Intelligence on Threats—Municipal Management of Maritime Warnings in 15th-Century Catalonia

Abstract

Since the early 14th century, the Mediterranean coasts of the Crown of Aragon had mechanisms in place to alert populations of incoming threats from the sea. In addition to maritime surveillance systems strategically positioned at elevated vantage points, any information reaching the coast that posed a threat to the safety of the population or trade was swiftly relayed along the shoreline, ensuring that coastal communities could prepare and defend themselves. This information, preserved in the correspondence of coastal city authorities, serves today as a primary source not only for reconstructing maritime threats in the late Middle Ages but also for assessing the role of urban leaders in managing defence. This article explores both aspects. By analysing maritime alerts either received in the city of Barcelona or disseminated from it during the first half of the 15th century, this study examines the main threats to the Catalan coastline while emphasizing the central role of cities in managing the alert system.

1. Introduction

Throughout the 14th century, the consolidation of new territories under the rule of the Crown of Aragon in the Mediterranean, along with the rivalry sparked by its growing political and economic presence with both Christian and Islamic competing powers, increased the need for almost permanent coastal surveillance systems as part of broader defence mechanisms.1 These systems, which had been known and occasionally practiced before, were expected to ensure the monitoring of vessels passing along the coasts and to report their arrival to the authorities so that appropriate defensive measures could be activated, allowing them to be forewarned and prepared for any enemy attack. Furthermore, to enhance prevention, information was also gathered on attacks and the preparations of large enemy fleets. These logistical tasks gradually became the responsibility of the newly established municipal councils of major coastal cities and settlements, which had to develop mechanisms for controlling communication and information flows.

Thus, by studying the correspondence of coastal municipalities, it is possible to reconstruct the maritime threat in the seas closest to the royal territories, assess how local communities perceived and were affected by it, and analyse their response and management. This article aims, first, to examine the consolidation of coastal surveillance systems and, more specifically, the development of alert messaging along the Catalan coast between the 14th and 15th centuries. Thus, it will focus on the emergence of the first coastal defence measures and the growing involvement of municipal authorities in the management of warning messages. Second, it seeks to analyse the perceived maritime threat along the Principality’s shores between 1433 and 1458, based on the alerts transmitted through intermunicipal correspondence. With this objective, it will delve into the different types of information that circulated through the coastal network of mail, their sources and itinerary, before turning to a detailed analysis of each specific threat.

This study is therefore at the intersection of the evolution of local communication systems and the development of municipal diplomacy in the Middle Ages—both of which have received particular attention from historiography in recent years2 and research on the management of maritime risk, specifically the dangers originating from the sea, which has recently been directed toward the prevention of economic losses (Fusaro et al. 2023; Rivera Medina 2023). However, this article approaches the topic from the perspective of defence and the protection of territories and their inhabitants. At its core, and as a common thread, lies the growing prominence of municipal institutions in public life and, more specifically, in the management of defensive responsibilities. This role became especially significant during the period under study, when King Alfonso the Magnanimous (1416–1458) was absent from his Iberian domains due to his expansionist ambitions. With much of the Crown of Aragon’s naval forces concentrated around him, the main coastal settlements were left on their own, with diminished response capacity in the face of increasing insecurity along the shores.3

2. Towards the Consolidation of Coastal Surveillance Systems in the Late Medieval Crown of Aragon

The coastal surveillance system, in the first place, considered the appointment of people—normally two—who would act as watchmen from strategic coastal points with high visibility, without the need, a priori, for major tower-type infrastructures, which would later be extended to coastal areas.4 Their name, in Catalan, is already indicative of their work, since they were called talaies—watchers, who watched by day—and escoltes—listeners, who listened at night. Secondly, the information should be transmitted to the other surveillance points by means of smoke signals during the day or fire signals at night, called alimares, in which the number of signals indicated the number of vessels sighted. This system of communication by fire and smoke signals was already known and used in late ancient and early medieval times (Ballestín i Navarro and Viladrich i Grau 2006).5 From the 14th century onwards, however, these signals were integrated into an ordinary system for the organization of coastal defence that would be perfected and consolidated over the years. In the event of a warning from the coast of a landing or invasion, the population, both on the coast and inland, was mobilized to the sound of horns or at the cry of “via fora” and organized into hosts.6 Whether the danger was imminent or not, the warnings had to reach the authorities, who were responsible for activating the necessary mechanisms to address such threats. These alerts from the lookout points were not only conveyed through signals but were also incorporated into the messaging system that, since the early 14th century, had been used to warn the rulers of coastal towns about threats from the sea. Moreover, this correspondence did not merely relay information from coastal watchmen; it also included reports from skippers and merchants, introducing news that could jeopardize the region’s defence and territorial integrity.

There is evidence of both the coastal surveillance system—through the appointment of talaies and escoltes, who were required to use fire and smoke signals—and the intermunicipal correspondence between coastal towns, which warned of maritime threats as early as the first half of the 14th century in various territories of the Crown of Aragon. In the 1330s, the king ordered his officers with jurisdiction in maritime areas to guard the coasts against the possibility of Genoese attacks, during the war between the Crown of Aragon and Genoa for the control of the island of Sardinia (Mutgé Vives 1965, p. 239).7 In the same period, the jurats of the city of Valencia were already warning of the sighting of Genoese ships along the coast (Díaz Borrás 1990b, p. 282). While in Majorca, in 1332, the king obliged the inland towns to help defray the costs of coastal surveillance (López Pérez 1995, p. 749).8 As a result of the war with Genoa, the 1350s saw repeated calls for the establishment of coastal guards in the Principality of Catalonia, along with the continued use of the fire signal system, which was already referred to as a customary practice (López Pérez 1995, p. 771). In fact, coastguards had already been placed in Catalonia with orders to set up “lighthouses or lanterns” to warn of enemy vessels in 1342, during the war with Mallorca (Costa 1981, p. 145).

Coastal surveillance and the sending of warnings by correspondence were certainly two distinct and interconnected prevention systems (Díaz Borrás 1990b, p. 279), although it has not yet been possible to clarify whether they were born hand in hand or whether one was implemented first and the other later. What is certain is that, at the end of that century and the beginning of the next, they already appeared as inseparable parts of the defence systems for the prevention of maritime attacks.

