The Financial Stress Index: Identification of Systemic Risk Conditions
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Index Construction
2.1. Conceptual Definition of Stress
2.2. Indicators of Stress
Market | Indicator Type | Variable | Indicator Data |
---|---|---|---|
Equity | Market Crashes—Equity Subsectors | SP5EENE D and SPLRCE G (S&P 500 energy); SP5EMAT D and SPLRCM G (S&P 500 materials); SP5EIND D and SPLRCI G (S&P 500 industrials); SP5ECOD D and SPLRCD G (S&P 500 cons. discretionary); SP5ECST D and SPLRCS G (S&P 500 consumer staples); SP5EHCR D and SPLRCA G (S&P 500 healthcare); SP5EFIN D and SPLRCF G (S&P 500 financials); SP5EINT D and SPLRCT G (S&P 500 information technology); SP5ETEL D and SPLRCL G (S&P 500 telecommunications); SP5EUTL D and SPLRCU G (S&P 500 utilities) | |
Foreign Exchange | Crashes Market—Spot Currencies | UKDOLLRD and GBPUSDG (Pound sterling, UK); EUDOLLRD (Euro, Europe); CNUSDSCD and USDCADG (Dollar, Canada); MXUSDSP D and USDMXNG (Peso, Mexico); USDAUSPD and AUDUSDG (Dollar, Australia); JPYN1UDD and USDJPYG (Yen, Japan); BBZARSPD and USDZARG (Rand, South Africa) | |
Covered Interest Spread | UKDOLLR D and GBPUSD G (Pound sterling, UK); EUDOLLR D (Euro, Europe); CNUSDSC D and USDCAD G (Dollar, Canada); MXUSDSP D and USDMXN G (Peso, Mexico); USDAUSP D and AUDUSD G (Dollar, Australia); JPYN1UD D and USDJPY G (Yen , Japan); BBZARSP D and USDZAR G (Rand, South Africa) | ||
BBGBP3F D and GBPUSD3D G (Pound sterling, UK); TDEUR3M D (Euro, Europe); BBCAD3F D and USDCAD3D G (Dollar, Canada); USMXN3F D (Peso, Mexico); BBAUD3F D (Dollar, Australia); BBJPY3F D (Yen, Japan); BBZAR3F D (Rand, South Africa) | |||
TRUK3MT D and ITGBR3D G (T-bill, UK); TREU3MT D (T-bill, Europe); TRCN3MT D and ITCAN3D G (T-bill, Canada); TRMX3MT D and ITMEX3D G (T-bill, Mexico); ADBR090 D (T-bill, Australia); TRJP3MT D and ITJPN3D G (T-bill, Japan); TRSA3MT D and ITZAF3D G (T-bill, South Africa) | |||
FRTBS3M D (T-bill, USA) | |||
Credit | Financing Spread | FRMCAAA D (Corporate bond yield); FRCPF3M D, FRFP3MT D, and IPUSAC3D G (Financial commercial paper yield) | |
TRUS10C D (10 year government bond); FRTBS3M D (T-bill, USA) | |||
Liquidity Spread—US$ Deposit Spread | ECUSD3M(IO) D (3 month dollar deposits, offered yield) | ||
ECUSD3M(IB) D (3 month dollar deposits, bid yield) | |||
Yield Curve Spread—Treasuries | TRUS10C D (10 year government bond) | ||
FRTBS3M D (T-bill, USA) | |||
Funding | Financing Spread—Interbank Liquidity | B5USD3M D and IBUSA3D G (US Interbank rate—interbank liquidity spread and interbank cost of borrowing spread); LHFINAN D and FRMCAAA D (financial bond yield—bank bond spread) | |
FRTBS3M D (US T-bill - interbank liquidity spread); USFDTRG D (fed. funds target rate - interbank cost of borrowing spread); TRUS10C D (10 year government bond - bank bond spread) | |||
Market Beta—Financial Subsector | SP5EFIN D (S&P 500 financials); SPLRCBK G (banking S&P 500 index) | ||
S.PCOMP D and SPXD G (S&P 500 index) | |||
Securitization | Financing Spread—Sec. Submarkets | LHGNM30 D and WIMRT30Y G (residential MBS); LHCRING D and LHIGCMB D (commercial MBS); MLABSMF D (asset backed securities) | |
FRTCM7Y D (7 year constant maturity treasury yield—RMBS); FRTCM10 D (10 year constant maturity treasury yield—CMBS); FRTCM5Y D (5 year constant maturity treasury yield—ABS) | |||
Real Estate | Return Spread | WIREI G (residential real estate); USNPIRN D and SPREITW G (commercial real estate) | |
FRTCM3Y D (3 year gov. bond yield) |
2.2.1. Financing Spread
2.2.2. Market Beta
2.2.3. Market Crashes
2.2.4. Covered Interest Spread
2.2.5. Liquidity Spread
2.2.6. Yield Curve Spread
2.2.7. Return Spread
