1. Introduction
Combining logics is a powerful and appealing idea—namely when coupled with powerful results that may allow the transfer of useful properties from the simpler logics being combined to the more complex resulting logic—proposed in its general form by Dov Gabbay in [
1,
2]. Given its fundamental character, the understanding of combined logics is a key ingredient of the general theory of universal logic [
3,
4] as well as a valuable tool for the construction and analysis of complex logics, a subject of growing importance in application fields such as software engineering and artificial intelligence (see, for instance, the FroCoS series of events and publications in [
5]).
Despite the long track of work on combined logics, leading to a substantial understanding of their semantics and proof-theory (see [
6,
7,
8,
9,
10,
11,
12]), automated support for combined logics is still lacking. This happens, in particular, because decidability-preservation results are scarce. Namely, we know from [
13,
14] that decidability is preserved by disjoint combinations of propositional logics, a result that is still far from most interesting practical uses. The only general result related to (but still distant from) decidability is [
15], where the preservation of the semantic notion of
finite model property is studied. There is also a proof of decidability preservation for fusions of modal logics [
16,
17], but which uses ideas and results from modal semantics that cannot be easily generalized. In a related, but somewhat different vein, there are a number of interesting and important decidability results about combined theories of equational and first-order logic [
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27] that explore similar ideas but that do not exactly fit the same purpose.
It is tempting to try to use semantic arguments to address the decidability of combined logics. However, only recently have we obtained usable general denotational semantics for combined propositional logics [
12], which naturally builds models of the combined logic from models of the component logics. In this paper, we shall not use semantics, but we will take advantage, in an essential way, the breakthroughs allowed by this gained understanding beyond the disjoint case, in order to formulate a natural and abstract criterion for decidability preservation when combining logics in
context extensibility. It is worth noting that, in general (see, for instance, [
14]), decidability is not preserved nor reflected by combination, and that our criterion is a sufficient condition for decidability to be transferrable.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) the definition, for the first time, of such an abstract criterion for decidability preservation, in the form of an extensibility condition with respect to a contextual syntactic function (
Section 2.4); (ii) the fact that our proof of decidability preservation is constructive, which allows us to show how to put up decision procedures for the combined logic using decision procedures for the components and to study the resulting complexity upper bounds (Theorem 2); (iii) the illustrations provided show that the notion of contextual extensibility is not too strong, as it can be used to recover two previous results in the area, namely, the preservation of decidability for disjoint combinations of logics [
14] and the preservation of decidability for fusions of modal logics [
16] (
Section 2.5); and (iv) finally, but notably, the smooth extension of our results beyond the propositional case, and in particular to the setting of 2-deductive systems (
Section 3) allows us to prove the preservation of decidability for disjoint combinations of equational logics (
Section 3.5.2). This last application is definitely related to the literature on decidability of combined theories already mentioned and as we discuss further, and somehow opens the way for a hopefully fruitful track of future results.
The rest of the paper consists, essentially, of two similar parts, namely comprising
Section 2 and
Section 3. The first of these is dedicated to combined propositional logics, while the other extends all the results to the setting of 2-deductive systems, but both essentially follow the same structure, including a characterization of combined logics, our criterion for decidability preservation, and then meaningful illustrations. The paper closes in
Section 4 with a summary of the results achieved and an outlook of future research.
2. Logics and Their Combination
We first study Tarski-style consequence relations (propositional logics), their combination, and the transference of decidability from the logics being combined to the resulting combined logic.
2.1. Syntax
The syntax of a (propositional) logic is defined, as usual, by means of a signature, an indexed family of denumerable sets, where each contains all allowed n-place connectives, and an infinite denumerable set P of variables (which we consider fixed once and for all). As standard, denotes the set of all formulas constructed from the variables in P using the connectives in . We will use to denote variables, to denote formulas, and to denote sets of formulas, in all cases possibly with annotations.
