Prudence, Rules, and Regulative Epistemology
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
This paper argues that regulative epistemology should focus on the virtue of prudence rather than norms of epistemic decision making. One can wonder at this point what exactly the difference is between being prudent and following some rule, and why the two could not combine? The author might have some more fundamental doubts about rule-following but no explicit discussion on this is offered here. The author argues that there are several problems with norms. Taking Ballantyne’s defeasible No Trespassing rule as an example for illustration, the author claims that rules don’t specify what one should do in every situation. However, it seems to this referee that virtues don’t either; perhaps they tell us even less. Another problem the author mentions is that the attempt to specify rules completely by adding further rules can only lead to a regress. This point has been made by Wittgenstein and many others. Again, is the virtue of prudence in better shape here? Finally, following rules at some level of specificity is impractical, according to the author. – It seems to me that the author has pointed to some potential problems of rule-following in a cursory way, and without raising the question whether the virtue of prudence might be in the same predicament (or even: worse off?). Several times the author states that one cannot make good epistemic choices just by following rules and that therefore we need prudence. But this does not show that rules are not necessary for good epistemic choices, only that they are not sufficient. Why not argue that one needs both rule-following and epistemic virtues; and that each is necessary and neither sufficient for good epistemic practice? Finally, the author also adds the claim that prudence is prior in 3 different ways to epistemic norms; this is a claim that would require more discussion.
Typos, etc. (numbers refer to lines)
70: “might be a quasi-“; skip “on”
131: “increases”; “will be successfully”
156: “virtuos mean theory”? I guess the author means the doctrine of the mean
161: “despite the fact that the appears”
172-177: missing page number for quote
217, last word: “thought”
224: “can govern”
297: “simply cannot be”
418; “deemed”
509-510: “testimony like an inference to the best explanation”??
This topic’s paper is interesting. However, many points (see above) are not addressed. The paper does not go that much depth. If accepted at all, then only after major revisions.
seems good but some minor things have been indicated in the report above
Author Response
Response to Reviewer #1
This paper argues that regulative epistemology should focus on the virtue of prudence rather than norms of epistemic decision making. One can wonder at this point what exactly the difference is between being prudent and following some rule, and why the two could not combine?
REPLY:
Yes, they do combine. Now we make this clear throughout the article.
The author might have some more fundamental doubts about rule-following but no explicit discussion on this is offered here. The author argues that there are several problems with norms. Taking Ballantyne’s defeasible No Trespassing rule as an example for illustration, the author claims that rules don’t specify what one should do in every situation. However, it seems to this referee that virtues don’t either; perhaps they tell us even less.
REPLY:
We agree that this is a difficulty; probably, the most important objection against prudence. We have called it the “no-guidance objection”. The “no-guidance objection” is a difficulty that partly derives from the quasi-perceptual character of the general virtue of prudence. However, we think that this difficulty is a bad argument to believe that only following rules tells us how to make good epistemic decisions. The article shows us that following rules leads us into a blind alley, while the need for virtue to make good choices has been acknowledged by many philosophers including regulative epistemologists, only that they have failed to notice that the focus of prudence is good or reliable decision-making.
Another problem the author mentions is that the attempt to specify rules completely by adding further rules can only lead to a regress. This point has been made by Wittgenstein and many others. Again, is the virtue of prudence in better shape here?
Finally, following rules at some level of specificity is impractical, according to the author. – It seems to me that the author has pointed to some potential problems of rule-following in a cursory way, and without raising the question whether the virtue of prudence might be in the same predicament (or even: worse off?). Several times the author states that one cannot make good epistemic choices just by following rules and that therefore we need prudence. But this does not show that rules are not necessary for good epistemic choices, only that they are not sufficient. Why not argue that one needs both rule-following and epistemic virtues; and that each is necessary and neither sufficient for good epistemic practice?