2.3. Indicator Transformation
Name | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | Skewness | Kurtosis | Kolmogorov−Smirnov A |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
EQ_SP5EENE_DD | 7690 | 0.46 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.09 | −2.15 (0.03) | 5.72 (0.06) | 0.18 *** |
EQ_SP5EMAT_DD | 6732 | 0.38 | 1.00 | 0.91 | 0.10 | −2.18 (0.03) | 5.79 (0.06) | 0.19 *** |
EQ_SP5EIND_DD | 11857 | 0.38 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.10 | −1.9 (0.02) | 3.96 (0.04) | 0.2 *** |
EQ_SP5ECOD_DD | 11857 | 0.47 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.09 | −1.64 (0.02) | 2.74 (0.04) | 0.19* ** |
EQ_SP5ECST_DD | 11857 | 0.54 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.07 | −1.66 (0.02) | 2.96 (0.04) | 0.19 *** |
EQ_SP5EHCR_DD | 7425 | 0.62 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.08 | −1.14 (0.03) | 0.38 (0.06) | 0.17 *** |
EQ_SP5EFIN_DD | 11857 | 0.22 | 1.00 | 0.90 | 0.12 | −2.17 (0.02) | 6.05 (0.04) | 0.19 *** |
EQ_SP5EINT_DD | 7690 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.14 | −1.81 (0.03) | 2.86 (0.06) | 0.2 *** |
EQ_SP5ETEL_DD | 6732 | 0.41 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.12 | −1.52 (0.03) | 1.75 (0.06) | 0.17 *** |
EQ_SP5EUTL_DD | 11857 | 0.47 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.09 | −1.94 (0.02) | 3.56 (0.04) | 0.19 *** |
FX_GBP_DD | 11857 | 0.67 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.07 | −1.28 (0.02) | 1.14 (0.04) | 0.14 *** |
FX_EUR_DD | 11857 | 0.68 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.06 | −0.79 (0.02) | −0.11 (0.04) | 0.12 *** |
FX_ZAR_DD | 11857 | 0.51 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.09 | −0.86 (0.02) | 0.44 (0.04) | 0.12 *** |
FX_CAD_DD | 11857 | 0.71 | 1.00 | 0.96 | 0.04 | −1.84 (0.02) | 5.79 (0.04) | 0.13 *** |
FX_AUD_DD | 11857 | 0.63 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.06 | −1.27 (0.02) | 1.87 (0.04) | 0.15 *** |
FX_MXN_DD | 11857 | 0.15 | 1.00 | 0.86 | 0.18 | −1.68 (0.02) | 1.98 (0.04) | 0.23 *** |
FX_JPY_DD | 11857 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.06 | −0.91 (0.02) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.13 *** |
FX_GBP_CIS | 11857 | −0.04 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.66 (0.02) | 0.15 (0.04) | 0.1 *** |
FX_CAD_CIS | 11857 | −0.02 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.4 (0.02) | −0.08 (0.04) | 0.07 *** |
FX_EUR_CIS | 4302 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.3 (0.04) | 0.4 (0.07) | 0.04 *** |
FX_MXN_CIS | 4826 | −0.02 | 0.30 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 2.21 (0.04) | 5.83 (0.07) | 0.23 *** |
FX_ZAR_CIS | 8276 | −0.02 | 0.14 | 0.05 | 0.02 | −0.2 (0.03) | 0.63 (0.05) | 0.04 *** |
FX_JPY_CIS | 8276 | −0.07 | 0.04 | −0.01 | 0.02 | −0.07 (0.03) | −1.01 (0.05) | 0.07 *** |
FX_AUD_CIS | 7968 | −0.03 | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.96 (0.03) | 0.5 (0.05) | 0.11 *** |
CR_CBS | 11857 | −0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.20 (0.02) | -0.06 (0.04) | 0.06 *** |
CR_CPS | 11857 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 2.6 (0.02) | 9.87 (0.04) | 0.18 *** |
CR_LIQS_MA | 10535 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.78 (0.02) | 3.76 (0.05) | 0.24 *** |
CR_TYC_MA | 11857 | −0.03 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.01 | −0.61 (0.02) | −0.1 (0.04) | 0.07 *** |
IB_LS | 11857 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 1.89 (0.02) | 4.46 (0.04) | 0.16 *** |
IB_CS | 11603 | −0.05 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 1.61 (0.02) | 9.17 (0.05) | 0.2 *** |
