Evaluating Corruption-Prone Public Procurement Stages for Blockchain Integration Using AHP Approach

Abstract

Corruption in public procurement remains a challenge to good governance, especially in developing nations. Blockchain technology has been espoused as a new paradigm for achieving sustainable public procurement practices for effective service delivery and, by extension, promoting sustainable development. Given the potential of blockchain technology, its implementation has been slow in developing countries. Additionally, there is an inadequate decision support framework to prioritize corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle for strategic blockchain integration at the most critical corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle given the scarce resources available in developing countries. Therefore, we employed a matured theory that is the principal-agent theory to identify key agency problems related to public procurement in developing countries. An interview with 25 experts and a thorough review of Ghana’s Auditor General produced seven public procurement cycle stages. Further, a survey was designed for experts and stakeholders to prioritize the identified procurement stages under the agency problems through the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Our results revealed that tender evaluation was the most critical stage susceptible to corruption, followed by contract management and procurement planning in the public procurement stages. Additionally, for the relative importance of the criteria, information asymmetry was ranked first, followed by moral hazard, and then adverse selection. This study offers a targeted framework for blockchain deployment in public procurement from an African country perspective. The outcome of this study provides insights for policymakers and procurement practitioners to know the most critical stages of public procurement stages and leverage blockchain technology given the scarcity of resources in developing countries to aid sustainable public procurement. The proposed blockchain framework can enhance service delivery, citizens’ trust, and international donor confidence in partnership and funding for public procurement projects in developing countries.

1. Introduction

Governments in both developed and developing countries govern by public laws to purchase goods and services [1]. Effective provision of goods and services promotes public trust, facilitates the achievement of good governance initiatives, and promotes sustainable economic growth. Public procurement accounts for about 12% of global GDP ($11 trillion annually) and 29.1% of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It is a critical avenue for the implementation of government budgets. For instance, in Ghana, public procurement accounts for GDP of about 14%, 50–60% of national budgets, and 24% of imports [2,3].

Notwithstanding the relevance of public procurement in national development, there is a dark side in the form of corruption. Public procurement has been seen over the years as a controversial sector needing urgent attention due to the behavior of the procurement managers in managing public finances [4,5]. These controversies include corruption, rent-seeking between procurement officers and the business community, poor implementation of donor funds, delays, and others. Public procurement remains highly vulnerable to corruption, with estimates suggesting that 10–20% of procurement spending is lost to corrupt practices [6]. The literature asserts that corruption has cost Africa about USD 148 billion a year, according to an AU press release in 2002 on 19 September in Addis Ababa. In sub-Saharan countries, the outlook of corruption through public procurement is estimated to be between USD 390 and USD 400 per year, and about 70% are based on public procurement [7]. In Ghana, the Ghana Auditor General Report of 2015 to 2020 shows that about GHS 13.9 billion was misappropriated by the ministries, metropolitans, departments, and agencies [8,9]. In such situations, corruption and fraudulent dealings can increase project costs by approximately 20–30%. Corrupt practices impede government efficiency, result in higher fiscal deficits, slower economic growth, substandard infrastructure, and inflated project costs. Addressing corruption in public procurement is, therefore, both an ethical and economic necessity. Corruption in public procurement poses a significant challenge, particularly in developing countries.

The implementation of blockchain technology presents an ideal solution to bring seamless communication, restore trust in the public procurement sector, and achieve the desired value [10].Blockchain technology has emerged as a transformative tool to enhance transparency, accountability, and trust in various sectors, including public procurement [11,12]. Also, ref. [13] analyzed blockchain’s role in reducing bid-rigging risks in Estonia’s public procurement system and found out that blockchain technology mitigates corruption. Additionally, ref. [14] quantified efficiency gains from blockchain integration in Bosnian infrastructure projects, demonstrating the technology’s cross-contextual applicability. In sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya’s National Blockchain Strategy [15] includes pilot programs to digitize procurement workflows and enhance transparency. These findings align with Ghana’s documented vulnerabilities in procurement planning and tender evaluation, as reported by the Auditor-General [16].

Considering the benefits of blockchain technology in eliminating the woes in the public procurement sector, some studies in different contexts have highlighted blockchain’s potential to create tamper-proof records, secure transactions, and minimize human discretion through smart contracts [17,18]. Others have shown how blockchain-based systems such as Spain’s Aragon model and South Korea’s Bid Rigging Indicator Analysis System (BRIAS) have been implemented to improve transparency and detect irregularities in public procurement [19,20]. Additionally, blockchain integration in public procurement concentrates on adoption, reducing corruption, and implementation challenges in developed countries [21,22].

In a study by [23], they propose a blockchain-based caching strategy for mobile edge computing, focusing on decentralized architectures for optimizing efficiency. While their study does not directly address public procurement, it highlights the advantages of decentralized frameworks in improving operational efficiency and security. This reinforces the viability of blockchain’s decentralized structure, which our research utilizes to enhance procurement transparency and accountability.

A study by [24] present a blockchain-based e-procurement system that integrates digital identities to reduce corruption in smart cities. Their approach closely aligns with our research focus on blockchain for public procurement.

However, while their study emphasizes identity verification and broad-level corruption prevention, our work prioritizes the corruption-prone stages of procurement before blockchain deployment, ensuring that blockchain interventions specifically target high-risk areas. This distinction underscores the strategic advantage of our approach, which applies AHP and principal-agent theory to systematically identify critical corruption vulnerabilities before incorporating blockchain solutions.

The integration of blockchain technology into public procurement systems to prevent corruption, waste, and delays has been concentrated in developed countries, leaving significant knowledge gaps regarding blockchain’s integration into public procurement in developing countries like Ghana. Ghana’s unique context, characterized by its advanced legal framework for e-procurement (e.g., the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) and the Ghana Electronic Procurement System (GHANEPS)), coupled with its high corruption risks in public spending, positions it as a critical case study for blockchain adoption in West Africa. Unlike neighboring countries such as Nigeria, where e-procurement implementation remains fragmented and inconsistently adopted, Ghana’s GHANEPS provides a centralized, institutionalized platform for blockchain integration [18,25]. Furthermore, Ghana’s Auditor-General reports consistently highlight systemic vulnerabilities in procurement planning and tender evaluation, creating a pressing need for blockchain’s transparency and immutability [9,16]. These factors, combined with Ghana’s role as a regional leader in governance innovation, make it a distinct candidate for exploring blockchain’s potential in addressing procurement corruption in resource-constrained environments.

The extant literature shows that blockchain technology implementation has been researched in developed countries, presenting a deeper opportunity for study using unique conditions in developing countries [26,27]. Empirical studies on the interplay between prioritizing corruption-prone areas of the public procurement cycle and blockchain technology strategic integration involve several relationships that are yet to be studied in developing countries [17]. Specifically, there is a lack of clarity in the theoretical decision-support framework regarding the phenomenon under study.

Methodologically, corruption in public procurement involves complex decision-making, which makes it difficult for stakeholders to find the relative importance of agency problems in public procurement and prioritize corruption-prone stages using statistical approaches. Following the recommendation of [28], an MCDM approach was therefore designed to analyze the experts’ opinions on the subject matter. Additionally, identifying corruption-prone stages in public procurement towards blockchain integration in the public procurement sector can provide insight and simplify blockchain implementation decisions in emerging economies. Consequently, following the above discussions, the study aims to address the following research questions.

(1)

What are the key agency problems and public procurement cycle stages?

(2)

How can the corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle be prioritized under the agency problems to integrate blockchain technology for effective corruption mitigation?

(3)

How can a blockchain integration model be designed to address the prioritized stages, aligning with agency problems and Ghana’s operational context?”

Subsequently, the study contributes to the literature by providing new insights into corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle from a developing country perspective to offer more tailored solutions to public procurement. Secondly, this study explores blockchain’s application in Ghana’s public procurement system, focusing on corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle. Additionally, we extend the principal-agent theory (PAT), which is often applied in market research, specifically game theory, to identify agency problems related to public procurement in developing countries. PAT was particularly relevant in providing a framework to determine the most critical agency problems and how blockchain technology can be integrated into the most crucial procurement stage to promote good governance. The findings will offer practical insights for policymakers, helping them adopt blockchain technology in a targeted manner, leading to transparency, accountability, and fiscal efficiency in developing countries.

2. Literature Review

The literature review section encompasses the theoretical underpinning, procurement in the public sector, stages of the public procurement in Ghana, potential integration of blockchain technology to solve corruption, blockchain technology, good governance in emerging developing economies, and application of the MCDM technique to agency problems and blockchain integration in the public procurement system.

2.1. Theoretical Background

2.1.1. Principal-Agent Theory

PAT originates from economics and organizational behavior, addressing the dynamics between a principal (e.g., government) and an agent (e.g., procurement officer or contractor) tasked with acting on behalf of the principal. This delegation often results in agency problems, including information asymmetry (IA), moral hazard (MH), adverse selection (AS), goal conflict (GC), and monitoring difficulty (MD) [29,30]. These problems are particularly relevant in Ghana’s public procurement system, where weak monitoring and systemic inefficiencies amplify corruption risks. The IA occurs when agents have more information than principals, leading to inefficiencies and corrupt practices [31]. In public procurement, IA can manifest at multiple stages, from procurement planning to project closeout. In Ghana, IA is a major driver of corruption, particularly during the tender evaluation phase, where officials may withhold critical information to manipulate outcomes [32,33]. Addressing IA is essential for enhancing transparency and accountability. Blockchain technology, with its ability to provide immutable and transparent records, offers a potential solution to mitigate IA and its associated risks. Also, MH arises when agents engage in opportunistic behavior without being fully accountable for the risks involved. This problem is prevalent during tendering and post-award phases, where agents might accept bribes or manipulate contracts for personal gain [34]. Studies on Ghana’s public–private partnerships (PPP) reveal that MH significantly impacts project quality, as contractors often renegotiate terms to their advantage [35]. Furthermore, the AS occurs when principals select suboptimal agents due to incomplete or misleading information [36]. In Ghana, inadequate assessment of bidders’ qualifications during the pre-tendering phase often leads to procurement inefficiencies and cost overruns [37]. Blockchain can address AS by improving information flow and ensuring verifiable data are accessible throughout the procurement process [18,38]. Similarly, the GC arises when agents prioritize personal gain over the principal’s objectives, such as transparency and value for money [31]. In Ghana’s e-government procurement system, GC is particularly pronounced during the pre-tendering and tendering phases, where procurement officials may manipulate needs assessments and specifications to favor certain suppliers [39]. Addressing GC through AHP allows for identifying stages where misaligned interests are most problematic, paving the way for blockchain solutions tailored to these vulnerabilities. Finally, effective monitoring is crucial for ensuring compliance with procurement regulations and preventing corruption. However, MD remains a persistent challenge in Ghana’s complex procurement systems, particularly during contract management and post-award phases [40]. Blockchain’s transparent and immutable records can reduce MD by providing real-time visibility into procurement activities, ensuring that agents’ actions align with contractual obligations [41].

The adoption of principal-agent theory (PAT) is particularly relevant in Ghana’s public procurement context, where corruption risks are fueled by weak oversight, information asymmetry (IA), and moral hazard (MH). PAT provides a structured framework for identifying corruption-prone stages within the procurement cycle and integrating blockchain technology to mitigate these risks. While critics, such as [42], argue that PAT oversimplifies agent behavior and neglects systemic factors like institutional culture, its emphasis on individual relationships and incentive structures is especially applicable in environments characterized by discretionary power and limited transparency, such as Ghana’s procurement system.

