Development of a Human Factors Approach to Equine-Related Human Accident Analysis, and Preliminarily Evaluation with Simulated Incidents
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- Unsafe acts which occur close to or directly result from the event and are usually identifiable as resulting from errors or violations.
- (2)
- Preconditions for unsafe acts being (a) the environment, surroundings, or technology, contributing if human decisions result in errors or unsafe conditions; (b) human conditions either physical or psychological and (c) personal readiness affecting individual practices, conditions, or actions.
- (3)
- Unsafe supervision occurs when an individual lacks direction, training, or guidance to safely achieve a required task. Resulting from (a) inadequate or limited assistance; (b) planned inappropriate activities during an emergency or normal operations; (c) failure to correct a problem when identified or (d) a supervisor willfully disregarding a correct procedure.
- (4)
- Organizational influences include (a) resource management and decisions about skills, staff, equipment needs or funding requirements; (b) organizational work climate and culture and (c) operational processes, structure, decisions, and rules that support the organization’s vision.
2. Methods
2.1. Stage One: Designing a Valid HFACS Framework for Equestrianism
2.2. Stage Two: Ensuring Reliability of HFACS Framework for Equestrianism
3. Results
4. Discussion
4.1. Safety and Risk Mitigation Application of the Equestrianism HFACS Framework
4.2. The Horse as a Living Animal and Its Association with Human Interaction-Error
4.3. HFACS-Eq Accident Analysis
4.4. HFACS-Eq Associations and Areas for Improvement
4.5. HFACS-Eq Limitations and Future Research
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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HFACS-Eq Levels | Categories | Total | Nano-Codes | Total |
---|---|---|---|---|
1. Unsafe Work-related Influences | Organisation | 3 | 1 | 7 |
Culture | 2 | |||
Operational Process | 4 | |||
2. Unsafe Supervision | Supervisory Skills/Capability/Experience | 4 | 2 | 10 |
Planned Appropriate Actions | 3 | |||
Corrections | 3 | |||
Supervisory Skills | 2 | |||
3. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts | Physical Environment/Surroundings | 8 | 7 | 33 |
Social Environment | 4 | |||
Horse/Sentient Being | 6 | |||
Resource Management | 8 | |||
Personal Readiness | 1 | |||
Optimal Mental State | 2 | |||
Optimal Physical State | 3 | |||
Optimal Human Performance | 2 | |||
4. Human Unsafe Acts | Skill-based Actions | 4 | 4 | 10 |
Perceptions | 2 | |||
Routine Adherence | 1 | |||
Cautious Adherence | 3 | |||
19 | Nano-codes | 60 |
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System—Equestrianism (HFACS-Eq) | ||
---|---|---|
1.Unsafe Work-related Influences | ||
Organisation | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Insufficient manager or management team | No person in charge or a management team. |
Culture | ||
1 | Reactive Leadership | Limited supportive leadership and untrustworthiness, e.g., reacting to problems after the event rather proactively managing risk. |
2 | Low morale | Personnel not confident to report or discuss safety concerns. |
Operational Process | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Poor operational tempo and/or workload | Limited time for task/activities, e.g., daily routine does not allow time for gear check pre-work. |
2 | Insufficient guidance/procedures | Limited documentation, communication of safe work task/activities, limited direction, and leadership to promote and support safe decision making. |
3 | Insufficient communication | Limited clear and concise information about the task/activity, e.g., limited instruction and information provided to the receiver’s level of understanding. |
4 | Insufficient procedures to monitor and review task/activity | E.g., No audits, checklists to identify systems gaps and areas for improvement. |
2.Unsafe Supervision | ||
Supervisory Skills/Capability/Experience | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Insufficient task/activity plan | Staff/personnel, coach, committee had no plan (either documented or verbal) to safely interact with horses. |
2 | Insufficient supervision for individual or team | Limited appropriately skilled/capable supervisors for the for task/activity. |
Planned Appropriate Actions | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Task/activity not within personnel/rider/handler/driver capabilities | First-time rider prematurely removed from the lunge-line to ride independently. |
