The following section presents an overview of the research about power in supply chain management and digitalization in SCM. To do so, this section is structured according to the three research questions, presented in the beginning of this paper. It starts with a general overview of the definitions of power used in the research subject and a development of a general definition of the approach to power in SCM, followed by a categorization of the results, ending with and an overview of the subjects of power and digitalization in SCM.
3.1. Development of a Power Definition Approach in SCM
According to this research objective, it was necessary understand the concept of supply chain power and to develop a general power definition in supply chain management. In a first stage, it can be summarized that authors are referring to the definitions of El-Ansary/Stern [
20] and Emerson [
21], or referencing the theoretical contributions of French and Raven [
16]. To develop a more general definition of the approach to power, any publication of both reviews was analyzed according to the used definition of the term of power. Summarizing these considerations and refer it to SCM power in context of this research is defined as:
Power is the ability to influence the decision variables of other supply chain participants, based on a mutual dependency relationship, regarding to the participants’ individual preferences.
This definition forms the basis for all further considerations in this research. Power is based on an individual ability, which is mostly based on a resource dependency, to influence decision variables of other supply chain actors, towards which power is applied in order to promote the achievement of one’s individual cooperate goals [
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27,
28,
29,
30,
31,
32,
33,
34]. The goals of this exertion of influence can range “from quality and delivery requirements to prices and contractual terms, through to issues of strategic direction, product development and competitive intelligence” [
28]. The ability to exert influence here is anchored in the relationship between the actors and is rooted in the use of different influence strategies. An overview of the different influence strategies and influence mechanisms is outlined in
Table A2 According to this definition of power, equal and symmetric relationships cannot be characterized by power. The term of power itself requests an asymmetric allocation in the ability of influence [
5]. Referring to this, an asymmetric distribution of power can be understood as the unilateral capability of influence, so one actor in a dyad is in position to reach its individual goals by influencing the decision variables of the other.
According to the power bases theory of French and Raven [
16], these influence strategies can be subclassified by mediated and non-mediated power strategies. Mediated power strategies are here considered to be constraints or legally based legitimations. Non-mediated power strategies include information power, expert power and referential power [
22,
35,
36,
37,
38]. Following Benton and Maloni [
22], the influence mechanism of reward should be listed separately under the categorization of reward-mediated power.
The analysis of the publications proved that a large part of the influence strategies is based on a resource dependency of the respective partners. Thus, 24 of the publications are directly related to the resource dependency theory (RDT), according to Pfeffer and Salancik [
39]; in addition, other publications also describe an influence strategy that is based on resource dependency, which is described as a mechanism of influence with regard to the influence strategies coercion, reward, informational power and expert power. Legitimate power and referential power, on the other hand, are not justified on the basis of this dependence.
In addition to resource dependence, various authors refer to the incurrence of transaction costs or transaction cost economics (TCE) as an influential mechanism with regard to various influence strategies. Ireland [
40] cites the creation of switching costs and the resulting costs for the change of supplier. Cox et al. [
41] describe the occurrence of transaction costs as part of a negotiation process and link the goal of economic action with the avoidance of such costs. Based on these costs, they also refer to the number of alternatives and the development of switching barriers [
22,
24]. Furthermore, TCE can be found in the evaluation of the supplier relationship [
23]. In addition to the RDT and the TCE, few other mechanisms of influence can be found in the literature. Ref. [
42] referring to the influence of power through process integration and the resulting ability to influence decision-making processes through information/expert knowledge. Wang et al. [
43] cite the same definition of power, but break down influence into market dominance and channel dominance. The resulting influence strategies increasingly refer to influencing price or channel strategies and are, however, also linked to the use of financial resources.
In summary, it can be highlighted that the term of power is composed on three different levels: the definition approach itself, influence strategies and influence mechanisms. The
Figure 4 highlights these different dimensions of power, which could be used as a theoretical approach to analyzing the influences; for example, digitalization can have on the power allocation of the supply chain. Furthermore, this first analysis can highlight the variety of different definition approaches and the necessity to develop a more SCM-specific and empirically validated definition. This research offers a first concept, which can be used for further validation.
