Social Justice in Scottish Education? Revisiting the Question

Abstract

Social justice is a key value within Scottish education and is listed as one of four professional values within the General Teaching Council for Scotland’s (GTCS) professional standards. This paper uses the work of Nancy Fraser to question what is meant by social justice within Scottish education. Parallels are drawn between the conception of social justice as presented within the Standard for Registration and the work of Fraser, highlighting the relevance of a professional standard that seeks to orientate professionals towards social justice rather than codify the practice in reference to a single scale on which all matters of justice should be weighed. Following this, the Getting it Right for Every Child policy (GIRFEC) is problematized to demonstrate the dangers of mis-framing. This paper ends by connecting the concept of professional orientation towards justice as indicated within the Standard for Registration to Aristotle’s idea of sensibilities and phronêsis.

1. Introduction

Social Justice is one of the four values listed within the professional standards set out by the General Teaching Council for Scotland [1] and as such is a value that Scottish educators must professionally enact, but what does it mean in practice [2,3]? The coming examples illustrate the difficulty in identifying and enacting justice within a social arena where interpretations of social justice may differ. Given the diversity of views, how can a class teacher, school leader or teacher educator make socially just judgements, or have confidence in those judgements? How can the professional community enact a quality that appears so complex and what does it mean for a profession if one of its central values is not easily understood? These challenges call into question both the substance of justice (the ‘what’) and the process by which justice can be enacted (the ‘how’). Drawing upon the work of Nancy Fraser [4,5,6,7], this paper aims to explore the question ‘What do we mean by social justice within Scottish Education?’, furthering ongoing discussion regarding the need for conceptual clarity regarding core terminology, such that practitioners, researchers, and policy makers can engage effectively and in coordinated ways [8,9].

The discussion in this paper will be guided by a critical investigation of two key sources within the Scottish Education landscape: The GTCS Standard for Full Registration [1] as an articulation of professional standards and Getting it Right for Every Child [10] as an example of a core policy. A critical investigation of these sources will be connected to the realities of daily life in school via interactions with the following two vignettes. Veugelers and Vedder [11] argue that moral values such as justice obtain their real meaning in contexts, identifying the distinction between a broad agreement regarding the desirability of justice as a virtue and specific agreement regarding what justice may entail or require in any given situation [12]. These vignettes are not constructed from data gathered from empirical research. They are constructed by the authors who worked as teachers in Scotland. While these vignettes are based on real-life events and situations, they are made up of multiple experiences which were re-storied. The vignettes were shared with several practicing teachers for their feedback and comments and were modified accordingly. As such, these vignettes will be revisited through this paper as a method for reflecting on the complexities inherent to both general and specific questions of social justice within Scottish education.

A primary school teacher has been working with a child who has been continually disrupting the other three children at their table when it is time to work. After unsuccessfully trying a number of approaches, the teacher and the child agree that during ‘writing time’ the child will work at a table by themselves, both to help them focus and complete their work and to allow the other children to do the same. At all other times, the pupil may sit with their group. It is also agreed that the pupil can try working back at their table with the aim being that the child learns how to successfully complete their work while sitting with others. The class teacher feels that this is a just approach, considering the needs of the group and the individual child. However, the child’s parents meet with the teacher to complain that their child is being treated unjustly and demand that they are moved back to work at the group table for all jobs. The class teacher experiences the parents’ disapproval keenly but nevertheless believes that the path they have taken to be appropriate. The class teacher reflects on the complexity of the situation with a colleague, noting the different, competing ideas of what ‘just’ would look like.

A Depute Head Teacher struggles to decide whether or not a pupil should be allowed to attend a three-day residential trip. Throughout the academic year, the pupil has been consistently violent and aggressive in class and in the playground, often hurting and or intimidating other children. The pupil’s behavior has often disrupted lessons, meaning that other children have missed learning opportunities. Staff within the school do not feel confident in their ability to successfully manage this child’s behavior and worry that the child’s potential disruptive behavior may negatively impact other children’s residential experience. In addition, the Depute has also received several parental complaints regarding this child’s behavior and its impact on other children. The general feeling within the teaching staff is that it would not be just/fair to allow this pupil to attend due to the potential of negatively impacting the trip for the other children, especially those who would share a room with the pupil. The Depute is mindful of issues of inclusion, equity, the impact of disadvantage and the benefits of a restorative rather than punitive approach and struggles with the competing demands for justice. Once again, the Depute finds themselves questioning what it means to ‘get it right for every child’.

This paper will argue that despite the freedom of a dynamic and participatory definition of social justice, there are frameworks, some of which are invisible, that limit and/or obscure the democratic functioning of social justice and may, at times enact instances of injustice. We recognisê that, as members of the education community, we are located within these complexities; indeed, the two introductory examples are the authors’ own stories and reflect the challenges we face in navigating this complex space. This will be further explored in the conclusion of this paper, where we discuss the Aristotelian concept of phronêsis as a possible way forward in enacting social justice.