We use , , to denote, respectively, the set of variables occurring in A, the set of subformulas of A, and the head constructor of A, given a formula . These notations have simple inductive definitions: , and for ; and if and , , , and . All these notations extend to sets of formulas in the obvious way.
As we are considering combined logics with mixed syntax, we need to consider different signatures, as well as relations and operations between signatures. Signatures being families of sets, the usual set-theoretic notions can be smoothly extended to signatures. We sometimes abuse notation and confuse a signature with the set of all its connectives, and write when © is some n-place connective . For this reason, the empty signature, with no connectives at all, will be simply denoted by ∅.
Let be two signatures. We say that is a subsignature of and write whenever for every . Expectedly, given signatures , we can also define the shared subsignature , the combined signature , and the difference signature . Clearly, is the largest subsignature of both and and contains the connectives shared by both. When there are no shared connectives, we have that . Analogously, is the smallest signature that has both and as subsignatures, and it features all the connectives from both and in a combined signature. Furthermore, is the largest subsignature of that does not share any connectives with .
A substitution is a function , which, of course, extends freely to a function for every . As usual, we use to denote the formula that results from by uniformly replacing each variable with , and for each .
Note that if
, then
. Still,
and
are both infinite denumerable. In fact, the pair can be endowed with a very useful bijection capturing the view of an arbitrary
formula from the point of view of
, the
skeleton function
(or simply
, or even
), for which the underlying idea we borrow from [
28]. Note that given
,
may be in
, in which case we dub
A a
-monolith or simply a
monolith. The idea is simply to replace monoliths with dedicated variables, just renaming the original variables. Let
be the set of all monoliths. It is easy to see that
is always denumerable, though it can be finite when
contains nothing but a finite set of 0-place connectives. In any case,
is always infinite denumerable because
P is, and thus we can fix a bijection
. The
bijection is now easily definable from
, inductively, by letting
for
, and for
and
,
if
, and
if
.
The bijection thus defined can be easily inverted by means of the substitution (or simply , or even ) defined by . Note, namely, that for every . Note also that the restriction of to P, (with a slight abuse of notation, we will use the same name) is a substitution, and for every .
2.2. Propositional Logics and Theories
Definition 1. A logic is a pair where Σ is a signature and is a relation satisfying:
- (R)
whenever (reflexivity);
- (M)
whenever for (monoticity);
- (T)
whenever and for every (transitivity);
- (S)
implies for any substitution σ (subst. invariance).
We further say that is compact whenever it further satisfies:
- (F)
implies there is a finite such that .
The compact part of a logic is also a logic where if and only if there is a finite such that . Of course, is compact if and only if .
We say that a set of rules axiomatizes whenever ⊢ is the closure of by (R), (M), (T), and (S), and write . Clearly, is compact if and only if it is axiomatized by a set of finitary rules ; that is, is finite for every rule , also simply denoted by .
A set of formulas is said to be a theory of when for every , if , then . Given a set , is the least theory that contains . We write for the set of theories of . We always have that . Every logic can be recovered from its set of theories, as if and only if whenever for every . Furthermore, from (S), it immediately follows that the set is closed for inverse substitutions; that is, given , implies that . Further, given logics and , we have that if and only if .
Example 1. The smallest logic over a given signature Σ is given by if and only if . It is easy to see that is compact logic and is axiomatized by the empty set of rules. We have that .
It is relatively straightforward to check that intersections of consequence relations are consequence relations (see [
29]). These facts make it relatively easy to enrich the signature of a logic. Namely, if
and
is a logic, then the
extension of to Σ, denoted by
, is the least logic with signature
such that
. The following is a useful alternative definition of such an extension.
Proposition 1. For , we have that if and only if . Hence, .
Proof. Just note that for each substitution , we have that is also a substitution, and also . We immediately obtain that , and also that if and ⊢ satisfies (S), then . Since are bijections, it is straightforward to show that satisfies properties (R), (M), (T), and (S). □
Thus, equivalently, if and only if there exists and such that , , and .
