Pareto on Cunning and Deceit

Abstract

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates praises reason and vilifies force. This preference for reason continued its role in philosophy and only a few political thinkers considered the use of force. Plato also dismissed persuasion as the Sophists’ art of making the weaker argument appear stronger and the stronger argument appear weaker. It was Machiavelli who focused on force and persuasion, but he was criticized for his advice to the Prince. Vilfredo Pareto did not offer counsel but rather provided one of the first realistic accounts of social behavior. For Pareto, that meant exploring the range of means which humans use to achieve what they want. For Pareto, that meant less attention on reason and more on persuasion and cunning. Thomas Hobbes wrote that force and fraud are two means, but Pareto insisted that humans use force, persuasion, and cunning. It is to Pareto’s credit as a social behaviorist that he provided one of the first scholarly analyses of cunning and deceit.

“Humans Shall Be a Race of Dupes for Time Immemorial”1

“Force, and Fraud, Are in Warre the Two Cardinall Vertues”2

1. Introduction

Early in his career as a social theorist, Vilfredo Pareto contended that there were three approaches to prompt people to act or to believe in a certain way: with the use of force, with persuasion, or by cunning. Pareto devoted much of his subsequent writings to the notion of force, which is prominently featured in major passages of his Trattato di sociologia generale (Treatise on General Sociology). He also devoted some effort to explaining persuasion. In contrast, he did not provide a specific account of cunning. Despite the lack of specific treatment, the notions of cunning and deception play major roles in Pareto’s theory of social behavior. While Pareto had argued earlier that neither force nor deception are fully successful and only persuasion is, his later approach suggested that nothing is totally successful. Despite the fact that there is no specific account of either cunning or deception, one can be reconstructed from a number of Pareto’s published works. Indeed, there is a continuum running from persuasion, to cunning, and then to deceit. In Pareto’s theory, the fox relies mostly on persuading his followers of the soundness of his ideas. But if it is necessary, he will resort to cunning to achieve his goals. Pareto believes that it is part of human nature to deceive. He also contends that people are prone to deceiving others but that they also tend to deceive themselves. This may lead one to believe that Pareto regarded some people as being inherently deceptive and that most people are inherently gullible; however, that is only partially true. He also contended that people were sometimes motivated by sympathy and even beneficence. This suggests that there is movement between deception and confidence; that is, a kind of equilibrium. This essay is an attempt to reconstruct Pareto’s ideas regarding cunning and deception by contrasting them with force and persuasion. As such it will add to our understanding of Pareto’s conception of social psychology.

This essay has four main sections. The first section provides a brief overview of Pareto’s conception of human behavior. The second section outlines Pareto’s notions of force and persuasion. The third section focuses on Pareto’s ideas regarding cunning and deception. The fourth section contains an evaluation and as well as some concluding comments.

2. Pareto’s Theory of Human Behavior

Anyone seeking a concise and definite account of Pareto’s theory of human behavior is bound to be disappointed. While Pareto was trained as an engineer and then became a professor of economics, he never had much interest in brevity and precision. Pareto authored half a dozen works but he is primarily remembered for his magnum opus: Trattato di sociologie generale. This should be rendered Treatise on General Sociology, but the English translation is The Mind and Society. This 1935 translation is in four volumes; the Italian version is in two volumes, as is the authorized French translation. In his “Introduction to Pareto’s Sociology”, Norbert Bobbio explained that the book was “monstrous”3 in the three senses of the term: “prodigy”, “deformed creature”, and especially, as an “unusual event” (Bobbio 1972, p. 55). Bobbio argued that Pareto’s work was unique in that it had little in common with what other sociologists wrote and that the largest portion of the Trattato bore almost no resemblance to what passes for sociological analysis. Pareto was a scientist and a historian—he relied on facts and made use of history. But the sheer number of facts and the massive reliance on history contributes to the daunting nature of Pareto’s major work. Furthermore, the development of his own terminology and his biting criticisms mean that Pareto is often misunderstood and rarely appreciated. As another noted commentator remarked, the Treatise’s ideas “sometimes seem idiosyncratic to the point of the bizarre” (Finer 1966, p. 8). Anyone expecting to find a positive account of human conduct in Pareto’s work will be disappointed; Aldous Huxley was correct to entitle his review of The Mind and Society “Pareto’s Museum of Human Stupidity4” (Huxley 1935, p. 1).