Prior to considering the specific context of Scottish education, it is necessary to first present a brief overview of some of the key points raised by Fraser [6], as these ideas will both provide the critical tools for this investigation and shape the grammar of the discussion.

2. Introducing Nancy Fraser’s Theory of Justice

The coming section will provide an outline of Fraser’s theory of justice, starting with a broad summary of Fraser’s critique outlined via an exploration of two symbols: the scales of justice and a map. Following this, a more detailed discussion will explore the three dimensions of Fraser’s theory of justice [6], those being representation, recognition, and distribution. Discussions around justice are highly sophisticated and complex; as such, it is beyond the scope of this article to fully capture the depth and nuance of Fraser’s work. Instead, a clear overview will be shared that is sufficient to engage with the question at hand—what is meant by social justice in Scottish education.

2.1. The Scales of Justice

Fraser [6] offers a critique of the concept of justice through an investigation of the associated iconography, which is the scales of justice and a map. Through the iconography of the scales of justice, Fraser calls into question the possibility of an impartial judge, arguing that the image of a single set of scales on which all claims can be weighed is a relic of a time when a canon of ontological assumptions as to the nature of the world, morality, and ‘the good’ were common and formed the underlying ‘grammar’ of justice discourse. By this critique, Fraser argues that ideologically we have moved on from a shared understanding of the substance (the ‘what’) of justice to a new ontologically diverse context, which manifests competing views as to the ‘what’ of justice. In the absence of a shared ontological worldview, Fraser questions whether the conventional ideal of impartiality present within the image of the scales of justice is now incoherent, noting that present-day claims for justice routinely run up against counterclaims whose underlying ontological assumptions are not shared. Indeed, while Fraser notes that the ‘most general meaning of justice is parity of participation’ [6] (p. 16), the presence of competing claims as to the ‘what’ of justice illustrates that the envisioned social arrangements necessary to bring about this parity of participation are complex and much contested.

Fraser begins her exploration of the ‘what’ of justice by presenting a two-dimensional model, comprised of the economic dimension related to distribution and the cultural dimension related to recognition. Within the economic dimension, Fraser argues that economic injustices of distribution can limit the full parity of participation, such that individuals and/or groups face economic systems that limit or deny access to resources resulting in injustices of distribution or maldistribution. In contrast, injustices within the cultural dimension find their root in misrecognition, where ‘institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value’ [6] (p. 16) bar or limit social standing. In this regard, the ‘what’ of justice appears to be comprised of two parts, the economic dimension related to distribution and the cultural dimension related to recognition; however, Fraser is clear that while these dimensions interact and overlap, they are not equivalent.

Through investigating the image of the scales of justice, Fraser exposes the problem of impartiality via the presence of competing claims regarding the ‘what’ of justice. In this discussion, the diverse conceptions as to the ‘what’ of justice produces significant questions such as ‘How much economic inequality does justice permit, how much redistribution is required, and according to which principle of distributive justice? What constitutes equal respect, which kinds of differences merit public recognition, and by which means?’ [6] (p. 15). However, Fraser is not content to remain pre-occupied with first-order questions regarding the ‘what’ of justice but rather adds an additional dimension to social justice discussions via her introduction of the concept of framing, explored through the image of a map.

2.2. The Map

The cartographic image of the map stands for the problem of framing and considers how the boundaries of justice are delimited; it introduces the political as the third dimension of Fraser’s theory of justice. According to Fraser, the political dimension is concerned with determining ‘who counts’ and as such determines the ‘reach’ [6] (p. 17) of the other dimensions (cultural and economic). In this regard, the political dimension has as its focus ‘issues of membership and procedure … (and as such) … is concerned chiefly with representation’ (p.17). As with the two prior dimensions (economic and cultural), the political dimension enacts its own kind of injustice, which Fraser calls ‘misrepresentation’ and describes the particularly political injustice, whereby issues are wrongly framed such that individuals and groups are not included as valid claimants.

In this analysis, Fraser argues that a ‘Westphalian’ mapping of political space, whereby citizens are members of bounded and individually governed states, is giving way to a more global, trans-territorial approach [6] (p. 2). Fraser offers several causes for this shift, citing sources such as the continued work of trans-national, human rights movements who promote the notion that humans, as humans, hold certain immutable human rights independent of their geographic location. In this, Fraser suggests that the clear distinction between domestic and international space is no longer valid, calls into question the view of territoriality as the sole basis for assigning obligations of justice, and challenges the ‘taken for granted boundaries’ nested within the Westphalian mapping of political space. By ‘denaturalizing’ the Westphalian mapping of political spaces, Fraser problematizes the very process of mapping and invites a critical analysis regarding ‘who counts’ when considering claims for justice; in doing so, she highlights previously unobserved ‘meta-political injustices’ which can arise when the ‘who’ of justice is itself unjustly defined. As such, the central problem associated with the image of the map is how to determine which mapping of the political space is just and consequently ‘who counts’ as a legitimate subject of justice.