Although maritime surveillance and the system of warnings by correspondence were known and practiced sporadically and apparently more focused on the defence of Christian enemies (Díaz Borrás 1990b, pp. 281–82), it would be the growing Islamic threat in the last third of the century that would consolidate the system. In 1367, the governor of Mallorca ordered that warnings be sent regarding any suspicious vessels spotted along the coast, following reports of Islamic ships in Cartagena. From there, the news had travelled through Guardamar, Alicante, Valencia, until they reached Mallorca (López Pérez 1995, p. 748). That order was followed, in 1370, by that of placing the watchmen in the customary places on the coast. From that moment on, the news of maritime alerts became continuous and constant, both in the Balearic Islands, and in the peninsular territories.9

Indeed, in the last third of the 14th century, there was a change in the balance of political forces in the Maghreb that resulted in an increase in the Hafsid maritime offensive on the Christian coasts. From the 1360s onwards, the Hafsid Sultanate of Tunisia undertook a unification of forces and territorial expansion through a process of restoration and recovery of lost territory that made it the hegemonic power in the Maghreb, while the Marinid, Zayanid and even the Nasrid Sultanate of Granada experienced the opposite phenomenon (Valérian 2006, pp. 35–101; Daoulatli 2009, pp. 34–36; López Pérez 1995, pp. 155–66, 705–29; Brunschvig 1982, pp. 195–96). Corsair operations and the pressure of Tunisian vessels on the coasts of the Crown of Aragon would increase as the Hafsid state reunified and consolidated its power (Valérian 2013a, pp. 48–49; 2013b, pp. 118–30; 2012, p. 124). Undoubtedly, the rise in maritime offensives would have contributed to securing funds for major restructuring and political unification efforts. However, it remains to be determined whether these expeditions were the result of private initiatives supported by the state or were directly orchestrated by state authorities (López Pérez 1996, pp. 3–4). Regardless, the increasing insecurity along the coasts and nearby seas of the Crown, driven by the pressure of Tunisian vessels, forced a reconsideration of the coastal defence systems. But, rather than introducing new methods, this led to the consolidation and systematic implementation of existing surveillance and warning mechanisms (López Pérez 1995, pp. 749), in which city leaders played a major role.

Regarding the involvement of municipal authorities in the warning messaging system along the coastal towns, there is already evidence dating back to the early 14th century. On 7 May 1302, the consellers of Barcelona alerted their counterparts in Tarragona and Tortosa about a Sicilian pirate, Rogerius, who, as they had learned by letter from the rulers of Sant Feliu de Guíxols, was attacking the coasts of Provence and the subjects of the King of Aragon. The man referred to as “pirate” was the future captain of the Almogavars of the so-called Catalan Company, Roger de Flor, who, it was said, had already attacked the place of Toulon (Rubió i Lluch 2001, pp. 7–8). Andrés Díaz Borrás also located the first evidence of the messaging of alerts by the leaders of the city of Valencia in the years ‘20–‘30 of the 14th century (Díaz Borrás 1993, p. XXI). These missives for the prevention of attacks surely appeared as a response for the growing external threat from enemies of the Crown, but occurred during a time of changes in the internal structuring of the institutions of power, in which the cities would rise as subjects with legal status and political participation in the Crown of Aragon.10 The management of coastal surveillance warnings by municipal authorities was neither immediate nor exclusive from that point onward, as evidenced by earlier cases in which the monarch or his representatives ordered the dispatch of warning messages along the coast or the placement of watchmen at strategic points. However, much like other defensive measures—such as the arming of ships—this responsibility increasingly fell, throughout the century, under the jurisdiction of the authorities of the major coastal cities, more de facto than de jure.11 Mostly of those which, due to their territorial influence, both inside and outside the kingdoms and Principality, acted as true capitals, Barcelona for the Principality of Catalonia, and the cities of Valencia and Majorca for the respective kingdoms.12

Although the extent of knowledge about surveillance systems varies across the territories of the Crown, being most thoroughly studied in the Kingdom of Valencia and least in the Principality of Catalonia, evidence suggests that municipal treasuries eventually also took on the funding of both coastal guards and the messaging system. Thus, Andrés Díaz Borrás identified the first coastal alert funded by the city of Valencia in 1351 (Díaz Borrás 1993, p. 60), while María Dolores López Pérez documented disputes led by inland towns in Mallorca over the financing of coastal guards in the late 14th century (López Pérez 1995, p. 749). In fact, on the island, funding was shared between inland and coastal towns at least until the early 15th century, when the University of the City and Kingdom—the municipal government of the city, which encompassed the entire island as a single territorial unit—took over the financing of coastal watchmen across Mallorca.13 By analogy, and in the absence of more concrete evidence, it can be assumed that if the rulers of the city of Barcelona were responsible for selecting and appointing the city’s coastal guards,14 they would also be the ones financing their services, as well as in other Catalan towns.15

In the same way, as part of the management of the maritime alert system, the messages through courier services became permanently integrated into the diplomatic and communication relations of the coastal cities themselves. This moment would coincide with the period of greatest Islamic pressure on the coasts, when defensive needs would have driven the consolidation of a defensive system that would fall squarely within the responsibilities of the municipal authorities. Although, as mentioned, there are warnings of threats along the coasts in Valencia since the early 14th century, these would not be consistently and regularly integrated into the correspondence of the rulers of the city of Valencia until 1374, the year in which the first notice appears in the Lletres missives of the municipal authorities, the jurats (Díaz Borrás 1990b, p. 282), coinciding with the moment of increased Islamic threat mentioned above.16 Specifically, that first letter reproduced a notice sent by the rulers of the city (or, in medieval times, the castle) of Ibiza, which is indicative of the functioning of the courier-based warning system on that island as well. Although the correspondence of the rulers of the city of Mallorca from that time has not been preserved, the letters from one of the coastal settlements closest to the capital, Llucmajor, serves as a testimony. In its missives, all the coastal threats from 1381 to 1399 are recorded (Font Obrador 1974, pp. 353–63).17 In fact, the first volumes of correspondence from the municipal rulers of Barcelona, the consellers, date back to 1381, since before that, the letters sent by the council did not constitute a documentary unit per se, but were copied along with other information about ordinances, elections of officials, etc., in the so-called Llibres de Consell (Orti Gost 1996, p. 95; Baydal Sala 2021, p. 11).