2.3. Combining Logics
Consider fixed signatures and and let . It is quite natural to formulate the combination of logics (also known as fibring) as follows.
Definition 2. The combination of logics , , which we denote by , is the least logic such that . The combination is said to be disjoint if .
We immediately obtain that is the smallest logic over that contains both and . Note that it also follows easily that the combination of compact logics is necessarily compact. Namely, if , are compact, then the least logic such that is also the least logic such that . Since it is clear that , it follows that . Similarly, we have that if and , then .
Example 2. Let be a logic and a signature. Consider to be the smallest logic over , as in Example 1. Since , we obtain that . Note, in particular, thatas The next result shows that this equality holds in general. We can now provide an explicit characterization of using only and or, more concretely, and .
Theorem 1. Let . For every , we have: Hence, is the smallest element of both and that contains Γ,
and Proof. Let be defined by if and only if for every with .
Let us first show that is a logic. Clearly, ⊢ satisfies (R) and (M); let us show it satisfies (T) and (S) also.
- (T)
Assume that and for every . This means that for every , and for every . By (M) for each , we conclude that for for every . Therefore, .
- (S)
Assume that , and thus for every . By (S), for each , we conclude that for every . Therefore, .
By definition,
. Now, given
with
, we obtain that
Hence, we can finally conclude that
and
. □
2.4. Contextual Extensibility and Decidability Preservation
We say that a logic is decidable if there exists an algorithm , which terminates when given any finite set and formula as input, and outputs if , and if . We will henceforth assume without loss of generality that the logic at hand is compact, as this definition is equivalent to deciding the compact version of the logic.
Theorem 1 is quite appealing, and mathematically clean, but a decision procedure for based on it would require (potentially) running through all common theories of the given logics containing a given set of premisses. One may try to obtain a more usable version which, instead, may only need to go through fragments of theories of the given logics which agree on a suitable, possibly finite, set of formulas. For the purpose, we introduce the notion of context, as a function such that . Aiming at decidability preservation, of course, we will further require that is finite for finite .
Definition 3. For a fixed context function , we say that two logics are-extensible
when for every and theories of for , That is, two logics are -extensible if any theories of the given logics that agree on the formulas in can be extended to a theory of the combined logic that agrees with the given theories on the formulas in .
Lemma 1. Let , be -extensible logics; is their combination. For every , we have: Proof. Using Theorem 1, if
, then there exists
such that
is a theory of both
and
. Easily then, one has
for each
, and
.
Reciprocally, if there is such that , but with for each , then it follows that and are theories, such that . Thus, directly from -extensibility, we can conclude that there exists a theory of such that . It follows that , and so .□
In order to apply these ideas toward decidability preservation, namely with the aim of analyzing the complexity of the underlying decision problems, we assume that the context function is computable in and , obviously with .
Theorem 2. Let be -extensible logics. If the decision problems for , are both in complexity class , then the decision problem for is in complexity class , as given by Table 1. Proof. Let
be deterministic algorithms deciding
, respectively, both running in time bounded by
and space bounded by
. To decide
, consider the following deterministic algorithm
.
The correctness of
is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1, as the algorithm builds precisely the least set
such that
and
. The
no output happens when a fixed point is reached, meaning that
, and thus
. When the
yes output is reached, we are sure that
, as
A was reached by departing from
and iteratively adding formulas in
to
if they follow either
or .
Let n be the size of . We know that is computed in time bounded by , and also that the number of formulas in , as well as the size of each such formulas, is bounded by . Therefore, the cycle is repeated times, each time on inputs of size , and runs in time bounded by .
Spacewise, we need to count the space used by each of , but we can assume that the independent calls to reuse space, and hence runs in space .
Assume now that
are non-deterministic algorithms deciding the complementary problems
, respectively, both running in time bounded by
. To decide
, consider the non-deterministic algorithm
.