2.1.2. Institutional Theory

Institutional theory provides a critical framework for understanding how formal and informal institutions shape Ghana’s public procurement system, offering a structural lens to explain persistent corruption despite legislative reforms. Rooted in the foundational works of [43,44] institutional theory posits that organizations adopt practices to align with societal norms, seeking legitimacy rather than efficiency. Refs. [45,46] extended this by distinguishing between formal institutions, codified rules like Ghana’s Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended with (Act 914), and informal institutions, such as cultural practices like clientelism and gift-giving. In Ghana, the tension between these institutions creates systemic vulnerabilities, enabling agency problems like information asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection to thrive.

Ghana’s Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663), as amended with Act 914, exemplifies formal institutional weaknesses. While the Act mandates competitive bidding and transparency, scholars highlight enforcement gaps that undermine its effectiveness. Ref. [39] attribute these weaknesses to underfunded oversight agencies and bureaucratic inefficiencies, which exacerbate monitoring difficulty. For instance, procurement officers often exploit discretionary power during tender evaluation, as the Act lacks robust mechanisms to hold them accountable [47]. Ref. [48] further critique the absence of supplier relationship management (SRM) frameworks, arguing that this omission fosters adverse selection by allowing unqualified contractors to manipulate procurement planning. These structural flaws intersect with informal norms, such as favoritism rooted in kinship ties, which distort competitive processes [49].

Informal institutions, deeply embedded in Ghana’s socio-cultural fabric, often override formal rules. Ref. [50] document how reciprocal gift exchanges, traditionally symbolic of goodwill, blur into bribery when influencing contract awards. Ref. [9] attributes this to a “parallel normative order” where loyalty to informal networks supersedes legal obligations. However, proponents of cultural relativism, like [37], argue that practices such as gift-giving reflect communal trust-building rather than corruption. Ref. [46] emphasizes the need for context-sensitive anti-corruption strategies that respect cultural traditions while addressing exploitative practices.

Blockchain technology emerges as a transformative institutional innovation, addressing both formal and informal challenges. As a regulative pillar [46], blockchain automates compliance through decentralized ledgers and smart contracts. Ref. [19] demonstrate blockchain’s potential to streamline tender evaluation by creating tamper-proof records of bid submissions, as seen in South Korea’s Bid Rigging Indicator Analysis System (BRIAS). Similarly, ref. [51] highlight how smart contracts enforce predefined rules in contract management, reducing human discretion and moral hazard. Ghana’s existing e-procurement system (GHANEPS) provides a viable foundation for such integration. GHANEPS’s modular API architecture allows phased blockchain adoption, such as using permissioned blockchains like Hyperledger Fabric with Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus to secure bid records while minimizing energy costs [52].

Concurrently, blockchain acts as a normative pillar, reshaping cultural expectations. Refs. [53,54] argue that blockchain’s transparency fosters trust among citizens and auditors by enabling real-time auditing. For instance, blockchain’s immutable audit trails could deter favoritism during tender evaluation, aligning procurement practices with principles of fairness. However, critics caution against over-optimism. Ref. [54] highlights low digital literacy and resistance from entrenched interests as barriers, while [13] warn that energy-intensive consensus mechanisms like Proof of Work (PoW) may strain Ghana’s infrastructure.

Ghana’s blockchain adoption can also be contextualized through ref. [43]’s concept of institutional isomorphism. Mimetic isomorphism may drive Ghana to emulate successful models like BRIAS, while coercive isomorphism could stem from international donors mandating digital transparency (IMF, 2023) [43]. Yet, ref. [55] critiques Africa’s reliance on Global North frameworks, urging solutions that reflect local realities.

In summary, institutional theory reveals that Ghana’s procurement corruption stems from systemic flaws, not merely individual misconduct. Blockchain bridges formal and informal institutional gaps, automating compliance in critical stages like tender evaluation while fostering norms of accountability. Success hinges on aligning technology with Ghana’s institutional realities, phasing adoption, and collaborating with stakeholders.

2.2. Procurement in the Public Sector

Public sector procurement, or government procurement, refers to the process through which government entities and public organizations acquire goods, services, and works needed to fulfill their functions and serve the public [56]. Public procurement is similar to that of the private sector [57], where they are governed by specific laws, regulations, and frameworks to ensure transparency, efficiency, accountability, and value for money. Public procurement objective, according to [57,58,59], refers to the purchase of the right quality of materials, at the right time, in the right quantity, from the right sources, at the right price.

Public procurement operates under specific guidelines and varies among countries, and each country must adhere to the given guidelines stipulated by public authorities [60]. The traditional public procurement systems are coupled with rigid structures that often lead to bureaucracies and delay the process of procurement. That is, it takes a lot of time to develop bid specifications, including extensive time for authorization [59]. The public purchase laws stipulate that, for a given contract to be awarded, it has to be given to the lowest bidder who meets the requirements of the bid [57]. Chosen suppliers vary; in the US, the supplier with the lowest responsible and responsive bid is awarded [57], while in the UK, the value of money is considered in choosing a supplier [61]. In some European states, procurement guidelines consider the most economically advantageous tender or the supplier with the lowest price [60].

2.3. Procurement in Ghana’s Public Sector

In Ghana, the public procurement process is governed by the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), along with subsequent amendments. These legislative frameworks aim to ensure transparency, fairness, and efficiency in public procurement, safeguarding public resources while fostering accountability and competition. The Ghana Electronic Procurement System (GHANEPS) has emerged as a pivotal tool for digitizing these processes, offering a more secure, transparent, and interactive platform for procurement activities [41].

There is no consensus on procurement cycle stages in the public procurement literature. Different authors, such as [62], have classified the public procurement cycle differently. Hence, to arrive at the appropriate public procurement cycle to use for the study, interviews with 25 purposively selected experts were conducted to determine experts’ opinions to arrive at the seven identified public procurement cycle stages in

Table 1. Public procurement cycle.

Procurement Cycle Stages	Explanation	Source
Procurement planning	This stage serves as the foundation of the process, where procurement needs are identified, specifications are determined, and comprehensive procurement plans are developed. It ensures that the procurement activities align with organizational goals and budgetary constraints.	[64,65,66]
Sourcing	This stage ensures a competitive and fair process to maximize value for money.	[67,68]
Tendering	This stage involves issuing tender documents and inviting bids from potential suppliers. However, this stage is prone to challenges, such as the principal-agent problem, where procurement officers may exploit their discretion and privileged information for personal gain.	[6,69]
Tender Evaluation	This stage is critical but often vulnerable to corruption due to a lack of transparency, as noted in Ghana’s Auditor General’s reports. This stage involves assessing bids to select the most suitable supplier and requires stringent oversight to mitigate risks of malpractice.	[39]
Contracting	This stage involves negotiating terms, drafting agreements, and formalizing the contract between the procurement entity and the supplier. Effective contracting ensures clear responsibilities and expectations.	[70]
Contract management	It encompasses the monitoring of contract execution to ensure compliance with agreed terms. This phase is crucial for safeguarding the procurement’s value and outcomes.	[71,72]
Finalization and Closeout	This stage concludes the procurement process. It involves inspecting and verifying deliverables to ensure every contract’s terms have been satisfactorily fulfilled. This stage confirms the successful completion of the procurement cycle and lays the groundwork for future procurements.	[71,72]

, which include the procurement planning, sourcing, tendering, tender evaluation, contracting, contract management, and finalization and closeout from the Ghanaian public procurement context. The expert also identified and categorized the 5 agency problems related to the public procurement sector, which aligns with previous studies [32,35,37,63].

2.4. The Potential of Blockchain Technology for Corruption Mitigation in the Public Procurement System

Public procurement plays a critical role in the effective delivery of government projects, accounting for significant portions of national budgets. However, the delegation of authority to procurement officials or contractors creates opportunities for corruption and inefficiencies.

There is a growing interest among researchers and industry practitioners in blockchain technology. It refers to a group of systematic blocks where transactions executed have a series of time-stamps and the data of these transactions can be accessible and distributed [73,74]. The blocks are added to create a chain to which all participants can access it. Blockchain has four main constituents: distributed ledgers, smart contracts, cryptography, and agreement protocols. Transactions can be conducted without a centralized authority. Its immutable and distributed database nature allows records to be organized in blocks using cryptography and different types of consensus mechanisms [75]. Blockchain is an open-source technology that is self-regulating [76].

Blockchain technology has emerged as a transformative solution for addressing corruption and inefficiencies in public procurement due to its key attributes: decentralization, immutability, transparency, and security. Integrating blockchain into public procurement holds significant potential to enhance accountability and reduce corruption by leveraging these characteristics. Blockchain’s decentralized nature eliminates reliance on a central authority to manage and verify procurement transactions. Instead, a distributed network of nodes validates transactions through consensus mechanisms such as Proof of Work (PoW) or Proof of Stake (PoS) [20]. This decentralization ensures no single entity can control the process, thereby enhancing the integrity of public procurement. Blockchain ensures that recorded transactions cannot be altered post-facto. This is particularly valuable in public procurement, where it secures procurement records against manipulation, preserving their integrity [77]. However, controlled updates, as allowed by permissioned blockchains, can address limitations in correcting errors or fraudulent entries. The transparent nature of blockchain enables real-time auditing of procurement transactions, reducing opportunities for corruption [18]. Innovations like zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) balance transparency with the need for confidentiality, ensuring sensitive data, such as bid anonymity, remains protected [78]. Blockchain’s decentralized and encrypted data storage safeguards against hacking and unauthorized access. Permissioned blockchains further enhance security by restricting access to trusted participants, making them particularly suitable for public procurement in Ghana [79].

Given the regulatory requirements and confidentiality concerns in Ghana’s public procurement system, this study adopts a permissioned blockchain model to ensure both transparency and data privacy. Unlike public blockchains, which provide unrestricted access to transaction data, permissioned blockchains allow only authorized stakeholders, such as procurement regulators, auditors, and approved suppliers, to validate and monitor transactions. This approach aligns with Ghana’s Public Procurement Act, which mandates controlled information disclosure at different procurement stages. Additionally, role-based access control (RBAC) and cryptographic techniques like zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) can be integrated to safeguard sensitive procurement details while maintaining the integrity and immutability of the records. This balance between security, transparency, and regulatory compliance makes permissioned blockchain a strategic choice for mitigating corruption and improving efficiency in Ghana’s e-procurement framework.

Smart contracts automate procurement transactions based on pre-determined conditions, eliminating the need for intermediaries and reducing human manipulation [80]. This automation enhances transparency and efficiency in processes such as tendering and payment disbursement [81]. However, challenges such as legal enforceability and rigidity in complex contracts are addressed by hybrid smart contracts, which combine on-chain transparency with off-chain flexibility [19]. Ghana’s public procurement system requires a scalable, energy-efficient blockchain mechanism to handle high transaction volumes. While Proof of Work (PoW) ensures robust security, its resource-intensive nature makes it unsuitable for large-scale applications like public procurement [20]. PoS, in contrast, offers a more sustainable alternative by requiring significantly less computational power. By utilizing validators who stake assets to secure the network, PoS achieves consensus efficiently, making it an ideal choice for blockchain integration in Ghana’s procurement system.

In addition, permissioned blockchains like Hyperledger Fabric and R3 Corda, which utilize Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols, provide a tailored solution for public procurement. These protocols ensure security and efficiency without the computational cost associated with PoW [13]. They also enhance transaction speed and control, key requirements for government procurement systems [82]. Ghana’s public procurement cycle comprises stages vulnerable to corruption, such as tendering, contract management, and closeout. Blockchain integration can mitigate these vulnerabilities by ensuring secure, immutable records and transparent workflows. For example, at the tendering phase, blockchain can provide tamper-proof records of bid submissions and evaluations, reducing favoritism and manipulation. Also, at the contract management stage, smart contracts can automate milestones and payments, minimizing human intervention and associated risks of corruption. Additionally, the closeout phase. Documentation related to project completion, including inspection reports and compliance checks, can be securely recorded on the blockchain, ensuring accountability.