REPLY:
Two things here. First, our strategy isn’t so much to articulate a rival account to regulative epistemology. So our goal isn’t to illuminate how prudence works or how it should replace rules. Rather, we wish to encourage regulative epistemologists to reflect on the need for epistemic virtue. Hence virtue epistemology is compatible with regulative epistemology. We think that the current version of our article makes this clear. Second, whether virtue is or not in the same predicament of rules requires an account of prudence we haven’t articulated. We see this as a challenge, but one that needs to be separately faced.
We would like to thank you for your interest. We hope that this version satisfies you. And of course, we’ll be glad to introduce new changes where appropriate.
Reviewer 2 Report
The paper argues that prudence is an important but underappreciated epistemic virtue. It does note, however, that it has not been completely ignored. So I am not sure how much this paper really adds to the literature, although I do think that much of what it argues for is true and well supported. In what follows I will make a few suggestions for possible improvements to the paper.
In the second paragraph, what the authors call regulative ethics sounds like normative ethics. And what might be called descriptive ethics sounds like meta-ethics. If this is right I think it would be good to use these more familiar terms. If it is wrong, I would like to see an explanation of why this is.
In the third paragraph, starting line 36, the authors imply that ethicists value prudence highly. This is why, I take it, they find it surprising that virtue epistemologists don't pay more attention to prudence. But do many ethicists today talk about prudence? I think, since it is often associated with mere self-interest, it is generally not regarded as relevant to ethics. At least among modern moral philosophers.
In lines 74-75 the authors identify prudence as "the virtue that enables us to make good, rational choices." This sounds like it might be the only virtue one ever needs! But I think they really mean that it enables one to make rational choices. That is, the word 'good' isn't really doing much work here. If this is right, it would be nice to see some explanation of what the authors count as rational. Is it rational to sacrifice one's life to save another, for instance?
On the other hand, if they really do mean that prudent people make good choices reliably, then prudence, as I say, might be the only virtue one ever needs. In which case I wonder whether such a master virtue really exists at all? And how might one get it? The authors don't really address these questions but they seem very important to me.
In lines 93-94 the authors identify phronesis as prudence. This isn't wrong, but isn't phronesis often translated as practical wisdom? And, relatedly, isn't thee debate about how best to translate it? And, I believe, this debate exists because it isn't really clear exactly what phronesis is. So in a section titled "What is prudence?" it doesn't help as much as one might think to identify prudence as phronesis.
In line 229 the authors talk about "the intention to think a thought." Is there such a thing? I don't think I can imagine it.
In lines 282-285 I think it would help a lot to give an example of the kind of situation that the authors have in mind.
Line 390: it is one thing to say that we need epistemic prudence. It is quite another to say what we need to do to acquire it. What do the authors have in mind? Is there anything we can do to become more prudent? If not, their suggestion seems a little empty.
It would be helpful to be given an account of how the unconscious cognitive states mentioned in line 396 differ from virtues.
In lines 537-545 the authors mention some things they think and about which they disagree with Ballantyne. They don't explain why they think these things though. It isn't obvious to me that they are right, so some defense of these views would help. I also wonder how exactly the pictures mentioned relate to virtues.
I am sympathetic to the paper's overall claims, but I think it would be much stronger if the issues identified above could be addressed.
There are a few mistakes (e.g., lines 111, 131, 161, 218, 320-321, 418) but nothing too hard to identify or fix.
Author Response
Response to Reviewer #2
The paper argues that prudence is an important but underappreciated epistemic virtue. It does note, however, that it has not been completely ignored. So I am not sure how much this paper really adds to the literature, although I do think that much of what it argues for is true and well supported. In what follows I will make a few suggestions for possible improvements to the paper.
REPLY:
In the new Introduction, we now specify in what sense is our article moving the discussion forward with respect to the existing literature on prudence, particularly, Zagzebski’s account, and a set of regulative epistemologies like Roberts & Wood, Baehr, or King. Basically, Zagzebski let it imply that reaching a good decision can be a matter of following internal rules. We argue that this is wrong and that no regulative epistemologist has so far clarified the role of prudence in guiding reason to a good epistemic choice. They assume that being a prudent agent fosters epistemic virtues, but don’t analyse decision-making. For this reason, we think that this article is actually breaking new ground in the literature.