The security of the coasts and the resulting development of messaging between coastal settlements became a civic concern, as it could threaten both the safety of the inhabitants and, above all, commercial and trade activity.18 In Barcelona, unlike in Valencia and Mallorca, these letters became part of a distinct documentary corpus, separated from other sent missives. This collection, known as Lletres patents, has its earliest recorded example dating back to 1433, coinciding with the restructuring of the escrivania major of the Consell of Barcelona, entrusted to Gabriel Canyelles. He was the one who decided to create four separate registers to preserve the city’s correspondence. Two of them were dedicated to receiving letters: the Lletres Reials Originals and the Lletres Comunes Originals. Another register would contain letters issued on the direct initiative of the city rulers, known as Lletres closes. Finally, another register was created for letters concerning grants and judicial rulings, commissions, the appointment of overseas consuls, attorneys, and other city officials, known as Lletres patents (Riera Viader and Rovira Solà 2013, pp. 388–91; Miquel Milian and Reixach Sala 2021, pp. 44–45). The Lletres closes, therefore, contain most of the correspondence that Barcelona’s rulers exchanged with their counterparts and with higher authorities both within and beyond Catalonia and the Crown of Aragon. As a result, they have been extensively studied and widely used in numerous research works.19 The Lletres patents, on the other hand, consist of concise messages, directives, or warnings that recipients were required to execute immediately and without hesitation. Being much less known and less worked, they nevertheless hide the key to the management of coastal defence.

The aim of the following pages will be, then, to analyse the first preserved volumes of the Lletres patents of Barcelona, referring to the years 1433–1458, covering the last years of the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous (1416–1458).20 It is a period of strong maritime insecurity, marked by a complex international panorama, and enhanced, in large part, by the aggressive diplomatic policy of the King of Aragon with its Mediterranean competitors. The Lletres missives of the consistory of the city of Valencia already allowed the reconstruction of the threats on the Valencian coasts and the response given to them at the municipal level during the first half of the 15th century (Díaz Borrás 2002; Hinojosa Montalvo 1975).21 This reconstruction has also been possible even in cross-border areas, such as the one connecting the north of the kingdom of Valencia with the south of the Principality of Catalonia, whose alerts allow us to assess inter-territorial solidarity in defensive terms (Díaz Borrás 1990a). The present article aims to carry out a similar research for the Catalan coasts, a study that had been pending. Through the letters sent by the consellers of Barcelona, it will reconstruct the threats that stalked the Catalan coasts at the time and relate the warnings to the political–diplomatic panorama to address the perception of maritime insecurity.

3. The System of Intermunicipal Coastal Warnings from the Observatory of Barcelona (1433–1458)

The news arriving through the coastal network of mail informs, roughly speaking, of three fundamental activities: attacks, preparation or arming of warships in enemy countries, and presence of enemy ships on the coasts. This triple typology has the common denominator of offering information on the enemies of the Crown at that moment, from whom hostile behaviour would be expected. Evidently, only those enemy vessels likely to attack would generate an alert. They mostly agree, therefore, with the validity of wars and treaties that the monarch established at the diplomatic level, differing from other news that the sovereign received about the rupture of agreements that some attacks entailed.

On the one hand, attacks considered illicit or fraudulent were reported to the lords (the monarch, the duke, the count, etc.) of those affected, both victims and attackers, denouncing the facts and requesting explanations and, above all, compensation for incidents that should not have occurred.22 On the other hand, news about lawful attacks, framed in a context of war or conflict between countries and aimed at prevention and defence of the territory, rather than relief and justice, as the previous ones, went through other channels of information. In the Crown of Aragon, the latter news was that which circulated at the municipal level, through the mentioned network of couriers that connected the different population centres along the coast.

Theoretically, then, through this intermunicipal network, one could delve into the study of the actions of official enemies. National skippers and captains who transgressed the laws would not, a priori and ordinarily, be notified, although their recidivism could end up including them in the news for the prevention of attacks.23 Thus, through the study of the information conveyed by this intermunicipal channel connecting coastal populations, we gain insight into the enemy’s strength, the extent of maritime insecurity at the time, and the activation of defensive mechanisms. These communications offer a “defensive” perspective, reflecting the perception of the victims, while also serving to assess the enemy’s offensive capabilities.

The sources of information were not only the watchmen of the coasts, who day and night communicated the passage and the presence of enemy ships, but also of attacks if they were eyewitnesses of them. Information provided by skippers, fishermen and, above all, merchants, were also added to the alert notification system. Whether they had been victims of the ships they reported, managing to escape and survive to recount their experience, or had witnessed the outfitting of ships in specific ports or their presence in particular locations during their travels, they felt compelled to notify the authorities in order to prevent potential harm; thus, this source ratifies the role of merchants and sailors as one of the major channels of information traffic in the medieval Mediterranean.24

It must be said that, although the news had the objective of informing and alerting of a possible danger, beyond its usefulness for the knowledge of the insecurity of the seas, it represents a fantastic instrument to value the times and costs of communication in the Middle Ages. The exact times of the sightings and the receipt of the first news are meticulously recorded, along with the moments the messenger arrived in each location. This allowed each town to assess the proximity of the danger and determine the window of time available to seek shelter. Similarly, the amounts paid to the messenger, which varied depending on the route or mode of transport—whether by sea or land—are also provided. However, these are aspects that will be explored in further studies. There is not much evidence on how the news was transported, but it must have been men on horseback who would inform the coastal towns and villages until they reached their destination.25 Travelling by sea was less common, as it, though faster, carried the risk of falling victim to the very danger being reported. An exception was mail arriving on the peninsula from the islands or traveling between islands, which was carried by the skippers, as it was the only available means of transportation.