3.2. Power as a Research Subject in SCM
According to the objective of this review, the results will be categorized and outlined in order to provide an overall picture of the research topic. Six superordinate categorizations of the research result, which are developed based on the research topics of each publication, can be highlighted. Every publication was assigned to the category it matches the most, which led to an overlap in some categories content. These focal points are presented in
Table 3, which also presents the main keywords of this category.
Thus, various definitions of power repeatedly reference a resource dependency as the basis of individual power, although the respective emphases of the individual studies are set differently. The aspect of opportunism was a recurring element in the power research. It can be found in the considerations about bargaining power by Sheu and Gao [
32] or Fabbri and Klapper [
44], but was also taken up in the analysis of power strategies of the construction industry in the UK by [
45], who linked power with the term of individual opportunism—the ability to assert one’s individual goals in the face of resistance from others. An opportunistic behavior is, in this context, understood to be very closely connected, with a minimization of the total benefit, which can be seen as the cumulative benefit of all parties [
46].
As well as the negative effects of an opportunistic behavior, the superordinate focus of symmetric power allocations in the chain can be highlighted in several publications and categorizations. Concerning the construct of power, the influences of opportunism and the influence of symmetric power allocations, there are only minor differentiations between all publications; furthermore, these categorizations are overlapping in several considerations, theories and results. However, differences can be found in the respective approaches to the topics of power, within the supply chain.
In a first superordinate category, the literature highlights an analysis of bargaining power or negotiation power in the supply chain. Based on the derivation of the bargaining power, different manifestations on the supply chain and the enforcement of individual goals can be justified. This category overlaps in content with the categories of power structures and power strategies discussed below. The availability of resources is associated with the bargaining power of individual partners in the supply chain and will have an influence on the negotiation process. Hereby, resources include material, financial resources and even the availability of information [
25,
27]. Another possible bargaining position can be generated by the creation of switching barriers. The respective negotiation strategy, the choice between reward or coercion strategies, has a decisive influence on the success of a negotiation situation. The enforcement of corporate goals, such as the enforcement of a pricing strategy, is positively influenced by the respective bargaining power of the contracting parties [
47,
48]. The transparent sharing of one’s own negotiating position reduces the negative effects that can result from premature action [
49].
The analysis of different dominance structures within dyads along the chain pointed out that opportunistic behavior will negatively influence the supply chain. Mutual dependencies between respective partners or a shift of power structures towards the customer side reduces opportunistic influence, which leads to a minimization of the total benefit [
50]. Similar to the collaborative approach, the highest benefit is reached by a symmetrical distribution of power. Symmetric power relationships and strong ties between the parties can foster the will of individual suppliers/customers to invest in expanding these relationships and increasing total benefits [
29,
51]. Individual dominance strategies increase opportunistic benefits, but simultaneously it can negatively influence the supply chain’s overall success [
51]. In addition to the positive influence of innovative solutions—in this context understood as IT solutions—Deitz et al. [
52] used this example by analyzing the influence of forced IT integrations. The empirical analysis shows the positive correlation of company liquidity on the implementation of forced measures, such as the introduction and integration of RFID chips in production. This power allocation can only be narrowed down for isoelastic demand, which induced a shift of the distribution of power towards the traders. In non-price-sensitive markets, in which the customer is strongly dependent on product availability, the total benefit can be increased more strongly by, e.g., pricing on the part of retailers than by process optimization on the part of manufacturers [
53,
54].
The analysis of different market structures or supply chain designs and their influence on power structures and supply chain performance forms the third category, which shows that the individual benefit can be maximized through an appropriate power position [
55]. For example, a power position of the manufacturer can lead to an increase in production volume, a decrease in the “retail price and the largest expected surplus for an individual buyer” [
56], on the other hand, the total “channel profit and the total consumer surplus” [
56] can increase due to a power position of the retailer [
56]. So, the market power structure will have a noticeable influence on the resale pricing strategy within multichannel service supply chains [
57]. Due to the influence of the more powerful actor, the objectives and target achievements of the entire chain continue to differ, but the chains targets are often influenced by the most powerful member.
