Zero Trust VPN (ZT-VPN): A Systematic Literature Review and Cybersecurity Framework for Hybrid and Remote Work
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- This research paper gives an overview of contemporary technologies used across enterprises, including VPNs and ZTNA, proxy servers, Secure Shell (SSH) tunnels, the software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN), and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE), among others.
- This paper identifies critical concerns associated with traditional technologies, including latency, throughput, scalability, and cyber threats, and identifies the gap to overcome these challenges.
- This paper presents a novel Zero Trust VPN (ZT-VPN) framework that integrates Zero Trust Network Access with virtual private networks to create a robust cybersecurity framework for remote work environments, aiming to fortify modern enterprises’ cybersecurity and privacy.
- Finally, this paper demonstrates the effectiveness of the ZT-VPN framework through various enterprise scenarios, highlighting its ability to prevent data leaks, manage access permissions, and provide seamless security transitions, thereby fortifying cybersecurity frameworks against contemporary cyber threats.
2. Background—Related Work
2.1. Virtual Private Network (VPN)
2.2. Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)
2.3. Proxy Servers
- When a client requests a resource, the request is first sent to the proxy server. The proxy server then forwards the request to the target server on behalf of the client. Once the target server responds, the proxy server sends the response back to the client. This process adds a layer of separation between the client and the target server.
- Proxy servers can hide the client’s IP address by replacing it with their own. This helps protect the client’s identity and location, providing a layer of anonymity.
- Proxy servers can cache frequently requested resources. When a client requests a resource that is already cached, the proxy server can deliver it directly from its cache, reducing the time and bandwidth required to retrieve the resource from the target server.
2.4. Secure Shell (SH) Tunnels
2.5. Software-Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN)
2.6. Secure Access Service Edge (SASE)
- SASE integrates networking functions, like a software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN), with security services, including Secure Web Gateway (SWG), Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), Firewall as a Service (FWaaS), and Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA). This convergence allows for a more streamlined and efficient approach to managing and securing network traffic [67].
- SASE is built on a cloud-native architecture, meaning that both the networking and security functions are delivered as cloud services. This allows for greater scalability, flexibility, and ease of deployment compared to traditional on-premises solutions.
- SASE grants access based on the identity of users and devices rather than relying on the traditional perimeter-based security model. This ensures that only authenticated and authorized users can access specific applications and resources, enhancing security.
- SASE solutions are globally distributed, meaning that they have points of presence (PoPs) around the world. This ensures that users can securely access applications and resources with low latency, regardless of their geographic location.
3. Systematic Literature Review—Methodology
- Identification phase: The review began with the identification phase, where an initial search was conducted using the query “Zero Trust VPN” OR “ZTNA” OR “Zero Trust Network Access” to capture the literature related to Zero Trust and VPN concepts. Two major academic databases, Google Scholar and Web of Science, were used to gather a comprehensive set of articles. This search returned 1090 results from Google Scholar and 406 from Web of Science, resulting in a total of 1496 papers.
- Screening phase: In the screening phase, the initial set of papers was reviewed to remove irrelevant studies. The first screening involved filtering by title, abstract, and keywords. Articles that were duplicates, gray literature, out-of-scope publications, book chapters, and editorial letters were excluded, reducing the pool to 608 papers. This step alone excluded 888 papers. A second screening was conducted based on a detailed reading of titles and abstracts. Articles that lacked relevance, were metadata-only or were otherwise irrelevant to this study were excluded. After this step, 426 more articles were removed, leaving 182 papers for further assessment.
- Eligibility phase: The eligibility phase involved two levels of in-depth evaluation to further ensure the relevance and quality of the remaining studies. In the first eligibility check, both abstracts and main bodies of the papers were skim-read to exclude those that did not meet the criteria for Methodological Evaluation Score (MES) assessment. This step excluded 65 papers, narrowing down the selection to 117. The second eligibility check involved a closer reading of the main bodies of the remaining articles, with an emphasis on applying MES assessment criteria. This step led to the exclusion of an additional 31 articles, resulting in 86 studies that met all eligibility requirements.
- Inclusion phase: Finally, in the inclusion phase, the remaining 86 studies were included in the final MES analysis, representing the highest-quality and most relevant articles for this systematic literature review. These studies formed the basis for the in-depth analysis and synthesis presented in this paper.
Literature Review
4. Design and Architecture
- Certificate-based authentication: OpenVPN creates an encrypted connection between the client and server based on SSL/TLS. Certificates are employed to ensure that both the client and the server are genuine. The process is as follows:
- –
- The VPN server has an independent SSL/TLS certificate and private key.
- –
- Every client gives out a distinct SSL/TLS certificate and a private key.
