1. Introduction
In the second half of the twentieth century, developed market economies had undergone an inflationary period after World War II, followed by a disinflationary period that started in the early 1980s accompanied by less regulation and greater reliance on market forces. These developments resulted in improved economic performance, but also increased volatility and market pressure on financial institutions following traditional fixed capital standards. In order to address these developments, regulators have moved towards risk-based capital requirements for financial institutions, while also allowing gradual relaxation of certain rules of governance of financial institutions and replacing them with a principle-based approach.
The risk measures imposed by regulators on insurance companies share a common feature: they are all related to the behavior of tails of the probability distribution of a firm’s financial results. The reason is that the regulatory purpose of capital requirements is to make capital available for absorbing losses occurring in extreme events, i.e., events of large financial losses, which could bring about insolvency. Risk-based capital requirements are a natural outgrowth of traditional prudential regulation aiming at preserving the solvency of private financial institutions.
Hence, safety capital should be computed by looking at the extreme risks that can impact financial institutions in general and insurance enterprises in particular. However, regulators differ in their specification of the tail indicator that they recommend. Some regulators impose the use of quantiles of the distribution (value at risk, or VaR), while other regulators impose the use of partial moments (tail conditional expectation or TCE, or an equivalent measure of expected shortfall). Furthermore, regulators also differ in their choice of time horizon. Finally, they also differ in their choice of confidence level (i.e., probability value for the quantile, or for the conditional expectation).
Comité Européen des Assurances and Mercer Oliver Wyman Limited (
2005) and
CEA (
2007) provide a comparison of different regulatory regimes for capital requirements. The most consequential regulation of risk-based capital is the European Union’s Solvency II. Solvency II imposes risk-based capital requirements computed using the VaR as a risk measure over a one-year period and with a confidence level of 99.5%. When Solvency II was being designed, it was to some degree modeled on the Basel II banking regulation, also using VaR as a risk measure for capital requirement purposes, for market risk. The credit crisis of 2008 in many ways exposed the weaknesses of VaR, and a new system of capital regulation for banking, Basel III (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s documents from 2019 and 2022), has been developed and implemented since (see also
Gatzert and Wesker (
2011) for a comparison of Solvency II and Basel regulations).
Solvency II is not only the main regulatory law for prudential regulation of insurance enterprises in the European Union, but it has become a model for risk-based capital requirements worldwide. The United States is one major exception to this trend, as the U.S. model regulation of insurance firms’ capital preceded Solvency II, and it is designed around a formula provided by the regulatory body, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) (see also
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (
2007) on ORSA perspectives).
The Canadian regulation of insurance capital differs from that of the European Union, and it is based on risk assessment of the firm in the context of certain extreme events. Canada’s Office of Supervision of Financial Institutions (OSFI) risk assessment process begins with an evaluation of the inherent risk within each significant activity of an insurer and the quality of risk management applied to mitigate these risks (see
Canada Office of Supervision of Financial Institutions 2022). After considering this information, OSFI determines the level of net risk and direction (i.e., whether it is decreasing, stable, or increasing) of the rating for each significant activity. The net risks of the significant activities are combined, by considering their relative importance, to arrive at the overall net risk (ONR) of the insurer. Furthermore, OSFI provides capital requirement guidelines, which must be then included in insurers’ own risk and solvency assessment.
In the cases of both the United States and Canada, we see a significant regulatory involvement in the supervision of risk-based capital. All regulators are, of course, involved in this process, but the approach of the European Union and, notably, Switzerland, is more principle-based than rule-driven. The Swiss regulation of risk-based capital for insurers includes a capital standard, and stress-testing of certain extreme scenarios. The capital standard is based on the expected shortfall, or, equivalently, tail conditional expectation (TCE).
In this work, we focus on two regulations: Solvency II and the Swiss Solvency Test (SST). The Swiss Solvency Test, implemented in 2004, preceded Solvency II, but in 2015 the European Union recognized the SST as the first regime to be fully equivalent to Solvency II. Solvency II imposes a capital requirement computed using value at risk (VaR) as a risk measure over a 1-year period and with a confidence level of , whereas SST uses TCE with a confidence level of over a 1-year period.
VaR and TCE are the most classic examples of risk measures (see for instance
Linsmeier and Pearson 2000;
Klugman et al. 2012;
Acerbi et al. 2001). A risk measure is a mapping from the random variable representing risk exposure to the set of real numbers. It can be interpreted as the amount of capital required to protect against adverse outcomes of a given risk. The paper by
Artzner et al. (
1999) introduced the concept of coherence of risk measures and has been very influential in the further development of risk measurement. A coherent risk measure is defined by the following four properties: subadditivity, monotonicity, positive homogeneity, and translation invariance. The properties of risk measures in the context of insurance are discussed by
Wang and Zitikis (
2021).
Acerbi and Tasche (
2002) noted that TCE is a coherent risk measure, while VaR is not (see also
Society of Actuaries (
2000) on TCE).
Rostek (
2010) provides an interesting alternative to evaluations of risk, a model of preferences, in which, given beliefs about uncertain outcomes, an individual evaluates an action by a quantile of the induced distribution.