By calling into question the ‘who’ of justice, the previously established structures of political claim-making have been destabilized, changing the way we argue about social justice. Where previously arguments focused solely on the ‘what’ of justice, that is, first-order questions of distribution and recognition, arguments now also focus on meta-level and second-order questions regarding “what is the proper frame within which to consider first-order questions of justice” [6] (p. 15). As such, it has become possible to ask ‘Do the boundaries of the political community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation?’ and ‘Do the community’s decision rules accord equally voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members?’ [6] (p. 18). Understanding justice as participatory parity, these questions highlight the potential for the political mapping of space to enact the uniquely political injustice of ‘mis-framing’, whereby individuals or groups are excluded from the territory and, as non-citizens, are unable to take forward claims for justice. As such, Fraser’s three-dimensional theory (economic, cultural, and political) requires an analysis of the ‘who’ of justice as well as the ‘what’. The coming discussion will introduce the final aspect of Fraser’s theory of justice on ‘how’ the ‘who’ of justice is identified.

2.3. The ‘How’ of Justice

Through Fraser’s analysis of images of scales of justice and a map, the following questions emerged: ‘What counts as a bona fide matter of justice’ (the ‘what’ of justice) and ‘Who counts as a bona fide claimant for justice?’ (the ‘who’ of justice) [6] (p. 5). These questions, in turn, gave shape to Fraser’s three-dimensional theory of justice comprised of the economic, the cultural, and the political. However, Fraser contends that investigations as to the ‘who’ of justice produces a ‘third-order, meta-level question, which (she calls) the question of “how”’ [6] (p. 42), how do we identify the ‘who’ of justice, and by what process can more just frames and framing processes be formed? By problematizing the ‘who’ of justice, the previously naturalized and invisible framing was made visible and, as such, open to critique. Fraser argues that the same process must now occur with regards to the invisible ‘who’; who decides the ‘how’ of justice, that is, who is it that is authorized to create the criteria and procedures by which the ‘who’ of justice is established? By asking how the various parties envision the process of deciding on the ‘who’ of justice, Fraser exposes the underlying and previously invisible assumptions regarding the ‘how’ of justice.

According to Fraser, the various factions vying to establish a particular ‘how’ of justice most often do so by employing a form of argumentation, which she describes as “offstage elsewhere” [6] (p. 47), whereby perspectives are presented as if they were settled facts that are known and proved within the social sciences. Fraser points to two key problems with this approach; firstly, that factions all present their perspective via appeals to ‘what is known’, as if these perspectives were settled facts, suggests an oversimplification of what in reality is a highly complex and much contested field. Fraser notes “how precisely such structures interact is by no means well understood by social scientist, whose accounts are mutually contradictory and controversial” [6] (p. 50). Secondly, Fraser argues that appeals to what is known via the social sciences conceals another unargued and unobserved assumption regarding justice, that the social sciences can identify the ‘who’. Asserting without reflection that social science can provide the answer ignores the challenge that social scientists have presented numerous competing answers. As such, the question of ‘how’ one should determine the most effective frame for matters of justice demands the pre-formation of a criterion or procedure to guide the process. This question produces a spiral within the discourse of justice, as once again, the question of ‘who’ emerges, this time in a new aspect, as the ‘who’ in question is the individual or group who will decide the frame. This line of analysis carries well into education, where matters can appear to be resolved by appeals to ‘what is known’ as if this were settled, where in reality complexity permeates much of the discourse.

Having outlined some of the key ideas within Fraser’s critic, the following section will consider how these ideas contribute to the question ‘What do we mean by social justice within Scottish Education?’ considering first the Standard for Full Registration [1] followed by Getting it Right for Every Child [10].