- –
- During the SSL/TLS negotiation, when a client connects to the server, it has to send its certificate to the server.
- –
- The server checks the client’s certificate against the list of the trusted certificates the server possesses. If the client’s certificate is valid and recognized as trustworthy by the server, then the SSL/TLS negotiation is accomplished, and the connection is established.
- Username/password authentication: Apart from the certificate, the VPN can also use the names and secret codes for other recognition in addition to the use of certificates. This is particularly useful when multiple clients use the same certificate, for instance, in road warrior configurations. The process is as follows:
- –
- Every client has a username and a password created on the VPN server.
- –
- If the client attempts a connection, it presents a certificate as mentioned above, and then the server is asked for a username and password.
- –
- It then has to verify the username and the password of the client against the list of clients and the password with which it has been configured.
- –
- If the credentials match those of the authenticated client, the client will be logged in and connected to the VPN.
- Combining certificate and username/password authentication: Besides the certificates, OpenVPN also has options for the username and password in the second level of the authentication. This is especially useful when several clients have the same certificate (for example, for the road warriors). The process is as follows:
- –
- Users obtain an account on the VPN server, which has their unique username and password.
- –
- When a client attempts to connect, it sends its certificate, as mentioned above, and the VPN server then asks for a username and password.
- –
- The server compares the given username and password with the client list and the necessary password.
- –
- If the username and password are correct, the client is authorized, and phase 2 of the VPN connection is initiated.
- Combining certificate and username/password authentication: In practice, a VPN can be configured to require both certificate-based authentication and username/password authentication for enhanced security. This ensures that clients possess the correct certificate and valid credentials to connect to the VPN server. In this, the clients go through both certificate-based authentication and username/password authentication before being granted access to the VPN server.
Algorithm 1: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) |
Require: VPN client, VPN configuration file (.ovpn), credentials (username and password)
|
- The user has to input their credentials into the VPN client, and then it will validate with the server, and then traffic goes to the internet.
- Then the person can access the web application; if VPN credentials are not validated, then it will not permit access to the web application.
- Now, the user has to put their credentials in the web app; at this point, the user is validated with a password, and it also receives the OTP on its registered mobile number.
- In the next step, the user device OS, settings, and device health are monitored, and user logs are generated every time it performs any activity.
- There is also access management; the user is restricted to the privileges that are allowed by the admin.
Algorithm 2: ZTNA Policy Enforcement Point (ZPE) |
Require: resources, userRoles, accessPolicies, ztnaConfig
|
4.1. Review of Case Study Findings Derived from the Literature
4.2. Case—Implementing ZT-VPN in a Mid-Sized Financial Services Company
- Initial access control and identity verification: The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is configured to require both certificate-based authentication and multi-factor authentication (MFA) before granting access. Each employee is provided with unique certificates and login credentials, ensuring that only authorized users with verified identities can connect to the company’s network.
- Contextual security measures: The Identity Enforcement Point (IEP) checks not only user credentials but also device health, operating system settings, and geographic location for each access attempt. For example, if an employee tries to access the system from an unrecognized location, additional verification is required. This added layer helps prevent unauthorized access due to credential theft.
- Continuous monitoring and limited access control: Using the Security Enforcement Point (SEP), SecureBank restricts access to specific resources based on employee roles and limits session times. Access logs are continuously monitored, and alerts are generated for any unusual behavior, like attempts to access restricted data or repeated login failures.
- Enhanced security with reduced attack surface: ZT-VPN’s multi-layered authentication and context-based access verification greatly reduce the risk of unauthorized access, protecting sensitive financial data from both external and insider threats.
- Scalability and flexibility: The framework’s inherent scalability allows SecureBank to accommodate additional users or adjust access privileges dynamically. This flexibility is essential for the organization as it grows or adjusts to new regulatory requirements.
- Improved access control and monitoring: With continuous monitoring through SEP, SecureBank’s IT team has enhanced visibility of user behavior, enabling them to detect and respond quickly to potential threats. Additionally, role-based and time-bound access control ensures that employees can only access the data they need, reducing the risk of lateral movement within the network.
- Increased confidence in remote work security: The ZT-VPN framework instills confidence in SecureBank’s remote access protocols, as employees can securely access necessary resources without compromising data protection. This reliability supports the organization’s long-term goals of flexible, secure remote work.
5. Results and Evaluation
- Improved security: VPNs traditionally provide a secure tunnel for remote users to access corporate resources.
- Enhanced user experience: Integrating VPN and ZTNA allows organizations to strike a balance between security and user experience.
- Scalability and flexibility: VPNs are typically designed to accommodate a fixed number of concurrent connections, which can be a limitation for organizations with dynamic workforces or fluctuating access demands.