The correctness of is again a direct consequence of Lemma 1, as the algorithm guesses a set such that and , and then answers according to whether . Easily, answers yes precisely when by guessing correctly a set for which and , and, hence, with and for every .
Similarly, the running time of is bounded by . □
We conclude that whenever the context function is computable in polynomial time ( being a polynomial), then the combined logic often retains the same complexity upper bound of the logics being combined, notably in case is , and beyond. When is at least computable in polynomial space ( being a polynomial), the combined logic still retains the same space complexity class of the logics being combined, above polynomial space, namely when is .
2.5. Applications
We now illustrate the results with some particular applications of Theorem 2. These illustrations are crucial in order to assess that our sufficiency criterion is not too strong to be usable in concrete cases.
2.5.1. Combining Logics with Disjoint Signatures
First of all, we obtain a much simpler proof, using Theorem 2, of the major result of [
14]: the preservation of decidability for disjoint combinations of logics. Assume that both
are decidable, and
. In order to prove that
is decidable and obtain a complexity upper bound for deciding it, it is enough to show the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assuming , we have that and are -extensible for some context function computable in polynomial time.
Proof. Let
be a singleton containing a theorem of either
or
; that is,
for some
, if such a theorem exists. When none of the component logics has a theorem, then
. We consider the context function
which can clearly be computed in quadratic time on
.
Suppose now that for some , there are for such that .
On the one hand, if , then none of the component logics has a theorem; . Hence, , and by Theorem 1, we obtain .
On the other hand, if , then we can simply pick the largest theory of any logic containing every formula in its language .
Thus, we proceed knowing that we can fix formulas such that and , where for the remainder of the proof. We now build such that .
First, we modify
so that they also agree on
(for simplicity, we chose to include none in
). Consider the substitution
such that
Clearly,
and
, where
.
Let
and obtain theories
and
coinciding with
in formulas of
and further agreeing on
. For each formula
with
we check if
and modify the skeleton variable
accordingly when building
. Hence, consider for each
the substitution
such that
Then, set
. By Proposition 1, we know that
. Easily, if
, or
and
, then
. Thus, we define sequences for
,
and
satisfying
:
Let
for
. It is clear that
. Make
. For any formula
, we have that
for every
. By compactness, we conclude that
. Hence,
for
.
Thus, (using Theorem 1) and agrees with on , which concludes the argument. □
It immediately follows from Theorem 2 that combining logics with disjoint signatures preserves the decision complexity classes , and .
2.5.2. Fusion of Modal Logics
One of the seminal examples of transfer theorem for combined logics is the preservation of decidability for the
fusion of modal logics. We show here that this result can also be recovered using Theorem 2. The technicalities of our proof follow along the lines of the proofs in [
16,
17], where the reader can find further details. We also obtain an upper bound for the complexity of the fusion of two logics depending on their complexity.
Let
stand for classical propositional logic, where
is a signature containing the usual classical connectives, namely
and
. For
, consider finite signatures
such that
is the shared signature. Every other connective
is understood as an
n-place modal operator of the
signature. Thus, we assume that each
is a
modal logic (see, for instance, [
16]), which in particular is classically based; that is,
if and only if
for
, and for every
n-place modal operator,
satisfies
Proposition 3. Any two modal logics and with are -extensible for some context function computable in exponential time and space.
Proof. For each finite set
, let
, and given
, let
, and consider the formula defined by
. Further, let
. We show that the logics
and
are
-extensible, with
It is clear that
is exponentially larger than
and computable in exponential time.
Let be such that . If , simply choosing the trivial theory would work. Hence, let us assume that this is not the case, and so neither nor are the trivial theory. Further, by Proposition 1, we have that . Since we could always add fresh variables if needed, we can assume, without loss of generality, that is infinite for both .
