A Robust Framework for MADS Based on DL Techniques on the IoT
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- The proposed solution is a robust MADS based on LSTM Autoencoder that has the capabilities to detect malware and gets a high accuracy, called RoMADS.
- RoMADS model performance was evaluated and we compared its results with the previous research results in this field.
- RoMADS model is distinguished by its ability to extract the features of data and reduce dimensions.
- It is also distinguished by its ability to take sequential data which has a different or fixed length. This is appropriate for the nature of the data in the IoT environments.
- RoMADS framework helps to take advantage of the devices currently on the market and adapt them to benefit from them in the IoT environments, which contributes to the rapid spread of the IoT and the increased dependence on it.
- RoMADS model contributes to saving time and energy consumption, as it checks every device that wants to enter the IoT network and converts its traditional protocol to the IoT protocol if need. Also, RoMADS framework depends on the fog computing architecture that is based on the principle of distributing the processing, which helps to reduce the time and energy consumption.
2. Background
2.1. Autoencoders
- Inputs layer, the original data is entered from input layer.
- Outputs layer, the reconstructed data comes out through the output layer.
- Hidden layers, it contains several layers.
- Encoder:
- b.
- Bottleneck
- c.
- Decoder
- d.
- Reconstruction Loss
2.2. LSTM
- Forget gate (ft) (a sigmoid layer)
- b.
- Input gate
- ◦
- Input gate layer (it) (a sigmoid layer):
- ◦
- A tanh layer
- c.
- Output gate
- ◦
- Output gate layer (ot) (a sigmoid layer):
- ◦
- A tanh layer:
- d.
- Cell state
3. Literature Review
IoT Malware Attacks
- The first phase: scan and takeover
- b.
- The second phase: attack launch
- i.
- DoS Attack
- ii.
- Spam Bots Attack
- iii.
- Brickers Attack
- iv.
- Cryptomining Bots Attack
- v.
- TimpDoor Attack
- vi.
- DeepLocker Attack
- vii.
- Mirai Attack
4. Methodology
4.1. Data Set
- DS2OS Data Set
4.2. Data Processing & Cleaning
4.3. Feature Selection
4.4. Experiment Environment
5. Proposed Solution
5.1. RoMADS Architecture
5.2. RoMADS Network
Intelligent RoMADS Gateways
5.3. RoMADS Devices
- Devices that need a high level of security because they contain sensitive data and critical user information, such as the following: passwords, user personal information, or financial information.
- Devices that need security but less than the previous one, because they do not contain any sensitive data or information.
- (a)
- High-level security (MDS + Encryption mechanism)
- ◦
- Embedded:
- ◦
- IoT Security Anchor Point (SAP):
- (b)
- Security (MDS)
5.4. RoMADS MDS Based on LSTM Autoencoder
- i.
- In LSTM encoders phase
- ii.
- In LSTM Decoders phase
6. Performance Criteria
- Model Accuracy
- True Positive (TP),
- True Negative (TN),
- False Positive (FP),
- False Negative (FN).
- b.
- Detection Rate of Malware
- c.
- Recall
- d.
- Precision
- e.
- F1-Score
- f.
- Error Rate
- ◦
- MAE
- ◦
- MSE
- ◦
- RMSE
7. Smart City Scenarios
- A.
- First Scenario: Secured RoMADS Network
Algorithm 1: Data come from external networks to IoT network. |
Input: Output: Malware or Normal -Data X enter to Intelligent IoT gateway { -X enter to MDS { -LSTM Encoder { -Features extraction, -Reduce the dimensions, -Fixed length } -Get latent space representation Z -LSTM Encoder { -Reconstruction of the data } -Calculation of the reconstruction error -If S > our set threshold -This is Malware { -Issuing the alarm until it is prevented from entering. -Take benefit from the features of malware that are targeted IoT in research and studies. } -Else -Normal { -Are the protocols compatible with IoT systems? { -Yes { -Cross the intelligent IoT gateway and enter the IoT network. } -No { -Convert its protocols into IoT protocols. { -Cross the intelligent IoT gateway and enter the IoT network. } } } } } } |
- B.
