Evolutionary Game-Based New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Strategies That Consider Carbon Reduction and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preferences
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Factors Affecting the Development of New Energy Vehicles
2.2. Research Model of the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain
3. Evolutionary Game Model of the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain
3.1. Problem Description
3.2. Symbols and Assumptions
3.3. Analysis of the Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Model
3.3.1. The Expected Returns of the Four Parties Involved in the Game
3.3.2. The Replication Dynamic Equation and Evolutionary Stability Strategy of the Four Parties
3.3.3. The Stability Analysis of Strategy Combinations
4. Numerical Case Study
4.1. The Impact of Benefits on the Government’s Strategy Choices
4.2. The Impact of on the Strategic Choices of Manufacturers and Governments
4.3. The Impact of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preferences on the Strategic Choices
4.4. The Impact of Tax Increase Coefficient on Manufacturers’ Strategy Choices
4.5. The Impact of Reducing Purchase Tax Amount on Consumers’ Strategy Choices
5. Conclusions
5.1. Main Conclusions
5.2. The Prospects for Upcoming Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Symbols | Meaning |
---|---|
Subsidies awarded to manufacturers for producing new energy vehicles | |
Subsidies provided to dealers for the sale of new energy vehicles | |
Subsidies provided to consumers for the acquisition of new energy vehicles | |
Benefits obtained from government subsidies | |
The cost of government environmental governance | |
Revenue from manufacturers producing new energy (traditional vehicles) | |
The cost of producing traditional cars | |
Taxation of new energy vehicles | |
Punishments for manufacturers (dealers) environmental pollution | |
Profit earned by dealers from selling new energy (traditional) vehicles | |
Marketing subsidies provided by manufacturers to distributors | |
The additional benefits brought by marketing new energy vehicles to dealers | |
The cost of dealer after-sales service | |
The price at which consumers purchase new energy (traditional) vehicles | |
The lifecycle value of new energy (traditional) vehicles | |
The coefficient of consumers’ preference for low-carbon options | |
Additional advantages brought by consumers’ low-carbon preferences | |
Additional benefits for manufacturers |
Manufacturers | Dealers | Government | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Provide Subsidy (x) | Not Provide Subsidy (1 − x) | ||||
Consumers | |||||
Purchase NEV | Purchase TV | Purchase NEV | Purchase TV | ||
Produce NTV () | Sell NEV () | ||||
Sell TV (1 − z) | |||||
0 | 0 | ||||
Produce TV (1 − y) | Sell NEV (z) | ||||
0 | 0 | ||||
0 | 0 | ||||
Sell TV (1 − z) | |||||
0 | 0 | ||||
0 | 0 |
Equilibrium Points | Eigenvalues | Positive and Negative Judgment | Stability | Condition |
---|---|---|---|---|
non | ||||
non | ||||
non | ||||
non | ||||
non | ||||
ESS | (E2) | |||
ESS | (E1) | |||
ESS | (E3) |
Equilibrium Points | Eigenvalues | Positive and Negative Judgment | Stability |
---|---|---|---|
non | |||
non | |||
non | |||
non | |||
non | |||
non | |||
non | |||
non |
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Xu, Y.; Han, L.; Li, X.; Zhu, W.; Ren, H. Evolutionary Game-Based New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Strategies That Consider Carbon Reduction and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preferences. Systems 2024, 12, 328. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090328
Xu Y, Han L, Li X, Zhu W, Ren H. Evolutionary Game-Based New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Strategies That Consider Carbon Reduction and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preferences. Systems. 2024; 12(9):328. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090328
Chicago/Turabian StyleXu, Yuanda, Lian Han, Xing Li, Wenxing Zhu, and Haiping Ren. 2024. "Evolutionary Game-Based New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Strategies That Consider Carbon Reduction and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preferences" Systems 12, no. 9: 328. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090328