Huxley was well aware of humanity’s belief in reason and progress, but he agreed with Pareto that this conviction was not well-founded despite its long history. For most of the past two thousand years, philosophers have extolled the virtues of reason. Plato contrasted the true realm of Forms with the deceptive jungle of appearances. Leibniz believed in the sufficiency of reason and that even God acted according to the principle of sufficient reason. Hegel believed that the state was the incarnation of reason. There have been those who have been less enamored with reason and rationality—Nietzsche comes readily to mind—but most empiricists have not denounced reason so much as insisted that it is not the sole source of human knowledge and activity. Hume famously insisted that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, but he did not totally denounce it. In contrast, Pareto regarded the worship of reason to be similar to any other worship—it was often detrimental to human beings. It was, and is, often used to provide excuses for actions. Pareto was ruthless in uncovering the false justifications that people have provided for their actions.5 Pareto was just as ruthless in his attempt to show that the modern beliefs in progress and peace were just as unwarranted as the deification of reason. Finer showed that while the nineteenth century saw the glorification of “progress, perfectibility and positivism” by the end of that century all three were either under attack or even discredited. Finer also argued that Pareto’s experiences during around the turn of the century prompted him to repudiate his early socialist leanings and his economic liberalism (Finer 1966, p. 4; Mornati 2020, pp. 77–81). For Pareto, reason was not the true motivator of human conduct, so he set himself the task of uncovering what were the factors which prompted people to act (Mornati 2020, pp. 112–13). As Pareto stipulated as early as 1908, “the greater part of human actions have their origin not in logical reasoning but in sentiment” (Pareto 1968, p. 27; Pareto 1980b, p. 179). For Pareto, it was emotion, and that could be activated by fear, by persuasion, or by cunning.

3. Force and Persuasion (Or Lions and Foxes)

The Trattato is so vast and so obscure that critics can often find some passage that seems to support their complaint. In her late work On Violence, Hannah Arendt claimed that Pareto glorified violence and rejected peaceful political means (Arendt 1970, pp. 65–72). Arendt had been right about many different things: the origins of totalitarianism and her critique of Eichmann, but she was wrong about Pareto. Pareto did not ever seek to show how things should be; sometimes he sought to reveal how they could be, but he was almost always concerned with how things are.6 Pareto began one of most sustained discussions regarding force with the sentence “The use of force in society” (Pareto 1935d, p. 1510, §2170, his italics). He then discussed two different types of society: those which extolled uniformity and stability and those which promoted individuality and change. Pareto allowed that these were extremes and that real societies possessed both of these sets of traits. But he maintained that it was accurate to indicate that there are these two types of societies and that historically there has been movement between the two types. What he also maintained was that each type of society often used force—the first to maintain homogeneity and the second to foster heteronomy. This was a matter of historical fact and to question whether the use of force was good or bad simply misses the point. It is worth quoting Pareto’s entire passage:

To ask whether or not force ought to be used in a society, whether the use of force is or is not beneficial, is to ask a question that has no meaning: for force is used by those who wish to preserve uniformities and by those who wish to overstep them; and the violence of the one stands in contrast and in conflict with the violence of the others (Pareto 1935d, p. 1512, § 2174).

Pareto goes on to say that when someone from a governing party “disavows the use of force”, what he means is that he rejects an insurgent’s use of force. Similarly, if an insurgent “disavows the use of force” what he means is that he rejects a governing party’s use of force. Pareto also insists that there is no particular meaning in asking whether it is beneficial to use force to maintain uniformities just as there is no particular meaning in asking whether it is beneficial to use force to overstep those uniformities (Pareto 1935d, pp. 1512–13, § 2175). Given that Pareto was an economist, it is not surprising that much of his work focused on economic issues. This was also prevalent in his discussions regarding force. In particular he wrote about strikes and how owners brought in scabs—and that there was violence on both sides. What makes his account more interesting is how owners could portray their use of force as legal and legitimate whereas the force that a striker used was illegal and totally illegitimate. He noted that this “transfers the question from the utility of the violence to the utility of the manner in which violence is applied”. The struggle is not just an economic one but a legal and a political one as well. Owners have political backing, so they portray their use of violence as not just useful but legal. Strikers can and do respond that they would use legal violence if they were allowed, but they are not. The strikers have no other choice than to use violence that their opponents deem illegal: “People who use illegal violence would ask for nothing better than to be able to transmute it into legal violence” (Pareto 1935d, p. 1530, § 2189). Thus, it is a matter of interpretation. In a lengthy and important footnote to § 2190, Pareto discussed how historians write about revolutions. If he is concerned with “facts” then he will try to determine whether the revolution was “‘just’ or ‘unjust’”. He will base his decision upon some metaphysical idea. But most historians are not so much interested in the “facts” as they are in ethics. This decision will most likely depend upon the historian’s sympathies. If he is a monarchist, then the monarch is right and the rebels are wrong, but if he is a democrat then the rebels are right and the monarch is wrong. If the historian is against the masses, then he will insist that they were duped into an insurrection by “the misleading wiles of demagogues”, but if he sides with them, then we will write that they were forced to rebel against “intolerably abusive laws”. Pareto concludes the footnote with the comment “How much paper and ink have been wasted in repeating such brainless chatter over and over again!” (Pareto 1935d, pp. 1531–32, § 2090, note 1).