In addition to examining the power structures within the supply chain, further publications focus on the analysis of power strategies or strategies of exerting influence. These considerations also take up the investigation of the relationships along the supply chain and their influence on the performance of the supply chain. Although there is a major overlap with the previous section in terms of content, these publications differ in their focus on relationship management and power strategies. Cox et al. [
41] highlight the meaning of individual power strategies, leaned against the power base theory, and a corresponding resource dependence. They emphasize the complexity of the various supply chain structures and suggest that each power strategy must be evaluated to the background of the individual requirements. Individual power strategies exhibit varying degrees of positive or negative effect on the supply chain relationships. Strategies of coercion, overriding mediating strategies, can significant negatively influence supply chain relationships, whereas non-mediating strategies have a significant positive effect. Strategies of reward turn out to be largely positive in terms of relationship quality within the supply chain and thus performance, but do not show a significant impact [
22,
25,
37,
58]. Assuming that power structures exist within each dyad, Maglaras et al. [
34] and Takashima and Kim [
24] show that corresponding factors of asymmetry negatively influence the respective relationship structures and performances, as well as the negative effect incompatibility of one’s own objectives with those of the respective partners will have on the success of the supply chain by the mechanism of dependency, whereby Chicksand and Rehme [
46] refer to value creation, which is based on the individual objectives and power strategies. Contrary to this, Hingley [
58] point out that power is not to be seen negatively throughout, but asymmetries are present as a basic condition of all interactions, and only the use of a dependence leads to negative effects.
As part of supply chain relationship management, the factor of power is an effective tool for managing suppliers and customers. Symmetrical power relationships can be highlighted as one driving forces to maximizing benefits along the supply chain. Considering collaboration and the effects of symmetrical power structures within the supply chain, forms another, overarching research focus. Several publications take up the collaborative approach to supply chain design, in the context of analyzing power effects on supply chain performance. Referencing the power mechanisms Benton and Maloni [
22], the literature pointed out the positive influence mechanisms of non-mediated power strategies on supply chain success. Similar to non-mediating power strategies, which positively influence supplier relationships quality, a collaborative strategy also has a positive effect on supply chain performance by aligning strategic goals [
86]. Collaboration, however, does not change the power structures in the chain, rather it creates a shared decision horizon and joint strategies, in which decisions are made for mutual benefit. Resource dependencies, the monetary strength of individuals and the asymmetric information relationships remain, but can be softened with regard to the joint achievement of goals. Therefore, it is necessary to know about one’s own individual market position, the market as a whole and possible influence strategies, and to include this knowledge in the strategy development [
36,
61,
62].
The final categorization forms the element of trust and its influence on power structures and supply chain performance. This category increasingly overlaps with the topic of collaboration. The recognition of an authority increases the confidence in the respective power position, from which an increase in the respective influence results, whereby this is not regarded as negative or opportunistic. Creating a common identity has a similar effect. This also increases trust among the different supply chain members and strengthens the power structures along the supply chain. Inter-organizational interfaces also have a trust-building effect; for example, they promote the exchange of information and thus increase the degree of trust and the associated benefits for the supply chain. Finally, perceived equity is asserted as an influencing factor on trust within the supply chain by [
88]. According to supply chain governance approach, the level of trust is positively influenced by the degree of information sharing and thereby increases the common benefit. Trust here represents the basis for creating long-term strategic partnerships, across the presence of asymmetrical power distributions [
26,
89]. The more trustworthy a supplier/customer is, the better the individual’s respective competitive position. The size and market power of a company increases the corresponding trustworthiness [
35].