2.5. Blockchain Technology and Good Governance in Developing Economies

Emerging developing economies face persistent governance challenges, including inefficiency, corruption, and lack of transparency in public administration [6]. Public procurement systems, which account for significant portions of national budgets, are particularly vulnerable to corruption and inefficiencies, exacerbating developmental issues. Blockchain technology offers transformative potential to improve governance by enhancing transparency, accountability, and operational efficiency in public procurement processes [17,18]. For example, smart contracts can automate procurement workflows, reducing delays and errors, while blockchain’s distributed ledger simplifies auditing through real-time, verifiable records, helping to streamline oversight efforts. Blockchain’s decentralized architecture minimizes control by a single entity, reducing the potential for manipulation. Its immutability safeguards procurement data integrity, while real-time transparency addresses information asymmetry, a key driver of corruption in developing economies [80]. Moreover, self-executing smart contracts further reduce human discretion and misconduct by automating complex workflows [83].

Notable case studies highlight blockchain’s potential to address governance challenges. For example, South Korea’s Bid Rigging Indicator Analysis System (BRIAS) leverages blockchain to detect procurement fraud, while pilot projects in Brazil and India have enhanced transparency and accountability in public administration [20,84]. However, many blockchain applications remain concentrated in developed countries, leaving a gap in adapting these technologies to the specific challenges of emerging economies.

In Ghana, public procurement faces systemic inefficiencies, weak regulatory oversight, and corruption. The Auditor-General’s reports frequently highlight bid rigging, opaque tender evaluations, and contract mismanagement, underscoring the need for innovative solutions [8,16]. Blockchain’s features, such as tamper-proof records and automated scoring through smart contracts, are well-suited to address these challenges, ensuring compliance with standards and reducing discretionary biases [85]. Blockchain integration into Ghana’s Electronic Procurement System (GHANEPS) provides a scalable pathway for adoption. By embedding blockchain, the government can ensure comprehensive, tamper-proof documentation of procurement activities, fostering trust among stakeholders, including international donors and civil society organizations [86]. This integration can mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard, two pervasive agency problems, enhancing governance outcomes.

Despite its potential, blockchain adoption in emerging economies faces barriers such as limited technical expertise, high costs, and regulatory challenges. These obstacles have been addressed in other contexts through phased strategies. For instance, India’s pilot blockchain projects in land registry systems streamlined operations and reduced fraud, emphasizing stakeholder training and policy alignment. Similarly, Brazil utilized public–private partnerships to offset costs and enable broader adoption [18,78]. Such strategies demonstrate the importance of aligning technology deployment with local needs. Blockchain technology represents a viable solution to governance challenges in developing economies, particularly in public procurement. By focusing on corruption-prone stages within Ghana’s procurement system, this study contributes to the broader understanding of blockchain’s potential to enhance governance frameworks. Its insights can inform scalable, context-sensitive applications, paving the way for more transparent, accountable, and efficient governance in emerging economies.

2.6. The Effect of Political Environment on Security and Privacy in Blockchain Integration

The integration of blockchain technology into public procurement systems does not occur in a political vacuum. Political environments, shaped by regulatory priorities, governance structures, and power dynamics, directly influence how blockchain’s security and privacy features are leveraged or undermined. In Ghana, where corruption in procurement drains an estimated 14% of GDP [16], blockchain’s potential to enhance transparency and accountability hinges on navigating these political complexities.

Stable political environments and clear regulatory frameworks often create fertile ground for secure blockchain adoption. Ghana’s Public Procurement Act (Act 663), for instance, mandates transparency but paradoxically enforces non-disclosure clauses during tender evaluations [41]. This duality highlights the need for adaptive blockchain models. A permissioned blockchain, which restricts data access to authorized stakeholders, could align with Ghana’s legal requirements while preserving auditability [79]. However, critics caution that overly rigid regulations risk stifling innovation. For example, data localization laws, which mandate that blockchain nodes operate within national borders, could centralize control and erode decentralization, a core security feature [12]. Ghana’s slow exploration of blockchain for procurement, partly due to resistance from officials reliant on opaque practices [87], underscores how political inertia can undermine technical solutions.

The tension between surveillance and privacy further complicates blockchain adoption. While democracies like Estonia use zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to balance transparency with privacy in procurement [84], authoritarian regimes often exploit blockchain’s transparency for surveillance. China’s blockchain-based social credit system, for instance, uses immutable records to monitor citizen behavior, raising ethical red flags [80]. Ghana faces its own challenges: its procurement laws prioritize confidentiality during tender evaluations, which could clash with blockchain’s transparency ethos. Critics argue that excessive transparency might expose sensitive bidder strategies or state secrets, weakening competitiveness [88]. To address this, Ghana’s proposed framework could integrate role-based access controls, ensuring sensitive data remain shielded from unauthorized parties while maintaining an immutable audit trail for regulators [78].

Political resistance rooted in systemic corruption also shapes blockchain’s viability. Blockchain’s tamper-proof records could disrupt Ghana’s procurement corruption by automating processes like payment releases through smart contracts, which only execute upon verified deliverables [83]. Yet, blockchain alone cannot dismantle entrenched corruption. Corrupt actors might collude to manipulate off-chain data inputs or resist adoption entirely, as seen in Nigeria’s stalled e-procurement reforms [55]. Ghana’s collaboration with the World Bank to digitize procurement through GHANEPS demonstrates how international oversight could counterbalance local resistance [72]. However, reliance on donor-driven agendas carries risks. Foreign-imposed technologies, such as energy-intensive blockchain protocols, may clash with local infrastructural realities. For developing countries like Ghana, energy-efficient consensus mechanisms like Proof of Stake (PoS) are increasingly recommended to address power constraints, as they require significantly fewer computational resources than Proof of Work (PoW) [20]. Future blockchain integration in Ghana’s procurement system would need to prioritize such adaptive models to align with infrastructural capabilities while meeting transparency goals.

Ultimately, blockchain’s success in Ghana’s procurement system depends on adaptive governance that harmonizes technical potential with political realities. While blockchain offers tools to mitigate corruption and enhance accountability, its implementation must navigate regulatory ambiguities, privacy trade-offs, and resistance from vested interests. Ghana’s experience suggests that hybrid models, combining permissioned blockchains, privacy-preserving technologies, and institutional reforms, offer a viable path forward. Future efforts should prioritize contextual solutions, ensuring blockchain complements rather than conflicts with the socio-political fabric of developing economies.

2.7. Challenges to Blockchain Implementation in the Public Procurement System

The adoption of blockchain technology in public procurement presents significant advantages, particularly in enhancing transparency, efficiency, and accountability. However, its implementation is often met with resistance due to professional skepticism, perceptions of adequacy in existing accounting standards, and systemic barriers. Understanding these challenges is crucial for developing strategies that facilitate blockchain adoption while addressing concerns from key stakeholders.

One of the major obstacles to blockchain adoption is professional skepticism among auditors, procurement officers, and executives. Many professionals question the reliability, security, and practical applicability of blockchain due to its decentralized nature and perceived lack of regulatory oversight [89]. Additionally, limited hands-on experience with blockchain applications in procurement makes stakeholders hesitant to transition from traditional, well-established financial and procurement systems. Without standardized auditing and compliance frameworks, skepticism remains a major barrier to adoption [90].

The belief that existing procurement regulations and accounting standards, such as IFRS, GAAP, and Ghana’s Public Procurement Act, provide adequate safeguards against corruption and inefficiencies. Many decision-makers do not see an immediate need for blockchain, assuming that current financial controls, auditing mechanisms, and procurement laws sufficiently regulate public sector transactions [91]. However, these frameworks still rely on centralized oversight, creating risks of manual errors, data manipulation, and non-transparent practices [74]. Blockchain technology offers automated compliance and immutable transaction records, but resistance persists due to regulatory inertia and reluctance to alter established practices.

Other factors include regulatory uncertainty, scalability concerns, and resistance to transparency, security risks, limited technical knowledge, high implementation costs, and unclear legal frameworks, however, capacity building programs, regulatory reforms, public–private partnerships, adopting more scalable blockchain solutions (e.g., permissioned blockchains, Layer 2 solutions) to reduce costs, governments to establish clear regulations addressing blockchain’s role in procurement compliance and oversight, implement permissioned blockchains with role-based access to balance transparency and privacy needs, and pilot implementation are some strategies suggested in the current literature to overcome the challenges [92,93,94].

2.8. Application of the MCDM Technique to Agency Problems and Blockchain Integration in the Public Procurement System

The application of MCDM techniques in public procurement is limited in many empirical studies. While some have utilized surveys, others have used interviews.

For example, ref. [95] applied principal-agent theory to explore how blockchain technology can mitigate municipal corruption in South Africa through interviews. The author found that blockchain technology has the potential to enhance accounting practices, e-tendering, transparency, and bookkeeping. In their study, ref. [96] employed the principal-agent approach to conduct a conceptual review and proposed a model for audit in blockchain technology integration. The authors also asserted that blockchain technology could disrupt traditional governance systems by eliminating bureaucracy, solving principal-agent issues, and eliminating moral hazards. In Nigeria, a study used semi-structured interviews using a case study design to propose a framework for the adoption of blockchain-based e-procurement systems in the public sector [97]. However, their study did not consider the cost of implementation as well as issues of privacy and security. Our study fills in the gap by considering the aspect of privacy and security as well as proposing permissioned blockchain to reduce the cost of implementation. Another study that aimed to identify the challenges and opportunities of blockchain to enhance payment systems by reducing cyber security and appropriate regulations applied a survey designed a blockchain interface [98].

Only a few have applied MCDM approaches in the public procurement literature.

Table 2. Application of MCDM approaches in the public procurement literature.

Aim of the Study	MCDM Technique	Context	Reference
This study aimed to analyze the challenges of procurement and supply chain management in the public sector using agriculture projects.	Delphi-AHP/Systematic review	Public sector project procurement and supply chain in Bangladesh	[104]
This study evaluated and predicted the success of a construction company in public tenders.	Neuro-fuzzy system	Data from a seven-year study in Serbia	[105]
This paper aimed to conduct a comparative analysis using some selected MCDMs to demonstrate how public procurement tenders can be made.	AHP/PROMETHEE	Real public tenders from a European institution	[106]
This study aimed to evaluate the most economic tenders.	AHP	Public tender evaluation in Italy	[107]
This paper sought to identify the priority of the influential criteria in GSCM applicable to government public procurement.	DEMATEL	Government Public Procurement in India	[108]
To establish a selection criteria for government managers to use for public tenders to select the best bid.	ANP/AHP	Public procurement process in Serbia	[109]
To evaluate the public transportation systems.	DELPHI, GAHP and PROMETHEE	Public transportation systems in Tehran	[110]
To identify operational requirements for the public education sector procurement in Maldives.	MCDA methods	Public sector (educational sector) in Maldives	[111]
This study aimed to develop an evaluation model for the web interface of the e-PP, which is called EKAP.	Hybrid-DAMTEL-ANP and Fizzy set	electronic Public Procurement (e-PP) in Turkey	[112]
This study sought to identify the adequate MCDA according to legal, operational, and performance requirements associated with public procurement.	MCDA methods	Public procurement in the Maldives using three-tier mixed-method	[113]
To evaluate suitable MADA methods of e-procurement decision models.	MADA methods	Education sector in Maldives/systematic review	[62]
To determine suitable weight-determination methods to facilitate public procurement decision-making.	AHP	Public procurement decision-making process	[112]

shows that most of the studies that applied MCDM approaches in public procurement were not conducted in Africa. Considering the focus of our studies, that is, to identify and determine the relative importance of the agency problems and prioritize the most susceptible corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle, proposed blockchain integration to the corruption-prone stages is still lacking in the literature. The AHP is a multi-criteria decision-making tool used by authors to evaluate the research framework. Studies have applied several MCDM approaches, such as TOPSIS and its extensions, ANP, Delphi, PSI, PROMETHEE, DEMATEL, ELECTRE, BWM, and other techniques, in the decision-making process regarding complex multi-criteria. However, each approach has its advantages, disadvantages, and peculiar features [99,100]. Most authors might consider the amount of computational time and effort, their skills and knowledge, and the assumptions of decision-makers. ANP, DEMATEL, PSI, and BWM have been suitable for pairwise comparisons for weight determination. DEMATEL is useful in establishing causality among factors. TOPSIS is useful for ranking to arrive at the most ideal solution. Nonetheless, their limitation lies in the subjective judgment when the number of dimensions increases, which can make the decision-making very complex. With this, the reliability used to derive a conclusion may be jeopardized. As such, the study applied AHP, which allows decision-makers to evaluate options based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria, making it highly versatile for use in procurement, where decisions often involve weighing multiple factors [101,102,103].