Critics have wasted paper and ink in regard to Pareto on violence because they focus on his notion of force. Yet the notion of force is not discussed until later in the book and it is in connection with Pareto’s distinction between lions and foxes. The distinction is between lions, which use force, and foxes, which employ persuasion, but before turning to those two types of animals, it is important to address some of Pareto’s comments on force and violence.

First, Pareto insisted that to ask whether it was beneficial or not was to ask a meaningless question. What matters is whether the one affirming or denouncing the use of force gains from its use or its lack of use (Pareto 1935d, pp. 1512–13; § 2174). Second, he was not encouraging the use of force; rather, he was explaining that it has been used throughout most of history. Third, and related to that, is the fact that Pareto was a scholar explaining human behavior and was not a philosopher telling people how they should or should not act. It is worth quoting in full the comment that he made towards the end of Chapter XII:

In the practice of the social sciences one must especially be on one’s guard against intrusions of personal sentiments; for a writer is inclined to look not for what is and nothing else, but what ought to be in order to fit in with his religious, moral, patriotic, humanitarian, or other sentiments.

(Pareto 1935d, p. 1737, § 2411)

Earlier in the Trattato Pareto discussed force in terms of military protection. As the need for military potection rises so does the likelihood that those with “bellicose instincts” will also rise (Pareto 1935d, p. 1553, § 2223). But Pareto also points out that countries can dominate others with means other than with force: “They conquer by gold, not by steel” (Pareto 1935d, p. 1556, § 2228). In his “Introduction” to his selection of Pareto’s writings, S.E. Finer provided a “Typology of political regimes”. The first one is a government that chiefly relies on physical force, and Finer suggested that Pareto’s historical examples included Sparta, Rome, and Venice. The second one is a government that chiefly relies on intelligence. Here, the examples include Athens and modern democracies. There is a third one which is mixed. Finer suggested that the main example was the earlier Roman Empire (Finer 1966, pp. 58–59).

Those who believe in the use of force are referred to as “lions” and those who prefer persuasion are regarded as “foxes” (Pareto 1935d, p. 1515, § 2178). As Alasdair Marshall pointed out, Pareto borrowed the terminology from Machiavelli. Charles H. Powers maintained that lions were “strong-willed, direct conservative persons”, in contrast to foxes who were diplomatic and believed in manipulation (Powers 2000, pp. 8, 13; Burnham 2020, p. 191). Joseph V. Femia explained that Pareto’s lions relied on force to maintain their domination while foxes used guile; but that these were mostly ideal types. In reality, the governing elites relied on a combination of “force and fraud” (Femia 2011, pp. 70–71). In other words, lions and foxes were not real descriptors but images. Clayton Fordham argued in his article devoted to clarifying Pareto’s imagery that Pareto did not spend much time on lions and foxes because they are primarily images. Furthermore, Fordahl maintains that lions and foxes do not reflect individual leaders, but represent groups (Fordahl 2020, pp. 319–20, 322–23). As Fordahl pointed out, Pareto mentioned lions and foxes only three times and very late in the Trattato. As Fordahl pointed out, the three brief mentions are “brief and shallow” (Fordahl 2020, p. 320). Perhaps more importantly, Pareto often conflated guile and fraud with persuasion, but sometimes he distinguished between them; hence, in my account there is tripartite division between force, persuasion, and cunning. Having explained Pareto’s concept of force and defended it from his critics, it is time to discuss Pareto’s comments on the power of persuasion.

4. Pareto on Persuasion

There is a fundamental tension between the use of force and the employment of persuasion. For Pareto, there is a cycle in which the ruling elites become less and less willing to use force or even the threat of force in order to maintain stability. Instead, they transition from being lions and become foxes. But as Finer argued, the ruling Italian elite believed in the “sentimental ideologies of his day” and that “persuasion, sweet reasonableness, enlightened self-interest, the habit of compromise and the like were all that were necessary to bring about a form of rule from which the sanction of violence was forever banished” (Finer 1966, p. 54).