As for the itinerary of the information along the Catalan coast, the correspondence records confirm the capital status of the city of Barcelona in the transfer of news in the Principality of Catalonia. It was accompanied by two other key points of reference for messaging: Tortosa, in the south, sometimes replaced by Tarragona, and Blanes, in the north. After Tortosa, the objective was for the information to reach the city of Valencia, while, to the north, the final objective was the town of Collioure, in the county of Roussillon. Thus, the notices arrived beyond Blanes, reached Barcelona by the hand of a messenger from that small town, and the same can be said for Tortosa regarding notices that arrived from the south of that city. In this way, the leaders of Barcelona warned all the maritime places to the north up to Blanes, and to the south all up to Tortosa, indicating to their authorities that from there they would be the ones in charge of warning up to Collioure and Valencia, respectively. The possible itinerary of the messenger can be known thanks to the news that departed from the points “in between”, that is to say, between Collioure and Blanes; between Blanes and Barcelona; between Barcelona and Tortosa; or between the city of Valencia and Tortosa. In these cases, the communities were moving the news one by one until they reached one of these three points (Blanes, Barcelona or Tortosa). The same routes are usually described, although sometimes with some variation (see the Figure 1). From north to south: Perpignan, Collioure, Llançà, Cadaqués, Torroella de Montgrí, (sometimes passing through Begur, Palafrugell), Palamós, Sant Feliu de Guíxols, Tossa, Blanes, Mataró, Barcelona. Or from south to north: València, Castelló (sometimes also Benicàssim and Alcalà), Peníscola, Tortosa, (sometimes, Perelló de Mar and Cambrils), Tarragona (sometimes also passing through Cubelles, Vilanova i la Geltrú, Sitges, Garraf), Barcelona. News from the islands, specifically from Ibiza and Mallorca, used to arrive either in Valencia, Tortosa, or directly to Barcelona, to join the messaging circuit.

There must have been other minor coastal settlements in addition to those explicitly mentioned as notified in the missives, but there is no certainty that all of them were always notified or if it depended on the type of threats. The route of the information, after all, was not stable, since it could be conditioned by the urgency of the information reaching the threatened place. For example, on 13 July 1454, the consuls of Collioure directly notified the authorities of Barcelona through a courier mentioned as “very urgent”, which arrived the same day, that five Genoese ships (three armed naus and the other two bound for Flanders) were on their way to Barcelona.26 They had been notified by good hand, since the informer was the skipper of a little boat (lleny) that accompanied the ships, which had been caught by the galley of a certain Botet. The people of Barcelona then alerted all the maritime places as far as Tortosa, in the south, but also as far as Blanes, in the north, since the mail from Collioure had arrived directly in Barcelona, skipping the other coastal towns. In fact, a few weeks earlier, on June 24 to be precise, the Barcelonians had been alerted with “very urgent” mail of the arming in Genoa of six naus, which must be these.27 On that occasion, the alert, which had reached the Catalan capital directly, was only communicated to the north, extending as far as Blanes. It was assumed that the Genoese squadron would follow the coastline and reach Catalonia from the County of Roussillon, after passing through Provence.

The alerts were directed to areas where the authorities could take action, such as enhancing coastal surveillance, warning the population, or arming vessels to defend against enemies. Thus, the locations from which information was sent and received did not always align with the designated coastal surveillance points or the numerous ports and wharfs along the Catalan coast,28 which far exceeded the number of towns notified by the coastal messaging system.29

In all, a total of 140 alerts on potential enemies of the Crown of Aragon ran along the Catalan coasts in 25 years, from 1433 to 1458, notifying the presence, arming or attack by 408 vessels (see Figure 2). Of these alerts, 58 referred to the presence of enemy vessels on the coasts and 63 to attacks that had occurred, although in 14 of these cases the victims were not harmed, as they managed to escape to tell the tale and represent the source of information. The balance is relatively even, as although there were more attacks than simple warnings of enemy presence, when excluding raids that resulted in no casualties, the warnings would outnumber the losses, according to the source. Finally, there were also reports of up to 19 armaments of warships in enemy ports likely to end up in Catalan waters, which had been witnessed by merchants and sailors who had frequented these ports before heading for Catalonia.

4. Maritime Threats in the Catalan Coasts (1433–1458)

Regarding the origins of the alerted vessels, the results are not surprising overall, as the vast majority belonged to the enemies that the King of Aragon had at that time, plus those who, due to their recidivism, were warned as enemies (see Figure 2). First and foremost, it is necessary to mention the Muslim group, the only one identified by religion rather than by the origin. Although the vessels came from various Islamic regions, they were always identified in the sources as “Moors”, making it very difficult to determine the exact location from which the threat originated. It is worth remembering that it was the Hafsid threat that, more than half a century earlier, as previously mentioned, had forced the improvement and stabilisation of the maritime warning system to prevent attacks throughout the Crown of Aragon. It is also likely that, during the first half of the 15th century, most Islamic threats originated from the Hafsid Sultanate, as a continuation of the situation already described for the late 14th century (Ferrer i Mallol 2005). Their attacks were even intensified by the presence and actions of King Alfonso the Magnanimous’ royal fleet along the Tunisian coasts, the most significant of which was the brief conquest of the island of Djerba.30 Additionally, the attacks were fuelled by the actions of the Crown’s own subjects, who operated in the area primarily as a retaliatory response to the incursions they had suffered (Burguera i Puigserver 2024, pp. 350–55, 361–67).