3. Social Justice and the GTCS Standard for Professional Registration

The General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS) Standard for Full Registration locates the professional values of social justice, integrity, trust, and respect and professional commitment ‘at the heart of the professional standards and underpin our relationships, thinking and professional practice’ [1] (p. 4). The centrality of these professional values is further demonstrated in their presence within all five professional standard documents: Standard for Provisional Registration [13], Standard for Full Registration [1], Standard of Career-Long Professional Learning [14] Standards for Middle Leadership [15], and Standard for Headship [16]. These documents function as assessment tools enabling the reviewer to assess whether a Scottish educator, be that probationer, class teacher, or member of management meets the standard. However, rather than offering a definition of any of the professional values such that an assessment may be carried out in contrast, the Standard for Full Registration specifically states that its aim is not to ‘address in detail how judgements will or should be made’ [1] (p. 6). Arguably, this approach reflects the complexity of the practice, where codifying all eventualities would be neither possible nor helpful; as such, it appears as though the document can be conceptualized as a compass, a ‘true north’, allowing a navigation towards a shared goal without mandating specific routes. The suggestion of an orientating tool continues, as the document describes how the standards should allow the reviewer to be ‘reassured that the capabilities described by the professional standard are achieved’ [1] (p. 6). By this, it appears as though the criteria being assessed is not if an individual follows the correct route but rather if an individual is correctly oriented. On one level of analysis, this approach could be argued to reflect the previously acknowledged complexity and diversity of practice, whereby creative and unique responses will be required to address the many and varied challenges faced, and as such asking questions about working towards an appropriate end may be more helpful than questions regarding the specific route taken: Did you take the right path? However, on another level of analysis, the question of what it means to be correctly oriented in the world becomes astonishingly complex. By what ideal does an individual or community orientate themselves and what is the dynamic by which an abstract ideal has the power to orientate an individual or a community, as the magnetic pole draws the needle of a compass? At this level of analysis, the full weight of Fraser’s arguments can be felt, as the very substance of justice becomes something mysterious, something ‘sensed’ more than understood and fully comprehended. Indeed, it is this very uncertainty that has given rise to the debate and disagreement regarding the ‘what’ of justice and the practical end of the symbol of justice as a single scale. It is perhaps to this end that Nataša Pantić [17] suggests that while social justice is widely promoted, desiring justice as a general value is markedly different to agreeing on what justice means or requires.

Within the context of the professional standards, how can a reviewer assess whether an educator is correctly oriented and how can a community of practice be sure that they are working toward justice? Interestingly, the GTCS offer a similar answer to these questions, as Fraser who advocates ‘democratizing’ disputes, offering the democratic process (the ‘how’ of justice) as a proxy answer for the question ‘what is justice?’. Within the Standard for Full Registration [1], social justice is described as ‘the view that everyone deserves equal economic, political and social rights and opportunities now and in the future’ [1] (p. 4). This definition of social justice implies a commitment to democratic processes, where individuals and groups possess equal rights and opportunities. Interestingly, what is implied in the current Standard for Full Registration (ibid) was explicitly stated in the prior Standard for Full Registration [18], where it was written that the enactment of social justice requires ‘committing to the principles of democracy’ (p. 5). Either way, whether explicitly stated or indirectly implied, the successful enactment of social justice within Scottish education appears linked to the democratic process, and while this may shed no extra light onto the ‘what’ of justice, it does offer practical guidance as to the ‘how’. Indeed, it could also be argued that the orienting principle is the democratic process. Perhaps this also goes some way towards explaining the problem of defining justice as a static concept. Asking ‘What is justice?’ reveals the inherent complexities of human existence, as actions that are ‘just’ in one situation may very well be ‘unjust’ in another. In contrast, approaching justice as a fluid concept reveals justice to be more akin to a particular set of enabling circumstances in which, and through which, justice can flourish.

From this reading of the Standard for Full Registration, it appears that social justice within Scottish education can be conceptualized as an orientating principle by which individuals and communities of practice can ‘correctly orientate themselves’ toward the successful enactment of social justice that is achieved via the democratic process. Furthermore, the enactment of a dynamic, democratic, and participatory process through which social justice actions and outcomes can be identified and carried out provides the ideal conditions for the development of phronêsis (this concept will be explored later in the paper), of the knowledge of how to act, or perhaps, more accurately, how to ‘enact’ social justice.

There are clear echoes of Fraser’s analysis present in this reading of the Standard for Full Registration, where the loss of a shared ontological foundation renders the possibility of a single scale (definition) of justice impossible, calling the ‘what’ (the substance) of justice into question. Where the single scale of justice no longer functions as a tool for the delivery of justice, that is, when a simple weighing on a single scale is no longer possible, the process of justice (that is, the ‘how’ of justice) becomes the mechanism by which justice is achieved. Thus, the concept of justice transforms from something static to which we refer to (what is justice?) to some something dynamic that requires a participatory process to enact (what are the enabling circumstances and/or processes through which justice can flourish?). As such, the reviewer assessing a colleague’s ability to meet the standards relating to social justice as presented within the Standard for Full Registration can do so by asking ‘Does this individual embrace the democratic, participatory process such that justice can be enacted?’.

It seems then that the Standard for Full Registration acknowledges the impossibility of a single scale (that is, a static definition) on which to weigh all issues of justice, presenting instead a dynamic and participatory process by which individuals and communities can orientate themselves towards justice. Just as ‘north’, as an orienting tool, is a direction leading to a destination, it appears as though social justice, as presented with the professional standards, can be understood as an enabling process as well as an outcome. The coming section will further this discussion by considering the presence and use of power, that is, of an individual’s or collective’s ability to define ‘who counts’ as an appropriate recipient of social justice.