Pareto mentions persuasion several dozen times, but he provided two extensive discussions of it. The two major discussions occur in the third and the fourth volumes in the English translation, but there are a number of passages in the first volume which warrant examination. Pareto distinguishes between facts which can be proven to be true or false and sentiments which we take to be true or false but cannot be proven. As Pareto remarks, “People say (people believe) that A = B, because it is true” (Pareto 1935a, p. 11, § 14). But these people are not describing an objective reality as much as they are hinting that it is “beneficial because true”. The first is an issue for science; the second is a matter of faith. The first is determined by one’s own observation, whereas the second is promoted by another person. As Pareto writes, someone who wishes to convince someone “is exhorting rather than proving” (Pareto 1935a, pp. 16–17, 23, §§ 23–24, 42). However, Pareto acknowledges that many people of faith attempt to present their articles of faith as matters of scientific validity. Pareto’s admonition is for people to recognize whether these propositions are empirically verifiable or whether they lay beyond verification. It is important to recognize that Pareto is not denigrating beliefs, because he acknowledges that beliefs, ideologies, and myths have utility. It is a matter of persuasion, and that is why people tend to speak of good and bad and what is better. This is a type of propaganda. Propaganda has no place in experimental science because science is founded upon facts. There is no persuasion; just calling attention to the verified facts. But within social science, there is a reliance on persuasion and one who “knows how to play deftly on sentiments” will have “his reputation for eloquence” soar (Pareto 1935a, pp. 39–40, § 76). But Pareto acknowledges that, in a certain sense, beliefs are also facts. What he means is that it is a fact that people believe such and such. It is worth quoting Pareto at length:

The reader must bear that in mind, as he encounters in these volumes facts which at first blush might seem insignificant or childish. Tales, legends, the fancies of magic or theology, may often be accounted idle and ridiculous things—and such they are, intrinsically; but then again they may be very helpful as tools for discovering the thoughts and feelings of men. So the psychiatrist studies the ravings of the lunatic not for their intrinsic worth but for their value as symptoms of disease.

(Pareto 1935a, p. 44, § 82)

Pareto insists that he is refraining from making value judgments and is only interested in setting out his new science of sociology. He uses facts from history as much as possible and refrains from contemporary issues in order to make his points as objectively as possible. He insists that the “seeker after experimental truth” and the “apostle” are often combined. However, “In these volumes I keep those attitudes strictly separate, retaining the first and barring the second” (Pareto 1935a, p. 45, § 86).

One of Pareto’s main targets is the doctrine of natural law. Except for those who blindly believe that natural law is divinely based, it seems to “look like a mass of nonsense” (Pareto 1935a, pp. 264, 272, §§ 445, 454). But people are often willing to accept opinions whether they are “external” or “inner”. By “external”, Pareto means scientific experience; by “inner” he means that which accords with sentiments (Pareto 1935a, p. 348, § 581). But people often appeal to authority, while Pareto reminds us that authority is used to “prove the existence of witches, ghosts, and the like”. Or else it is an appeal to “everybody knows” or “nobody denies” (Pareto 1935a, pp. 351, 359, §§ 584, 595). This is often a form of “inner persuasion” (Pareto 1935a, p. 380, § 625). But this is often no more than trying to persuade someone that it is intrinsically good. Pareto points to a fact that he will repeat; that a person recognizes that telling the truth will not work, so he first deceives himself before deceiving others. He offers the illustration of a politician who insists on solidarity because, if others engage in it, it will mean money for him. Pareto opines that the politician “would get many laughs but few votes”. So, the politician moves from personal gain to the belief “that his real interest is the welfare of others”. “Oftentimes the person who would persuade others begins by persuading himself” (Pareto 1935b, p. 502, § 854).

The first sustained discussion of persuasion is found at the beginning of volume three and can be said to run from §1397 through §1462. However, as with force and with cunning, Pareto does not provide a clear and coherent account of persuasion. As with force and cunning, Pareto dislikes abstract theories and prefers to offer concrete examples. This is especially true regarding persuasion—it lacks the definiteness of force and the demarcation between persuasion and cunning is fluid.