- Second Scenario: Secured RoMADS Device
Algorithm 2: Data come from another IoT device in same IoT network. |
Input: Output: Malware or Normal -Is the device built with a security layer that contains the malware detection system? { -Yes { - Continue, } -No { - Connect device to IoT SAP, - Continue, } -X enter to MDS { -LSTM Encoder { -Features extraction, -Reduce the dimensions, -Fixed length } -Get latent space representation Z -LSTM Encoder { -Reconstruction of the data } -Calculation of the reconstruction error -If S > our set threshold -This is Malware { -Issuing the alarm until it is prevented from entering. -Take benefit from the features of malware that are targeted IoT in research and studies. } -Else -Normal { -Connect to other IoT device. } } } |
8. Experiment Results and Discussion
8.1. Simulation Assumptions
8.2. Simulation Scenario
- Communication Objects: It is a term referring to the communication between the smartphone, the smart refrigerator, the smart supermarket system, as well as the bank to deduct the amount.
- Smartphone: RoMADS MDS is integrated on the same device because it is considered a smart device with high capabilities. The Smartphone may become connected to the same network with the smart refrigerator or any other network.
- Smart Refrigerator: RoMADS MDS is not integrated in the same device because of the smart refrigerator’s lack of security mechanisms. So, it connects to the IoT SAP for security mechanisms. It may become connected to the same network with the smartphone or any other network.
- Smart Supermarket System: The smart supermarket has its own IoT network, which contains smart RoMADS gateways with RoMADS MDS built into it. So, anything that has already been examined and checked is allowed to enter the IoT network or communicate with it.
- The Bank and Credit Card Information: The bank has its own IoT network, which contains smart RoMADS gateways with RoMADS MDS built into it. So, anything that has been already examined and checked is allowed to enter the IoT network or communicate with it. All users’ information must be fully encrypted and connected with a strong authentication software to ensure the user’s identity, and to make sure that they will not be breached or violated. This kind of network is classified among the highest level of security in our framework.
8.3. Case Study
8.4. Simulation Environment
8.5. Result and Discussion
9. Conclusions
- (1)
- It presents the state-of-the-art research and studies related to our study.
- (2)
- Proposed a solution based on DL techniques which is RoMADS framework, in order to improve the security and protection from malware.
- (3)
- Presented RoMADS framework architecture that combines fog computing architecture with IoT social architecture. The fog computing architecture gives RoMADS framework the concept of distrusting the load on a number of smart gateways and smart sensors, which contributes to improving the time consuming aspect. The IoT social architecture works in a similar manner to the social relations between humans and, consequently, puts preventive security measures accordingly. This helps in improving the performance of real-time systems.
- (4)
- To reduce the energy and time consumed, RoMADS framework checks and converts the traditional protocols to IoT protocols for all the packages coming to the IoT system.
- (5)
- RoMADS framework has the ability to deal with the sequential of data with different lengths. It works to reduce the dimensions, remove the noise, and extract the main features.
- (6)
- RoMADS framework has the ability to remember and store the important features of data for a long time, which contributes to obtaining an intelligent model that has a high capacity of detection, understanding, and analysis.
- (7)
- RoMADS framework helps to exploit the devices currently available on markets by adapting and exploiting them in IoT environments. This helps to speed up the transition to smart IoT environments, which provides a comfortable and healthy life for humanity.
- (8)
- RoMADS model results were as follows: 99.03% for Accuracy, 99.99% for Recall & Detection rate, 99.00% for F1-Score, 99.04% for Precision, 0.0096% for MAE, 0.0096 for MSE, and 0.0980 for RMSE.
- (9)
- The RoMADS model experiment results surpassed eighteen models of previous research works related to this field. RoMADS framework is scalable, evolvable, and adaptable when it is applied in different real IoT environments.