IB_BBS | 11857 | −0.01 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 2.95 (0.02) | 14.06 (0.04) | 0.14 *** |
IB_FB | 11857 | −0.16 | 0.69 | 0.29 | 0.13 | 0.15 (0.02) | 0.21 (0.04) | 0.02 *** |
RE_RRE | 11857 | −0.13 | 0.12 | −0.01 | 0.05 | 0.06 (0.02) | −0.92 (0.04) | 0.04 *** |
RE_CRE | 11357 | −0.58 | 0.15 | −0.02 | 0.14 | −2.15 (0.02) | 4.81 (0.05) | 0.17 *** |
SEC_CMBS | 5848 | −0.01 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 3.66 (0.03) | 15.89 (0.06) | 0.23 *** |
SEC_RMBS | 11857 | −0.01 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.38 (0.02) | 2.19 (0.05) | 0.05 *** |
SEC_ABS | 6392 | −0.01 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 3.78 (0.03) | 17.19 (0.06) | 0.24 *** |
2.4. Aggregating Financial System Stress
3. CFSI Calibration
Name | TP | FP | TN | FN | T1 | T2 | IV | NTSR | µ | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel 1: Quarterly ( and 3 bins were used for IV) | |||||||||||||
1 | Credit Weights | 1.01 | 12 | 2 | 72 | 6 | 0.33 | 0.03 | 0.33 | 0.04 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 0.64 |
2 | Principal Component Weights | 1.04 | 12 | 3 | 71 | 6 | 0.33 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 0.06 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 0.63 |
3 | Equal Market Weights | 0.56 | 13 | 11 | 63 | 5 | 0.28 | 0.15 | 1.08 | 0.21 | 0.8 | 0.09 | 0.57 |
4 | Portfolio Theoretic Weights | 0.59 | 9 | 6 | 68 | 9 | 0.5 | 0.08 | 0.49 | 0.16 | 0.8 | 0.07 | 0.42 |
Panel 2: Monthly ( and 3 bins were used for IV) | |||||||||||||
1 | Equal Market Weights | 0.68 | 36 | 23 | 202 | 17 | 0.32 | 0.1 | 0.62 | 0.15 | 0.8 | 0.09 | 0.57 |
2 | Principal Component Weights | 0.98 | 33 | 14 | 211 | 20 | 0.38 | 0.06 | 0.27 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.08 | 0.56 |
3 | Credit Weights | 0.78 | 33 | 22 | 203 | 20 | 0.38 | 0.1 | 0.71 | 0.16 | 0.8 | 0.08 | 0.52 |
4 | Portfolio Theoretic Weights | 1.03 | 20 | 7 | 218 | 33 | 0.62 | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.8 | 0.05 | 0.34 |
Panel 3: Weekly ( and 4 bins were used for IV) | |||||||||||||
1 | Principal Component Weights | 0.88 | 163 | 95 | 854 | 96 | 0.37 | 0.1 | 0.52 | 0.16 | 0.8 | 0.08 | 0.5 |
2 | Credit Weights | 0.77 | 154 | 93 | 856 | 105 | 0.41 | 0.1 | 0.66 | 0.16 | 0.8 | 0.07 | 0.46 |
3 | Equal Market Weights | 0.65 | 153 | 113 | 836 | 106 | 0.41 | 0.12 | 0.75 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.07 | 0.43 |
4 | Portfolio Theoretic Weights | 0.62 | 105 | 66 | 883 | 154 | 0.59 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.7 | 0.04 | 0.3 |
Panel 4: Daily ( and 4 bins were used for IV) | |||||||||||||
1 | Principal Component Weights | 0.86 | 1207 | 601 | 5872 | 781 | 0.39 | 0.09 | 0.38 | 0.15 | 0.7 | 0.08 | 0.48 |
2 | Credit Weights | 0.73 | 1174 | 661 | 5812 | 814 | 0.41 | 0.1 | 0.62 | 0.17 | 0.7 | 0.07 | 0.45 |
3 | Equal Market Weights | 0.64 | 1132 | 761 | 5712 | 856 | 0.43 | 0.12 | 0.6 | 0.21 | 0.7 | 0.07 | 0.41 |
4 | Portfolio Theoretic Weights | 0.65 | 744 | 401 | 6072 | 1244 | 0.63 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.7 | 0.05 | 0.29 |
4. CFSI Interpretation
4.1. Decomposition of Stress
4.1.1. Credit Weights
4.1.2. Market Components
4.2. Historical Relevance of Stress
4.2.1. Stress Regimes
Break Test | Scaled F-Statistic | Critical Value ***A | Break Date |
---|---|---|---|
0 vs. 1 *** | 2773.19 | 13.00 | 06/24/1980 |
1 vs. 2 *** | 1368.53 | 14.51 | 12/07/2010 |
2 vs. 3 *** | 669.86 | 15.44 | 05/09/1975 |
3 vs. 4 *** | 166.92 | 15.73 | 05/23/2006 |
4 vs. 5 *** | 736.42 | 16.39 | 04/11/1991 |
5 vs. 6 *** | 184.09 | 16.60 | 07/23/1998 |
6 vs. 7 *** | 47.12 | 16.78 | 03/19/1986 |
7 vs. 8 | 0.00 | 16.90 | not found |
4.2.2. Links to Regulation
5. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Author Contributions
Conflicts of Interest
References
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- 3Despite similarities between the financing spread and the return spread a key difference is that the former measures the expected rate of return associated with purchasing an asset whereas the latter calculates the realized spread.
- 4Note that market crash indicators for the equity market and return spread indicators attempt to capture the realized downside exposure of designated markets. As a result, we invert the CDF transformation for these series, i.e., we use . For a price series, the observation with the worst realized return under the original CDF would yield a value close to zero instead of the desired value . Similarly, Yield Curve Spread indicators are also inverted based upon literature which finds that flat and inverted yield curves correspond to slow growth prospects.
- 5Specifically, note that since the CDF transformation depends only upon the rank ordering of observations, while .
- 6Namely, we consider the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s VIX, Merrill Lynch’s MOVE, and JP Morgan’s global FX volatility (JPMVXYGL), alongside three calculated volatility measures for corporate bonds, real estate, and securitization from 1 May 1992 to 30 June 2015.
- 7We select such that approximately 20% of observations will indicate a crisis and fix K = 2, and L = 2.
- 8The IV metric calculation divides the sample into n bins and becomes unstable if there are not good and bad classifications in each bin.
- 9Oet et al. [60] recommend selecting τ and μ for each stress measure in order to maximize the relative usefulness of the series.
- 10The stress period marks the 1973–1975 US crisis that included such momentous events as the fall of the Bretton Woods system, the 1973 oil crisis, the 1973–1975 recession, and the 1973–1974 stock market crash.
- 11For the equity market several sub-market indicators are not available 1970, and market capitalization data was not found before 1995. Before 1995 we use the earliest available information to infer the size of each sector relative to the set of sectors for which indicator data is available.
- 12Similarly data is not available to parse out the foreign exchange weight to each country prior to 1977. To enable some historical estimate of stress, the weights for each country from 1977 are applied backwards through 1970.
- 13Note that the aggregate size of the equity and foreign exchange markets relative to the financial system is available through the Financial Accounts of the US Z.1 Report. However, historical estimates of stress within the equity and foreign exchange markets are naturally limited by the opacity of relative weight within these markets.
- 14The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and Glass–Steagall Act of 1993 prevented US financial intermediaries from expanding their activities to become universal banks.
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Oet, M.V.; Dooley, J.M.; Ong, S.J. The Financial Stress Index: Identification of Systemic Risk Conditions. Risks 2015, 3, 420-444. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks3030420
Oet MV, Dooley JM, Ong SJ. The Financial Stress Index: Identification of Systemic Risk Conditions. Risks. 2015; 3(3):420-444. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks3030420
Chicago/Turabian StyleOet, Mikhail V., John M. Dooley, and Stephen J. Ong. 2015. "The Financial Stress Index: Identification of Systemic Risk Conditions" Risks 3, no. 3: 420-444. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks3030420