Volume three is entitled The Theory of Derivatives and Pareto regards derivatives as the varying tales that we tell ourselves. This is in distinction from residues. A residue is universal; a derivative is a particular. A residue is more important in Pareto’s theory, and he specifies six types (Finer 1966, p. 14; Femia 2009, pp. 35–36, 38). For the purposes of this essay, only some specific derivatives are important. What is important are myths and ideals because Pareto is concerned with the stories that we tell others and those we tell ourselves. As Pareto states, “we centre our attention on the ways in which people try to dissemble, change, explain, the real character of this or that mode of conduct”. Human beings are persuaded by sentiments (residues), but they use particular explanations. Pareto maintains that humans have a tendency to hide their actual motivation and to substitute what they believe is a better “explanation”. As he says, “Where there is no explaining there is no derivation”. A child maintains that we do thus and thus because we do thus and thus, but an adult says that we do thus and thus because we ought to do thus and thus (Pareto 1935c, pp. 885, 888, § 1397, 1400). We have moved from “is” to “ought”. Pareto suggests that this “ought” is a reflection of our “duty” but he asks, “What in the world is this thing ‘duty’ that has suddenly popped up?” He adds that everyone has an answer, from the childish response of the illiterate, to the educated man, to the philosopher. But all they have done is transition from the concrete to the abstruse. These are words that everyone uses in order to persuade (Pareto 1935c, p. 891, § 1403).

After discussing Aristotle on rhetoric and logic, Pareto distinguishes between the logician who investigates logical errors in reasoning with what the sociologist must do. The sociologist “must find out why the false argument is accepted, why sophistry persuades”(Pareto 1935c, p. 894, § 1411). Persuasion differs not only from individual to individual but from group to group. In an example that helps explain the difference between a residue and a derivative, Pareto writes that “A Chinese, a Moslem, a Calvinist, a Catholic, a Kantian, a Hegelian, a Materialist, all refrain from stealing; but each gives a different explanation for his conduct” (Pareto 1935c, p. 897, § 1416). The maxim against theft is the residue, but the different explanations are the derivatives from that maxim. The maxim may be superior, but the explanations will likely be more persuasive. A blunt assertion sometimes has “great persuasive force”, but there is almost always an accompanying explanation (Pareto 1935c, p. 901, § 1425). He clarifies this by stating the difference between “Run” and “one ought to run”, and that it is the “moral” force that is more persuasive. There is a similar case with respect to how some authoritative command is successful. Pareto suggests that if it is an oral command, it will carry more weight if it is said in a “doctoral, sententious tone, with great assurance”. It will be more effective “in a book rather than a newspaper, in a newspaper rather than in the spoken word” (Pareto 1935c, p. 903, § 1430). This is a matter of the degree of authority, but he differentiates between the authority which is a “tool of proof” and the authority which is a “tool of persuasion” (Pareto 1935c, p. 905, § 1434). In other words, authority is a residue, but its various manifestations are its derivatives. Pareto spends several pages on what counts as authority and how it can mislead. His example is Theodore Roosevelt, who having been elected President of the United States of America is not only welcomed throughout the major cities of Europe but is feted by some of Europe’s greatest scholars as being a genius. Having been elected somehow conferred upon Roosevelt the expertise to “advise the English on how to govern Egypt” and to “advise the French on the number of children they should have” (Pareto 1935c, pp. 906–7, § 1436). This is not a matter of whether Roosevelt should or should not be regarded as a competent authority in such matters; rather, it is an example of how people need to believe in authority and how willing they are to extend a firmly grounded conviction in one area to other unrelated areas. This is not so much a matter of persuasion as it is the belief that society knows best. Pareto mentions how people used to believe in the power of prayer to cure illnesses and he allows that that practice is no longer as prominent as it had been. However, this has been replaced by hygienists who insist that one drop of brandy or wine will ruin one’s health. Pareto’s response is enlightening: “A pair of eyes and a walk through such a district are all that is required to be convinced of the contrary”. And Pareto insists that the author of a textbook on morals “believes—and his reader must believe by virtue of his authority” that when he says a drop of alcohol will destroy a mother’s health and ruin her baby as well, that he must really believe this (Pareto 1935c, pp. 914–15, § 1440). Pareto was never fond of Germans, but he pointed out that German professors and university students tended to drink and drink rather heavily yet it did not seem to impair their intellectual work. Pareto singled out Abel, the great mathematician, who “abused alcoholic beverages” and “should have turned out an idiot”. “Bismarck, too, should have had a microscopic capacity for mental work” (Pareto 1935c, p. 916, § 1441). It is the power of “authority” to persuade even when experience reveals that “wisdom” to be nonsense. In addition, absolute declarations are often modified and those changing the meaning of a dictum seem unbothered by the resulting contradiction. Pareto writes that the maxim “thou shall not kill” is modified to read both “thou should not kill except in certain circumstances” and “thou shall kill in certain circumstances” (Pareto 1935c, p. 1006, § 1558). One means to minimize the apparent discrepancy is to append certain modifying words such as “true”, “right”, and “genuine”. Pareto notes that all Christian sects have martyrs but they each claim that their martyrs are the “true” ones. But “true” and “truth” have two applications: facts and beliefs (Pareto 1935c, pp. 1008, 1011, §§ 1564, 1567). The “truth” of facts is easily revealed by experience, but the “truth” of beliefs is almost impossible to determine. That is the case because it is not clear to the believer whether the “confusion” is caused by the believer’s “predetermined design” or something else (Pareto 1935c, p. 1023, § 1578).