For
, consider the congruences
defined as
if and only if
; let
be the quotient algebra
. As observed in [
30], the
-reduct of each
is an infinite countable boolean algebra (ciaB). Letting
be the algebra morphism given by
and
be the top element of
, we have that
.
Consider . Since both theories coincide on , we have that for each , . Here, we can split it into two cases:
If there is some with , then , as actually we must have for all . It is known that any two ciaBs are isomorphic. Since the top and bottom elements must be identified, we have and for every .
Using the boolean-valid equation , when , it is clear that . Furthermore, if and , then the boolean-valid equation implies that . This means that the set of values is a partition of . Again, it is known that there is an isomorphism of the two ciaBs that identifies and for every (and, by the same argument as in the previous case, for every .
Hence, in either case, and by identifying the values in the two algebras and along the guaranteed suitable isomorphism, we obtain that for every . Furthermore, we also have that for every . Namely, letting , it is clear that . Note, in particular, that .
Let
be the
-algebra obtained by merging
and
along the considered isomorphism. We denote the top element of
by
, and we have that
’s
-reduct is isomorphic to the
-reducts of the original algebras, and also that
for
(modulo the isomorphism). We know that
such that
extends to a homomorphism
, which is uniquely determined for formulas with variables in
. Thus, for every
,
. Consider
to be the theory induced by
v, and let
be
, and for
, let
for some formula
B with
; then
since the set of theories of any logic is closed under inverse images of substitutions. Hence,
, and therefore
Moreover, as for and , we have iff iff iff ; we know that agrees with in . Thus, we conclude that are -extensible. □
From this fact, and according to Theorem 2, we can conclude that deciding the fusion of logics decidable in
is in
. This complexity upper bound is not too tight, in general, although the fact that it was obtained using a very general, not tailored, result such as Theorem 2 may help to explain why. Indeed, using our result, we can also conclude that combining two modal logics decidable in
yields an
upper bound for their fusion, whereas it is well known (see [
17]) that the decision problem for the fusion of two copies of the basic normal modal logic
is in
, as is also the decision problem for the logic
.
It is worth noting, though, that an alternative proof of Proposition 3 using a simpler context function computable in polynomial time is impossible in the general case. For instance, modal logic
is known to be in
, whereas deciding the fusion of two copies of
is known to be a
problem [
17]. According to our Theorem 2, a polynomial time computable
function would yield a decision procedure for such a fusion in
, which is strictly below
unless there is a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy. However, as far as we know, there is no known counterexample eliminating the possibility of finding a suitable
computable in polynomial space, even if using exponential time, which would yield the preservation of
by fusion.
It should further be observed that, despite the fact that the context function obtained is exponential, for particular inputs , with a logarithmic amount of □-headed subformulas, deciding if A follows from can still be done with a polynomial time slowdown in the decision time of the algorithms used to decide the component logics using the algorithms in Theorem 2. This is natural, since formulas with head in are treated as (new) variables by . This behavior is analogous to the growth in complexity in the -problem for classical logic being strongly dependent on the number of variables of the input rather than on its overall size.
3. Beyond Propositional Logics
We now study the generalization of the previous results beyond propositional logics, in particular in the realm of
k-deductive systems [
31]. These are consequence relations defined over a (possibly) non-freely generated language, as
k-formulas are
k-tuples of formulas in an algebraic language. Although, as it will become clear, all the results would be smoothly obtainable for arbitrary
k, we focus our attention on the case
, and in particular on equational reasoning.
3.1. Syntax
Given a signature , a 2-formula over is a pair with , which we will simply denote by . The set of all 2-formulas over is , where . Given , it is also useful to define .
Other definitions in
Section 2.1 are smoothly adapted to 2-formulas. Substitutions
act on 2-formulas and sets thereof in the expected way:
, and
. Similarly, when
, we have
and
.
3.2. 2-Logics, Equational Logics, and Their Theories
Let us start by lifting Definition 1 according to [
31].
