The Regulatory Framework for Safety Management Systems in Airworthiness Organisations
Abstract
:1. Introduction to Safety and Safety Management Systems in Aviation
- the technical era (from the early days of aviation until the 1960s) where safety deficiencies were mainly attributed to technological failures,
- the human factors era (from the 1970s to the 1990s) when the focus of safety extended to include human factors issues, most notably human-human and human-machine interfaces, and
- the organisational era (from the 1990s to the present), encompassing organisational factors in addition to human and technical factors.
2. An Overview of the ICAO Framework for SMS
- Approved Training Organisations that operate in accordance with Annex 1.
- Operators of airplanes or helicopters authorized to conduct international commercial air transport in accordance with Annex 6, Part I or Part III (section II).
- Approved Maintenance Organisations, providing services to operators of airplanes or helicopters engaged in international air transport in accordance with Annex 6, Part I or Part III (section II).
- Organisations responsible for the type design or manufacture of aircraft, engines or propellers in accordance with Annex 8.
- Air Traffic Services (ATS) providers in accordance with Annex 11.
- Operators of certified aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14, Volume I.
- Safety policy and objectives
- 1.1.
- Management commitment
- 1.2.
- Safety accountability and responsibilities
- 1.3.
- Appointment of key safety personnel
- 1.4.
- Coordination of emergency response planning
- 1.5.
- SMS documentation
- Safety risk management
- 2.1.
- Hazard identification
- 2.2.
- Safety risk assessment and mitigation
- Safety assurance
- 3.1.
- Safety performance monitoring and measurement
- 3.2.
- The management of change
- 3.3.
- Continuous improvement of the SMS
- Safety promotion
- 4.1.
- Training and education
- 4.2.
- Safety communication
3. Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SM-ICG)
4. Status of Regulation and Implementation of SMS—A Global Review
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Australia [37],
- Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA), Australia [36],
- European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Union [38],
- European Defence Agency (EDA), European Union [39],
- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United States [40],
- Transport Canada (TC), Canada [43]
4.1. EASA
- Phase I—Introduction of SMS requirements in Part-M Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation,
- Phase II—Introduction of SMS requirements in Part-145 Maintenance Organisations and Part-21 Design and Production Organisation.
4.2. FAA
4.3. CASA
4.4. DASA
5. Challenges of SMS Implementation in Organisations Involved in Airworthiness
- Existing research on human error management techniques, tools and error investigation decision aids are mainly in the context of functions related to operational environments [13]. Further research needs to be conducted to develop techniques and tools that are more appropriate for airworthiness organisations and specifically applicable for design organisations.
- Protection of safety data, safety information and related sources, considering the sensitivity of data has not been adequately addressed by all regulators. SMS data could be made public or be required to be produced in civil litigation. ICAO standing is broadly addressed by the “Code of Conduct on the Sharing and Use of Safety Information” documented in the GASP and supplemented by the “Principles for the protection of safety data, safety information and related sources” in Annex 19. Sharing of data should consider the balance between the benefit of sharing versus any adverse effects such as loss of reputation of the organisation, and reduced marketability of services and products.
- Lack of sufficient safety reports or feedback that affect safety due to various reasons including lack of just culture or reporting culture within either own organisation, or external interfacing organisations.
- Deficiencies in reporting processes, data management systems, and data analysis tools to make optimal use of safety data.
- The need to have an integrated approach, with flexibility to integrate existing and proposed programs on safety, quality, security management, and systems engineering to avoid duplication but still ensuring the framework of SMSs are maintained within the context of the airworthiness organisation.
- Service providers interface with other organisations, and the interface management requirements.
- The cost burden of additional resources to be allocated to implement SMSs and related activities such as SMS gap analysis, SMS implementation plans, development of organisational procedures, interface management procedures, human resources for new roles, and responsibilities under the SMS and for the provision of SMS training to all staff involved in the processes that affect safety. Cost is dependent on the size and complexity of the organisation and the types of operations and functions carried out by the organisation.
- Lack of guidance material available for establishing safety targets and safety performance indicators specific for each organisation and operating context.
6. Benefits of SMS Implementation in Airworthiness Organisations
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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CASA | DASA | EASA | EDA | FAA | USAF | TC | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SSP Implemented | Yes | N/A | Some States under EU | N/A | Yes | N/A | Yes |
Regulation on SMS | Various CAO, AC, and CAAP 1 | DASR SMS | 2018/1139 (As Management Systems which include safety risk management) | Work in Progress | FAR Part 5 | Air Force SMS—AFI 91-202 | CAR Part 1—Subpart 7 |
Approved Flight or Pilot Training Organisations | No Published Information | No Published Information | Regulated (for ATPL-MPL-CPL and Type Rating) 2 | Voluntary Implementation-Pending Regulation | SMS is Integrated into USAF Mishap Prevention Program applicable to USAF MAJCOMs/FOAs/DRU | No Published Information | |
Approved Maintenance Training Organisations | No Published Information | No Published Information | Rulemaking in process | Voluntary Implementation-Pending Regulation | No Published Information | ||
Commercial Air Transport Operators or Military Operators (as applicable) | Regulated | Regulated | Regulated as a requirement for Management System | Regulated | Regulated | ||
Approved Maintenance Organisations | Regulated | Regulated | Rulemaking in process | Voluntary Implementation-Pending Regulation | Regulated | ||
Approved Design & Production Organisations | No Published Information | Regulated | Rulemaking in process | Voluntary Implementation-Pending Regulation | Rulemaking in process | ||
Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations (CAMO) | No Published Information | Regulated | Rulemaking in process | Not Applicable | No Published Information | ||
Air Traffic/Air Navigation Service Providers | Regulated | Rulemaking in process | Regulated | Regulated | Regulated | ||
Aerodrome Operators and Airport Operators | Regulated | Rulemaking in process | Regulated | Voluntary Implementation-Pending Regulation | Regulated |
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Batuwangala, E.; Silva, J.; Wild, G. The Regulatory Framework for Safety Management Systems in Airworthiness Organisations. Aerospace 2018, 5, 117. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace5040117
Batuwangala E, Silva J, Wild G. The Regulatory Framework for Safety Management Systems in Airworthiness Organisations. Aerospace. 2018; 5(4):117. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace5040117
Chicago/Turabian StyleBatuwangala, Eranga, Jose Silva, and Graham Wild. 2018. "The Regulatory Framework for Safety Management Systems in Airworthiness Organisations" Aerospace 5, no. 4: 117. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace5040117
APA StyleBatuwangala, E., Silva, J., & Wild, G. (2018). The Regulatory Framework for Safety Management Systems in Airworthiness Organisations. Aerospace, 5(4), 117. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace5040117