3. Materials and Methods

The research methodology considered in this paper follows the logical flow of prioritizing corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle as depicted in Figure 1 to achieve the decision support framework shown in Figure 2, that is, to identify and find the relative importance of the agency problems and rank the agency problems against corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle using the AHP technique. This will help make an informed decision regarding public procurement towards blockchain integration to enhance public sector operations and consequently good governance. So far, studies have considered using AHP in the analysis of multi-criteria decision-making issues in management in other contexts [108], including those related to the adoption of blockchain technology [113]. However, research using the AHP and principal agency theory methodology in public procurement towards blockchain integration is limited. Our study contributes to the literature in this direction.

3.1. Data Collection, Sample Size, and Sampling Method

To achieve the objectives of the study, an in-depth review of the Ghana Auditor General’s reports and initial interviews with experts were made to identify (7) stages of the procurement cycle and instances of corruption and inefficiencies within the procurement system. Also, a comprehensive literature review was conducted from Google Scholar, Taylor and Francis, Scopus, and Web of Science to identify agency problems in public procurement in the Ghanaian context; they were validated with the opinions of the experts under 5 factors as explained in Section 2.1.1 Lastly, a questionnaire was developed to prioritize the public procurement cycle stages using the agency problems as criteria [114]. The experts were purposively selected, including procurement officials, accountants, administrators, IT professionals, auditors, and anti-corruption specialists from civil society who had significant experience and knowledge in public procurement and blockchain technology. Since the AHP approach does not require a huge number of decision makers and other research has utilized fewer respondents [115], the 25 experts were deemed sufficient to produce reliable results. The questionnaire instrument included multiple-choice questions and a Likert scale on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 = equal importance to 9 = extreme importance according to a pairwise scale of comparison [116,117]. The different types of questions in the instrument were designed to obtain detailed qualitative and quantitative data regarding the subject matter [114,118].

All research activities were conducted in compliance with the university’s code of conduct and ethical guidelines.

3.2. AHP Approach

AHP is a multi-criteria decision-making tool developed by Thomas Saaty in the 1980s, widely used for simplifying complex decisions by structuring them into a hierarchical format. AHP allows decision-makers to evaluate options based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria, making it highly versatile for use in procurement, where decisions often involve weighing multiple factors [101,102,103].

AHP’s structured approach enables decision-makers to compare different corruption risks systematically. This makes it an excellent tool for prioritizing procurement stages based on risk severity, particularly in environments where corruption is a major concern [101,119,120]. Its ability to handle both qualitative expert judgment and quantitative data gives it flexibility, making it suitable for evaluating complex, corruption-prone procurement stages like tender evaluation, contract management, and procurement planning [120,121].

Despite its strengths, AHP has been criticized for its reliance on expert judgment, which can introduce bias into the decision-making process. The method’s pairwise comparison can also become cumbersome when applied to a large number of criteria, leading to potential inconsistencies in judgments [103,108]. Furthermore, AHP does not account for dynamic changes in the procurement environment, such as shifts in market conditions or political pressures, which can influence the relative importance of corruption risks [104,122].

It structures decision-making into three levels: the goal at the top, criteria at the intermediate level, and alternatives at the bottom. This multi-tiered analysis ensures that decision-makers can prioritize alternatives based on a weighted comparison of criteria, enhancing the robustness and transparency of the process. The key steps in the AHP framework include:

Step 1: Problem Definition

For analytic hierarchy process (AHP) analysis, we configured the decision-making problem by identifying the stages of the procurement cycle, which includes procurement planning (PP), sourcing (S), tendering (T), tender evaluation and review (TER), contracting (C), contract management (CM), and finalization and closeout (FC) as a set of alternatives A = {A₁, A₂, …, A_m} and information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, goal conflict, and monitoring difficulty as key agency problems identified through principal-agent theory to represent a set of criteria C = {C₁, C₂, …, C_n} to prioritize corruption-prone stages. In this stage, the objective of the study was clearly defined.

Step 2: Structuring the Hierarchy

We build a decision hierarchy starting with the overall goal, followed by the intermediate criteria, and ending with the alternative solutions or stages. Figure 2 at Section 3.1 shows the hierarchy structure process.

Step 3: determining the relative weight of the criteria (identified agency problems)

The comparison involves determining the relative importance of each of the criteria. Here, the 25 experts will pair each of the criteria in the same scale as step 4 using Equation (1), and an aggregated pairwise ranking will be conducted to find the relative weights.

Step 4: Pairwise comparison matrix and priority weighing the procurement stages against criteria

The comparison involves determining the relative importance of one stage over another regarding the criteria (e.g., information asymmetry). For example, the value a_ij represents the importance of stage i over stage j. If stage i is as equally important as stage j, then a_ij = 1. If stage i is slightly more important than stage j, a_ij = 3, and so on, according to the scale (1, 3, 5, 7, 9 with intermediate values 2, 4, 6, 8) as shown in

Table 3. Pairwise scale of comparison [120,123].

Degree of Importance	Definition	Explanation
1	Equal importance	Two activities have equal contributions to an objective
3	Moderate importance of one over the other	Judgment and experience slightly favor one activity over the other
5	Strong or essential importance	Judgment and experience strongly favor one activity over the other
7	High	One of the activities is very strongly favored compared to the other; its dominance isshown in the practice
9	Extremely high	The evidence that favors one of the activities over the other is of the maximal possible affirmation order
2, 4, 6, 8	For compromises amongst the values above	In some of the cases, one requires the numerical interpolation of a compromise judgment due to the fact that there are not any suitable words that can describe it

.

$$\mathbf{A}={\left(a_{ij}\right)}_{n\times n}=\left[\begin{array}{ccc}{a}_{11}& a_{12}& a_{1n}\\ a_{21}& a_{22}& a_{2n}\\ a_{n1}& a_{n2}& a_{nn}\end{array}\right]$$

(1)

In the final step, each one of the matrices undergoes normalization, and relative weight values are estimated. The right eigenvector presents relative weight values (w) that correspond to the maximal eigenvalue (${\lambda }_{max}$) as follows:

$$A_w={\lambda }_{max} . w$$

(2)

3.3. Consistency Check in Pairwise Comparisons

To ensure the reliability of pairwise comparisons in the AHP, the consistency of the judgments must be verified. In an ideal case, a matrix is perfectly consistent if the principal eigenvalue ${\lambda }_{max}=n$. Equals the matrix size (n). When this occurs, weights can be derived directly through normalization of any row or column [124]. However, real-world judgments often introduce inconsistency, requiring a systematic method to measure it.

Consistency is evaluated based on the relationship among the matrix entries. In a consistent matrix, the relationship $a_{jk}\times a_{ij}=a_{ik}$ holds for all elements [125]. The degree of inconsistency can be measured using the consistency index (CI), calculated as follows:

$$\mathrm{C}\mathrm{I}={\displaystyle \frac{{\lambda }_{max}-n}{n-1}}$$

(3)

To assess whether this inconsistency is within acceptable bounds, the consistency ratio (CR) is computed by dividing the CI by the random index (RI), a value derived from simulations of random pairwise comparison matrices. The CR is defined as follows:

$$\mathrm{C}\mathrm{R}={\displaystyle \frac{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{I}}{\mathrm{R}\mathrm{I}}}$$

(4)

A CR of 0.10 or lower is generally accepted as an indicator of sufficient consistency [126]. If the CR exceeds this threshold, the pairwise comparisons should be revisited to improve consistency [127]. For smaller matrices, stricter thresholds are applied: CR must be ≤0.05 for n = 3, ≤0.09 for n = 4, and ≤0.10 for n > 4.

The Random Index (RI) values for various matrix sizes, as defined by [102], are presented in

Table 4. Values of the RI [128].

N	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
RI	0.0	0.0	0.58	0.90	1.12	1.24	1.32	1.41	1.45	1.49

.

3.4. Aggregation of Expert Judgements

To synthesize the pairwise comparisons from the 25 experts, we employed the Aggregation of Individual Judgments (AIJ) method, which synthesizes raw pairwise comparison matrices using the geometric mean. Unlike the Aggregation of Individual Priorities (AIP), which aggregates priority vectors post-calculation, AIJ preserves the reciprocal property and consistency of group judgments, ensuring a unified decision structure that aligns with collective reasoning in multi-stakeholder contexts [101,129,130]. This approach is mathematically robust for deriving consensus-driven priorities, particularly in public procurement settings where transparency in corruption risk mitigation is critical [129].

The geometric mean was calculated for each pairwise comparison entry using Microsoft Excel 2024 (Equation (5)), as SuperDecision software (v3.2) does not natively support AIJ. For a comparison between elements i and j, the aggregated judgment ${\tilde{a}}_{ij}$ is computed as follows:

$${\tilde{a}}_{ij}={\left(\prod _{k=1}^n{a}_{ij}^{\left(k\right)}\right)}^{1/n}$$

(5)

where:

i 

${\tilde{a}}_{ij}$ represents the aggregated judgment for the comparison between elements $i$ and $j$,

ii 

$a_{ij}^{\left(k\right)}$ represents the judgment provided by expert $k$,

iii 

$n$ is the number of experts.

We prioritized the AIJ method over AIP due to its capacity to harmonize divergent expert perspectives into a coherent framework, reducing the risk of skewed priorities that arise from averaging post-hoc weights [129,130]. This methodological rigor strengthens the reliability of identified corruption-prone stages for targeted blockchain integration.

3.5. Application to the Ghana Public Procurement Sector

The AHP framework through PAT is relevant for this study because the Ghana public procurement sector offers a unique and important context. Blockchain adoption in public procurement is in its early stages in developing countries. However, there have been recommendations about its benefit in eliminating corruption in different sectors through transparency, efficiency, accountability, and immutability [131]. Public procurement has a significant impact on economic development. In Ghana, public procurement accounts for GDP of about 14%, 50–60% of national budgets, and 24% of imports [2].

Public procurement has been seen as a controversial topic due to the behavior of the central and municipal governments in managing public finances [3]. These controversies include corruption, rent-seeking between procurement officers and the business community, poor implementation of donor funds, and others. Corruption has cost Africa about USD 148 billion a year, according to an AU press release in 2002 on 19th September in Addis Ababa. The Ghana Auditor General Report of 2015 to 2020 shows that about GHS 13.9 billion was misappropriated by the ministries, metropolitans, departments, and agencies [8,132]. The global outlook of corruption through public procurement is estimated to be between USD 390 and USD 400 per year and about 70% in sub-Saharan countries [7]. In such situations, corruption and fraudulent dealings can increase project costs by approximately 20–30%. When government oversight and public monitoring are inadequate, this often leads to the development of projects driven more by the potential for bribes and kickbacks than by their actual economic value. Over the years, efforts have been advanced by governments to manage public procurement issues by introducing an e-procurement framework. Thus, the e-government strategy paper of 2004 identified e-procurement as a medium-term objective planned for implementation by June 2007. Amidst the economic, social, and environmental advantages of blockchain technology in effective government service delivery, progress in its integration into the Ghana public procurement systems has remained limited over time. Consequently, a decision-making approach that could allow key stakeholders to make a sound judgment and embrace blockchain implementation could be crucial. Incorporating PAT into the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) helped authors to identify the procurement stages most susceptible to corruption and propose a targeted blockchain integration.