- Granular access control: This solution enables organizations to implement granular access controls based on user roles, device types, and other contextual factors.
- Centralized management and visibility: ZTNA solutions often provide centralized management consoles and comprehensive visibility of user access and activity.
Discussion and Limitations
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
BYOD | Bring your own device |
DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol |
DoS | Denial of Service |
HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
IAM | Identity and access management |
IEP | Identity Enforcement Point |
IP | Internet Protocol |
MFA | Multi-factor authentication |
PEP | Policy Enforcement Point |
PoP | Point of presence |
SASE | Secure Access Service Edge |
SD-WAN | Software-defined wide area network |
SSH | Secure Shell |
SEP | Security Enforcement Point |
SSL | Secure Sockets Layer |
TLS | Transport Layer Security |
VPN | Virtual private network |
ZT-VPN | Zero Trust VPN |
ZTNA | Zero Trust Network Access |
References
- Hodge, R. VPN Use Surges During the Coronavirus Lockdown, But So Do Security Risks; CNET: San Francisco, CA, USA, 2020; Volume 23. [Google Scholar]
- Singer, P.W.; Friedman, A. Cybersecurity: What Everyone Needs to Know; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2014. [Google Scholar]
- Deibert, R.J. Subversion Inc: The age of private espionage. J. Democr. 2022, 33, 28–44. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhang, Z.; Zhang, Y.Q.; Chu, X.; Li, B. An overview of virtual private network (VPN): IP VPN and optical VPN. Photonic Netw. Commun. 2004, 7, 213–225. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Baykara, M.; Gürel, Z.Z. Detection of phishing attacks. In Proceedings of the 2018 6th International Symposium on Digital Forensic and Security (ISDFS), Antalya, Turkey, 22–25 March 2018; pp. 1–5. [Google Scholar]
- Kaur, J.; Ramkumar, K. The recent trends in cyber security: A review. J. King Saud Univ. Comput. Inf. Sci. 2022, 34, 5766–5781. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ghelani, D. Cyber Security, Cyber Threats, Implications and Future Perspectives: A Review. Authorea Preprints 2022. Available online: https://www.techrxiv.org/doi/full/10.22541/au.166385207.73483369 (accessed on 30 September 2024).
- Alkhalil, Z.; Hewage, C.; Nawaf, L.; Khan, I. Phishing attacks: A recent comprehensive study and a new anatomy. Front. Comput. Sci. 2021, 3, 563060. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- O’Kane, P.; Sezer, S.; Carlin, D. Evolution of ransomware. IET Networks 2018, 7, 321–327. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- McIntosh, T.; Kayes, A.; Chen, Y.P.P.; Ng, A.; Watters, P. Ransomware mitigation in the modern era: A comprehensive review, research challenges, and future directions. Acm Comput. Surv. 2021, 54, 1–36. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Dutkowska-Zuk, A.; Hounsel, A.; Xiong, A.; Roberts, M.; Stewart, B.; Chetty, M.; Feamster, N. Understanding how and why university students use virtual private networks. arXiv 2020, arXiv:2002.11834. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Jegede, A.; Fadele, A.; Onoja, M.; Aimufua, G.; Mazadu, I.J. Trends and future directions in automated ransomware detection. J. Comput. Soc. Inform. 2022, 1, 17–41. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Khan, E.; Sperotto, A.; van der Ham, J.; van Rijswijk-Deij, R. Stranger VPNs: Investigating the Geo-Unblocking Capabilities of Commercial VPN Providers. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement, Virtual Event, 21–23 March 2023; pp. 46–68. [Google Scholar]
- Santhanamahalingam, S.; Alagarsamy, S.; Subramanian, K. A study of cloud-based VPN establishment using network function virtualization technique. In Proceedings of the 2022 3rd International Conference on Smart Electronics and Communication (ICOSEC), Trichy, India, 20–22 October 2022; pp. 627–631. [Google Scholar]
- Li, Y.; Liu, Q. A comprehensive review study of cyber-attacks and cyber security; Emerging trends and recent developments. Energy Rep. 2021, 7, 8176–8186. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhang, Z.; Al Hamadi, H.; Damiani, E.; Yeun, C.Y.; Taher, F. Explainable artificial intelligence applications in cyber security: State-of-the-art in research. IEEE Access 2022, 10, 93104–93139. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Furnell, S. The cybersecurity workforce and skills. Comput. Secur. 2021, 100, 102080. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Rajasekharaiah, K.; Dule, C.S.; Sudarshan, E. Cyber security challenges and its emerging trends on latest technologies. In IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering; IOP Publishing: Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2020; Volume 981, p. 022062. [Google Scholar]