3.3. Power and Supply Chain Digitalization
The following section analyzes the reviewed literature, linked to the research area of SCM and digitalization. The concept of supply chain digitalization in this review is associated with technological improvements, such as IoT, CPS and smart products, as well as being driven by technologies such as big data, etc.; however, to avoid technological specialization, this review focusses on general terms, such as digitalization, etc. Including the preceding considerations about supply chain digitalization, the collection and analysis of data will become a critical resource in the chain. Overall, it can be concluded that the concept of power is only addressed in a very rudimentary way in relation to supply chain digitalization. Several publications are dealing with the impact of information availability on collaboration or relationship quality. Further results can be mentioned in the impact of new business models, such as e-Commerce, on supply chain structures and supply chain design. Based on the induced restructuring of the chain and value creation, first approaches about the relation between digitalization and supply chain power structures can be elaborated.
Based on this assumption, information sharing can be used as an influence mechanism of power; furthermore, it will have an impact on the level of collaboration, by influencing the level of trust. Vendrell-Herrero et al. [
10] hereby lead a bidirectional perspective on the theorem of power: digital servitization can strengthen the power position of downstream companies, if they gain control over the connection channels to consumers; furthermore, a strengthening of the position of upstream companies can be demanded by regaining a resource dependency. In addition to the use of information as an influence mechanism of power, Vendrell-Herrero et al. [
10] link the concept of digital disruptive technologies and business models to the analysis of enterprise collaborations within supply chains. The use of digital technologies enables companies to introduce new products or distribution channels, leads to a change in value creation, such as corporate processes, and ultimately changes competition in the market [
8,
90]. By considering the availability of information and the capability of data analysis, data processes have become another central resource of the chain, which influences the power allocations.
Referring to the principal–agent theory, power asymmetries in the chain can be deduced in dependency to information’s availability. The allocation of information is asymmetric allocated on side of the agent, who can decide which information it is willing to share with the principal. However, informational availability or expert knowledge can be understood as mechanisms of coercion or reward. Information sharing, depending on the individually chosen corporate strategy, can on the one hand promote the consolidation of collaborative strategies, but on the other hand, only the withdrawal of information availabilities or knowledge can be used as a strategy to expand asymmetric power distributions [
89]. As an example, this development in value creation, induced by digitalization, can be located in the more original, end-customer-oriented sales landscape of stationary retail, where the final customers make their procurement decisions in the stationary store, which also takes over the functions of the warehouse logistics. One of the main objectives of the stationary trade concerns the reduction in transaction costs. This creates a corresponding power position of stationary retailing—on the one hand, there is a customer proximity, and their purchase behavior can be analyzed, on the other hand, further instances and tasks of the supply chain takes over. With the growth of e-commerce platforms or mobile shopping, the supply chain expands to include another actor. The power structures within the chain shift accordingly. Like brick-and-mortar retail, e-commerce platforms meet the needs of the end customer and expand their market share. Similar to stationary retail, the platforms receive information about the customer’s preferences, but at the same time they reduce transaction costs on the customer side through significantly increased transparency and comparability. Distinctions are primarily found in logistics—the transport of products to the customer. In addition to the reduction in transaction costs, they point out various influencing factors that distinguish digital commerce from analog commerce and establish added value for the customer. Furthermore, they cite customizability, spatial independence and corresponding interaction as added value. In these factors, Reinartz et al. [
9] justify the increase in power that digital sales models gain over analog sales models.
Digitalization leads to changes in value creation and competition, further to a growth of digital monopolies, and so it is influencing the allocation of power in the chain [
90]. Similar to the approaches of Reinartz et al. [
9], Subramaniam [
90] shows that digitalization creates value when processes or collaborations can be made faster and more easily due to digital measures, thus creating a competitive advantage in the market. Market entry barriers, such as physical availability of products and raw materials or product developments, are no longer the only limiting factors. The analysis and availability of data is becoming increasingly important. Following Subramaniam [
90], it can result in a monopoly position that is both product-associated and data-driven. With regard to the consideration of digital monopolies, he concludes that the original definition of a monopoly, tied to the respective market shares, is no longer sufficient.