discussions of matters of common concern in the public square. Interestingly, this tendency has led to the growth of alternative media that tend to deal with religion in a polarized way. The failure of the mainstream media to cover religious disputes seems to have allowed for the emergence of strong but polarized social media engagement. Unless media organizations become more serious about their responsibility to provide platforms for informed public discussion in which a range of voices are represented and respected, further social fragmentation and political polarization is likely to follow. The future of this trend will be interesting to follow.