Calling attention to the process by which the ‘who’ of justice is framed (or mis-framed) is an indispensable concept for the critical investigation, as it enables the mapping of the political space to be interrogated from the standpoint of justice [6]. This is a matter of justice, as wherever group membership or citizenry is established, these boundaries equally define who is not included as a valid recipient for claims to justice. In the first vignette shared at the start of this paper, the parents’ mapping of the issue might appear to be very narrow, including only themselves, their child, and the class teacher. Thus, while the discussion was democratic in that all identified parties were heard, the ‘framing’ was arguably unjust, as the other pupils affected by the individual’s behavior were excluded and as such denied the opportunity to raise their own claims for justice. It also appears as though the parents were conceptualizing justice as a specific, static outcome (their child always working at the group table) rather than a dynamic, democratic, and participatory process; when this outcome was in dispute, they exercised power, in the form of parental disapproval, to achieve their outcome. It is also worth reflecting that the power wielded by disapproving parents may carry more coercive force than the power of the pupil’s voice; certainly, it is fair to assume that adults may be more skilled in wielding the power they possess. The wielding of power actively enforced the specific, political mapping most advantageous to the parent’s continued position of power; that is, the particular frame presented by the parents, enforced by their disapproval, excluded the voice of other children as, arguably, including them may have weakened the parent’s perceived ability to achieve their desired outcome. As such, the use of power to map a political space is a key strategy for maintaining power, for while a democratic process may be presented, the exclusion of relevant parties creates a distortion in the process benefiting the party in power.

In this vignette, we observe how the delimiting of bounded territories can be naturalized and invisibly shape arguments about social justice, such that while issues regarding the ‘what’ of justice are debated, questions regarding ‘who counts’ as a claimant of justice are left unobserved. Understanding justice as participatory parity, these questions highlight the potential for the political mapping of space to enact the uniquely political injustice of ‘mis-framing’, whereby individuals or groups are excluded from the territory and, as non-citizens, are unable to take forward claims for justice. Within the context of professional practice, this three-dimensional theory requires an analysis of the ‘who’ of justice as well as the ‘how’. Recognizing the dynamic, democratic, and participatory process (the ‘how’ of justice) as the enabling circumstances by which socially just outcomes can be achieved (the ‘what’ of justice), it could be argued that in the example of the parents and their child, social justice would require the class teacher to resist the potentially ‘unjust’ mapping of the issue (drawn via the power of parental disapproval) and to instead work to ensure that all relevant claimants are included and given voice. Through this process, questions of distribution (what other resources may be required) and recognition (issues of social status; what voice do the pupils whose parents did not complain have?) can be more fully explored.

As we have argued in this section, Fraser’s analysis of the image of the map to investigate the ‘who’ of justice, helps us to problematize the democratic ‘how’ of justice, forging a powerful conceptual link between the ‘what’, the ‘how’, and the ‘who’ of justice. However, further consideration must be given to the presence and use of power as a tool for framing issues of justice and the potential for mis-framing to enact injustice both within and outside the education community. The coming section will consider the Getting it Right for Every Child policy [10] as a context for further exploring the problematic of mis-framing and continue to answer the question ‘What do we mean by social justice within Scottish education?’

4. Social Justice and Getting It Right for Every Child

Where the Standard for Professional Registration offers the dynamic, democratic, and participatory process (the ‘how’ of justice) as a proxy answer for the question ‘what is justice?’, the ‘Getting it Right for Every Child’ (GIRFEC) policy [10] appears to present the eight listed wellbeing indicators as component parts of justice. It is reasonable to assume that preventing or limiting an individual or community’s advancement in one of these dimensions (Safe, Healthy, Achieving, Nurtured, Active, Responsible, Respected, and Included) could be conceived of as an act of injustice.