4. Results

Evaluation and analysis of the AHP framework

A structured decision hierarchy was developed, as depicted in Figure 1. Using the visual representation of the framework in Figure 2, we identified the experts and subsequently established the agency problems through Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and the stages of the public procurement cycle. The detailed procedures are shown subsequently.

Step 1: Determining the experts (Demographic information of the experts)

The study relied on expert decision-making to appropriately prioritize the corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle using the AHP framework. In all, 25 industry experts were purposively selected as mentioned in Section 3.1, representing a wide range of stakeholders each with extensive experience and requisite knowledge in their roles in the public procurement sector, made up the decision makers; see

Table 5. Demographic information of the experts.

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	18	72
Female	7	28
Total	25	100
Age Group
18–25	0	0
26–35	3	12
36–45	11	44
46–55	9	36
56+	2	8
Total	25	100
Professional Expertise
Procurement Official	6	24
Accountant	6	24
Auditor	5	20
Administrator	2	8
Blockchain/IT Expert	2	8
Anti-Corruption Expert	2	8
Entrepreneur (Supplier or Contractor)	2	8
Total	25	100
Years of Experience
6–10	11	44
11–15	12	48
16–20	2	8
Total	25	100
Highest Academic Qualification
Diploma	0	0
Bachelor’s Degree	4	16
Master’s Degree	18	72
Doctorate Degree	3	12
Total	25	100
Professional Association
Ghana Institute of Procurement and Supply (GIPS)	6	24
Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS)	1	4
Institute of Chartered Accountants, Ghana (ICAG)	3	12
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA)	3	12
Institute of Internal Auditors, Ghana (IIAG)	5	20
Chartered Institute of Administrators and Management Consultants-Ghana (CIAMC)	2	8
None	5	20
Total	25	100
Sector
Ministries	5	20
Local government	5	20
Public Universities	5	20
Civil society	5	20
Supplier/contractors	5	20
Total	25	100

.

Step 2: Identification of agency problems through PAT and the public procurement cycle stages

As previously explained under Section 2.1.1 first, an in-depth review of the Ghana Auditor General’s reports was performed to identify the public procurement cycle stages. Secondly, a comprehensive literature review was conducted from Google Scholar, Taylor and Francis, Scopus, and Web of Science to identify agency problems related to public procurement under PAT. Subsequently, an initial interview with experts was conducted regarding the main themes of the study. From the interview, experts made suggestions and refined the decision criteria. In all, seven (7) procurement cycle stages of instances of corruption and inefficiencies were validated, and five key agency problems within the procurement system in the Ghanaian context were further recommended by the experts, which is consistent with the literature [39]. The decision makers also provided recommendations to eliminate fraud and corruption in public procurement.

Step 3: Structuring the hierarchy

We build a decision hierarchy starting with the overall goal, which is to prioritize corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle for blockchain integration, followed by establishing the decision-making criteria based on PAT and ending with the alternative based on the public procurement cycle as presented in Figure 1.

Step 4: Relative weight of importance of corruption risk-prone areas of the identified agency problems (criteria) in the public procurement system

The respondents evaluated the criteria by pairing each criterion with another to determine their relative severity in contributing to corruption in the public procurement cycle stages for the goal on how blockchain integration can be introduced to mitigate their negative effects. Experts’ judgement was normalized to arrive at the ideal priorities, which were ranked to obtain the most critical agency problem. The results of the AHP analysis are summarized in

Table 6. Priorities of corruption risk factors (criteria) of Ghana’s public procurement system.

Criteria	Normalized Priorities	Idealized Priorities	Ranking	Consistency Ratio (CR)
Information Asymmetry	0.22256	0.50669	2	0.07515
Goal Conflict	0.10386	0.23645	4
Moral Hazard	0.07508	0.17094	5
Adverse Selection	0.43924	1.00000	1
Monitoring Difficulty	0.15926	0.36258	3

. It revealed that adverse selection with a normalized priority of 0.43924 is the most critical agency problem prone to corruption, followed by information asymmetry (0.22256) and monitoring difficulty (0.15926). Goal conflict and moral hazard were deemed less critical but still significant contributors to corruption in the procurement process. The consistency ratio (CR) of 0.07515 indicates that the judgments made during the AHP process were consistent and reliable, as the CR is below the acceptable threshold of 0.1. This implies that the prioritization of criteria, that is, the identified agency problems as corruption risk factors, is robust and credible.

Step 5: Pairwise comparison matrix of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle under the identified agency problems

Pairwise comparison matrices were constructed to evaluate the relative proneness to corruption of each procurement stage against these criteria as in (Equation (1)). The relative proneness to corruption of one stage to the other was performed using the relative importance scale developed by [102] as shown on Table 4. Following the comparison, each matrix was normalized, and the right eigenvector was calculated to estimate the relative weight values corresponding to the maximal eigenvalue (Equation (2)).

To ensure the consistency of expert judgments, a consistency index (CI) was computed (Equation (3)), followed by the calculation of the consistency ratio (CR), comparing the CI to the random index (RI) (Equation (4)). All matrices were found to have CR values below the acceptable threshold of 0.10, confirming the reliability of the judgments.

The individual judgments provided by the 25 experts were aggregated using the geometric mean (Equation (5)) which preserves the reciprocal property of the pairwise comparisons. This synthesis produced consistent group judgments, ensuring robust prioritization of the corruption-prone stages for blockchain integration. The values obtained were used to construct the group pairwise comparison matrix as shown in

Table 7. Aggregated pairwise comparison with respect to information asymmetry.

Procurement Stages	PP	S	T	TER	C	CM	FC
PP	1	3.1072	2.0616	8.8320	3.8771	6.9925	3.0603
S		1	3.0253	8.5401	5.0978	8.0075	2.0953
T			1	7.0026	5.0395	6.0422	4.0115
TER				1	7.9467	5.0061	8.5455
C					1	2.1644	6.0648
CM						1	8.5858
FC							1

,

Table 8. Aggregated pairwise comparison with respect to goal conflict.

Procurement Stages	PP	S	T	TER	C	CM	FC
PP	1	4.1069	3.1729	8.1582	3.1745	6.1090	5.0780
S		1	3.0797	8.6616	4.0876	8.0285	4.0180
T			1	7.0700	3.0877	4.1155	4.1369
TER				1	6.0323	3.0877	8.6616
C					1	2.2253	6.0119
CM						1	7.0677
FC							1

,

Table 9. Aggregated pairwise comparison with respect to moral hazard.

Procurement Stages	PP	S	T	TER	C	CM	FC
PP	1	3.0862	2.6102	8.0833	3.0302	7.0366	3.1088
S		1	4.1680	8.5401	6.0540	8.0884	5.1104
T			1	4.1349	2.3252	3.0877	8.5347
TER				1	6.0983	4.1242	8.5858
C					1	3.0782	7.0518
CM						1	8.5804
FC							1

,

Table 10. Aggregated pairwise comparison with respect to adverse selection.

Procurement Stages	PP	S	T	TER	C	CM	FC
PP	1	3.2317	2.1441	8.0503	4.0963	7.0518	4.0645
S		1	2.0189	8.0386	3.0524	7.0323	4.0684
T			1	7.0300	2.0953	4.0579	4.0770
TER				1	7.0597	4.0856	8.5804
C					1	5.0567	5.0256
CM						1	8.0935
FC							1

and

Table 11. Aggregated pairwise comparison with respect to monitoring difficulty.

Procurement Stages	PP	S	T	TER	C	CM	FC
PP	1	6.0285	2.0616	7.0562	3.0588	4.0559	4.0922
S		1	2.0953	8.4547	3.0957	7.0562	3.0524
T			1	8.8681	3.0238	5.0739	3.0732
TER				1	5.0633	5.0863	8.0503
C					1	5.0322	6.0658
CM						1	7.0401
FC							1

.

Step 6: Ranking of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle under the identified agency problems

The AHP analysis produced detailed pairwise rankings of the corruption-prone stages within the public procurement cycle under the identified agency problems toward strategic blockchain integration. The values obtained were input into the SuperDecision software (version 3.2) to generate the priorities and their respective consistency values as shown in

Table 12. Priorities of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle with respect to information asymmetry.

Procurement Stage	Normalized Priorities	Idealized Priorities	Ranking	Consistency Ratio (CR)
Procurement Planning	0.06703	0.19876	5	0.08987
Sourcing	0.06791	0.20136	6
Tendering	0.11585	0.34354	4
Tender Evaluation	0.33723	1	1
Contracting	0.15095	0.44761	3
Contract Management	0.23058	0.68373	2
Finalization and Closeout	0.03045	0.09031	7

,

Table 13. Priorities of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle with respect to goal conflict.

Procurement Stage	Normalized Priorities	Idealized Priorities	Ranking	Consistency Ratio (CR)
Procurement Planning	0.05523	0.13302	5	0.09262
Sourcing	0.03720	0.08959	6
Tendering	0.10246	0.24678	4
Tender Evaluation	0.41518	1	1
Contracting	0.13350	0.32156	3
Contract Management	0.23493	0.56584	2
Finalization and Closeout	0.02151	0.05180	7

,

Table 14. Priorities of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle concerning moral hazard.

Procurement Stage	Normalized Priorities	Idealized Priorities	Ranking	Consistency Ratio (CR)
Procurement Planning	0.05393	0.13582	5	0.09363
Sourcing	0.04602	0.11588	6
Tendering	0.11054	0.27836	4
Tender Evaluation	0.24058	0.60585	2
Contracting	0.13002	0.32743	3
Contract Management	0.39710	1	1
Finalization and Closeout	0.02181	0.05492	7

,

Table 15. Priorities of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle with respect to adverse selection.

Procurement Stage	Normalized Priorities	Idealized Priorities	Ranking	Consistency Ratio (CR)
Procurement Planning	0.05506	0.13150	5	0.09841
Sourcing	0.05414	0.12928	6
Tendering	0.10831	0.25864	4
Tender Evaluation	0.41875	1.00000	1
Contracting	0.14848	0.35458	3
Contract Management	0.19347	0.46201	2
Finalization and Closeout	0.02179	0.05204	7

,

Table 16. Priorities of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle regarding the monitoring difficulty.

Procurement Stage	Normalized Priorities	Idealized Priorities	Ranking	Consistency Ratio (CR)
Procurement Planning	0.31210	1	1	0.09145
Sourcing	0.04425	0.14179	6
Tendering	0.06039	0.19350	5
Tender Evaluation	0.27113	0.86874	2
Contracting	0.09810	0.31432	4
Contract Management	0.19110	0.61231	3
Finalization and Closeout	0.02293	0.07348	7

and

Table 17. Overall priorities of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle.

Procurement Stage	Normalized Priorities	Idealized Priorities	Ranking
Procurement Planning	0.17268	0.53089	3
Sourcing	0.05178	0.15919	6
Tendering	0.08854	0.27222	5
Tender Evaluation	0.32527	1.00000	1
Contracting	0.12494	0.38411	4
Contract Management	0.21231	0.65272	2
Finalization and Closeout	0.02447	0.07523	7

.

This section presents the priority rankings of the procurement stages based on the identified agency problems, highlighting the stages most susceptible to corruption and the potential for blockchain technology integration to mitigate these risks.

Step 6.1 Ranking the public procurement cycle under information asymmetry

The tender evaluation stage ranked highest with a priority of 0.33723 (Table 12), signaling that this stage is the most vulnerable to corruption due to information asymmetry. This finding aligns with previous studies, which have identified the tender evaluation stage as a critical point where incomplete or misleading information can lead to corrupt practices [130] Blockchain technology, known for providing immutable and transparent data, can mitigate this risk by ensuring verifiable information is accessible to all stakeholders [133]. The “Contract Management” stage followed with a priority of 0.23058. The “Planning” and “Sourcing” stages ranked lower, with priorities of 0.06703 and 0.06791, respectively. The lowest priority was assigned to the “Closeout” stage (0.03045), indicating that information asymmetry is less of a concern in this phase. The consistency ratio (CR) was 0.08987, below the 0.10 threshold, confirming that the comparisons are reliable [134].