Definition 4. A 2-logic is a pair , where Σ is a signature, and is a relation satisfying, for :
- (R)
whenever ;
- (M)
whenever for ;
- (T)
whenever , and for every ;
- (S)
implies for any substitution .
We further say that is compact whenever it satisfies:
- (F)
implies there is finite such that .
We also say that a set axiomatizes whenever ⊢ is the closure of by (R), (M), (T), and (S), and we write .
For , we still write and for the set of theories of .
The notion of 2-logic covers, in particular, what we will call
equational logics. Given a set of equations
, we denote by
the following set of rules.
An
equational logic is a 2-logic
axiomatized by
for some set of equations
; that is,
. Note that since the rules in
are always finitary for any
, we have that every equational logic is compact.
This notion of an equational logic corresponds to the quasi-equational theory of the variety axiomatized by , . That is, if and only if the quasi-equation is valid in all algebras of the variety.
Theories in these logics are sets of equations satisfying . Clearly, every theory defines a congruence on , identifying formulas A and B if and only if .
Example 3. The smallest 2-logic over a signature Σ, corresponding to Example 1, is such that if and only if , and correspondingly we have that . This 2-logic is axiomatizable by the empty set of rules.
However, the smallest equational logic is , that is, the 2-logic axiomatized by rules , , , and for each .
We also have that 2-logics are closed for intersections, and it still makes sense to define the extension of a 2-logic to a larger signature as the least 2-logic with signature such that . We can also lift Proposition 1 into an analogue statement characterizing the language extensions of 2-logics.
Proposition 4. For , we have that if and only if . Hence, .
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, using the facts that , and and are bijections, and the properties instead of for . □
Equivalently, if and only if there exist and such that , , , and .
3.3. Combining 2-Logics
At this point, it is easy to lift Definition 2.
Definition 5. The combination of 2-logics , , which is once again denoted by , is the least 2-logic such that . The combination is said to be disjoint if .
Note that it also follows easily that the combination of compact 2-logics is necessarily compact. Namely, if and are compact, then so is . Further, if and axiomatize each of the given logics, then axiomatizes .
Example 4. For equational logics and , we haveand . As the reader may already suspect, Theorem 1 also adapts to the analogue statement characterizing the combination of 2-logics.
Theorem 3. Let . For every , we have: Hence, is the smallest element of both and that contains Γ,
and Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 by using properties instead of for . □
3.4. Contextual Extensibility and Decidability Preservation Revisited
As before, a 2-logic is said to be decidable if there exists an algorithm that terminates when given any finite set and as input, and outputs if and if .
Again, Theorem 3 is not enough to obtain a decision procedure for the combined logic. As in the propositional case, we consider context functions with finite for finite . Furthermore, we can naturally generalize the notion of -extensibility to 2-logics.
Definition 6. For a fixed context function , we say that two 2-logics are-extensible
when every and theories for , Moreover, Lemma 1 easily lifts as well.
Lemma 2. Let be 2-logics. For every , we have: Proof. Again, the proof is analogous to that of Lemma 1 by invoking Theorem 3 instead of Theorem 1. □
Gathering all these elements, we can also easily adapt the decidability preservation result of Theorem 2 to decide the combination of decidable 2-logics. As before, let be a context function such that is computable in and , obviously with .
Theorem 4. Let be -extensible 2-logics. If the decision problems for , are both in complexity class , then the decision problem for is in complexity class , as given by Table 1. Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Theorem 2 by adapting the algorithms to work with 2-formulas instead of formulas. □
3.5. Applications
We shall now give two illustrative applications of Theorem 4. In both cases, we shall use the context function
defined by
which works for both applications in this section. In a more explicit form:
It is clear that is computable in polynomial time.
3.5.1. Splitting the Smallest Equational Logic
With an eye on the fact that Theorem 4 can be iteratively applied to the combination of any finite number of 2-logics, we use the result to prove the well-known fact that the smallest equation logic is decidable as a result of combining the decidable 2-logics corresponding, in isolation, to each of the forms , , , and .