While the Standard for Professional Registration assesses that the educator (professionally and personally) enacts social justice by the extent to which they are oriented towards social justice via their enactment of and commitment to dynamic, democratic, and participatory processes, GIRFEC, in contrast, asks whether the educator seeks to ensure individuals within their care are Safe, Healthy, Achieving, Nurtured, Active, Responsible, Respected, and Included via dynamic, democratic participatory processes. This is a far more difficult question to answer, for a number of reasons. Firstly, what do each of these wellbeing indicators mean? While the Scottish government has provided resources that seek to further explain and clarify what is meant by these terms, it appears reasonable to assume that an individual’s biography associated with each of these terms will conceptually hold sway. For example, providing a shared definition of the word ‘nurture’ in no way guarantees that the same conceptual image (and/or emotional response) will be conjured within the individual upon hearing the word. Rather, having understood the meaning of the word ‘nurture’, each individual will look to their own biography to populate the word with meaning. For some, this word may mean the development of skills to become independent and autonomous; for others, it may conjure images of paternal caregiving. Knowing what a thing ‘is’, is different from what that thing means to an individual; as such, it is reasonable to assume that the wellbeing indicators may hold vastly different meanings within the education community and across the population that they serve. In addition, individual biographies may well create a bias toward particular indicators, even if these preferences can be balanced out via democratic discussions. As an example, where an individual experienced bullying as a child, ‘safe’ and ‘included’ may become the primary lens used and resultingly enforce a hierarchy upon the indicators and within GIRFEC. In addition to the individual lens through which an educator may view the wellbeing indicators, schools can also create collective ways of valuing and hierarchically arranging the indicators in response to current school priorities. For example, a whole school focus on the Highland Games may, for a time, place ‘healthy’ as the dominant value within the school. Longer lasting priorities, such as closing the attainment gap, may equally produce hierarchical configurations of the wellbeing indicators. In light of Fraser’s analysis, the possibility of particular value/wellbeing indicators becoming hierarchically dominant is problematic, potentially wrongly framing issues resulting in additional acts of injustice.

The wellbeing indicators are presented as component parts of the wellbeing without hierarchy. The various GIRFEC practice tools (My World Triangle; Resilience Matrix) enable practitioners to enquiry into the circumstance and wellbeing of individual children, such that areas for development (concern) can be identified and actions put in place. In this sense, for that individual child, an ordering of the wellbeing indicators takes place such that areas of concern can be addressed. This individual hierarchy is created in response to the child and in collaboration with relevant individuals (careers and educators). As such, the question, what do we mean by social justice within Scottish education, is answered, in this instance, through the educator’s commitment to ensure individuals within their care are Safe, Healthy, Achieving, Nurtured, Active, Responsible, Respected, and Included via a dynamic and democratic participatory process. However, as mentioned above, what happens when a bias enforces a hierarchy within GIRFEC?

In the second vignette, presented earlier, the Depute is trying to decide whether a child should attend a residential trip. This vignette needs to be contextualized within a wider discourse, where inclusion is observed as a foundational key value within Scottish education with inclusive pedagogy presented as a keyway of mitigating against external causes of educational inequality [17]. If ‘included’ is a dominant value and the highest good, then ‘excluded’, in turn, becomes the worst and most damaging outcome. As such, any member of this community would seek to ensure no child experiences the ultimate harm of being ‘excluded’, perhaps even wellbeing indicators are sidelined at that moment. In the residential trip, there is a possibility that the pupil’s behavior may cause the students’ peers and/or members of staff to become physically unsafe, either during the outdoor activities or within the dorms. If a hierarchy does exist and if ‘included’ sits atop this, these safety concerns might be discounted by and made subject to, the ‘ultimate harm’ of being excluded. Thus, the hierarchy that was initially constructed as a creative act of justice, addressing the specific needs of the individual or group (dynamic; fluid) is transformed from a solution to a performative act that is static, fixed, and measurable. The Depute Head Teacher was aware that taking this child on a residential trip would involve a significant risk, yet it was also ‘known’ that excluding the child was not an option. Thus, the Depute Head Teacher is caught in an aporia, an irresolvable contradiction in navigating through the eight wellbeing indicators.

A second, related challenge is the conceptual ossification that can occur, such that a spectrum of meaning calcifies into binary positions. When a concept becomes conceptually rigid, by definition, its range of movement lessens, thus movement is restricted between binary positions. Where social justice is conceptualized as a dynamic, democratic, and participatory process, divergent ideas are the materials from which the acts of social justice emerge. That is, through the democratic and participatory process, an answer to the question ‘what is just’ is co-created by the group. However, located within a rigid hierarchy, where social justice is conceptualized as a specific, static outcome, the potential spectrum of responses is reduced to binary positions. Within the context of GIRFEC, this would produce the following binary positions: Safe/Unsafe, Healthy/Unhealthy, Active/Inactive, Nurtured/Unnurtured, Achieving/Un-achieving, Respected/Disrespected, Responsible/Irresponsible, and Included/Excluded. Binary positions emerge when democracy is replaced by hegemony and when a community of thought is replaced by a single, dominant ideology. In the metaphorical language of Fraser, this is when the ‘scales of justice’ (plural) are forcibly replaced by the single scale of the dominant political force; the instillation of this single scale also serves as a cartographical tool, remapping the political environment in service of the dominant group and/or ideology.