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
IoT | Internet of Things |
Ref. | References |
MDS | Malware Detection System |
ADS | Anomaly Detection System |
ML | Machine Learning |
ANN | Artificial Neural Network |
CNN | Convolutional Neural Network |
Ars | Association Rules |
DL | Deep Learning |
DBN | Deep Belief Network |
DNN | Deep Neural Network |
LSTM | Long Short-Term Memory |
GAN | Generative Adversarial Network |
KNN | K-Nearest Neighbor |
NB | Naive Bayes |
PCA | Principal Component Analysis |
SAEs | Neural Network-Stacked AutoEncoders |
RNN | Recurrent Neural Network |
SVMs | Support Vector Machines |
LSTM | Long Short-Term Memory |
MAE | Mean Absolute Error |
MSE | Mean Square Error |
RMSE | Root Mean Square Error |
DT | Decision Tree |
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Ref. | Proposed Solutions | Techniques | ML/DL | Detection Approaches | Dataset | Scalability | Result |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[25] | MDS based on DL called BDLF, which combines behavior graphs of API calls with the SAEs model. | SAEs, DT, KNN, NB, and SVM | DL, ML | Anomaly | Collected the dataset sample by VX Heaven | The system is scalable due to its dependence cloud | The results of the experiment showed an improvement in the detection precision of the model. |
[26] | Using Fuzzy pattern and the fast Fuzzy pattern for MDS | Fuzzy pattern | ML | Anomaly | They used four datasets, which are IoT, Vx-Heaven, Kaggle, and Ransomware | - | they have proven the effectiveness of their proposed. |
[27] | Converting the binary codes of the malware into images | CNN | DL | Anomaly | Malware image data from Vision Research Lab | - | High accuracy and low loss ratio |
[28] | Building a MDS for Android devices based on SVM | SVM | ML | Anomaly | Create dataset using application in the actual mobile environment | - | The results proved outperforms other ML techniques. |
[29] | Building a MDS for Android devices | Random Forest algorithm | ML | Anomaly | Antimalware dataset | - | Their model has yielded promising results |
[30] | A framework that is a botnet detection system based on two-level DL framework. The first level is responsible for similarity measures in the DNS services based on a predefined threshold to deter the most common DNS information over Ethernet connections. In the second level, they proposed to add an algorithm for a domain generation depending on DL architectures to use it for classifying the domain names into normal and abnormal ones. | Number of DL techniques | DL | Anomaly | The similarity checker dataset is called DS1, and the DGA detection dataset is called DS2. | Highly scalable due to use the DNS big data. | The result of their experiment ensured the improvements in detection rate, F1-score, and false alarm rate. |
Features | Type |
---|---|
sourceID | String [] |
sourceAddress | String [] |
sourceType | String [] |
sourceLocation | String [] |
destinationServiceAddress | String [] |
destinationServiceType | String [] |
destinationLocation | String [] |
accessedNodeAddress | String [] |
accessedNodeType | String [] |
operation | String [] |
value | String [] |
timestamp | Integer [] |
normality | String [] |
Features | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
sourceID | String [] | The ID of the source. |
sourceAddress | String [] | The Address of the source. |
destinationServiceAddress | String [] | The Address of the destination Service. |
accessedNodeAddress | String [] | The Address of the accessed Node. |
value | String [] | The value of the package. |
normality | String [] | This column contains normal and six different types of malware. We used it as a target column. |
Ref. | Classifier | Accuracy (%) | Recall & Detection Rate (%) | F1-Score (%) | Precision (%) | Error Value | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