Let for , and set .
Proposition 5. Fixed signature Σ and the 2-logics , , and are jointly -extensible.
Proof. Let for . Assuming that for every for some fixed , we show that there is such that .
Consider . It is clear that . It is now sufficient to show that the other inclusion also holds.
Knowing that and for , and using the fact that rules and are expressed using only variables, it follows that . Further, if and , then either , and , or and .
Furthermore, from and , it follows that if , then either C or D is not in . Let it be D, without loss of generality. If , then either , , or . Thus, . This argument can be adapted to an arbitrary finite number of applications of congruence rules. If a derivation of uses exactly k instances of congruence rules, introducing, respectively, for , then if and, assuming without loss of generality, that , we can conclude that either , , or . Hence, since is compact, implies . Therefore, since , we have that for every . □
Now, the known result that congruences can be computed in polynomial time follows by Theorem 4 just from the fact that calculating and the closures for each of its requirements (symmetry, reflexivity, transitivity, and congruence) can also separately be done polynomial time.
Corollary 1. There is a problem deciding if is in .
Of course, the same also follows for the 2-logics generated by subsets of the rules in Y, e.g., rules corresponding to equivalence or tolerance relations. Further note that if no congruence rules are involved, it is enough to consider the simpler context function .
3.5.2. Combining Equational Logics with Disjoint Signatures
We now study the combination of equational logics and analyze the preservation of decidability and complexity in the disjoint case along the lines of Theorem 4. This is a particularly interesting case, as it goes in the direction of a myriad of important modular decidability results for reasoning modulo equational theories, which we discuss later.
Proposition 6. Assuming , we have that equational logics and are -extensible.
Proof. For simplicity, let
for
,
, and
. Further, given
and
, define
and let
.
In order to prove that are -extensible, we show that, given , and such that , there is such that for .
If , then picking the trivial theory does the job. We proceed, otherwise, knowing .
Let , , and for , define
- -
- -
Further, let , , and for and , define
- -
,;
- -
;
- -
.
By definition, we have that
and
for every
. We show below that for every
and
, we have the following two properties.
Thus, using compactness (which holds for any equational logic), we have that (by (
1) and (
2)) for
,
This finishes the proof, as it immediately follows that
for
as desired. To prove (
1) and (
2), we need two technical lemmas.
Lemma 3. Assuming that , we have, for , that the following properties hold. Proof. Note that
, but in general,
. Still, since
, then
. Using
and the assumption that
, we conclude that (
3) holds.
To see that (
4) holds, assume by contradiction that we have
such that
, but
. Then either
A or
B (or both) must be in
. Without loss of generality, let it be
A. Since
,
is a variable, and
. Using the substitution invariance of
and Proposition 4, we obtain that
, which is absurd, since
by (
3).
In particular, we have that
for any
. Hence,
for any
and
. This observation, together with (
3) and the fact that
, implies (
5). □
Lemma 4. Still assuming that , for , we have that Proof. By definition,
. Consider the following equivalence relations (for
) on
, where
For each
, let us pick a representative
, picking
whenever possible. Let
and
. By Lemma 3 (
4) and (
5), for
,
.
Consider
defined by
By construction,
and
. Further, we have that
As
is contained in any theory of every equational logic, we have that
and note that
Since inverse images of theories by substitutions are theories, we have that
and from Proposition 4, we obtain that
.
By definition of
, using Lemma 3 (
3) and (
5), we obtain that
We now have that
, and since
and
are bijections,
Hence, □
We now prove properties (
1) and (
2) by induction on
.
For the base case
, we know that
; thus, (
1) holds. Now, we are in position to use Lemmas 3 and 4 with
. By Lemma 4, we have that
, and from Lemma 3 (
3), we know that
. Since
, we conclude that
and thus (
2) holds.