2 | Insufficient horse behavior/temperament assessment | No assessment completed on horse prior to task/activity or regularly updated, e.g., No E-BARQ, professional assessment. |
3 | Insufficient risk management (hazard identification, risk assessment, pre-task/activity brief) | E.g., Mares and stallions located in close proximity, limited barriers and controls in place. |
Corrections | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | High-risk human behavior not corrected | Insufficient supervision and observation to correct a rider/handler/diver who has limited skills to interact safely with a particular horse. |
2 | Equipment deficiencies not corrected | Poorly fitting tack and equipment. |
3 | Horse unsuitability not corrected | E.g., Novice rider allocated inexperienced or difficult horse. |
Supervisory Effort | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Insufficient supervision to follow/enforce existing routines or rules | E.g., When bareback riding is not allowed, but rider rides horse without a saddle and not prevented from doing so. |
2 | Insufficient and inattentive supervision | E.g., Supervisor not focused on the present. |
3.Preconditions for Unsafe Acts | ||
Physical Environment/Surroundings | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Unfavorable weather | E.g., Windy or raining |
2 | Unfavorable temperature | Unusually hot or cold |
3 | Unfavorable noise levels | Excessive traffic, loud machinery, etc. |
4 | Insufficient visibility | Excessive dust, snow, or other visual hazards |
5 | Unfamiliar environment | Environment horse and rider are not familiar with environment, e.g., racetrack both horse and rider have not previously been exposed to before |
6 | Unfavorable terrain | E.g., Ground surface not intact, dry or irregular topography |
7 | Inappropriate surrounding for rider/handler/driver skill level | E.g., Beginner rider riding in a large open area |
Social Environment | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Pressure from others (actual or perceived pressure) | E.g., Limited support network, peer-pressure |
2 | Competitive environment | E.g., Riding at a show or competition |
3 | Professional or paid environment | Rider or handler is being paid money to ride or handle the horse |
4 | Inappropriate social environment | Limited protection for the health, wellbeing, and human rights of participants |
Horse/Sentient Being | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Poor horse conformation for task/activity | E.g., Sway-backed, or cow-hocked |
2 | Dangerous current/historical horse behaviors | E.g., Limited response to human cues, shies, bucks, bites, kicks |
3 | Suboptimal horse health | E.g., Unhealthy horse, not maintained, identifiable injury or illness |
4 | Insufficient capability/training for required level of activity | E.g., (1) Horse received limited training to enable safe human interactions (2) Inexperienced horse allocated to a less experienced rider or handler |
5 | Insufficient horse welfare and management conditions | E.g., Horse had no social/herd interaction opportunity, insufficient shelter, etc. |
6 | Insufficient horse history | Horse history not identified, communicated, or recorded for the chosen rider/handler/driver |
Resource Management | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Horse history not identified, communicated, or recorded for the chosen rider/handler/driver. | E.g., Rider or handler was not warned a horse has been known to buck |
2 | Insufficient task/activity personnel allocation and level of skill | E.g., Moving a group of horses from one paddock to another, allocated as a two-person job, but only one available |
3 | Insufficient general equipment for the task/activity | Providing equipment that is not fit for purpose, e.g., dressage saddle for mustering |
4 | Equipment not correctly fitted | Limited or poorly fitted equipment, e.g., saddle to small |
5 | No helmet | E.g., Helmet not worn for ground or ridden work |
6 | No chest/torso protector | E.g., Body vest not worn |
7 | Unsuitable and unsafe footwear | No closed in footwear, e.g., riding boots |
8 | Inappropriate horse-rider/handler match for selected task/activity | No horse/rider/handler assessment match completed e.g., rider a beginner and sent to muster in a large paddock independently |
Personal Readiness | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Positive illicit drug and/or alcohol test | Illicit drugs or alcohol identified by on-site or laboratory testing Excludes medical response drugs. |
