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Article

Social Media Campaigning in Greece: The Case of the 2023 National Parliamentary Elections

by
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos
1,*,
Achilleas Karadimitriou
2,
Dimitrios Souliotis
1 and
Vasileios Rousopoulos
1
1
Department of Communication and Media Studies, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 105 59 Athens, Greece
2
Department of Communication, Media & Culture, School of International Studies, Communication & Culture, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, 176 71 Athens, Greece
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Journal. Media 2025, 6(3), 142; https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030142
Submission received: 20 June 2025 / Revised: 4 August 2025 / Accepted: 30 August 2025 / Published: 6 September 2025

Abstract

In contemporary democracies, social media platforms are widely used for political campaigning, with political figures seeking to connect with diverse segments of the public. This study aims to illuminate the implementation of online political campaigning in Greece by analysing the content shared on four social media platforms (Facebook, X, Instagram, and TikTok) by the leaders of the three principal political parties during the 2023 pre-election phase. We employ content analysis to evaluate primarily the textual and secondarily the visual elements of the posts (N = 1.222) found on the relevant accounts, using a coding framework that comprises 32 variables. The research draws on concepts pertinent to the platformised era, such as “virality,” “personalisation,” and “network media logic,” to highlight how contemporary politicians favour direct and easily comprehensible communication patterns with citizens. The results suggest that political leaders in Greece utilise social media as a means of emotionally mobilising voters. X and Facebook emerged as the primary platforms for distributing political messages, while Instagram and TikTok focused more on personalised and non-political content. The elements of personalisation were particularly prominent in the posts made by the leader of the Conservative Party (New Democracy), who demonstrated greater proficiency in utilising TikTok’s features.

1. Introduction

In recent years, rapid technological advances have significantly transformed the landscape of political communication, offering political parties and figures new ways to engage with voters (Punathambekar & Kavada, 2015). Research on social media election campaigns has mainly concentrated on the use of the X platform (formerly Twitter), with additional focus on Instagram (Filimonov et al., 2016; Bossetta, 2018; Larsson, 2021; Bossetta & Schmøkel, 2023; Haßler et al., 2023; Thiele & Seliger, 2025) and Facebook (Ceccobelli, 2018; Bene, 2021; Heft et al., 2023; Jost, 2023; Stier et al., 2018; Baviera et al., 2023). The dominance of these platforms in public discourse has led some theorists (Van Dijck et al., 2018) to explore the idea of the “platform society,” emphasising the crucial role that digital environments play in shaping social, economic, and political realities (Dalton, 2016). This change is particularly evident in political communication and the development of the political information environment (Van Aelst et al., 2017), where large parts of political debate and public discourse have shifted from traditional media to social networking sites. This transition has been instrumental in supporting electoral campaigns, influencing political agendas, and shaping public perceptions.
Since the rise in the Web 2.0 era, social media platforms have been seen as spaces where new practices of self-focused content creation have flourished. This view is supported by the arguments of Castells (2009) and Stiegler (2009/2017), who emphasised the importance of self-expression enabled by the social media landscape, a process seen as driving significant changes in communication behaviours. By employing the concepts of “creative autonomy” and “individuation’s power,” respectively, they highlighted the vital role of self-centredness, facilitated by social media features, in promoting political participation and empowerment, as well as the dissemination of political messages. Furthermore, over recent years, visuals have gained the power to support attitudinal formation, offering cognitive shortcuts to aid decision-making, thus playing key roles in political communication (Lilleker, 2019). Recent research has also demonstrated that social media platforms, such as TikTok, are valuable means of promoting political engagement, and political figures utilise them to develop and express political authenticity through tactics of immediacy, consistency, and ordinariness (Grantham et al., 2025).
This paper aims to examine how the leaders of Greece’s three most influential political parties, based on previous parliamentary power—Kyriakos Mitsotakis of the right-wing New Democracy, Alexis Tsipras of the left-wing SYRIZA, and Nikos Androulakis of the centre-left PASOK-KINAL—used social media platforms during the 2023 pre-election period. The research investigates how these leaders leveraged social media to emphasise key issues related to plans for the country’s future, intending to attract the attention and support of digital users. Notably, the study explores the strategic use of social media—both textual and visual—over a two-month period (May and June 2023), which was a critical time for public persuasion and mobilisation amid a complex double-round political race.
By exploring concepts related to the platformisation of communication, such as “virality”, “personalisation” and “network media logic”, this study mainly aims to identify and critically compare similarities and differences in the social media content shared by Greek politicians. Using a coding framework of 32 variables, we analyse the content posted by three politicians on four platforms (Facebook, X, Instagram, and TikTok) during the two rounds of the 2023 national parliamentary elections up to the formation of a self-governing administration. A notable feature of this election cycle is the unprecedented and systematic use of TikTok by Greek political actors as a campaign tool. However, the differing familiarity with the platform’s features was evident.