- AL-Hawamleh, A.M. Predictions of cybersecurity experts on future cyber-attacks and related cybersecurity measures. Momentum 2023, 3, 15. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Shaukat, K.; Luo, S.; Varadharajan, V.; Hameed, I.A.; Xu, M. A survey on machine learning techniques for cyber security in the last decade. IEEE Access 2020, 8, 222310–222354. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Secure Remote Access Best Practices-Check Point Software—checkpoint.com. Available online: https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/network-security/what-is-vpn/covid-19-and-secure-remote-access-best-practices/ (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Fatima, M.; Abbas, H.; Yaqoob, T.; Shafqat, N.; Ahmad, Z.; Zeeshan, R.; Muhammad, Z.; Rana, T.; Mussiraliyeva, S. A survey on common criteria (CC) evaluating schemes for security assessment of IT products. PeerJ Comput. Sci. 2021, 7, e701. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Streun, F.; Wanner, J.; Perrig, A. Evaluating susceptibility of VPN implementations to DoS attacks using adversarial testing. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium 2022 (NDSS’22), San Diego, CA, USA, 24–28 April 2022. [Google Scholar]
- Zhou, Y.; Zhang, K. Dos vulnerability verification of ipsec vpn. In Proceedings of the 2020 IEEE International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Computer Applications (ICAICA), Dalian, China, 27–29 June 2020; pp. 698–702. [Google Scholar]
- Ginty, S. Discover the Anatomy of an External Cyberattack Surface with New RiskIQ Report|Microsoft Security Blog—microsoft.com. Available online: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/04/21/discover-the-anatomy-of-an-external-cyberattack-surface-with-new-riskiq-report/?msockid=355668c01f696b823ed97c6f1e6f6a0f (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Singh, K.K.V.; Gupta, H. A New Approach for the Security of VPN. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Information and Communication Technology for Competitive Strategies, Jaipur, India, 19–21 December 2016; pp. 1–5. [Google Scholar]
- Frahim, J.; Huang, Q. Ssl Remote Access Vpns (Network Security); Cisco Press: Indianapolis, IN, USA, 2008. [Google Scholar]
- Shut the Front Door: Analyzing VPN Vulnerability Exploits—mandiant.com. Available online: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/webinars/mandiant-intelligence-briefing-stories-directly-frontline (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Syed, N.F.; Shah, S.W.; Shaghaghi, A.; Anwar, A.; Baig, Z.; Doss, R. Zero trust architecture (zta): A comprehensive survey. IEEE Access 2022, 10, 57143–57179. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Arshad, J.; Talha, M.; Saleem, B.; Shah, Z.; Zaman, H.; Muhammad, Z. A Survey of Bug Bounty Programs in Strengthening Cybersecurity and Privacy in the Blockchain Industry. Blockchains 2024, 2, 195–216. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Nagmote, S.U.; Soni, P.D. An Overview of Network Security Model Using Cryptography, Firewall and Vpn for Social Organization with There Benifits. Int. J. Eng. Res. Technol. (IJERT) 2013, 2. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Adeyinka, O. Analysis of problems associated with IPSec VPN Technology. In Proceedings of the 2008 Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering, Niagara Falls, ON, Canada, 5–8 May 2008; pp. 001903–001908. [Google Scholar]
- Sombatruang, N.; Omiya, T.; Miyamoto, D.; Sasse, M.A.; Kadobayashi, Y.; Baddeley, M. Attributes affecting user decision to adopt a Virtual Private Network (VPN) app. In Proceedings of the Information and Communications Security: 22nd International Conference (ICICS 2020), Copenhagen, Denmark, 24–26 August 2020; pp. 223–242. [Google Scholar]
- Rothvoß, T.; Sanita, L. On the complexity of the asymmetric VPN problem. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization, Virtual, 16–18 August 2009; pp. 326–338. [Google Scholar]
- Dutkowska-Zuk, A.; Hounsel, A.; Morrill, A.; Xiong, A.; Chetty, M.; Feamster, N. How and why people use virtual private networks. In Proceedings of the 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22), Boston, MA, USA, 10–12 August 2022; pp. 3451–3465. [Google Scholar]
- Sawalmeh, H.; Malayshi, M.; Ahmad, S.; Awad, A. VPN remote access OSPF-based VPN security vulnerabilities and counter measurements. In Proceedings of the 2021 International Conference on Innovation and Intelligence for Informatics, Computing, and Technologies (3ICT), Virtual Conference, 29–30 September 2021; pp. 236–241. [Google Scholar]
- Cheung, K.H.; Mišić, J. On virtual private networks security design issues. Comput. Netw. 2002, 38, 165–179. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Bansode, R.; Girdhar, A. Common vulnerabilities exposed in VPN–A survey. J. Phys. Conf. Ser. 2021, 1714, 012045. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- With Everyone Working from Home, VPN Security is Now Paramount—zdnet.com. Available online: https://www.zdnet.com/article/covid-19-with-everyone-working-from-home-vpn-security-has-now-become-paramount/ (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Einler Larsson, L.; Qollakaj, K. Cybersecurity of Remote Work Migration: A Study on the VPN Security Landscape Post COVID-19 Outbreak. 2023. Available online: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1778036/FULLTEXT03.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2024).