Step 6.2 Ranking the public procurement cycle under goal conflict

Similar to information asymmetry, the tender evaluation stage was ranked highest for goal conflict, with a priority of 0.41518, indicating a high risk of conflicting interests during this phase. This is consistent with the literature, which highlights how conflicting objectives often emerge during the evaluation stage, leading to inefficiencies and opportunities for corruption [135]. The “Contract Management” stage also exhibited significant goal conflict risk, with a priority of 0.23493. Blockchain can play a pivotal role here by aligning goals through smart contracts that enforce terms automatically [136]. The “Closeout” stage had the lowest priority (0.02151). The consistency ratio (CR) of 0.09262 falls within the acceptable level and demonstrates that the judgments made are consistent [102]. Table 13 below shows details of the priorities of corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle with respect to goal conflict.

Step 6.3 Ranking the public procurement cycle under moral hazard

Moral hazard is most prominent in the contract management stage, which received the highest priority of 0.39710, reflecting the heightened risk of improper behavior and contract manipulation. This finding resonates with previous research that highlights post-contractual opportunism as a key challenge in contract management [34]. Blockchain, through the use of smart contracts, can significantly reduce the risk of moral hazard by ensuring that contract terms are enforced automatically and transparently [137]. The “Evaluation” stage followed closely behind with a priority of 0.24058. The “Closeout” stage, again, ranked the lowest at 0.02181. The consistency ratio (CR) for this analysis was 0.09363, below the 0.10 threshold. See Table 14 for details.

Step 6.4 Ranking the public procurement cycle under adverse selection

Adverse selection presented the highest risk in the evaluation stage, with a priority of 0.41875 (see Table 15), suggesting that this phase is particularly susceptible to selecting inappropriate suppliers due to hidden information. This supports findings from [30], who identified adverse selection as a major issue during the evaluation process. Blockchain’s potential to improve supplier selection by providing verifiable supplier data can mitigate this risk [138]. The “Contract Management” stage had the second-highest priority at 0.19347, while “Closeout” was once again the least affected stage with a priority of 0.02179. The consistency ratio (CR) was 0.09841.

Step 6.5 Ranking the public procurement cycle under monitoring difficulty

The procurement planning stage was ranked the highest for monitoring difficulty, with a priority of 0.31210. This finding indicates that ensuring compliance and oversight is most challenging at this early stage. This is consistent with [139], who highlighted the challenges of monitoring during the planning phase in public procurement. Blockchain can address this issue by providing real-time monitoring and auditable records, ensuring compliance from the start [87]. The evaluation stage followed with a priority of 0.27113, while the “Closeout” stage was the least problematic with a priority of 0.02293. The consistency ratio (CR) was 0.09145, indicating reliable comparisons. Table 16 shows the details of the normalized and idealized priorities of the procurement stages as regards monitoring difficulty.

Step 6.6 Overall priorities ranking of corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle under all criteria

In evaluating the severity of corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle in respect to all criteria, experts evaluated the tender evaluation stage as the most critical for blockchain integration, given its overall priority of 0.32527. This stage was followed by “Contract Management” (0.21231) and “Procurement Planning” (0.17268), indicating that these stages require significant attention for mitigating corruption risks. Similar studies have noted the importance of focusing on critical stages to maximize the impact of blockchain technology in public procurement [140]. “The Finalization and Closeout” consistently ranked as the least vulnerable stage across all criteria, with a low overall priority of 0.02447. Details of the overall priorities is shown in Table 17 below and Figure 3.

5. Discussion of the Results

The results of this study, derived from the application of the AHP and PAT, offer critical insights into the prioritization of corruption risks across the various stages of Ghana’s e-government procurement cycle. By assessing corruption risk factors, namely information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, goal conflict, and monitoring difficulty against seven key stages of the procurement cycle, the analysis has identified the stages most susceptible to corruption as well as the corruption risk factors that influence corruption most within the procurement cycle. This prioritization not only aligns with the existing literature on corruption in public procurement but also sheds light on how blockchain technology can be strategically deployed to mitigate these agency problems at the critical stages identified.

5.1. Ranking of Identified Agency Problems (Criteria) That Are Most Prone to Corruption Risk

Adverse selection was ranked as the most critical corruption risk factor, with a normalized weight of 0.43924. This highlights the problem of incomplete or misleading information during the contractor selection process, leading to the selection of unqualified or corrupt contractors. Blockchain’s ability to provide a transparent and immutable record of all procurement processes can reduce the likelihood of adverse selection by ensuring that all relevant information, including contractor qualifications and past performance, is readily available and verifiable by all stakeholders. Blockchain could also integrate with existing databases to verify contractor credentials and eliminate false representations.

The second-ranked factor, information asymmetry, with a normalized weight of 0.22256, reflects the disparities in information between government officials and contractors, creating opportunities for corrupt practices. Blockchain can mitigate this issue by providing a decentralized ledger that makes procurement information, from bidding to contract execution, equally accessible to all parties. This equal access reduces the ability of any single actor to manipulate or obscure information for personal gain. The use of smart contracts could further ensure that contract terms are automatically enforced, reducing opportunities for manipulation.

Monitoring difficulty was the third most critical criterion, with a normalized weight of 0.1592. Monitoring difficulty points to the challenge of overseeing and ensuring compliance throughout the procurement process. Blockchain can alleviate these challenges by providing real-time, immutable records of transactions and contract performances. This allows for continuous monitoring without the need for extensive human oversight. The technology could also help establish a transparent audit trail, simplifying the process of detecting and addressing potential breaches of contract or unethical behavior.

Goal conflict ranked fourth with a normalized weight of 0.10386, signifying the misalignment of objectives between the government (the principal) and contractors (the agents). Smart contracts embedded within a blockchain system could help align these objectives by automatically enforcing compliance with predefined conditions. For example, payments can be made contingent upon the completion of certain milestones, reducing the risk of contractors cutting corners to achieve their personal or organizational goals at the expense of the public interest.

Moral hazard, with the lowest normalized weight of 0.07508, represents the risk of contractors engaging in unethical behavior because they do not bear the full consequences of their actions. Blockchain’s transparency and immutability can discourage such behavior by ensuring that all actions are permanently recorded and can be traced back to the responsible party. This heightened accountability reduces the incentive for contractors to engage in corrupt practices.

Lastly, the study may not have fully addressed the legal and regulatory frameworks necessary for supporting the adoption of blockchain in public procurement. These frameworks can vary significantly across jurisdictions and could pose substantial barriers to the effective implementation of the proposed solutions. The importance of legal infrastructure in adopting new technologies, like blockchain, has been emphasized by [141] and more recently by [142], who argued that the success of blockchain initiatives depends heavily on the adaptability and responsiveness of the legal and regulatory environments in which they are implemented.

5.2. Ranking of Public Procurement Cycle Stages Under the Identified Agency Problems

Firstly, the tender evaluation stage emerged as the most critical for blockchain intervention, primarily due to its susceptibility to information asymmetry, goal conflict, and adverse selection. This stage is often where the most significant corrupt practices can occur, given the high level of discretion and the lack of transparency typically associated with it. This is consistent with the extant literature [89,143]. Tender evaluation as the most corrupt stage highlights how the opacity of this stage allows for manipulation and favoritism, leading to adverse selection and other forms of corruption. Blockchain technology, with its ability to provide an immutable and transparent record of all evaluation criteria and decisions, offers a robust solution. In the Ghanaian context, the Public Procurement Act (Act 663) contains specific provisions regarding the non-disclosure of information related to tender evaluation. Section 63 of the Act explicitly states that information relating to the examination, clarification, evaluation, and comparison of tenders must not be disclosed to suppliers, contractors, or any unauthorized persons. This non-disclosure clause is intended to protect the integrity of the evaluation process but also contributes to the lack of transparency that can enable corrupt practices. Blockchain’s capacity to enforce transparency without violating such legal provisions could be critical in ensuring that tender evaluations are conducted fairly. By maintaining an immutable and decentralized record, blockchain technology can provide the necessary transparency while respecting the non-disclosure requirements mandated by Ghanaian law. The use of permissioned blockchain networks, where access to sensitive information is restricted to authorized personnel while still maintaining the overall transparency and auditability of the process, could be a solution that balances these concerns [74].

However, implementing blockchain in the tender evaluation stage is not without challenges. One key challenge is ensuring that the blockchain system aligns with existing legal frameworks, particularly in contexts like Ghana, where non-disclosure clauses are crucial for maintaining the confidentiality of the evaluation process. A potential solution is the use of permissioned blockchain networks, which can help maintain the necessary confidentiality while ensuring transparency and auditability for authorized stakeholders. This approach has been successfully implemented in other countries, such as in certain European Union public procurement systems, where blockchain technology has been adapted to comply with strict data protection regulations [86,88]. The integration of smart contracts within blockchain can further enhance the objectivity of the tender evaluation process. Smart contracts can be programmed to automatically enforce predefined evaluation criteria, thus minimizing human intervention and reducing the opportunities for manipulation. This would directly address the issues of information asymmetry and goal conflict by aligning the actions of procurement officials with the broader public interest and ensuring that the evaluation process is conducted fairly and transparently [144].

Nevertheless, the adoption of blockchain technology in public procurement, particularly in tender evaluations, requires significant investment in both technology and training. Stakeholders, including procurement officials and contractors, need to be adequately trained to interact with blockchain systems. There is also the challenge of interoperability with existing procurement systems and the need for a legal framework that supports the use of blockchain in public procurement. These challenges must be carefully considered and addressed to ensure the successful implementation of blockchain technology in Ghana’s public procurement processes [84]. A comparative analysis with other countries can provide additional insights; for instance, Brazil and South Korea have explored the use of blockchain in public procurement with mixed results. While blockchain improved transparency and reduced corruption in certain areas, challenges related to the scalability of the technology and its integration with existing legal and procurement frameworks were significant [143]. Learning from these experiences, Ghana can adopt a phased implementation approach, starting with less sensitive procurement processes before scaling up to more complex and corruption-prone stages like tender evaluation [87]. The experience of the Russian Federation’s Unified Procurement Information System (UPIS) supports this approach. The UPIS has shown significant success in enhancing transparency and reducing corruption during the tender evaluation phase by ensuring that all stakeholders have access to the same information and that all decisions are fully auditable [86]. The implementation of blockchain technology in the tender evaluation stage could significantly improve the integrity of the process, making it a critical area for intervention in efforts to mitigate corruption in Ghana’s e-government procurement system. However, this must be performed with careful consideration of legal, technical, and operational challenges, drawing on lessons from both local and international experiences to ensure that the benefits of blockchain are fully realized without compromising the integrity of the procurement process.

