Exploring the Impact of Political Patronage Networks on Financial Stability: Lebanon’s 2019 Economic Crisis
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Defining Political Patronage Networks
2.2. Understanding Crony Capitalism and Its Implications for Lebanon
2.3. New Institutional Economics (NIE)
2.4. Theoretical Justification of Interrelationships
- 1.
- Institutional Environment and Political Patronage
- 2.
- Rule of Law and Corruption Levels
- 3.
- Corruption Levels and Economic Development
- 4.
- Political Patronage and Economic Development
- 5.
- Institutional Environment and Economic Development
2.5. Integrating Project Management, New Institutional Economics, and Economic Theories for Effective Governance Reforms
- World Bank Projects: The World Bank often employs PM principles to manage its development projects. For instance, the implementation of infrastructure projects in developing countries requires meticulous planning, stakeholder engagement, and continuous monitoring—core aspects of PM.
- Public Sector Reforms: Many public sector reform initiatives, such as those in the health and education sectors, have utilized PM techniques to ensure successful implementation. These reforms are treated as projects with defined objectives, timelines, and resource allocations.
- Anti-Corruption Programs: In countries like Georgia and Singapore, comprehensive anti-corruption programs have been implemented using PM frameworks. These programs involve setting clear goals, developing detailed action plans, managing resources efficiently, and continuously monitoring progress, all of which are fundamental PM practices.
- The Keynesian Theory of Aggregate Demand delves into the fluctuations of domestic and foreign demand, shaping economic output and employment dynamics (Foster 2013). Leveraging this theory enables the identification of barriers to project implementation while aligning interventions with prevailing economic conditions.
- The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments underscores the critical influence of exchange rates and monetary policies on a nation’s balance of payments (Murad 2022). Deliberate consideration of transaction costs and incentives is paramount for optimizing decision-making processes and resource allocations.
3. Lebanon’s Economic Crisis
4. Political Patronage Networks in Lebanon and the Impacts
4.1. Role of Political Elites in Economic Decision Making
4.2. Interconnectedness between Political and Financial Interests
4.3. Case Studies and Insights from Interviews
- 1.
- Influence of Political Actors on Financial Policies
- 2.
- Role of Patronage Networks in Banking Sector Governance
- 3.
- Impact of Corruption on Financial Institutions
4.4. Insights from Interview Analysis of Lebanon’s Financial Crisis
5. Methodology
5.1. Data Collection Methods
- Literature Review and Document Analysis: A comprehensive review of primary and secondary sources, including government documents, policy reports, media articles, and academic literature, was conducted to contextualize the findings of the study. Document analysis provided valuable insights into historical trends, policy trajectories, and institutional dynamics shaping Lebanon’s economic crisis.
- In-Depth Interviews: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders to elicit insights, perspectives, and firsthand accounts of the functioning of political patronage networks in Lebanon. Interviews were tailored to explore participants’ experiences, observations, and analyses of the intersection between political power dynamics and economic decision making.
- Selection of Participants: In total, 22 individuals were interviewed, as represented in Table 2, based on their expertise, knowledge, and experience relevant to Lebanon’s political and economic landscape. Key informants included policymakers, economists, academics, and individuals with firsthand experience of or insights into the workings of political patronage networks and financial networks, including deputies in Parliament. NVivo facilitated systematic organization and analysis of qualitative data, unveiling patterns and relationships within the dataset.
- Case Studies: In-depth case studies were employed to examine specific instances of political patronage networks within Lebanon’s economic landscape, shedding light on their mechanisms and consequences.