- VPN Access and Activity Monitoring, Sans, 2020.-Bing—bing.com. Available online: https://www.bing.com/search?q=VPN+Access+and+Activity+Monitoring%2C"+Sans%2C+2020.&qs=n&form=QBRE&sp=-1&lq=1&pq=vpn+access+and+activity+monitoring%2C"+sans%2C+2020.&sc=1-48&sk=&cvid=167E379FC8C341CCB182FAC4A95D10D3&ghsh=0&ghacc=0&ghpl=. (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Ikram, M.; Vallina-Rodriguez, N.; Seneviratne, S.; Kaafar, M.A.; Paxson, V. An analysis of the privacy and security risks of android vpn permission-enabled apps. In Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference, Monica, CA, USA, 14–16 November 2016; pp. 349–364. [Google Scholar]
- Yoo, S.J. A Study on the Improvement of Security Enhancement for ZTNA. Converg. Secur. J. 2024, 24, 21–26. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Nazir, A.; Iqbal, Z.; Muhammad, Z. ZTA: A Novel Zero Trust Framework for Detection and Prevention of Malicious Android Applications. Preprints 2024. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Stafford, V. Zero trust architecture. NIST Spec. Publ. 2020, 800, 207. [Google Scholar]
- Developing a Framework to Improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. Available online: https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2017/06/01/040513_cgi.pdf (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- NIST. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. Available online: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2024).
- Malatji, M.; Marnewick, A.L.; Von Solms, S. Cybersecurity capabilities for critical infrastructure resilience. Inf. Comput. Secur. 2022, 30, 255–279. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zscaler’s 2022 VPN Report: As VPN Exploits Grow, 80 Percent of Organizations Shift Towards Zero Trust Security—zscaler.com. Available online: https://www.zscaler.com/press/ (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- A VPN Security Brief from AmZetta Technologies, LLC. Available online: https://amzetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AmZetta-Remote-AccessSecurity-Going-Beyond-VPN-Security-Brief.pdf (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Pavlicek, A.; Sudzina, F. Use of virtual private networks (VPN) and proxy servers: Impact of personality and demographics. In Proceedings of the 2018 Thirteenth International Conference on Digital Information Management (ICDIM), Berlin, Germany, 24–26 September 2018; pp. 108–111. [Google Scholar]
- Hurkens, C.A.; Keijsper, J.C.M.; Stougie, L. Virtual private network design: A proof of the tree routing conjecture on ring networks. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 2007, 21, 482–503. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Javed, M.S.; Sajjad, S.M.; Mehmood, D.; Mansoor, K.; Iqbal, Z.; Kazim, M.; Muhammad, Z. Analyzing Tor Browser Artifacts for Enhanced Web Forensics, Anonymity, Cybersecurity, and Privacy in Windows-Based Systems. Information 2024, 15, 495. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Talan, A. Zero Trust Network Access with Cybersecurity Challenges and Potential Solutions. Ph.D. Thesis, National College of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland, 2022. [Google Scholar]
- Campbell, M. Beyond zero trust: Trust is a vulnerability. Computer 2020, 53, 110–113. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Sood, A.K. Empirical Cloud Security: Practical Intelligence to Evaluate Risks and Attacks; Mercury Learning and Information: Duxbury, MA, USA, 2023. [Google Scholar]
- Kazim, M.; Pirim, H.; Shi, S.; Wu, D. Multilayer analysis of energy networks. Sustain. Energy Grids Netw. 2024, 39, 101407. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Jeffery, C.L.; Das, S.R.; Bernal, G.S. Proxy-sharing proxy servers. In Proceedings of the COM’96. First Annual Conference on Emerging Technologies and Applications in Communications, Portland, OR, USA, 7–10 May 1996; pp. 116–119. [Google Scholar]
- Saini, K. Squid Proxy Server 3.1: Beginner’s Guide; Packt Publishing Ltd.: Birmingham, UK, 2011. [Google Scholar]
- Shahid, J.Z.; Cimato, S.; Muhammad, Z. A Sharded Blockchain Architecture for Healthcare Data. In Proceedings of the 2024 IEEE 48th Annual Computers, Software, and Applications Conference (COMPSAC), Osaka, Japan, 2–4 July 2024; pp. 1794–1799. [Google Scholar]
- Xu, V. MAZE: A Secure Cloud Storage Service Using Moving Target Defense and Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) Tunneling. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 2020. [Google Scholar]