Secondly, the contract management stage is the second most critical for blockchain intervention and presents significant risks related to moral hazard and monitoring difficulty. This stage involves the execution and oversight of contracts, where issues like cost overruns, subpar performance, and contract renegotiations frequently occur [34]. These challenges are particularly evident in Ghana, as demonstrated by the Pwalugu Irrigation Project scandal, where a USD 12 million payment was made for mobilization with minimal actual work completed on the project. This incident highlights the weak oversight mechanisms and lack of transparency in contract execution, leading to substantial financial losses for the government [16,83]. Blockchain technology, particularly through the use of smart contracts, offers a robust solution to these challenges. Smart contracts can embed contractual obligations into immutable code that automatically enforces compliance. For example, payments can be tied to the completion of specific deliverables, which must be verified by multiple stakeholders on the blockchain, thereby reducing the risk of moral hazard. This approach ensures that contractors are paid only when they fulfill their contractual obligations, addressing issues like those observed in the Pwalugu project [145]. Moreover, blockchain enhances monitoring capabilities by providing a real-time, transparent audit trail of all activities related to contract execution. This transparency is crucial in Ghana, where monitoring difficulties often arise due to opaque reporting systems and limited access to real-time data. A blockchain-based system would allow all stakeholders, including auditors and regulatory bodies, to access up-to-date information on contract performance, facilitating early detection and resolution of non-compliance issues [39,87]. In their study, ref. [55] provides additional insights into the challenges and potential of blockchain technology in addressing corruption in public procurement, particularly in the context of South Africa. The paper highlights how blockchain could enhance transparency and reduce opportunities for corrupt practices, which are prevalent in traditional procurement systems. It emphasizes the importance of a legal framework that supports the adoption of blockchain, an insight that is equally relevant to Ghana, where existing procurement laws may need to be adapted to accommodate such technologies [55]. However, the implementation of blockchain in Ghana is not without challenges. Integrating blockchain with existing procurement systems and developing a legal framework to support smart contracts are critical steps that must be taken. The experiences of other countries, such as Brazil and South Korea, suggest that a phased approach, coupled with capacity-building initiatives, could effectively address these challenges [74].

The procurement planning stage, while not as critical as the tender evaluation and contract management stages, still plays a pivotal role in the overall procurement process and presents significant risks that warrant blockchain intervention. This stage lays the foundation for the entire procurement cycle, and any flaws such as poorly defined project scopes, inaccurate needs assessments, or inflated cost estimates can have cascading effects throughout the process [146]. In Ghana, the Auditor-General’s reports have highlighted cases where improper procurement planning, characterized by poor documentation and weak oversight, has led to misallocated resources and significant project delays [16]. Blockchain technology has the potential to address these issues by providing a transparent, immutable record of all procurement planning activities. This technology could ensure that all procurement plans are recorded in a decentralized ledger accessible in real-time, enabling continuous monitoring and auditability from the outset. Such transparency would make it easier to detect deviations from approved plans and address them promptly, thereby reducing the risk of corruption [86]. Moreover, the planning stage is particularly susceptible to corruption due to the high level of discretion involved in decision-making. The work of [87] underscores that this stage is often overlooked in anti-corruption efforts despite being vulnerable to corrupt practices like bid rigging, manipulation of procurement specifications, and conflicts of interest. By incorporating blockchain into this phase, governments can ensure that all decisions are traceable and transparent, thereby reducing the potential for manipulation and ensuring that procurement processes are fair and competitive [87]. Furthermore, studies have shown that inadequate procurement planning can lead to significant price differentials and cost overruns, which are often indicators of corruption [147]. Blockchain can mitigate these risks by providing a detailed, verifiable record of all procurement activities, from needs assessment to final budget allocations, which can be reviewed by all stakeholders. This capability is particularly important in ensuring that the procurement process remains transparent and that any changes to the procurement plan are made in a manner that is visible to all relevant parties [148].

The sourcing and tendering stages, while not the most vulnerable to corruption, play a critical role in determining the success of procurement processes. In Ghana, these stages have faced significant challenges, as highlighted in the Performance Audit Report on the National Ambulance Service. The report documented how a servicing contract for ambulances was awarded to an unregistered company, bypassing already approved and more qualified suppliers [149]. This decision is a clear case of adverse selection and moral hazard, where unqualified suppliers were favored, leading to poor service delivery and increased operational risks. Blockchain technology, particularly through smart contracts with multi-level approval mechanisms, offers a targeted solution to these issues. Smart contracts can enforce conditions requiring approvals from multiple oversight bodies before a contract is finalized. For example, a smart contract could be programmed to ensure that each step of the procurement process, such as technical compliance checks and financial audits, is verified and approved by relevant authorities before proceeding. This multi-tiered approval process minimizes the chances of manipulation and ensures that only qualified suppliers are awarded contracts. Previous studies highlight how smart contracts provide secure, traceable audit trails for all transactions, significantly increasing transparency and reducing risks associated with human error or manipulation. For instance, blockchain’s ability to automate the verification and approval processes helps ensure that procurement decisions are based on accurate and reliable information, thereby preventing adverse selection, as observed in the National Ambulance Service case [150]. Implementing smart contracts with multi-level approvals could significantly mitigate risks associated with non-competitive procurement, ensuring that all decisions are subject to rigorous oversight and transparency [14]. Additionally, other studies have shown that the application of blockchain in procurement can substantially enhance the efficiency and integrity of the process, making every transaction traceable and reducing opportunities for corruption [151,152].

The finalization and closeout stage was ranked the lowest in terms of corruption vulnerability, consistent with other studies. Nevertheless, blockchain integration at this stage could still yield benefits, particularly in ensuring that final payments and project Macneil deliverables are accurately recorded and transparent. The Auditor-General has noted issues with final payment disbursements, where contractors receive payments despite failing to meet their obligations [149]. By ensuring that final payments are contingent on the verified completion of project deliverables, blockchain could enhance the integrity of the closeout process, reducing the likelihood of corrupt practices at this stage [14].

5.3. Experts Recommendations for Corruption Mitigation in Public Procurement

The qualitative part of the survey presented the opinions of the experts on corruption mitigation in public procurement. The findings are consistent with [14], including leveraging blockchain technology implementation, stakeholder engagement, education, regular audit, punishment for non-compliance, and strengthening of procurement laws [14,141,142] as seen in Figure 4.

Concerning leveraging blockchain technology, the experts were emphatic that blockchain technology implementation will promote transparency, and immutability can discourage unscrupulous behavior by ensuring that all actions are permanently recorded and can be traced back to the responsible party. This heightened accountability reduces the incentive for contractors to engage in corrupt practices.

Furthermore, stakeholder engagement was advanced by experts as an essential aspect in eliminating the menace of corruption in public procurement. In recent years, there has been an increasing call for stakeholder collaboration in public decision-making. More so, the complexities of the Ghana public procurement require expertise, innovative skills, and knowledgeable inputs from relevant stakeholders to tackle corruption. This also ensures that the voices of citizens are considered in decision-making. The government can build strategic partnerships with the private sector to build blockchain infrastructure.

Education is observed to be relevant in mitigating corruption. This is evident in the Auditor-General’s reports, which highlight cases where lack of knowledge leads to improper procurement planning, characterized by poor documentation and weak oversight, that has led to misallocated resources and significant project delays [16].

Also, non-compliance, which they advanced without any form of punishment, has eaten into the fabric of the public procurement sector.

On strengthening procurement laws, the current procurement laws of non-disclosure are seen as a major avenue for corruption; specifically, the Public Procurement Act (Act 663) and Act 914, as amended, contain specific provisions regarding the non-disclosure of information related to tender evaluation. Experts therefore call on policymakers to review and revise the procurement laws through a collaborative dialogue. Regulatory frameworks should be established to guide public procurement practices as well as blockchain implementation, address legal recognition for blockchain-based contracts, and ensure data privacy and system interoperability.

5.4. Proposed Blockchain-Enabled Public Procurement

Proposed blockchain-enabled public procurement based on PAT

The proposed blockchain-enabled procurement cycle system, based on the PAT framework and the institutional theory, provides a robust solution to challenges in procurement processes, including corruption, inefficiencies, and lack of transparency. In Ghana, where procurement often suffers from these issues, this proposed framework leverages blockchain technology to introduce transparency, accountability, and fairness, significantly reducing the opportunities for misappropriation of funds and unethical practices [18].

In the procurement planning stage, corruption is commonly observed in the manipulation of requirements and terms to favor specific vendors, as evident in the analysis. This issue would be addressed by using smart contracts to encode all terms and conditions immutably, ensuring they cannot be altered after deployment. Through announcing tenders on a blockchain platform, procurement information becomes publicly accessible and resistant to tampering, preventing fraudulent activities and fostering inclusivity in the process. The vendor selection phase is another critical point prone to corruption in Ghana, often characterized by nepotism, bribery, and opaque decision-making. In Ghana, manual evaluation processes are susceptible to bias, where officials manipulate bids to favor preferred vendors [17,153]. The blockchain-enabled framework would combat this by enabling transparent submission and evaluation of bids. Each proposal is securely stored on the blockchain, making alterations impossible. Automated scoring through smart contracts ensures that vendors are selected based on merit and predefined criteria, eliminating opportunities for favoritism or bribery while promoting fairness. Corruption during the contract award phase often arises from unauthorized amendments to contract terms or side agreements that divert resources. The proposed framework mitigates this by encoding all contract terms into smart contracts, which are publicly auditable and enforceable. Payments are secured in a blockchain-based escrow account and are only released when specific milestones are verified as shown in Figure 5. This approach eliminates upfront payments that are susceptible to misuse and ensures that contracts remain binding and transparent.

In the contract management phase, corruption often manifests through falsified progress reports, inflated costs, or the delivery of substandard goods and services. The study identifies limited oversight in Ghana as a significant agency problem, which enables these practices to persist. Blockchain technology automates contract approvals through multi-signature validation, requiring multiple stakeholders such as the Public Account Committee of parliament, auditors, and contracting authorities to verify and approve key milestones or contract variations before execution. This decentralized decision-making process prevents unilateral actions, minimizes discretion, and reduces opportunities for corruption, such as unauthorized changes to contract terms or fraudulent progress approvals. Finally, the payment and closure phases often experience unauthorized payments or the misallocation of funds due to weak financial controls. This framework automates payments using smart contracts, ensuring funds are released only after all contractual conditions are fulfilled and validated. Additionally, the blockchain creates an immutable audit trail of all transactions, enhancing accountability and making it easier to detect fraudulent activities. This ensures public funds are effectively utilized and reach their intended beneficiaries. Consequently, the adoption of this blockchain-enabled procurement cycle in Ghana would drastically reduce corruption by eliminating information asymmetry, where all stakeholders, including oversight bodies, access the same transparent and immutable data. It would enforce accountability by ensuring actions are traceable and discourage fraudulent behavior by creating immutable records. Furthermore, the transparency introduced through blockchain platforms ensures procurement processes are open to scrutiny, minimizing the likelihood of corrupt practices. By automating monitoring and payment processes, the framework also may reduce dependency on intermediaries, who are often vulnerable to external influence. Corruption has long been a significant barrier to efficient public service delivery in Ghana. The blockchain-enabled procurement cycle, designed on the PAT framework, offers a transformative approach to addressing this challenge. By embedding transparency, automation, and immutability into every phase of procurement, this framework mitigates corruption risks and builds trust in the system. Its implementation could drive efficiency, ensure equitable resource allocation, and advance sustainable development, particularly in critical sectors vital to Ghana’s progress.

Scalability, regulatory adaptation, and implementation strategy for blockchain-enabled procurement

The proposed blockchain framework is designed to complement, rather than replace, existing e-procurement platforms by enhancing transparency, security, and efficiency. While many countries, including Ghana, have adopted digital procurement systems, these systems often rely on centralized databases, which remain vulnerable to manipulation and inefficiencies [18,154]. By integrating blockchain, procurement records become tamper-proof, verifiable, and decentralized, significantly reducing corruption risks while ensuring compliance with procurement regulations [12,74].

This framework is scalable and adaptable beyond Ghana, as public procurement challenges, such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection, are common across developing nations [32,155]. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methodology used for prioritizing corruption-prone procurement stages can be adjusted to different legal and institutional contexts by modifying criteria weightings based on country-specific procurement risks [101]. Additionally, the blockchain model is flexible enough to align with centralized, decentralized, or hybrid procurement structures. Countries with centralized procurement, such as Ethiopia, can implement blockchain at a national level, while those with decentralized procurement, such as Nigeria or India, can adopt a federated blockchain approach for interoperability across different administrative levels [18].