It is obvious that, following the logic of coastal navigation practised in the Late Middle Ages—sailing mostly along the shoreline—most warnings about Islamic vessels, which totalled 29 in the years analysed, reached Barcelona from the south. That is, they would have arrived via Tortosa or Tarragona, from those areas or from the Kingdom of Valencia, or the Balearic Islands.31 Even so, the Islamic threat was the second most frequent in the seas surrounding the Principality, surpassed only by the Provençals. They were even sighted in areas further north of Barcelona, such as Cape Begur.32

They represented a considerable group whose presence along the coasts of the Crown of Aragon remained constant over the years,33 even though their threats did not require the mobilisation of significant resources to counter them. Certainly, not at the level of other warnings concerning Christian groups. They were described as small squadrons composed, at most, of three oared vessels, often referred to as llenys or galiotes (oared vessels smaller than galleys). There were only four exceptional instances in which Islamic fleets sailing together were reported, consisting of between five and eight oared vessels, posing a potential risk of reaching Catalonia.34

Warnings about the preparation of large fleets at various points in North Africa, supposedly intended to attack Christian coasts, began to be reported from 1456 onward, always conveyed by merchants returning from those regions. It was a Mallorcan ship that, in February 1456, informed Peniscola that three fustes were being prepared in Algiers and four more in Bougie. This news then travelled along the coast until it reached the hands of the Barcelona authorities.35 In September of the same year, the authorities of the city and kingdom of Mallorca notified their counterparts in Barcelona that two merchant ships arriving on the island had raised the alarm after witnessing a squadron departing from the African coast. This fleet consisted of a galley and 14 galiotes, which they believed had already captured two galiotes from the island of Ibiza.36 In contrast, in June of the following year, they received confirmation of previous reports through a letter from a Christian captive in Bougie. This letter corroborated earlier intelligence that 27 vessels were being prepared in the city—some already completed and others still under construction—with the specific aim of heading toward the area near Salou, including los Garridells, lo Perelló, lo Canar, un loch que ha dellà la Ràpita e Vilaseca, to seize it. At that point, the authorities in Barcelona had already placed a spy in Bougie to monitor developments. However, they simultaneously issued warnings to all coastal settlements south of the capital, urging them to remain vigilant.37 In none of these cases is there evidence that the large number of vessels described actually reached the coasts of the Crown of Aragon, except perhaps for the warning that the Mallorcan authorities decided to send to their Barcelona counterparts due to the sheer size of the reported fleet. About twenty days after receiving the warning, the consellers were notified that a large fleet of “Moorish vessels” had been sighted off the coast of Villajoyosa, in the Kingdom of Valencia. However, no further incidents were reported.38

Apart from the continuous threat posed by vessels of Islamic origin, the group that generated the most alerts, although concentrated in specific periods, was that of the Provençals (39), followed by their Genoese allies (25). This is without considering the number of vessels categorised as enemy due to their way of navigation, the size of their fleet, or simply because they had been seen attacking, even though their origins could not be immediately identified (27), as it is shown in Figure 2. The Provençals and Genoese were the main Christian enemies of King Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon. During his reign, the king also faced conflicts with Castile, Florence, and Venice, but these were much shorter and, in principle, had less impact on the security of the Catalan coasts—although maritime clashes, especially with the first two, did occur.39 As these were Christian powers, their coastal threat was intermittent, depending on the agreements and ruptures of truces and peace treaties between their rulers. This was not the case, however, with the Islamic threat, whose specific origins were often unidentifiable along the coasts. Thus, even if the King of Aragon established peace treaties and agreements with certain political entities, others remained free to arm vessels that would still be identified by coastal guards simply as “Moors”, posing a constant danger to coastal populations.40

The confrontation between the Crown of Aragon and Genoa was already longstanding, and Genoese presence along the coasts, as well as the warnings coming from Ligurian lands, were nothing new, as seen in the early 14th century. This does not mean that the alerts were taken lightly, as the Genoese naval force represented a very powerful threat due to its great offensive capacity.41 Both powers had been competing for dominance in the western Mediterranean, and any move to establish political or commercial influence at strategic maritime points, such as the island of Sardinia in the past or the conquest of the Kingdom of Naples at that time, would provoke the other’s aggression in response.42 However, what does represent a novelty in the broader maritime landscape and, particularly, in naval warfare, is the emergence of the Provençal naval force, especially due to the high levels it had reached by the mid-15th century. In the early years under study, their attacks were linked to the Genoese, often operating as auxiliaries or in the rear of the powerful and seasoned Ligurian fleet, with accounts describing joint actions by the “Genoese and Provençals”.43 However, by the mid-century, the Provençals had even surpassed the Genoese.

The reason for this new situation can be traced to the political and expansionist agenda pursued by King Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon in the western Mediterranean. Most notably, it was linked to his intentions to conquer the Kingdom of Naples, after Queen Joanna II of Naples (1414–1435) had adopted him as her legitimate heir in 1421, only to later withdraw her trust and offer the right of succession to the other candidate, Louis III of Anjou, Count of Provence (1417–1434).44 During the back-and-forth of the queen, who wavered between both candidates for several years, neither of them was willing to give up their claim to the coveted throne. This situation led the Crown of Aragon into a direct confrontation with the County of Provence, particularly after the royal fleet, commanded by Alfonso the Magnanimous himself, attacked and looted the port of Marseille in 1423.45 Although the direct consequences of this attack cannot be traced in the Catalan municipal correspondence due to the lack of records from those years, this moment has been marked as the beginning of the war and the start of Provençal naval participation against the subjects of the Crown of Aragon.46 Additionally, from the very beginning they would be supported, aided, and assisted by the Ligurian force, as Genoa sought to prevent, at all costs, the power of the Crown from growing in the maritime space and also within the Italian Peninsula. For instance, in June 1421, news reached Mallorca that a squadron of 13 Genoese vessels had attacked the town of Cadaqués and burned the settlement of Llançà, which was situated half a league inland.47

Due to the preservation of municipal correspondence records from Barcelona only after 1433, the first news in these sources about Genoese and Provençal vessels near the Catalan coasts dates from the year 1436, as it can be seen in the Figure 3. This marks exactly one year after the famous Battle of Ponza, in which King Alfonso the Magnanimous himself was captured by the Ligurians, after the Genoese fleet defeated the royal navy near the Italian island.48 This event, whose consequences politically disrupted both competing powers, effectively ended the peace that the Crown of Aragon had signed with the Republic and, previously, also with the Duke of Milan Filippo Maria Visconti, who was then the lord of Genoa, in 1428.49 From then on, and once the Genoese ties with the Duke of Milan were broken, alerts for Genoese vessels would be issued almost every year along the Catalan coasts until the conquest of Naples in 1442.