- Dusi, M.; Gringoli, F.; Salgarelli, L. A preliminary look at the privacy of SSH tunnels. In Proceedings of the 2008 Proceedings of 17th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, St. Thomas, VI, USA, 3–7 August 2008; pp. 1–7. [Google Scholar]
- Yang, Z.; Cui, Y.; Li, B.; Liu, Y.; Xu, Y. Software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN): Architecture, advances and opportunities. In Proceedings of the 2019 28th International Conference on Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN), Valencia, Spain, 29 July–1 August 2019; pp. 1–9. [Google Scholar]
- Yalda, K.G.; Hamad, D.J.; Ţăpuş, N. A survey on Software-defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN) architectures. In Proceedings of the 2022 International Congress on Human-Computer Interaction, Optimization and Robotic Applications (HORA), Ankara, Turkey, 9–11 June 2022; pp. 1–5. [Google Scholar]
- Iesar, H.; Iqbal, W.; Abbas, Y.; Umair, M.Y.; Wakeel, A.; Illahi, F.; Saleem, B.; Muhammad, Z. Revolutionizing Data Center Networks: Dynamic Load Balancing via Floodlight in SDN Environment. In Proceedings of the 2024 5th International Conference on Advancements in Computational Sciences (ICACS), Lahore, Pakistan, 19–20 February 2024; pp. 1–8. [Google Scholar]
- Islam, M.N.; Colomo-Palacios, R.; Chockalingam, S. Secure access service edge: A multivocal literature review. In Proceedings of the 2021 21st International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications (ICCSA), Cagliari, Italy, 13–16 September 2021; pp. 188–194. [Google Scholar]
- Yiliyaer, S.; Kim, Y. Secure access service edge: A zero trust based framework for accessing data securely. In Proceedings of the 2022 IEEE 12th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC), Virtual, 26–29 January 2022; pp. 0586–0591. [Google Scholar]
- Awale, V.; Gaikwad, S. Zero Trust Architecture Using Hyperledger Fabric. In Proceedings of the 2023 14th International Conference on Computing Communication and Networking Technologies (ICCCNT), Delhi, India, 6–8 July 2023; pp. 1–4. [Google Scholar]
- Abbas, H.; Emmanuel, N.; Amjad, M.F.; Yaqoob, T.; Atiquzzaman, M.; Iqbal, Z.; Shafqat, N.; Shahid, W.B.; Tanveer, A.; Ashfaq, U. Security assessment and evaluation of VPNs: A comprehensive survey. ACM Comput. Surv. 2023, 55, 1–47. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Security Issues with Virtual Private Network (VPN) and Proxy Services. Available online: https://www.academia.edu/51073706/Security_issues_with_Virtual_Private_Network_VPN_and_proxy_services (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Cybersecurity After COVID-19: 10 Ways to Protect Your Business and Refocus on Resilience. Available online: https://www.marshmclennan.com/assets/insights/publications/2020/june/cybersecurity_after_covid_19.pdf (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Fuchs, J. Vishing: New Threat to VPNs—avanan.com. Available online: https://www.avanan.com/blog/vishing-new-threat-vpn (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Odokuma, E.; Musa, M. Internet Threats and Mitigation Methods in Electronic Businesses Post COVID-19. Int. J. Comput. Appl. 2022, 184, 1–4. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Purchina, O.; Poluyan, A.; Fugarov, D. Securing an Information System via the SSL Protocol. Int. J. Saf. Secur. Eng. 2022, 12, 563–568. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- He, Y.; Huang, D.; Chen, L.; Ni, Y.; Ma, X. A survey on zero trust architecture: Challenges and future trends. Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comput. 2022, 2022, 6476274. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Pittman, J.M.; Alaee, S.; Crosby, C.; Honey, T.; Schaefer, G.M. Towards a model for zero trust data. Am. J. Sci. Eng. 2022, 3, 18–24. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Buck, C.; Olenberger, C.; Schweizer, A.; Völter, F.; Eymann, T. Never trust, always verify: A multivocal literature review on current knowledge and research gaps of zero-trust. Comput. Secur. 2021, 110, 102436. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ward, R.; Beyer, B. Beyondcorp: A new approach to enterprise security. Mag. USENIX SAGE 2014, 39, 6–11. [Google Scholar]
- Osborn, B. Beyondcorp: Design to deployment at google. Useni 2016, 41, 28. [Google Scholar]
- Zero Trust: What, Why and How. Available online: https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2023/04/07/zero-trust-the-what-why-and-how/ (accessed on 26 August 2024).