MAE | MSE | RMSE | ||||||
[25] | SAE-DT | - | 99.2 | 98.9 | 98.6 | - | - | - |
[46] | DBN | 96.76 | 97.84 | - | 95.77 | - | - | - |
[47] | Random forst | 89.03 | 98.0 | 94.2 | 98.0 | 0.1097 | - | - |
[47] | SVM | 85.43 | 85.5 | 85.4 | 85.3 | 0.1532 | - | - |
[48] | ANN | 86.0 | - | - | - | - | 0.041 | 0.202 |
[49] | Neural Network | 91.14 | 95.01 | 93.32 | - | - | - | 0.3983 |
[49] | Multiple Association Rule | 66.70 | 78.84 | 79.74 | - | - | - | 0.5747 |
[49] | Bayesian | 84.11 | 94.89 | 85.98 | 0.1695 | 0.3668 | ||
[50] | RNN (LSTM) | 94.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
[51] | CNN | 94.0 | 94.67 | - | - | - | ||
[52] | Deep autoencoder (DAE + GAN) | 95.74 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
[53] | Neural Networks | 75.93 | 73.33 | 67.01 | 61.68 | - | - | - |
[54] | ARI-LSTM | 93.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
[55] | CNN | 96.6 | 98.4 | 96.2 | 94.0 | - | - | - |
[55] | DNN | 91.0 | 91.1 | 90.9 | 90.6 | - | - | - |
[56] | DBN—decision tree | 96.0 | - | 96.0 | - | - | - | - |
[57] | CNN | 94.5 | 94.5 | - | 94.6 | - | - | - |
[58] | RNN | 96.01 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
The proposed model RoMADS | AE-LSTM | 99.0385720855369 | 99.99709795841374 | 99.00 | 99.0414187577247 | 0.00961427914463095 | 0.00961427914463095 | 0.09805243059012331 |
With Shifting | Without Shifting | |
---|---|---|
Epoch | 200 | 200 |
Timesteps | 5 | 5 |
Batch size | 64 | 64 |
LSTM Layer 1 | (None, 5, 32) | (None, 5, 32) |
LSTM Layer 2 | (None, 16) | (None, 16) |
LSTM Layer 3 | (None, 5, 16) | (None, 5, 16) |
LSTM Layer 4 | (None, 5, 32) | (None, 5, 32) |
ACC (%) | 99.0385720855369 | 97.22854708257086 |
TPR (%) | 99.99709795841374 | 1.0 |
PPV (%) | 99.0414187577247 | 97.2285083675579 |
Recall (%) | 99.0 | 97.0 |
F1-score (%) | 99.0 | 96.0 |
MAE | 0.00961427914463095 | 0.027714529174291423 |
MSE | 0.00961427914463095 | 0.027714529174291423 |
RMSE | 0.09805243059012331 | 0.16647681272264742 |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Epoch | 200 | 400 | 90 | 1 |
Timesteps | 5 | 5 | 5 | 1 |
Batch Size | 64 | 64 | 64 | 32 |
LSTM Layer 1 | (None, 5, 32) | (None, 5, 32) | (None, 5, 64) | (None, 5, 32) |
LSTM Layer 2 | (None, 16) | (None, 16) | (None, 32) | (None, 16) |
LSTM Layer 3 | (None, 5, 16) | (None, 5, 16) | (None, 5, 32) | (None, 5, 16) |
LSTM Layer 4 | (None, 5, 32) | (None, 5, 32) | (None, 5, 64) | (None, 5, 32) |
ACC | 99.0385720855369 | 99.0385720855369 | 99.0385720855369 | 99.0385720855369 |
TPR | 99.99709795841374 | 99.99709795841374 | 99.99709795841374 | 99.99709795841374 |
Precision | 99.0414187577247 | 99.0414187577247 | 99.0414187577247 | 99.0414187577247 |
Recall | 99.00 | 99.00 | 99.00 | 99.00 |
F1-Score | 99.00 | 99.00 | 99.00 | 99.00 |
MAE | 0.00961427914463095 | 0.00958553690503564 | 0.009599908024833294 | 0.009700366458288425 |
MSE | 0.00961427914463095 | 0.00958553690503564 | 0.009599908024833294 | 0.009700366458288425 |
RMSE | 0.09805243059012331 | 0.09790575521916799 | 0.09797912035139576 | 0.09849043841047934 |
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Talal, H.; Zagrouba, R. A Robust Framework for MADS Based on DL Techniques on the IoT. Electronics 2021, 10, 2723. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10212723
Talal H, Zagrouba R. A Robust Framework for MADS Based on DL Techniques on the IoT. Electronics. 2021; 10(21):2723. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10212723
Chicago/Turabian StyleTalal, Hussah, and Rachid Zagrouba. 2021. "A Robust Framework for MADS Based on DL Techniques on the IoT" Electronics 10, no. 21: 2723. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10212723
APA StyleTalal, H., & Zagrouba, R. (2021). A Robust Framework for MADS Based on DL Techniques on the IoT. Electronics, 10(21), 2723. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10212723