The period also coincides with the end of the four-year truce signed between the Crown of Aragon and the County of Provence in 1431, after a large Barcelona fleet swept the Provençal coasts up to Marseille in an attempt to deter the attacks carried out by the Provençals and Genoese against Catalan vessels.50 However, the number of Provençal vessels alerted from the Catalan coasts would be much lower and always in conjunction with Genoese vessels, except for three sailing fustes identified off the coast of the Formigues Islands, which raised doubts as to whether they were “Moors or Provençal”.51 This confusion may indicate certain similarities between both fleets, which were distinguished by a smaller size and simpler rigging than the Genoese, features that had already been noticed through the alerts on the Valencian coast (Díaz Borrás 2002, pp. 66–74).

The definitive conquest of the Kingdom of Naples by the King of Aragon in 1442 marks a paradoxical turning point in the frequency of enemies along the Catalan coasts. The conflict with the rival Genoa and Provence does not stop, but rather increases, this time with the latter. The Genoese threat virtually disappears, and the Ligurians will not return to the Catalan coasts until more than ten years later, in 1454. This period indeed coincides with the truce signed by the King of Aragon with the Commune of Genoa in 1444, the terms of which were ratified in 1448, following a failed peace attempt in 1447 (Olgiati 1990b; Lisciandrelli 1960, pp. 150, 153). However, the apparent calm along the Catalan littoral should not be confused with mutual respect and a cessation of hostilities. Especially after 1450, when the peace formally expired but both sides intended to avoid restarting direct confrontation, numerous acts of piracy are described, both Catalans attacking Genoese and vice versa, which were attempted to be mitigated diplomatically, through the sending of embassies (Del Treppo 1976, pp. 403–10; Olgiati 1990a, pp. 11–83; Maccioni 2014–2015, pp. 367–77). The distant scenario of the fights does not jeopardise the security of the Catalan coasts, which is why no alerts for possible Genoese threats are issued until 1454, when the Republic decides to prepare a fleet to attack Naples in response to the capture of the Squarciafica navis by two vessels of the King of Aragon (Olgiati 1990a, pp. 35–38). Part of this fleet, composed of about eight naves, could be the one alerted in June 1454 in Genoa and, by July, from Collioure. According to the informers, this fleet was supposed to attack the Catalan coast.52 At the time, the Genoese would also begin to warn of potential damage from the Catalans on the Ligurian coasts through fire and smoke signals (Olgiati 1990a, pp. 50, 58, 92).

Indeed, relations had deteriorated so much between the two parties, with repeated episodes of attacks on merchant ships and subsequent retaliations through similar acts from both sides (Olgiati 1990a, pp. 84–150), that it was necessary to ratify a new peace in July 1455 (Lisciandrelli 1960, p. 158). However, this peace would last just over a year, as in August 1456, the King of Aragon declared war on the Superba again, citing the occupation of its lands in Corsica and the provision of weapons to the Muslims as the pretext (Lisciandrelli 1960, p. 158). For several months, the king’s fleet had been threatening the city of Genoa, which led the Republic to hire the services of several captains, better known for their skill on the seas than for their honesty and commitment to the task assigned to them by the city (Basso 1994, pp. 543–48). Among them there were Battista Aicardo di Porto Maurizio, also known as Scarincio; Giovanni Gattilusio, a representative of the Greco-Genoese lords of the island of Lesbos; as well as some members of the Genoese Levantine fleet, commanded by Pietro Giustiniani di Campis, former podestà of Chios, along with the ships of Oliviero Doria and Battista Paterio (Basso 1994, p. 546; 2013, pp. 241–48; 2014, p. 217).53

It is likely that it was these captains, with a fleet of 13 well-armed galleys, who would lay siege to the city of Barcelona in July 1457.54 The great threat posed by the Genoese fleet forced the consellers to alert the rest of the coasts of the Principality, while requesting reinforcements from other towns and even from the admiral of the royal fleet, Bernat de Vilamarí, to come to their aid.55 The admiral, who was at the time assisting the Hospitaller knights in the waters of the Levant, would respond in some way to the call for help, but likely not in the manner the Barcelonans had hoped. In the spring of 1458, he was sent by the king to Genoa, where he would lay siege to the city by sea, while the opponents of the government of Doge Pietro Campofregoso, supported by Alfonso the Magnanimous, laid siege to it by land. The blockade would only be lifted with the death of the king in June, after the Republic had placed itself under the protection of King Charles VII of France (1422–1461) (Basso 1994, pp. 549–51; Basso 2018).

The decade of apparent tranquillity on the Genoese front is exploited by the Provençals to launch the most aggressive maritime actions recorded in the years studied, starting in 1449. The years following the conquest of Naples continue in the same vein, with only one sighting of Provençal ships reported in July 1444.56 However, from June to December 1449, eight alerts regarding the presence and attacks of vessels from the County of Provence were launched, undoubtedly the highest number recorded in a single year by one group (see Figure 3). In June, reports came in that four baleners and two galleys were being outfitted in Marseille, relayed by a sailor who, travelling from the Provençal city, stopped in Collioure to give the news. Then, in December, Queen Maria herself, acting as the lieutenant of the Crown of Aragon, informed the authorities of Barcelona that five galleys and baleners were being readied in Provence to patrol the Catalan coasts.57 In September, a Provençal fleet ran a ship aground near Cubelles and Vilanova i la Geltrú, while from Mataró, two galleys and a balener, supposedly from Provence, were seen capturing and taking another ship.58 Even from Ibiza, a report came in about an armed Provençal galley that had captured a boat and was heading towards the Catalan coasts.59 The end of the 1440s also coincides with the time when the threat of vessels from the County became more prominent along the coasts of the kingdoms of Valencia and Mallorca (Díaz Borrás 2002, pp. 70–74; Guiral Hadziiossif 1980, p. 271; Burguera i Puigserver 2024, pp. 186–91).