- Saleem, B.; Ahmed, M.; Zahra, M.; Hassan, F.; Iqbal, M.A.; Muhammad, Z. A survey of cybersecurity laws, regulations, and policies in technologically advanced nations: A case study of Pakistan to bridge the gap. Int. Cybersecur. Law Rev. 2024, 5, 533–561. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Vensmer, A.; Kiesel, S. Dynfire: Dynamic firewalling in heterogeneous environments. In Proceedings of the World Congress on Internet Security (WorldCIS-2012), Guelph, ON, Canada, 10–12 June 2012; pp. 57–58. [Google Scholar]
- Giannakou, A.; Rilling, L.; Pazat, J.L.; Morin, C. AL-SAFE: A secure self-adaptable application-level firewall for IaaS clouds. In Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), Luxembourg, 12–15 December 2016; pp. 383–390. [Google Scholar]
- Crichigno, J.; Bou-Harb, E.; Ghani, N. A comprehensive tutorial on science DMZ. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor. 2018, 21, 2041–2078. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- French, A.M.; Guo, C.; Shim, J.P. Current status, issues, and future of bring your own device (BYOD). Commun. Assoc. Inf. Syst. 2014, 35, 10. [Google Scholar]
Checklist | VPN | ZTNA |
---|---|---|
Security features | Creates an encrypted tunnel for data transfer between the user’s device and the company’s network. However, it may be vulnerable to attacks if misconfigured or if outdated encryption standards are used. | Provides customizable access control settings with a more granular security approach, including micro-segmentation and adaptive trust, which minimizes lateral movement within the network. |
Trust model | Trust is established once when the user connects to the network, after which they have access to all resources. | Employs a Zero Trust model, verifying identity and access permissions continuously, ensuring that only authorized users can access specific resources. |
Access security model | After authentication, users have broad access to the network, potentially increasing the risk if credentials are compromised. | Users can only access specific applications or data as defined by granular policies. Access is determined based on factors of, for instance, identity, device posture, and application sensitivity. |
Performance | Can introduce latency as all traffic is routed through a central server, creating a single point of congestion, especially under heavy load. Performance can degrade with increased distance from the server. | Traffic is routed directly to the application or service, reducing latency and avoiding bottlenecks. It also allows local breakout, which improves user experience. |
Authentication | Typically uses basic methods like username and password. Additional security layers like MFA (multi-factor authentication) are optional and may not be consistently enforced. | Enforces robust authentication methods, including MFA, device identity verification, and contextual factors like geolocation and time of access. |
Deployment complexity | Generally straightforward to deploy, especially for small- to medium-sized networks. It requires the configuration of VPN servers and client software on user devices. | Deployment can be complex, requiring integration with identity providers, defining granular policies, and ensuring compatibility with existing applications and network infrastructure. |
Scalability | Scalability can be challenging as VPN servers need to handle all traffic, which may require significant infrastructure investment as the user base grows. | Designed for scalability, as it does not route all traffic through a central point. Easily supports a growing user base and can integrate with cloud services seamlessly. |
Use cases | Suitable for remote access to internal resources, secure communication over public networks, and when centralized control over network traffic is needed. | Ideal for secure access to cloud applications, enforcing least-privilege principles and protecting against insider threats by restricting lateral movement. |
Technology | Security | Trust Model | Performance | Use Case | Scalability |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
VPN | Encrypted tunnel, risk of broad access | Trust established once | Latency due to centralized routing | Secure remote access to internal resources | Limited scalability due to server capacity |
ZTNA | Granular access, continuous verification | Zero Trust, continuous | Direct routing, low latency | Securing cloud and hybrid environments | Highly scalable, supports cloud integration |
Proxy servers | Basic anonymity, web filtering | Basic credentials, no internal security | May introduce latency | Content filtering, anonymity | Scales for web traffic, not for internal security |
SSH tunnels | Strong encryption, secure remote access | Single-session access | Minimal impact | Secure remote management, tunneling | Not scalable for large user bases |
SD-WAN | Integrated security options, optimized routing | Secure site-to-site | Dynamic routing, optimized traffic | Connecting branches, performance optimization | Scales for large networks, complex deployment |
SASE | Comprehensive security, Zero Trust | Zero Trust, granular | Optimized, low latency | Cloud-native, remote workforce security | Highly scalable, complex implementation |
