Blockchain-Based Supply Chain for Postage Stamps
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- The types of indicia and problems of their circulation are listed in Section 2.
- An overview of the blockchain technology is provided in Section 3.
- A general description of the proposed blockchain solution is introduced in Section 4.
- Pitfalls and possible directions for improvement are provided in Section 5.
2. Russian Post Indicia and Associated Risks
- meter stamps
- postage stamps
- printed postage impressions for envelopes and postcards (Printed postage impressions are not considered in this article because of the significant dominance of meter stamps and postage stamps in Russia).
2.1. Franking
2.2. Stamps
- counterfeit postage stamps
- technically authentic postage stamps bypassing accounting systems.
3. Blockchain
- atomic changes to the database (transactions) are grouped into blocks
- integrity and tamper-resistance of the transaction log are assured by hash links among blocks.
- Linked timestamping [14]: blockchain nature makes it possible to provide a universally verifiable proof of existence or absence of certain data or a state transition in the blockchain database.
- As transactions are cryptographically authorized by logical originators of such transactions, blockchain eliminates the risks associated with the single point of failure posed by centralized authorization systems.
- Client-side data validation prevents man-in-the-middle attacks.
- The universality of cryptographic proofs provided to clients allows to securely transfer them to third parties (e.g., for tax accounting or as evidence in legal action).
- In public permissionless blockchains data is public. The consensus algorithm is censorship-resistant (e.g., proof of work used in Bitcoin) which ensures that maintainers are free to enter and leave the system. Write access to the blockchain is public, too. Maintainers accountability in permissionless blockchains is economically secured by prohibitively high cost of attacks in proof-of-work consensus.
- Private blockchains have a well-defined and restricted list of entities with read and write access to the blockchain (e.g., a group of banks, the regulator and law enforcement in a hypothetical banking blockchain). End users of services codified in the blockchain (i.e., bank clients in the example above) do not have any access to the blockchain data.
- Public permissioned blockchains restrict write access to the blockchain data similarly to private blockchains, but are designed to be universally auditable. These blockchains grant read broad access to end users.
- Services as the most extensible part of the framework, encapsulates business logic of blockchain applications. An Exonum-powered blockchain may have a number of services; the same service can be deployed in various blockchains (possibly with prior configuration). Services have a degree of autonomy and each service performs logically complete and only necessary operations for a particular task. Services interface enables reuse and composability. In blockchain terms, services implement endpoints for processing transactions (cf. POST and PUT requests for HTTP REST services), as well as for read requests (cf. GET endpoints for HTTP REST services) that retrieve persistent information from the blockchain state (for the definition of blockchain state, see below).
- (Lightweight) clients have typical functionality of clients in SOA. They are originators of most transactions and read requests in the system and are correspondingly provided with cryptographic key management utilities and withtools to generate transactions and verify (also cryptographically) responses to read requests.
- Middleware reduces complexity of the system from the point of view of service developers and provides:
- −
- ordering and atomicity of transactions
- −
- interoperability among services and clients
- −
- replication of services among nodes in the network which is designed for service fault-tolerance and auditability by auditing nodes
- −
- management of service lifecycle (e.g., service deployment)
- −
- data persistence
- −
- access control
- −
- assistance with generating responses to read requests, etc.
4. Blockchain Architecture
4.1. Participants
- (Transactions) validators: the computing centres of Russian Post that perform the functions of blockchain validators [14]. The initial list of their public keys is written in the blockchain’s genesis block and can subsequently be changed by the consensus of the validators. A high-performance computer with high-speed and reliable Internet access, as well as a private key from the list of validators, are required for their work. Validators check compliance of transactions entering the network with formal blockchain rules; compose blocks from the correct transactions, and participate in the consensus on adding new blocks to the blockchain
- (Token) issuers: Issuers need a computer with Internet access and a private key from the public key listed in the list of the blockchain maintainers to work. The list of privileged public keys is managed by validators. The status of issuer should be assigned to the Company as the only official seller of stamps at the primary market.
- (Postal) acceptance inspectors: the Company’s employees responsible for mail acceptance procedures and stamp (both physical and token) cancellation. They need a computer with Internet access and a private key corresponding to the public key from the list of receivers recorded in the blockchain to work.
- Clients: all legal entities participating in the stamps market according to the rules established for corporate clients. They need a smartphone or computer with Internet access to work. Each client is associated with one or several public keys and can receive tokens from the Company or another client that purchased tokens from the Company. Using its private key(s) it can transfer tokens to other participants and create transactions for the provision of postal services.
- Auditors: authorized Company’s representatives and other organizations that hold private keys from the public ones andare included in the list of auditors. They need a computer with an Internet connection to work. Auditors guarantee the correctness of the system performance.
4.2. Transactions
- Stamp token emission.
- mail preparation: reservation of tokens in amount of mailings to be sent.
- token cancellation and mail acceptance with stamps cancellation: In order to make the system flexible and efficient we add reverse transactions for token emission, mail preparation and stamps cancellation. Reverse transactions should have limited time to be performed and should be signed by the privileged issuers and acceptance inspectors correspondingly.
4.3. Token Emission and Circulation
- purchase of new stamps from the Company
- Declaration of uncancelled stamps, acquired prior to blockchain platform launch.
4.4. Workflow
- 1–2.
- A corporate client purchases stamps from the Company off-chain. Simultaneously, the Company transfers an equal amount of tokens to a client via blockchain.
- 3–4.
- One corporate client can transfer stamps to another corporate client, i.e., make a deal on a secondary market. He should also make a blockchain token transfer transaction at the same amount of stamps.
- 5–6.
- A corporate client can send mailings for stamps. From blockchain point of view, the client has to generate mail preparation transaction which declares the mailing parameters and freezes tokens, if mail acceptance inspector can process the operation, he sends transaction which finalizes mailing procedure and burns the client’s frozen tokens.
4.5. Demo Code
5. Pitfalls and Future Work
5.1. Denial-of-Service Attack with Transactions
5.2. Pseudoanonymity vs Anonymity
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
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Share and Cite
Yanovich, Y.; Shiyanov, I.; Myaldzin, T.; Prokhorov, I.; Korepanova, D.; Vorobyov, S. Blockchain-Based Supply Chain for Postage Stamps. Informatics 2018, 5, 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/informatics5040042
Yanovich Y, Shiyanov I, Myaldzin T, Prokhorov I, Korepanova D, Vorobyov S. Blockchain-Based Supply Chain for Postage Stamps. Informatics. 2018; 5(4):42. https://doi.org/10.3390/informatics5040042
Chicago/Turabian StyleYanovich, Yury, Igor Shiyanov, Timur Myaldzin, Ivan Prokhorov, Darya Korepanova, and Sergey Vorobyov. 2018. "Blockchain-Based Supply Chain for Postage Stamps" Informatics 5, no. 4: 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/informatics5040042
APA StyleYanovich, Y., Shiyanov, I., Myaldzin, T., Prokhorov, I., Korepanova, D., & Vorobyov, S. (2018). Blockchain-Based Supply Chain for Postage Stamps. Informatics, 5(4), 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/informatics5040042