5.2. Integrating Insights: Synthesizing Findings
6. Analysis: Economic Challenges and Implications
6.1. Governance Paralysis in the Shadow of Crony Capitalism
6.2. Financial Fragility: Navigating the Nexus of Political and Financial Interests
6.3. Obstacles to Reform and Accountability Mechanisms
7. Recommendations and Conclusions
7.1. Conclusions
7.2. Recommendations
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Event | Analysis | Conclusion | Roadmap to Reforms |
---|---|---|---|
Airport Duty-Free Extension | The extension of Phoenicia Aer Rianta Co.’s contract at Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport has raised eyebrows due to its stark contrast with the previous agreement. While the new contract is valued at LBP 1.9 trillion per year, significantly lower than the previous LBP 150 billion per year, the actual amount received by PAC Duty-Free is considerably higher. This discrepancy, along with InterWorld’s bid of LBP 1 trillion, underscores potential irregularities in the bidding process and raises questions about the factors driving the substantial increase in value of Mohamed Zeidan’s company. | The extension raises questions about potential political patronage in contract decisions. | The extension underscores the need for transparency and fairness in economic agreements, highlighting the impact of political patronage on governance. |
IMF Transfers Since 2021 | Lebanon’s allocation of USD 1.139 billion in special drawing rights (SDRs) in September 2021, followed by USD 1.63 billion spent with only USD 76 million remaining, has raised corruption concerns. Despite a Finance Ministry breakdown, transparency issues prompted a Parliamentary investigation. Key concerns include separate account creation and undocumented spending justifications, indicating questionable practices. The absence of an audit response heightens suspicions of fund misuse. While the government cites COVID-19 needs for spending, the committee aims to prevent future violations, emphasizing accountability. | Suspected irregularities in fund allocation raise concerns about political patronage. | Accountability is paramount in financial management; policies should prevent political influence in fund allocation. |
Libanpost Management Decision | Recently, in November 2023, the decision to persist with Libanpost’s management despite the successful bid by Merit-Colis Prive highlights the chronic issues of non-compliance, inefficiency, and opaque decision making prevalent within Lebanon’s public sector. The extension of the Libanpost contract, despite its expiration in 2019 and the subsequent successful bid by a well-established French company, not only underscores the country’s governance challenges but also signals the potential impact of political influences on such crucial matters. The rejection of the bid results, allegedly influenced by political connections, further perpetuates the status quo, leading to continuous losses for the public treasury and hindering potential investment that could have revitalized the postal sector. | The decision suggests potential political influence, hindering fair competition. | Fair competition must be ensured in public sector bids; governance reforms should curb political influences in decision making. |
Electricity Sector Corruption | Excessive cash transfers totaling USD 14 billion to Electricity du Liban from 2010 to 2018, averaging 3.8% of Lebanon’s GDP annually, have strained the government budget, reflect EDL’s inability to sustain itself, and raise concerns about corruption within the electricity sector, posing severe economic consequences for the country. Corruption in the sector is worsened by EDL’s exploitation by political elites, who use it to provide free electricity to their supporters, resulting in 55% of uncollected bills. Additionally, 45% of the electricity generated by EDL remains unbilled, indicating the systematic corruption within the system. | Political patronage contributes to corruption and inefficiencies in the electricity sector. | Structural reforms are necessary to combat corruption and ensure transparency in governance; political influence must be curbed. |
Financial Engineering Scheme | This scheme in Lebanon, akin to a Ponzi Scheme, deeply influenced the nation’s financial landscape and economic stability. Acting as a mediator, the Central Bank orchestrated swaps of sovereign bonds between commercial banks and the government to address public debt and bolster foreign currency reserves. Notably, swaps involved buying Eurobonds in foreign currency from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and selling Certificates of Deposits (CDs) and Eurobonds to commercial banks (Bitar 2021). This mechanism attracted foreign currency deposits, predominantly in USD, which were then recycled, leading to a significant increase in sovereign risk and balance sheet expansions for both the Central Bank and commercial banks (IMF 2020). The surge in bank assets and liabilities, evident in the provided data, reflects the extent of financial engineering activities during the period. However, challenges emerged as trust waned and foreign currency inflows dwindled, disrupting the scheme and exposing the Central Bank to negative carry on its foreign currency borrowing (IMF 2020). This disruption underscores the vulnerability of Lebanon’s financial system and the risks associated with unsustainable financial practices. | Political influence may have played a role in sustaining flawed financial engineering. | Sustainable financial practices are essential; governance reforms should prioritize transparency and accountability to prevent political influence. |
Participant Group | Selection Criteria | Number of Participants |
---|---|---|
Policymakers | Individuals with expertise in Lebanon’s political and economic landscape, policymakers, and deputies in Parliament. | 5 |
Economists | Professionals with extensive knowledge of economic structures, trends, and challenges in Lebanon. | 7 |
Academics | Scholars specializing in Lebanon’s political and economic context, possessing insights into the functioning of patronage networks. | 7 |