Consider again the Depute Head Teacher from the second vignette. The Depute is aware of the benefits of the residential trip for the pupils; however, the Depute is also aware of the challenges, objections, and potential dangers in bringing the child with challenging behavior. A dynamic, democratic, and participatory process would involve the relevant individuals in the decision-making process that work together to navigate a way forward. In contrast, a binary approach would consider any instance where a pupil was not a participant in all available school activities as an act of exclusion (included/excluded), and this option would be discounted without further discussion. In this regard, the narrowing of a concept/value (inclusion) arguably increases its functional utility, allowing schools to make decisions more quickly, an important consideration within the busy workings of a school; however, binary definitions also remove the need for democratic discourse, as a single judge can weigh the issue, removing the need for a jury to work together to create a solution. A particular mapping of political space occurs in response to the presence of binary definitions, which is one that arguably results in the unjust framing of issues such that relevant individuals are excluded. Perhaps the child and/or their parent would prefer an alternative arrangement to be explored, one which might contain more potential for the child to be successful. However, when concepts calcify into binaries, the possibility of exploration is reduced. Notably, the limited exploration produced in consequence of binary positions also significantly reduces the individual’s and community’s ability to develop phronêsis—practical knowledge of how to act—when addressing the matter of social justice, as the single scale largely dictates the course to be taken. Where social justice is conceived of as a value to be oriented towards the development of practical knowledge of how to navigate and act, phronêsis is essential, and as such should be cultivated within the community.

In this section, the Getting it Right for Every Child policy [10] has been used as a tool for exploring the question: what do we mean by social justice within Scottish education? Wellbeing indicators were introduced as additional elements to the substance of justices, as conceived of within Scottish education. Connections were made to the Standard for Professional Registration, such that the question ‘What do we mean by social justice within Scottish Education?’ can be answered by ‘Does this educator seek to ensure individuals within their care are Safe, Healthy, Achieving, Nurtured, Active, Responsible, Respected and Included via a dynamic, democratic participatory process?’. Two key problems were explored in relation to this: the problem of imposing a hierarchy upon the wellbeing indicators and, secondly, the problem of conceptual ossification, such that a spectrum is replaced by binary definitions. There is a final question to be asked of GIRFEC to help understand what is meant by social justice, that being ‘What does it mean to get it right for every child?’.

In the vignette concerning the Depute Head Teacher, was the dilemma ‘how to get it right for every child’ or ‘how to get it right for one child’? If, as already discussed, a hierarchy does exist within the wellbeing indicators with ‘included’ at the top, those children attending the trip have already had their primary (that is hierarchically superior/dominant) need met, while the individual child is ‘at risk’ of being excluded, with their dominant value being unmet. In this analysis, the solution is simple: the individual child should also attend the residential trip and we have ‘got it right for every child’. However, if all wellbeing indicators are of equal value, the question is far more complex. What if by including the child, one other child feels less safe and is less able to enjoy and engage in the experience? What if three children feel unsafe? Can this dilemma be understood as a form of metaphysical redistribution, where the children’s collection of wellbeing indicators are the economic units being redistributed? That is, in order for the individual child to attend the trip, the collective pool of wellbeing is assessed and redistributed; if the majority of these children are safe, nurtured, included, and achieving, increasing the extent that the individual child is ‘included’ by taking from the collective pool is therefore a ‘just’ redistribution of these assets. Distribution, after all, requires that resources be taken from one group and redistributed across the collective. However, distributive justice is normally conceptualized as a redistribution of resources with the intention of removing barriers, such that specific outcomes are available to all. Yet, in this instance, it appears as though it is the child’s own wellbeing that is being redistributed; child X can be a little less safe so that child Y can be a little more included. However, this appears more like a balancing of the books after the event rather than a redistribution to remove barriers. Arguably, the position that the individual child is in is a consequence of failings across a number of domains. What then does it say about our culture that when a system/s have produced unbalanced outcomes, the materials used to resolve the dilemma are the wellbeing of children?

Fraser [7] argues that all who belong to the same moral universe, in this case, Scottish education, deserve equal concern and should not be instrumentalized for the sake of others. As such, it could be argued that the instrumentalization of some children to meet the needs of others may be in itself an unjust act, where a particular mapping of political space raises some children’s claims above others, as in the example given above, where the safety of some children may be instrumentalized to provide the inclusion of another. While GIRFEC undoubtedly describes aspects of a just society, this can become problematized when mis-framing occurs, and values are wrongly placed into rigid hierarchies, such that the question of ‘what is just’ is answered solely by reference to a single hierarchically dominant virtue such as inclusion. Importantly, Fraser [7] argues that while social arrangements can display a multitude of virtues, the realization of these virtues “depends on a prior, enabling condition, namely, that the social arrangements in question be just” (p. 41–42). This idea produces a powerful insight, namely that the answer to the question of ‘what is justice?’ can only be “justice is the overcoming of injustice.” [7] (p. 43). Social justice is not inclusion, equity, or equality, although a just society would undoubtedly contain these virtues. In fact, analyzing the issue in this way would suggest that to answer the question of ‘what is justice?’, by reference to other virtues, can result in an unjust mapping of space, producing injustice as a consequence.