Criteria | Google BeyondCorp [78,79] | NIST Zero Trust Architecture (SP 800-207) [45] | Forrester Zero Trust Model [80] |
---|---|---|---|
Primary focus | Device and user authentication | Continuous verification and micro-segmentation | Data-centric security and continuous monitoring |
Implementation complexity | High, complex outside of Google ecosystem | High, due to comprehensive guidelines | Moderate, adaptable, but requires significant changes |
Flexibility | Limited, tailored to Google infrastructure | High, vendor-neutral | Moderate, adaptable to various environments |
Device management | Centralized control, strong device verification | Device posture checks | Focus on endpoint security |
User authentication | Strong emphasis on SSO and MFA | Multi-factor authentication | Continuous identity verification |
Network access | No inherent trust, direct access to applications | Micro-segmentation, network isolation | Micro-segmentation, no trust within network |
Data protection | Focus on securing access to data through identity and device state | Policy-based data protection | Strong emphasis on data protection |
Monitoring and logging | Centralized monitoring, comprehensive logging | Continuous monitoring | Continuous monitoring and incident response |
Maturity | High, well established in large-scale environments | High, comprehensive, and widely accepted | High, influential in industry standards |
Support and documentation | Extensive support and documentation from Google | Detailed guidelines and government backing | Extensive industry literature and best practices |
Best suited for | Large enterprises, especially those using Google infrastructure | Government agencies, large enterprises | Enterprises prioritizing data security and adaptable solutions |
Author(s) | Key Findings from Previous Studies | A | B | C | D |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
He et al. [75] | Review of technologies supporting the Zero Trust framework. | Y | Y | Y | X |
Syed et al. [29] | Examines the impact of Zero Trust on access control and authentication mechanisms. | Y | Y | P | P |
Pittman et al. [76] | Analysis of Zero Trust as applied to data objects instead of access pathways. | Y | X | X | P |
Buck et al. [77] | Identification of industry and academic gaps and an overview of Zero Trust principles in various contexts. | Y | X | X | P |
Cherrueau et al. [69] | Highlights Zero Trust scaling challenges and provides secure configuration guidelines, emphasizing encryption and identity controls. | Y | X | Y | X |
S et al. [70] | Analyzes security and usability issues in VPN and ZTNA, with emphasis on the effects of poor configuration. | P | Y | X | Y |
Wang et al. [71] | Assesses performance aspects of ZTNA and VPN, focusing on latency, scalability, and protocol optimization. | Y | Y | Y | P |
Da Silva et al. [72] | Proposes Zero Trust for smart home environments, with behavior-based authentication; includes edge computing considerations. | Y | X | P | Y |
Hunt et al. [74] | Proposes a ZTNA VPN model that discusses enhanced visibility, with potential latency impacts for real-time applications. | Y | Y | P | Y |
Google [78,79] | Describes Google’s ZTN framework for secure access control; limited to Google’s infrastructure. | Y | X | Y | X |
NIST [45] | Vendor-neutral Zero Trust framework with continuous user/device verification and context-based policies. | Y | Y | Y | P |
Forrester model [80] | Focuses on data-centric security, continuous monitoring, and reducing lateral network movement. | Y | Y | X | P |
Vensmer et al. [82] | Explores Dynfire, a ZTN access control framework applied in academic settings, lacking risk management features. | Y | X | Y | P |
Giannoku et al. [83] | Proposes AL-SAFE, a ZTN model for cloud environments, missing policy language and risk management. | Y | P | Y | P |
This article | Evaluation of Zero Trust VPN (ZT-VPN) and ZTNA with vendor-supported adoption in open-source contexts. | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2024 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Zohaib, S.M.; Sajjad, S.M.; Iqbal, Z.; Yousaf, M.; Haseeb, M.; Muhammad, Z. Zero Trust VPN (ZT-VPN): A Systematic Literature Review and Cybersecurity Framework for Hybrid and Remote Work. Information 2024, 15, 734. https://doi.org/10.3390/info15110734
Zohaib SM, Sajjad SM, Iqbal Z, Yousaf M, Haseeb M, Muhammad Z. Zero Trust VPN (ZT-VPN): A Systematic Literature Review and Cybersecurity Framework for Hybrid and Remote Work. Information. 2024; 15(11):734. https://doi.org/10.3390/info15110734
Chicago/Turabian StyleZohaib, Syed Muhammad, Syed Muhammad Sajjad, Zafar Iqbal, Muhammad Yousaf, Muhammad Haseeb, and Zia Muhammad. 2024. "Zero Trust VPN (ZT-VPN): A Systematic Literature Review and Cybersecurity Framework for Hybrid and Remote Work" Information 15, no. 11: 734. https://doi.org/10.3390/info15110734
APA StyleZohaib, S. M., Sajjad, S. M., Iqbal, Z., Yousaf, M., Haseeb, M., & Muhammad, Z. (2024). Zero Trust VPN (ZT-VPN): A Systematic Literature Review and Cybersecurity Framework for Hybrid and Remote Work. Information, 15(11), 734. https://doi.org/10.3390/info15110734