Key Informants | Individuals with firsthand experience of or insights into the workings of political patronage networks, including those linked to financial networks. | 3 |
Total | 22 |
Phase | Practical Steps |
---|---|
Phase 1 | Conduct Inclusive National Consultations: Organize forums, town hall meetings, and online platforms to gather input from citizens across various regions and demographics. Engage with marginalized groups to ensure their voices are included in the vision for governance reform. Engage Diverse Stakeholders: Form a coalition of political leaders, civil society organizations, private sector representatives, and international partners to guide the consultation process. Facilitate workshops and seminars to build consensus among stakeholders on key reform objectives. |
Phase 2 | Set Up an Independent Anti-Corruption Commission: Draft and enact legislation that ensures the commission's autonomy from political interference. Recruit commissioners through a transparent and merit-based process, involving input from civil society and international experts. Provide adequate funding and resources to enable the commission to operate effectively. Strengthen the Electoral Commission's Independence: Amend electoral laws to grant the commission full control over election administration, free from government influence. Implement strict rules for political party financing and transparent reporting of campaign expenditures. Reform the Judicial Appointment Process: Establish independent judicial councils to oversee the appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges. Ensure a transparent selection process with input from the legal community and civil society. Increase funding for the judiciary to improve its capacity and independence. |
Phase 3 | Implement Transparency Protocols: Require public officials to declare their assets and income periodically, with these declarations made publicly accessible. Introduce open data initiatives to make government spending and procurement processes transparent. Develop a robust legal framework to protect whistleblowers who expose corruption. Introduce Stricter Campaign Financing Regulations: Cap individual and corporate donations to political parties and candidates. Mandate detailed and timely reporting of all campaign contributions and expenditures. Establish an independent oversight body to monitor compliance and enforce penalties for violations. Decentralize Power: Transfer specific powers and resources to local governments, ensuring they have the autonomy to make decisions. Create capacity-building programs to strengthen the administrative and financial management skills of local officials. Develop accountability mechanisms to monitor the use of devolved funds and prevent local-level patronage. |
Phase 4 | - Transition to proportional representation and encourage non-sectarian political parties. - Advocate for constitutional reforms to support proportional representation and reduce sectarian influence, aiming to mitigate the impact of political patronage. - Allocate budget resources to these sectors and establish monitoring mechanisms to ensure effective use of funds, targeting reduction of patronage networks' influence. |
Phase 5 | Increase Funding for Education and Healthcare: Allocate a significant portion of the national budget to education and healthcare, prioritizing underserved areas. Implement transparent and merit-based processes for the allocation of scholarships and healthcare subsidies. Create Empowerment Programs for Youth and Women: Develop mentorship and entrepreneurship programs to enhance the skills and opportunities for youth and women. Establish quotas or incentives for the inclusion of youth and women in political and economic leadership positions. Partner with NGOs and international organizations to provide funding and technical support for these initiatives. |
Phase 6 | Enhance International Partnerships: Sign agreements with international organizations to receive technical assistance and funding for anti-corruption initiatives. Participate in global forums and networks to share best practices and learn from successful reform experiences in other countries. Adopt Global Best Practices: Form expert committees to review and recommend the adoption of international standards in governance and economic management. Pilot best practice initiatives in selected sectors before scaling them nationally. Regularly update national policies to align with evolving global standards and practices. |
Phase 7 | Establish a Performance Management System: Develop key performance indicators (KPIs) to track the progress of governance reforms. Set up independent audit bodies to conduct regular evaluations and publish their findings. Utilize data analytics to identify trends and areas for improvement. Regularly Review and Update Reform Strategies: Form a governance reform task force responsible for continuous monitoring and evaluation. Engage in regular public consultations to gather feedback and adjust strategies accordingly. Ensure transparency and accountability in the review process by making all reports and updates publicly accessible. |
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Share and Cite
Abou Ltaif, S.; Mihai-Yiannaki, S. Exploring the Impact of Political Patronage Networks on Financial Stability: Lebanon’s 2019 Economic Crisis. Economies 2024, 12, 183. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12070183
Abou Ltaif S, Mihai-Yiannaki S. Exploring the Impact of Political Patronage Networks on Financial Stability: Lebanon’s 2019 Economic Crisis. Economies. 2024; 12(7):183. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12070183
Chicago/Turabian StyleAbou Ltaif, Samar, and Simona Mihai-Yiannaki. 2024. "Exploring the Impact of Political Patronage Networks on Financial Stability: Lebanon’s 2019 Economic Crisis" Economies 12, no. 7: 183. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12070183
APA StyleAbou Ltaif, S., & Mihai-Yiannaki, S. (2024). Exploring the Impact of Political Patronage Networks on Financial Stability: Lebanon’s 2019 Economic Crisis. Economies, 12(7), 183. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12070183