If religion had claim to the “truth” in the past, “science” lays claim to it now. “Science” now has “minor deities” such as “Democracy”, “Humanitarianism”, and “Pacisficism”. Just like with religion, “science” is effective at finding the root cause of evils. Pareto notes that “If there are paupers, illiterates, hoodlums, degenerates, drunkards, lunatics, spendthrifts, thieves, assassins, conquerors, capitalism alone is to blame” (Pareto 1935c, p. 1318, §§ 1890–1891). This is a type of persuasion: there are many types ranging from simple fairytales all the way to complex metaphysics. He adds that the “persuasive force” is often found in the general residues as much as in the particular derivations. This is the beginning of Pareto’s second main discussion of persuasion, yet it is lengthier than the earlier one and is less focused. But it has a strength that exceeds the first one: Pareto rails against the “theology of ‘equality’” and the insistence on “truth”, “justice”, morality”, and “happiness” (Pareto 1935c, pp. 1319–23, §§ 1892–1998). It is the human disposition to believe in these ideals, but then they assume that they must exist. Pareto insists that “One has left the field of reality to go wandering in imaginary worlds”. People prefer this and will construct all kinds of explanations in order to convince themselves. The “Romans were able to act in bad faith and persuade themselves all the while that they were acting in good faith” (Pareto 1935c, pp. 1327, 1333, §§ 1906, 1920). He is incredulous that the Jesuits are “credited” with inventing the maxim that the “ends justify the means” because that has a history that goes back thousands of years before that Catholic group even existed (Pareto 1935c, p. 1339, § 1926). Homer in the Iliad and Dante in the Inferno have main characters who lie and mislead (Pareto 1935c, p. 1341, § 1928). The Greeks and the Trojans both invoked their gods; the Germans and the French did the same in 1870 (Pareto 1935c, p. 1360, § 1951). “Eternal Justice” has disappeared only to be replaced by “Immanent Justice” (Pareto 1935c, p. 1363, §§1952–1953). The Greeks were particularly adept at persuading their audiences that justice meted out punishment for crimes (Pareto 1935c, pp. 1363–72, 1388–90, §§ 1954–1973, 1982–1984). These may seem like “fairytales”, but Pareto reminds us that we have similar ones (Pareto 1935c, p. 1395, § 1994). It may seem as if theories impact practices, but he insists that practices impact theories more. That does not mean that theories have little value; it means that we use theories to justify our practices (Pareto 1935c, p. 1405, § 2008). Knowledge and reason do not reign; persuasion and beliefs rule.

5. Pareto on Cunning and Deception

The title Transformazion de Democracia, or The Transformation of Democracy, is problematic for two reasons. As Pareto says, “democracy” is an imprecise term and so the entire title is suspect. However, he insists that he will use it. It is also problematic because it is used as a book title when the work is a collection of articles. The work is composed of five parts, four of which were published during the spring and summer of 1920 in installments in Rivista di Milano.

In the “Introduction” to The Transformation of Democracy, Charles Powers provided a biographical sketch of Pareto’s life. Powers emphasized Pareto’s scientific background and his concern with accuracy. But Powers also stressed that Pareto was always aware of human foibles and was always concerned with hypocrisy (Powers 2000, pp. 6, 17). While both topics were present in the Trattato, the concern with hypocrisy is manifested throughout much of The Transformation of Democracy.

Pareto begins The Transformation of Democracy with a semi-apology about the title. He admits that it is not quite accurate, but he partially blames the notion of democracy itself. He insists that no one has been able to provide a clear definition of “democracy”, and he is not going to make the attempt in this book (Pareto 2000, p. 25). Rather, his concern is with the transformation of democracy; that is, the two tendencies that are cyclical: centripetal force which concentrates power in a central core and centrifugal force which erodes power and throws it to the periphery (Pareto 2000, p. 37). He is convinced that the early twentieth century was witnessing the centrifugal movement, and his book was an attempt to discuss how this movement was taking place.