For the step, by induction hypothesis we have that
holds. Then again, as in the base case, Lemmas 4 and 3 (
3) are available. By Lemma 4, we obtain that
and thus (
1) holds. As in the base case, we use the fact that
and Lemma 3 (
3) to conclude that
Thus, (
2) holds for
. □
From Theorem 4 and the fact that can be calculated in polynomial time on the size of , we conclude that combining equational logics with disjoint signatures thus preserves the upper bound complexity classes for the given logics , , , , and .
As far as we know, this exact result has not been stated and proven before, but it is very closely related to many similar and even more ambitious results in the literature. Indeed, in [
16], a similar statement is obtained, but in the context of varieties of algebras whose reducts are boolean algebras. Other results focused on deciding the word problem (theoremhood) rather than the associated consequence relations. In [
18], it is shown that the Turing degree of the word problem for the variety
, i.e., deciding whether
, is the join of the Turing degrees for the word problems for
and
. In Theorem 4, we assume more and obtain more. Still, our result implies Pigozzi’s whenever we depart from from decidable
and
. This is so, in particular, when one can reduce the problem of deciding
to the word problem for
, for instance, when both varieties have a strong ternary deductive term [
32]. Our result is also reminiscent of Nelson–Oppen-like results, showing preservation of decidability of combined first-order quantifier-free stably-infinite theories with equality over disjoint signatures [
19]. Of course, assuming decidability of boolean combinations of equations is more demanding than assuming the decidability of the underlying equational logic. Note, still, that the extra expressivity raises compatibility issues related to the cardinality of the models. These observations also apply to interesting variations and extensions of Nelson and Oppen’s seminal result, including some non-disjoint cases such as [
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26].
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed the first generally applicable criterion for the preservation of decidability when combining logics, and analyzed the complexity bounds thus obtained. It is clear from our development that in order to be applied as in Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, the notion of
-compatibility can be imposed only for finite
since we are considering deciding statements regarding finite sets of hypotheses. Further note that these theorems could be adapted to join any finite set of logics at once by imposing
-compatibility as a bunch, the advantage being that the number of logics being combined would enter as a multiplicative factor in the complexity bound obtained, thus improving the bound obtained by joining them iteratively. When joining logics with polynomial time or space, as in
Section 3.5.1, this is not so relevant, as it would only affect the degree of the resulting polynomial, but in general it may really yield better upper bounds.
Further, we have shown that our criterion works by providing new proofs for previous results in the area, uniformly using the same abstract idea of contextual extensibility of theories. What is more, due to the generality and abstractness of our notion of extensibility, we have shown that the technique of contextual extensibility can be applied well beyond propositional-based logics, namely in the context of 2-deductive systems and in particular of equational logics. In order to best establish the relationship of our criterion and subsequent decidability preservation proofs, namely with the myriad of important known results for combined equational and first-order theories, it will of course be crucial to adopt other useful extensions of the plain Tarskian notion of logic, namely in order to cover, at least, Horn, clausal, and boolean combinations of atomic formulas, such as equations.
There are several other topics for further research. An obvious one is to pursue specialized decidability preservation results for propositional logics sharing a common base, sufficiently well-behaved but not necessarily classical, thus extending the result for fusions of modal logics covered in
Section 2.5.2, for which [
21] may be useful. The semantic characterizations of [
12], using non-determinism and partiality, may play a crucial role in this setting. Another interesting question is whether there may be a criterion akin to
-extensibility that allows us to decide the preservation of decidability of the theoremhood relation of the logics, or of the corresponding satisfiability problem, which in the concrete case of disjoint signatures and by using the ideas in Lemmas 3 and 4, could help us in mimicking Piggozi’s proof in [
18]. Last but not least, we envisage studying the relationship between our notion of contextual extensibility and model-theoretic techniques involving forms of amalgamation, namely in the lines of [
24,
33,
34,
35].