A key challenge in blockchain adoption is regulatory uncertainty and legal enforceability of smart contracts. Ghana’s Public Procurement Act (Act 663, as amended by Act 914) does not explicitly recognize blockchain transactions or smart contracts, creating the need for regulatory reforms [41]. To address this, policymakers can align procurement laws with global best practices, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the European Union’s MiCA framework, to provide legal clarity [21,55]. Additionally, a blockchain governance body within the Public Procurement Authority can oversee compliance, smart contract execution, and dispute resolution mechanisms, ensuring smooth integration with existing procurement laws [21].

Recognizing Ghana’s resource limitations, the funding and maintenance of blockchain infrastructure can be achieved through a phased implementation strategy, focusing on high-risk procurement categories before scaling nationwide [18]. Public–private partnerships (PPPs) and international donor funding from organizations such as the World Bank, African Development Bank, and UNDP can support initial deployment costs. Additionally, cloud-based blockchain solutions can reduce infrastructure investment while ensuring cost-efficient scalability [156]. Over time, transaction-based cost recovery models or integration into procurement fees can help sustain long-term maintenance [157].

By leveraging modular design, phased deployment, regulatory alignment, and diversified funding mechanisms, the proposed blockchain-enabled procurement system can enhance transparency, accountability, and efficiency while remaining adaptable to different procurement environments [17].

5.5. Blockchain-Enabled E-Procurement System Architecture

To ensure transparency, accountability, and efficiency in Ghana’s public procurement system, we propose a permissioned blockchain-based architecture integrated with the Ghana Electronic Procurement System (GHANEPS). The proposed system consists of several key components, as illustrated in Figure 6.

(1)

Government Procurement System: The procurement process starts within the government’s e-procurement system, where procurement requirements, tenders, and supplier information are recorded.

(2)

Permissioned Blockchain Network: This serves as the backbone of the system, ensuring secure, immutable records of procurement activities while maintaining role-based access for stakeholders.

(3)

Smart Contracts (Procurement Automation): Automates critical procurement processes such as bid submissions, contract execution, and milestone-based payments, minimizing human discretion and corruption risks.

(4)

Identity Management (Supplier Verification): Uses blockchain-based identity verification to authenticate suppliers, preventing fraudulent entities from participating in procurement.

(5)

Distributed Ledger (Transaction Transparency): Ensures that all procurement records—such as bid evaluations, contract terms, and financial transactions—are securely stored and verifiable by authorized entities.

(6)

Stakeholder Integration: Various actors, including auditors, procurement authorities, and approved suppliers, interact with the blockchain system to monitor and validate procurement transactions, ensuring regulatory compliance and fair competition.

This blockchain-based procurement model mitigates corruption risks by ensuring tamper-proof records, decentralized validation, and automated enforcement of procurement rules. Furthermore, the permissioned nature of the blockchain ensures that sensitive procurement data remain protected while promoting transparency where required.

5.6. Compatibility with Ghana’s E-Procurement System (GHANEPS)

Blockchain technology can significantly improve Ghana’s Electronic Procurement System (GHANEPS) by strengthening compliance, security, transparency, and accountability. While GHANEPS digitizes procurement processes, it still faces challenges such as bid rigging, lack of real-time auditability, and contract mismanagement, which create opportunities for corruption [158]. Blockchain, with its decentralized, immutable, and transparent ledger, addresses these weaknesses by ensuring that every procurement transaction is securely recorded and auditable [159].

Some critics argue that integrating blockchain into public procurement could be costly and technically complex, particularly in developing countries with limited infrastructure [160]. While cost and complexity are valid concerns, the long-term benefits of automated fraud detection, tamper-proof contract execution, and enhanced supplier verification outweigh the initial investment. More importantly, permissioned blockchain ensures that the system aligns with Ghana’s regulatory requirements while minimizing unnecessary decentralization costs [161].

Excessive transparency could also compromise sensitive procurement data, exposing confidential bid details and leading to unfair competitive advantages. To address this, the proposed blockchain integration for GHANEPS adopts a permissioned model with role-based access control (RBAC). This setup ensures that only authorized entities, such as procurement officials, auditors, and approved suppliers, can access procurement data, striking a balance between transparency and data privacy.

Beyond security and compliance, blockchain technology enhances interoperability between GHANEPS and other governmental systems, allowing seamless data exchange across procurement, auditing, and regulatory agencies. By automating bid verification, contract management, and payment approvals, blockchain minimizes human discretion, which remains a key driver of corruption in Ghana’s procurement system [162].

Rather than seeing blockchain as an additional burden, policymakers should embrace it as an opportunity to strengthen public trust in procurement. By embedding blockchain into GHANEPS, Ghana can increase donor confidence, improve fiscal discipline, and ensure fair competition in public contracts. The challenge is not whether blockchain should be adopted but how quickly and effectively it can be implemented to maximize impact.

6. Conclusions, Implications, and Study Limitations

6.1. Conclusions

This study underscores the transformative potential of blockchain technology in addressing critical agency problems in public procurement, as identified under the PAT with the support of institutional theory. While our study focuses on Ghana as a case study, the methodology and findings have broader applicability to other developing and developed economies with similar procurement challenges. The findings reveal that the tender evaluation, contract management, and procurement planning stages are the most susceptible to corruption, making them key focus areas for targeted interventions. By addressing issues such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, and monitoring difficulties, blockchain will offer a robust framework to enhance transparency, accountability, and efficiency throughout the procurement process. In the procurement planning stage, blockchain can securely store and verify supplier credentials and document justifications for procurement needs, ensuring that procurement decisions are transparent and based on verifiable data. During the tender evaluation stage, blockchain’s tamper-proof and time-stamped system for bid submissions mitigates risks of manipulation, while smart contracts automate the evaluation process, reducing bias and ensuring compliance with established guidelines. In the contract management stage, where monitoring difficulties and moral hazard are most pronounced, blockchain integrated with IoT systems provides real-time tracking of performance milestones, ensuring adherence to contract terms. Automated payment disbursements via smart contracts further enhance accountability by minimizing delays and opportunities for manipulation. The post-award phase also benefits from blockchain’s immutability, as inspection reports and final documentation are securely stored and made auditable, reducing the risk of mismanagement and corruption. By aligning blockchain’s capabilities with the specific vulnerabilities identified through PAT with the support of instructional theory, this study proposes a strategic and focused approach to mitigating corruption at the most vulnerable stages of the procurement cycle. The findings emphasize that leveraging blockchain’s features, such as immutability, transparency, and automation, may significantly reduce inefficiencies and foster trust in public procurement systems. This tailored application of blockchain not only strengthens the integrity of procurement processes but also contributes to more effective governance, particularly in contexts like Ghana, where corruption remains a pressing challenge.

6.2. Theoretical Contribution and Implication

The study has addressed significant issues in blockchain and public procurement systems in Africa, where corruption and inefficiencies are prevalent. Specifically, the integration of blockchain technology into the critical procurement stages can enhance transparency and accountability by creating tamper-proof and auditable records of procurement activities. Currently, a framework that holistically evaluates the corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle is limited in the extant literature. However, decision-making regarding public procurement is complex and difficult because of political interference. As such, this study adds to the body of knowledge by providing practical insight on corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle and integration of blockchain technology to the most critical corruption-prone stages to enhance good governance and effective service delivery and, consequently, sustainable development. Although previous studies have recognized corruption in the procurement cycle, none of them has empirically tested the most important ones using PAT and institutional theory. Also, these studies have not taken a holistic approach to integrating blockchain technology in the public procurement systems. More to the point, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to apply the PAT with the support of institutional theory and the public procurement cycle to identify and prioritize critical corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle. Accordingly, we respond to the recommendation for theoretical rigor and implementation of blockchain technology [16]. The results support the PAT that, even though all five constructs are important criteria in identifying corruption-prone stages of the procurement cycle, adverse selection was ranked as the most critical corruption risk factor, and the tender evaluation stage of the public procurement cycle emerged as the most pertinent for blockchain intervention.

Lastly, we applied the AHP as an analytical framework, which served as a theoretical framework for analyzing the critical corruption-prone stages of the public procurement cycle. Other research can utilize this framework in related studies.

6.3. Practical and Policy Implications

Public procurement and blockchain technology implementation are a complex decision-making process demanding a holistic analysis and a key expert’s stakeholder viewpoint. Due to the pervasive nature of corruption in the public procurement cycle and the slow implementation of blockchain infrastructure in developing economies, it is relevant to identify the most critical procurement stages so that blockchain technology can gradually be introduced given the limited resource availability and inadequate technological infrastructure development in Africa and Ghana in particular. At the highest level of decision-making, adverse selection was ranked as the most critical corruption risk factor, and the tender evaluation stage of the public procurement cycle emerged as the crucial stage for blockchain intervention.

To ensure the implementation of blockchain technology in public procurement, smart contracts should be adopted to promote transparency, accountability, and foster trust among stakeholders, including suppliers, international development partners, and the general public, thereby strengthening governance frameworks and public confidence in government institutions. The findings suggest that policymakers should establish regulatory frameworks to guide blockchain implementation, address legal recognition for blockchain-based contracts, and ensure data privacy and system interoperability.

Blockchain technology implementation goals should align with procurement policies and be reviewed regularly to make policy adjustments. Policies should also promote training and capacity building among procurement officials and stakeholders, enabling them to manage and optimize blockchain-based systems effectively. Also, we recommend a bottom-up approach to blockchain integration given the lack of technological resources in developing countries.

For effective service delivery, there is a need for collaboration of the procurement stakeholders from both public and private institutions to create a seamless and integrated governance system. This study points to the pervasive nature of corruption in the Ghana procurement system; actionable recommendations are therefore proposed for blockchain technology integration for corruption mitigation to promote good governance.

6.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Studies

The study has some limitations that provide opportunities for future work. Firstly, while the findings demonstrate the transformative potential of blockchain technology, challenges such as scalability, integration with existing systems, and balancing transparency with confidentiality remain. This presents opportunities for future research, particularly in exploring how emerging technologies like IoT, artificial intelligence, and blockchain can be integrated to build more resilient and adaptive public procurement systems.

This study proposed a permissioned blockchain-based architecture integrated with the Ghana Electronic Procurement System (GHANEPS). A follow-up project by the authors delves into the simulation of the permissioned blockchain smart contract deployment in the Ghanaian context. Some critics argue that integrating blockchain into public procurement could be costly and technically complex, particularly in developing countries with limited infrastructure [72]. Although the cost and complexity are valid concerns, the long-term benefits and, more importantly, permissioned blockchain ensure that the system aligns with regulatory requirements while minimizing unnecessary decentralization costs [160]. This presents opportunities to other authors who want to explore permissioned blockchain architecture in similar socio-economic and political environments in different contexts.

Again, integrating blockchain technology demands collaboration with relevant stakeholders to create a seamless and integrated governance system [100]. From this perspective, future studies that consider how stakeholder innovation capacity and professional skepticism influence the integration of blockchain technology would be interesting.

Even though the study’s theoretical grounding was based on PAT and institutional theory, the conceptual framework did not consider other factors except the agency problems identified using the PAT for prioritization. Institutional theory was relevant in proposing the blockchain technology integration. Therefore, further research could explore other related public procurement corruption-prone risk factors by adding other theoretical models to give a holistic view of this phenomenon.

Also, the study focused on a single country using a few experts in the evaluation process, which might limit the generalizability of the study findings. Future studies can conduct a comparative empirical study in similar contexts. This can lead to a better understanding of how contextual and demographic characteristics affect public procurement and blockchain implementation.

Lastly, while the experts for the analysis were considered to be more knowledgeable on the subject matter, the AHP technique of weight determination may introduce bias in expert judgment. Also, the AHP method cannot generate interrelationships among decision factors. Future studies could consider a large sample size and using a hybrid method to validate the results. Also, other objective weighting methods like entropy could be employed to enhance the objectivity of findings.