While only five warnings of Provençal threats were issued along the Catalan coasts between 1436 and 1446, more than thirty-five were recorded from 1448 to 1458. They were especially present and active in 1455 and 1456, with as many as six alerts reported each year. These threats, unlike those of the previous years, were led by powerful fleets consisting of up to 14 vessels, including galleys and galiotes, in August 1455, and four galiotes—one from Monaco and three from Provence—in April 1456.60 In fact, their relations with the Ligurian Republic did not cool after the Aragonese conquest of Naples. Despite the peace agreements signed between Genoa and Alfonso the Magnanimous, the Genoese continued to maintain good relations with Renato of Anjou, exchanging mutual favours. For example, the Genoese fleet continued to rely on the port of Marseille as an allied harbour for both commercial and military operations (Olgiati 1990a). This is why reports were again made in August 1455 of joint armament efforts between the Provençals and Genoese from that port.61 Among those responsible for the damage, the names of two famous captains were also recognised: Audinet (or Auzinet) and Jean de Villages, who sometimes operated with another Genoese corsair, Giovanni Grimaldi.62

Interestingly, the Provençals seem to reduce their activity in 1457, precisely when the Genoese fleet reappears with great force on the Catalan coast, even threatening the capital. In fact, there seems to be a complementary relationship between the alerts of the Provençal and Genoese fleets (see Figure 3). Judging by the results of the coastal warning system, there are no periods of time in which both are reported with intense activity simultaneously. Instead, the greater activity of one is accompanied by a lesser presence of the other, and vice versa. It is as if, in some way, they represented the same opposing bloc, with the Genoese aggressiveness shifting to the Provençal forces during periods of official truce with the Crown of Aragon. After all, as Enrico Basso already pointed out, behind the actions of the corsair Scarincio and other captains who lent their services to the shared cause of Genoa and Provence against the Crown of Aragon, there were the Mediterranean aspirations of Charles VII of France, once the Hundred Years’ War had ended (Basso 2014, p. 218). Perhaps the increasing influence of France over the County of Provence should also be noted to explain the heightened Provençal threat on the Iberian coasts in the mid-15th century and during the last years of the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous.63

Genoese and Provençal forces were undoubtedly responsible for most of the alerts during that period, reaching the city of Barcelona via the Levant coast, i.e., from Blanes and Collioure, with a total of 53 alerts, closely followed by the 49 received via mail from the southwestern coast, through Tortosa and Valencia. Eight messages were sent from the islands, specifically from Ibiza and Mallorca, while the rest reached the city of Barcelona directly, through sailors, victims, witnesses, or messages from higher authorities.

Special mention should be made of the alerts from the Castilians (9), often also identified as Basques, and to a lesser extent, the Portuguese (2). Although they were not officially enemies of the Crown of Aragon at that time (with Castile only having a brief state of war from 1429 to 1430),64 their vessels became suspicious, and their presence was occasionally reported from the lookout points. This caution stems from the role that the Castilians, most of them of Basque origin, and to a lesser extent, the Portuguese, played in the late medieval Mediterranean, being well recognized as both skippers, transporters and, at times, as corsairs (Conde Mendoza 2023, 2024; Gouffran 2022; Ferrer i Mallol 2003, pp. 115–28; Priotti 2003, pp. 33–46; Vela i Aulesa 2000; Heers 1955, p. 314). Their services, both maritime and naval, were offered to both Mediterranean commercial companies and the feuding lordships, with a major example being the long-standing enmity between the Crown of Aragon and the Republic of Genoa during the 14th and 15th centuries. However, while in the 14th century it seems that a majority of Castilian captains would have opted to offer their services to the Catalan-Aragonese side (Ferrer i Mallol 1968, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2006; Simbula 1993, pp. 95–118), the information from the 15th century often places them as aggressors against the Crown’s vessels, acting in favour of their competitors (Díaz Borrás 2002, pp. 80–85; Burguera i Puigserver 2024, pp. 210–15).

In July 1449, for example, two Basque ships were reported off Cape Tordera, in Blanes, near the present-day Malgrat de Mar, which had departed from Genoa.65 Another curious case involved a Basque captain who, according to the source, had a Provençal wife and waged war against the Catalans for her sake. In September 1453, he raided the port of Salou, south of Tarragona, where he captured a boat bound for Mallorca loaded with goods, seized ten men and four slaves, as well as a boat, a caravel, and a llaüt that were in the port.66 In fact, it was noted that the number of Castilian captains established in the port of Marseille, especially those of Galician origin, increased during the rule of Count Louis II of Anjou (1384–1417), but especially after the port was sacked by Alfonso the Magnanimous in 1423, filling the gap of vessels left by the attack and participating in the renewal of urban privateering (Gouffran 2020, pp. 229, 238; 2022, pp. 90, 96).

Portuguese captains also participated in the conflicts between the Crown of Aragon and its enemies, with their presence in the Mediterranean increasing after the conquest of Ceuta in 1415, which marked the beginning of their maritime expansion into Africa (Unali 1994, 2004, 2002; Heers 1956). Although they already maintained mercantile businesses in some Mediterranean ports, aside from their commercial activities, they were well-known for trafficking goods and engaging in privateering, like their Castilian neighbours (Themudo Barata 1998; Adao da Fonseca 1978). Strongly encouraged by the expansionist ambitions of the Portuguese monarchy, Portuguese captains and shipowners took advantage of the Ceuta base and their predatory experience against Muslims to become involved in the ongoing conflicts between the Christian powers of the western Mediterranean (Miranda and Barros 2019; Adao da Fonseca 2006).67 In contrast to their Castilian neighbours, it seems that at least during the first half of the century, the Portuguese had a greater tendency to enlist on the side of the Crown of Aragon. While their presence may have been reported occasionally, they appear more often as allied corsairs, helping to protect the coasts or selling booty on Aragonese soil (Burguera i Puigserver 2024, pp. 206, 459, 503–5).68 In fact, during the 25 years analysed, only one attack was reported involving two Portuguese caravels, one with 80 to 100 tons and the other with 30 to 40 tons, which in January 1453 raided some fishing boats from Tortosa in the Alfalcs, in the Ebro delta, and took with them two boats (a lleny and a llaüt) which were heading to Valencia.69 Additionally, in April 1447, there was an alert regarding the arrival at the port of Salou of the corsair Pere Yvanyes (Pedro Ibáñez, Castilian, or Pedro Eanes, Portuguese?) with a balener and an armed caravel.70

Finally, the last group alerted from the Catalan coasts between 1433 and 1458 was the Florentines, although the three alerts, all reported between March and October of 1453, correspond to a single captain: Pierozzo de Pazzi, recognised in the sources as Perosso or Posso. In fact, the Catalan sources do not mention his natio or possible origin, but instead report the actions of the corsair as if he were a lone actor, perhaps because he first served the Anjou of Provence against the Crown of Aragon, and then fought for Florence when they went to war with the Crown (Heers 1994, p. 512; Del Treppo 1976, p. 416; Coll Julià 1954, p. 179). At that precise moment, he could very well have acted on behalf of both lordships, as both conflicts were ongoing. Once his actions at sea were recognised, the Barcelona authorities even referred to him as a “condottiero” of the seas (Coll Julià 1954, p. 179).