5. Conclusion: Practical Judgments as a Possible Way Forward

Social justice is a core value within Scottish education and is widely promoted; however, as noted by Pantic [17], desiring social justice as a value is markedly different to agreeing on what social justice means or requires, as evidenced by the complexities discussed within the two vignettes. In the absence of a single scale upon which claims for justice can be weighed [7], navigating the complex and highly contextualized claims for justice requires far more than a passion for social justice, something which teachers often cite as a reason for entering the profession [19]. Indeed, Pantic notes that well-intentioned teachers may ‘inadvertently contribute to the perpetuation of inequitable educational outcomes for some learners because of the assumptions embedded in the institutional contexts in which they work or because of their own unexamined assumptions’ [20] (p. 219). Through analysis of the Standards for Full Registration [1], this article has suggested that commitment to a dynamic, democratic, and participatory process may be a meaningful way in which to conceptualizse and operationalize social justice within Scottish education. In this regard, the iconography of justice as a single scale is replaced by a compass as an orienting principle. Navigating through a map with a compass as an orienting principle creates several complex dilemmas and aporetic moments in the life of educators when engaging with students and their careers, as well as schooling systems. One possible way to think through these complex dilemmas and aporias is through reflecting through Aristotle’s [21] idea of phronêsis.

Aristotle [21] outlines intellectual virtues (epistêmê, technê, and phronêsis), all of which aim towards eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the sort of happiness/flourishing worth seeking or having. While for the purpose of the argument in this paper, the focus is on phronêsis, we provide a short definition of the other two virtues to help us explain phronêsis. Epistêmê is theoretical or philosophical knowledge that focuses on the real knowledge of universals as opposed to opinions, while technê is craft knowledge that is context-dependent, pragmatic, and has a practical instrumental goal using technical knowledge and skill [22]. Phronêsis is different from epistêmê and technê, as it is not knowledge in itself or the skills to do something but is the capacity to act. The focus of phronêsis is the process that is ‘concerned with how knowledge and experience are brought to bear in particular situations’ [23] (p. 3). It is the capacity ‘to see’ and be sensitive to a situation, to discern, to deliberate, to reflect, to judge, and to act [24]. Richard Smith’s [25] use of the term ‘practical judgment’ is for translating the term phronêsis. Smith argues that ‘practical reasoning risks connotations of a technical process, while the term judgment ‘connects the cognitive and affective and captures something important of the discernment of particulars in practical judgment, as well as its ethical character’ [25] (p. 330). Aristotle [21] argues that phronêsis ‘is concerned with action and action is about the particular’ (p. 92); thus, he stresses the agency of the person engaging in practical judgments in judging and deciding the ‘reasonable action to perform in a concrete situation’ [26] (p. 19). But, as Daniel Nyberg [27] argues, ‘phronêsis is not the “right” way of doing things in a particular community, but the ethically good action a practical wise person would take’ [27] (p. 589). As Black [28] points out, different people involved in the same situation may judge the situation differently, and yet all these judgments will be reasonable. Within the two vignettes, phronêsis requires the practitioners to actively engage in the process of justice by resisting ideological rigid frames which offer simplistic and uniform solutions, favoring instead a process that is more dynamic and participatory. Indeed, the kind of dynamic and participatory thinking that phronêsis facilitates appears more equipped to navigate the complexities of representation, recognition, and distribution central to Fraser’s theory of justice [6].

We provide the concept of phronêsis at the conclusion of this paper, as we authors think that this could shed light on how to enact social justice as a conceptual bridge between the image of a compass as an orienting principle towards justice (the ‘what’ of justice) and a commitment to a dynamic, democratic, and participatory process to enact justice (the ‘how’ of justice). Interestingly, the GTCS professional standards state that professional values ‘support us to ask critical questions of educational theories, policies and practices and to examine our own attitudes and beliefs’ noting that ‘values, and the connections between values and actions, requires regular reflection over the course of teachers’ careers as society and the needs of learners change and as understanding develops’ [1] (p. 4). This critical reflection can be understood as the production of phronêsis, whereby prior attempts to enact social justice are reflected upon and the knowledge of how to act in relation to claims for justice is enhanced. This is akin to the expert and amateur mountaineer, who, despite both being able to orientate themselves correctly using a compass, possess different levels of ability to navigate the mountains safely. It is the knowledge of how the phronêsis of the experienced mountaineer optimizes the information provided by the compass. Likewise, educators can only develop their ability to navigate the many and complex claims for justice experienced in practice, through a robust and critical reflection on their attempts to achieve justice. Interestingly, the process of critical reflection required for the production of phronêsis also acts as a counterbalance to the impulse that would seek to create rigid, overly organizational structures for managing claims of justice. In this regard, by resisting rigid structures which may inadvertently mis-frame matters of justice, phronêsis is also the process by which the ‘who’ of justice is considered, mediating between the pull for organizational structure and certainty and the contextualized individual.