Optimal Mental State | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Cognitive overload or underload | Task/activity outside the physical or language capabilities of the participant or is not stimulating/engaging enough to maintain interest |
2 | Mental fatigue | Limited breaks and changes of task/activity included to reduce stress and/or boredom |
Optimal Physical State | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Known or recent physical fatigue | E.g., Insufficient sleep |
2 | Known, recent or historical injury/illness | Limited physical function, restrictions, e.g., recent illness or surgery |
3 | Insufficient food/sustenance and or fluids | Insufficient energy and hydration to meet task/activity demands |
Optimal Human Performance | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Cognitive deficits | E.g., Learning difficulties, autism diagnosis |
2 | Physical deficits | Insufficient level of hearing, eyesight, flexibility, and range of movement for task/activity |
3.Human Unsafe Acts | ||
Skill-based Actions | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Did not follow intended activity/task | E.g., Rode at canter even though could only safely ride at trot |
2 | Did not follow rules/procedures correctly | E.g., Rode in open paddock, when instructed to stay in round-pen |
3 | Did not follow all safety precautions | Chose not to follow a safety process, e.g., using non-compliant PPE or riding with damaged tack |
4 | Insufficient knowledge or skill to choose safer task/activities | The rider/handler/driver did not have the level of capability and training to correctly assess risk |
Perceptions | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Did not identify a hazard or problem | E.g., crossed the road with oncoming car |
2 | Did not adequately mitigate a known risk | Young horse not perceived as increased risk over older, more experienced horse |
Routine Adherence | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Did not follow normal/safe routine | E.g., rode horse without first lunging, as was routine for this horse |
Cautious Adherence | ||
No | Nano-codes | Explanation |
1 | Did not follow careful/cautious behavior | E.g., Riding with unsafe and unsuitable equipment, willfully taking risks |
2 | Did not preserve, maintain, and repair equipment | E.g., Limited repairs or maintenance of equipment, no forward thinking to check equipment and repair |
3 | Did not demonstrate cautious and sensible behavior and took risks | E.g., Thrill or sensation-seeking behavior and risk taking |
Scenario No | KF | z | p-Value | % Agreement |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.576 | 4.346 | <0.001 | 68% (N = 13) |
2 | 0.472 | 3.565 | <0.001 | 74% (N = 14) |
3 | 0.729 | 5.501 | <0.001 | 84% (N = 16) |
4 | 0.775 | 5.849 | <0.001 | 89% (N = 17) |
5 | 0.095 | 0.719 | 0.472 | 47% (N = 9) |
6 | 0.662 | 4.998 | <0.001 | 84% (N = 16) |
7 | 0.675 | 5.098 | <0.001 | 79% (N = 15) |
8 | 0.515 | 3.887 | <0.001 | 79% (N = 15) |
9 | 0.367 | 2.768 | 0.006 | 68% (N = 13) |
10 | 0.573 | 4.322 | <0.001 | 68% (N = 13) |
Scenario No | KF | z | p-Value | % Agreement |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.354 | 4.744 | <0.001 | 68% (N = 41) |
2 | 0.156 | 2.087 | 0.037 | 90% (N = 54) |
3 | 0.430 | 5.774 | <0.001 | 82% (N = 49) |
4 | 0.585 | 7.855 | <0.001 | 92% (N = 55) |
5 | 0.245 | 3.293 | <0.001 | 82% (N = 49) |
6 | 0.491 | 6.586 | <0.001 | 88% (N = 53) |
7 | 0.302 | 4.054 | <0.001 | 77% (N = 46) |
8 | 0.345 | 4.635 | <0.001 | 85% (N = 51) |
9 | 0.245 | 3.293 | <0.001 | 82% (N = 49) |
10 | 0.518 | 6.945 | <0.001 | 78% (N = 47) |
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Chapman, M.; Fenner, K.; Thomas, M.J.W. Development of a Human Factors Approach to Equine-Related Human Accident Analysis, and Preliminarily Evaluation with Simulated Incidents. Safety 2022, 8, 72. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8040072
Chapman M, Fenner K, Thomas MJW. Development of a Human Factors Approach to Equine-Related Human Accident Analysis, and Preliminarily Evaluation with Simulated Incidents. Safety. 2022; 8(4):72. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8040072
Chicago/Turabian StyleChapman, Meredith, Kate Fenner, and Matthew J. W. Thomas. 2022. "Development of a Human Factors Approach to Equine-Related Human Accident Analysis, and Preliminarily Evaluation with Simulated Incidents" Safety 8, no. 4: 72. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8040072