In September 1452, he was already recognised for arming a 15-oared ship and two brigantines in the Castilian port of Cartagena. According to what was learned from a fugitive from his galley, their intention was to capture subjects of the King of Aragon and sell them in “Moorish lands”.71 No news was received about the captain until the following March, when the authorities in Barcelona were notified via a messenger who arrived by sea from Valencia, and who had received the information from their Ibizan counterparts. The captain had captured a galley commanded by a certain Clusa in the waters of the island. With three caravels, a brigantine, and the captured galley, Perosso’s galley then set course for the Catalan coasts. Days after receiving the news, there were reports of the squadron being sighted at Cape Martí (Xàbia) and Cape Moraira, in the southern part of the Kingdom of Valencia, just off the coast of the island of Ibiza.72 It seems they did not move north until the first days of October, when the authorities of Tarragona reported that a balener, a galley, and a brigantine had attacked the fishing boats that were heading out to fish for tuna at eight in the morning. According to reports, it was Perosso who took six of these boats, with all the men on board. The captain, recognised by contemporaries as “one of the greatest corsairs in the world” or also as “the great corsair”, was eventually captured by a Barcelona squadron commanded by Jaume Bertran in June 1454. Imprisoned and executed, his body was publicly exhibited in the courtyard before the court of the veguer of Barcelona (Coll Julià 1954, pp. 179–80; Del Treppo 1976, pp. 416–17).

5. Conclusions

During the last centuries of the late Middle Ages, the local authorities of the coastal settlements in the Crown of Aragon were responsible for an intermunicipal messaging system to prevent and alert of potential maritime threats. The growing insecurity, driven by a greater political and economic presence of the Crown in the western Mediterranean and the resulting rivalries and competitions with other lordships, stimulated an interest in protecting the king’s subjects and trade, the main economic activity. In practice, it fell under the management of municipal authorities. Being on the front lines and the primary targets of offensives on the coasts, the rulers of the communities were the first to be interested in perfecting a warning system to minimize the consequences of enemy threats. This would be a solidarity-based coastal messaging system, shared between administratively and politically autonomous territories, but under the same king, sharing common enemies, threats, and concerns. The maritime warning system would thus be part of the main communicative and diplomatic activities of the coastal settlements, especially of those larger, more populous, and more politically influential in the institutions and relations with the monarchy, capable of radiating their influence on smaller towns and populations. This was the case with the cities of Barcelona, Valencia, and Mallorca, which acted as capitals of the Principality of Catalonia and respective kingdoms.

Through the study of this intermunicipal correspondence, which in the case of Barcelona would eventually integrate a distinct documentary series from the rest of the letters sent, the Lletres patents, one can reconstruct the maritime threat along the coasts of the Principality, and even further beyond, since news which could compromise the security of the Catalan coastline was received not only from the coastal points of the Principality, but also from the Kingdoms of Valencia and Mallorca. However, not all warnings of passing ships correspond to every vessel that roamed the coasts, nor do the recorded attacks reflect all those that occurred at sea during that time. The notifications specifically refer to incidents that posed a threat to the protection of ports, ships arriving and departing with cargo, coastal workers, or the residents and towns along the shore. In the future, these records could be further supplemented with reports from other settlements along the Catalan coast.

Although the response to enemy threats could not always be prepared swiftly, prevention was crucial, especially in a time when most of the Crown’s naval forces were far from the Iberian lands. The king concentrated large vessels in the waters of southern Italy, first for the conquest of the Kingdom of Naples and later through the deployment of commercial ventures and military interests. In the absence of the monarch and deprived of part of the naval forces from the territories of the Crown, coastal surveillance and the alert system became vital to ensure the integrity of the lands and subjects of the Crown of Aragon and its valued commercial activity.

The analysis of the intermunicipal notification system not only highlights urban control and management over the flow of information that could threaten their defence but also acts as a gauge of the inhabitants’ perception of insecurity within the royal territories. Undoubtedly, local rulers recognised the importance of controlling the information transmitted through various channels until it reached them. However, it appears that the limits of these prevention systems were tested during this period, as the number of reports on attacks nearly equalled those concerning the presence or armament of enemy vessels. Amid the king’s expansionist policies, which led to the Crown of Aragon accumulating enemies across the Mediterranean, the number of fronts grew. In addition to the traditional Islamic and Genoese threat, vessels of Provençal and Florentine origin, and eventually also Castilian and Portuguese ships, were added to the danger, with an average of more than five notifications of coastal threats per year. Although it is not currently possible to compare the data with other periods due to the novelty of this study, the numbers shown in the Figure 3 indicate an increasing enemy pressure on the coasts over the years, with the peak occurring just in the middle of the century, in the years leading up to the monarch’s death.

In the end, coastal threats fall within the diplomatic, political, and military landscape of the time, and they help to understand the importance that municipal management acquired during an era of growing conflict on the seas. Without a doubt, the experience gained during the final years of Alfonso the Magnanimous played a crucial role in refining and strengthening defence and threat prevention systems, better preparing them for future conflicts. Both those of a more immediate nature, such as the Catalan Civil War, and those with a longer reach, like the impending Ottoman–Turkish threat that would start to be felt in the western Mediterranean in the closing years of the century.