Pareto repeatedly draws attention to what he had written in the Trattato and he does so in order to refer his readers to his earlier and fuller account and to keep The Transformation of Democracy short. It is helpful to remember that this book was composed of journal articles, so he was probably writing for a slightly less sophisticated audience. But, by referring to his scholarly book, he was able to provide a better focused account.

The first chapter is entitled “Generalizations” and one of the most important points that Pareto makes is his repeated reminder that what we often take to be “objective” is what we subjectively believe—these are our beliefs, our biases, and our prejudices. He writes, “Men view facts through their own prejudices” and “It is useful to distance oneself from precast beliefs” (Pareto 2000, pp. 26–27). One of the strongest beliefs is the belief in absolutes, and that is why people have turned to religion and to metaphysics because they provide the comfort of absolute “truths”. But Pareto takes pains to call out empiricists; while they do not believe in absolutes, they look for “past phenomena which are exactly alike”. That is because “history never really recurs” (Pareto 2000, p. 26). Both those who seek absolutes and those in search of patterns tend to blur the distinction between what is scientifically good and what is good for society. Pareto complains that his readers have sometimes criticized his work for lacking judgment, but he points out that it is not his position to judge whether something is right or wrong. He likens himself to a physician who diagnoses an illness but cannot offer a cure. Pareto knows that bourgeoise society is sick, but that any such remedy “is completely unknown to me” (Pareto 2000, p. 27). Others are pursuing an “ideal goal” but “I study what is and not what ‘should be’” (Pareto 2000, pp. 31, 28). Pareto concludes “Generalizations” by indicating that the following three chapters are devoted to the weakening of central authority, the increase in demagogic plutocracy, and the transformation of sentiments (Pareto 2000, p. 34). Much of The Transformation is composed of political facts which Pareto uses to show the decline of democracy. Neither his specific facts nor his general theory is relevant here; what is, is his notions of cunning and deceit.

As Pareto did in the Trattato, here he brings up capitalism. Here, though, the connection with capitalism is in terms of ideology and in relationship with unions. Pareto’s claim is that capitalists were too concerned with the “imperialist ‘religion’” and too interested in increasing their wealth. Their greed made them blind to the realities of war. If they had ended the war in 1917, both sides would have achieved partial victories. However, one side insisted on total victory while the other side would not admit to any defeat (Pareto 2000, p. 42). Something similar was taking place between the government and the unions. The capitalists behind the government insist on drawing up new laws but the ruling class recognizes that union members will ignore these new laws. Hence, the officials rationalize the union’s appropriation of property with excuses. Pareto likens this to a man who falls off his horse and claims “I wanted to get off”. In Pareto’s view, this is as much a matter of economic power as it is a legal issue. If one asks, “Are such actions lawful?” the response is, “Who cares about the law?”—certainly not the powerful unions. Pareto insists that the government’s sole “concern is to avoid getting devoured by a beast it cannot control”. He also maintains that the government will try to maintain control, either by making promises that it knows it cannot keep or through simple cunning (Pareto 2000, pp. 45, 48–49).

It is an oversimplification to suggest that up until the modern age, most rulers used force to instill fear in their subjects. But one theme of modern political theory was the belief in the perfectibility of the human race. From Bacon to Bentham, there was the conviction that history was a linear progress towards better humans and that people would be naturally inclined towards achieving a more perfect union. Pareto was profoundly skeptical of this and his work with the unions in the 1880s revealed to him that the unionists were just as duplicitous as the capitalists. This is the background for chapter three: “The Plutocratic Cycle”. He provides several key facts: there has been a massive increase in wealth; this increase in wealth has been increasingly unevenly distributed; and two social classes have been amassing more power—the wealthy speculators and the wage earners. Pareto adds a fourth fact: that rather than continuing their historical opposition, the two classes have in effect joined forces. The result has been a plutocratic democracy; that is, the wealthy speculators have been joined by the factory workers to spread the belief that somehow this increase in wealth is essentially “democratic”. What this really means is that the two classes have joined in order to manipulate public opinion, and they do this by deception (Pareto 2000, p. 55). Pareto reminds his readers that they should neither disregard history nor place too much emphasis on it and he reminds them that there have been two types of rule—by force and by consensus. His concern is with modern politics and that means the employment of “manipulative skills”, which often means “deceit and cunning”. Pareto also notes that one tends to think of force and consensus as being in opposition; however, they are often found together, with one type dominating the other. Pareto does not refer to these as lions and foxes, but he does reiterate how transformations are cyclical (Pareto 2000, pp. 56–57). He explains that most ruling elites tend to miscalculate, and this was most evident in the First World War. It appears that it was a war between “military plutocracy” and “demagogic plutocracy” and the former—meaning Prussia—lost and the latter won. Yet this was in reality a bourgeois war. The miscalculation stemmed from the belief that the war would be short and would not cost much. Even when the elites realized that the war would neither be short nor cheap, they continued making these claims to the “common people”. Pareto maintains that the elites allowed themselves to be misled by their own miscalculations and they also deceived others. However, Pareto insists that “A person who is sly is eventually deceived by someone even more cunning” and that “One can really say that in this case that the snake bit the swindler” (Pareto 2000, p. 59). Elites tend to make promises that they know they cannot keep and they offer predictions that they understand are faulty. “The principal goal of each of these measures is to deceive the multitudes”. The people are the ones who pay the price: “They are all like good lambs, ready to be sheared” (Pareto 2000, pp. 60–61, notes 4 and 7).