Fadina et al. (
2021) designed a unified axiomatic framework for risk evaluation principles, which quantifies jointly a loss random variable and a set of plausible probabilities. They called such an evaluation principle a generalized risk measure.
Fuchs et al. (
2017) show that a notion of a quantile risk measure is a natural generalization of that of a spectral risk measure and provides another view of the distortion risk measures generated by a distribution function on the unit interval. In this general setting, they prove several results on quantile or spectral risk measures and their domain with special consideration of the expected shortfall. They also present a particularly short proof of the subadditivity of the expected shortfall risk measure.
Denuit et al. (
2006) provide a comprehensive review or modeling risk in incomplete markets, with emphasis on insurance risks, expanding on and combining in a comprehensive review the existing literature on quantitative risk management.
Li and Wang (
2022) noted that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed the shift from the
value at risk (VaR) to the
expected shortfall (ES) for internal models in market risk assessment (see
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2019,
2022). Inspired by that development, Li and Wang introduced a new distributional index, the probability equivalence level of VaR and ES (PELVE), which identifies the balancing point for the equivalence between VaR and ES. PELVE has desirable theoretical properties, and it distinguishes empirically heavy-tailed distributions from light-tailed ones.
Barczy et al. (
2022) generalized and further developed the PELVE measure and applied this indicator to a high-order TCE, which is distinct from the extended TCE introduced in the present paper.
Fiori and Rosazza Gianin (
2021) construct another generalization by constructing an indicator that relates monotone risk measures.
Our paper was developed independently from this stream of papers and develops related comparisons of VaR and TCE quantiles, but without introducing an intermediate indicator such as PELVE. A key contribution of our paper is the introduction of a new risk indicator that extends TCE to take into account higher-order risks. We also provide comparisons of this new indicator with more classic risk indicators.
More deeply, the goal of our paper is to understand how regulators choose such or such risk indicators for solvency computations. Thus, our goal is to understand the implicit utility function of insurance regulators and to understand how equivalent risk valuation systems can be put in place, but we do so without introducing any type of utility function. It is, of course, entirely possible that the regulations put in place are not fully a result of a certain intent, but rather of a political process so that what we determine may not be the output of an actual utility function of a specific regulator. However, making the implicit functioning of actual regulations explicit should be a valuable contribution in assuring that regulations function in an effective and efficient manner.
The paper makes use of two probabilistic assumptions, where we assume that claims can be either Pareto or generalized Pareto (GPD) distributed. We make these assumptions for two main reasons: they allow us to very conveniently derive readable results and they are consistent with what is observed for claims with heavily distributed tails. The reader interested in exploring situations where claims could be associated with semi-heavy tails can be referred for instance to
Le Courtois (
2018) or
Le Courtois and Walter (
2014).
The paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide a general overview of the two main risk measures, VaR and TCE, and briefly discuss equivalence results that relate to the confidence levels of VaR and TCE. In
Section 3, we introduce a new and generalized tail indicator, and we discuss the relation between the quantiles of this indicator and the quantiles of VaR, in a simple Pareto framework, and then in a generalized Pareto framework.
Section 4 examines equivalence results between the quantiles of generalized indicators.
5. Conclusions
We end this paper with a brief illustration based on actual data. We use a fire insurance claim data set, labeled “beaonre” within the R package CASdatasets. This dataset includes 1823 observations of fire insurance claims from the year 1997. We transform this dataset of claim costs into a dataset of reimbursements, from which we can compute VaR, TCE, and . To compare VaR or TCE with a high-order TCE indicator, we need to adjust the latter quantity in terms of scale. For instance, we may want to solve . While exact solutions to this equation do not exist, we can still deduce a relation between VaR and .
We show in
Figure 13 the link between VaR and the high-order TCE indicator (computed with
) in the case of fire data. This figure is consistent with the theoretical results shown, for instance, in
Figure 6. Thus,
Figure 13 confirms, in passing, the relevance of the GPD assumption. Further illustration with actual data is out of the scope of the present paper but could be a matter of an interesting extension.
To conclude, we introduce in this paper a new risk indicator that is a high-order TCE risk measure. We compare the quantiles of this indicator to the quantiles of VaR in a simple Pareto framework, and then in a generalized Pareto framework. We also examine equivalence results between the quantiles of high-order TCEs. By doing so, we aim at illustrating the interplay between implicit choices of risk measures by regulators and the characteristics of probability distribution tails.
Among the possible theoretical extensions of our paper, one could cite the verification that the high-order indicator that we introduce is indeed a coherent risk measure. While this is out of the scope of the present paper, a separate document is in the process of being written on this aspect. See for instance
Krokhmal (
2007) or
Barbosa and Ferreira (
2004) for references on the coherence of related indicators. Another possible extension of our paper could consist in examining the relation between high-order TCEs when the probability distribution admits tails that are not modeled using the generalized Pareto distribution, but using, for instance, the semi-heavy tails of infinitely divisible probability distributions. Finally, it could be interesting to examine the stability of high-order TCE indicators (see for instance the discussion in
Le Courtois et al. (
2020) on the cross-stability of second and fourth-order moments).