In the second paragraph, what the authors call regulative ethics sounds like normative ethics. And what might be called descriptive ethics sounds like meta-ethics. If this is right I think it would be good to use these more familiar terms. If it is wrong, I would like to see an explanation of why this is.
REPLY:
We agree. We have made the appropriate changes. We’re thankful for this observation.
In the third paragraph, starting line 36, the authors imply that ethicists value prudence highly. This is why, I take it, they find it surprising that virtue epistemologists don't pay more attention to prudence. But do many ethicists today talk about prudence? I think, since it is often associated with mere self-interest, it is generally not regarded as relevant to ethics. At least among modern moral philosophers.
REPLY:
We have expanded the parallels between normative ethics and regulative epistemology to show that it’s commonly believed that virtue ethics is a non-starter when it comes to normative ethics because of the “no-guidance objection” (see above). With this, we’re setting the context for the coming discussion. Yet we haven’t explored how current ethicists deal with prudence because this paper isn’t offering an alternative to regulative epistemology, but inviting those thinkers to look again at how decisions are made.
In lines 74-75 the authors identify prudence as "the virtue that enables us to make good, rational choices." This sounds like it might be the only virtue one ever needs! But I think they really mean that it enables one to make rational choices. That is, the word 'good' isn't really doing much work here. If this is right, it would be nice to see some explanation of what the authors count as rational. Is it rational to sacrifice one's life to save another, for instance?
REPLY:
We don’t want to imply that epistemic prudence is the only virtue one needs, but the virtue that enables good epistemic choice. Other epistemic virtues (like open-mindedness or conscientiousness) are important to inquiry in general, the lack of which will no doubt impact the quality of one’s epistemic choices, but prudence is the virtue that regulates decision-making, it’s as it were its focus, whereas other intellectual virtues have their focus elsewhere (e.g., open-mindedness is about the discovery of new truths). We acknowledge that this idea that decision-making is the focus of prudence is a big claim, yet it isn’t from us, it's Aristotle’s idea. It’s for this reason that prudence is so central to rational inquiry and why we think that epistemology has spoken too little about it).
On the other hand, if they really do mean that prudent people make good choices reliably, then prudence, as I say, might be the only virtue one ever needs. In which case I wonder whether such a master virtue really exists at all? And how might one get it? The authors don't really address these questions but they seem very important to me.
REPLY:
This is a fair point. As we said above, if our argument is correct, this should probably be the target of new research.
In lines 93-94 the authors identify phronesis as prudence. This isn't wrong, but isn't phronesis often translated as practical wisdom? And, relatedly, isn't thee debate about how best to translate it? And, I believe, this debate exists because it isn't really clear exactly what phronesis is. So in a section titled "What is prudence?" it doesn't help as much as one might think to identify prudence as phronesis.
REPLY:
We now translate phronesis as “practical wisdom”. Thanks for noting this. We’ve also introduced more examples to try and clarify how practical wisdom works for Aristotle.
We would like to thank you for your interest. We hope that this version satisfies you. And of course, we’ll be glad to introduce new changes where appropriate.
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
This revised version of the paper has improved considerably. It argues that virtue-epistemic and rule-based accounts of regulative epistemology do not give epistemic agents guidance ‘here and now’. We cannot just rely on rules to make good epistemic decisions. Hence, we need non-rule-based epistemic prudence. This also shows the limits of regulative epistemology as well as the need to inquire more into epistemic prudence. I think the article is now ready for publication.
Author Response
We would like to thank you for your positive comments. We are glad that you like the revised paper.
Reviewer 2 Report
I have no changes to suggest. I am still not sure that I agree with the authors, but that isn't how decisions to publish should be made. The paper's thesis is interesting and well supported.
Author Response
We appreciate your feedback, and thank you for saying that the paper's thesis is interesting and well supported.