In chapter four—“Sentiments”—Pareto discusses hypocrisy and how many people pretend to believe in “democratic ideology”. The well-to-do flatter the workers and they claim to be “progressive”. But their idea of “progressive” differs from that of the workers. The workers actually believe in being progressive, but the wealthy have lost heart. “They humbly submit to their opponents, kissing the very hands that despoil them”. Pareto concludes that the elites continue to use “fraud and deception” and that “They rely on sly manners to achieve goals, rather than upon courage and force” (Pareto 2000, pp. 64–66).

Pareto is scathing in his denunciation of the effects of the war. Countries devalued currencies rather than pay debts; they claimed that they had no choice but to go into war; and they insisted that “everyone” must suffer. Yet the common people were the ones who paid the price: “Profiteering sharks squander resources. Speculation replaces production” (Pareto 2000, pp. 68–69). Yet, the well-to-do have lost power to the working class. What he was witnessing was the weakening of plutocracy and the strengthening of demagogy. Pareto concluded with a repeated claim that he was refraining from judging (Pareto 2000, pp. 70–71).

Cunning and deceiving others are bad, but Pareto seems to think that deceiving one’s self is possibly worse. In either case, it is too often done. While self-deception is discussed in his later writings, it is also found in his treatise on the elites from 1908. In the introductory chapter Pareto explains that people often invent reasons to then justify past actions. He explains that the individual firmly believes his own reasons, thus he begins by deceiving himself before deceiving others (Pareto 1968, p. 27). Pareto argues that people have always declared that certain causes which are imaginary are given instead of real ones. He insists that the saying that the man who sees the mote in the eye of another fails to note the beam in his own eye has always been true. Pareto notes that people are often prone to ridicule people who, in the past, have claimed that such and such was the cause of some action; yet they are just as likely to claim an equally ridiculous reason for some current event (Pareto 1968, pp. 30–31). Pareto again emphasizes that people deceive themselves as well as other people (Pareto 1968, p. 35). It is, according to Pareto, a human need for stability and security and people believe that an absolute provides that. These may be religious beliefs, ideological convictions, or societal myths but they provide comfort. Pareto does not dispute their usefulness, but he does want to draw attention to the means which rulers will use in order to maintain order. This is often by force or by persuasion; sometimes it is a matter of cunning and deceit.

6. Concluding Comments

Plato maintained that reason was the highest form and the best part of the soul. In contrast, appetites were base because they were irrational. But Plato’s philosophy was about ideals; Pareto’s social psychology was about real life. In “Pareto’s Irrationalism” John Carroll argued that Pareto was a “very honest thinker” regarding others and was honest about himself (Carroll 2009, pp. 138, 143). Machiavelli and Hobbes are among the very few who matched Pareto’s ruthless assessment regarding what people claim to believe and what they actually hold true. They are also two philosophers who pointed to the disparity between words and actions. Pareto’s entire work on social behavior shows that people often dupe other people for a number of reasons, such as money, power, esteem, and that people often fool themselves into believing certain things. Pareto railed against those who insisted that there are absolute principles and that there is steady progress towards a better future. Unlike Plato and all of the other idealists, Machiavelli and Hobbes were realists who understood human nature. Vilfredo Pareto may never achieve the fame of either Machiavelli or Hobbes, but he should be remembered as the thinker who provided one of the clearest and most realistic accounts of force, persuasion, and cunning and deceit.