1.1. Social Media Use in Political Campaigning: From Network Media Logic to Algorithmic Data Perception

In today’s media-rich environment, social media has become a vital platform for political communication, particularly during election periods. Politicians utilise social media to engage directly with voters, fostering two-way conversations and enhancing political discourse. Platforms like Facebook play a significant role in this process by enabling unfiltered communication that effectively conveys politicians’ positions and influences public opinion (Zeng et al., 2010; Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015).
Social media platforms offer politicians the opportunity to bypass traditional media gatekeeping, thereby gaining greater control over their campaign messages (Broersma & Graham, 2012). This interaction with digital media allows politicians to shape issues in their favour, avoiding the critical scrutiny and fact-checking typically conducted by mainstream media (Graham et al., 2013; Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015). Furthermore, platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) enable the rapid dissemination of information, often outpacing traditional media outlets (Ahmed & Skoric, 2014, 2015).
Social media platforms serve various roles in election campaigns by enabling political actors to highlight specific traits, customise their strategies, and engage more directly with voters (Vergeer et al., 2013; Enli, 2017). However, research indicates that these platforms are often used more for self-promotion than for fostering meaningful policy discussions (Glassman et al., 2010; Grant et al., 2010; Golbeck et al., 2010; Baxter & Marcella, 2012).
Social media platforms play a crucial role in political campaigns by enhancing message effectiveness, fostering online engagement, and revealing voter opinions (Bor, 2014; Ahmed & Skoric, 2014, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2016). Their ability to mobilise voters, deliver relevant content, and encourage campaign donations underscores their importance in contemporary political strategy (Abid et al., 2023; Hoffmann & Suphan, 2017).
All these affordances illustrate the rise in network media logic in political communication, a development widely recognised in the 2010s when scholars pointed out key distinctions between the era dominated by platforms and the period of mass media, especially in terms of content creation, information spread, and media use. As researchers reassess the logic of network media, they have noted notable shifts in the character of political discourse. In the evolving landscape of opportunities for interaction and discussion among emotionally driven digital communities—where unequal influence on content dissemination and opinion formation exists—academics are concerned that a new logic of irrationality might pose a threat to political campaigns (Klinger & Svensson, 2024, pp. 37–38).
The academic interpretation of network media logic has not developed in a straight line, as the earlier optimistic view has evolved into a more complex understanding that describes the relationship between social media platforms and the increasing spread of disinformation in the public sphere. In this context, researchers have broadened the concept of network media logic by including factors such as the absence of professional editing in content creation for networked media, the influence of data on information production and distribution, the rise in emotionally intense public debates, the significant role of superspreaders in networked conversations, and the growth of participatory propaganda (Klinger & Svensson, 2024, p. 39).
Over the past few years, the theoretical debate has shifted towards the idea of algorithmic data (García-Orosa, 2022), based on the argument that it replaces humans in essential activities related to media content production, dissemination, and consumption (Klinger & Svensson, 2018). Considering that the algorithmic systems of popular platforms, such as Facebook, are influenced by digital users’ reactions to posts (for example, adverse reactions like anger lead to increased visibility), it seems that political campaigns cannot ignore these technological advances. The recent rise in negativity, hostility, and aggression in political campaign posts (Baranowski et al., 2022) may be directly linked to the potential of these traits to boost engagement and, consequently, visibility. Similarly, “clustered publics” formed around shared interests and tastes (primarily on second-generation social media platforms, such as TikTok) have also proven highly effective in driving online engagement (Gerbaudo, 2024).

1.2. The Transition to Visual Political Communication: The “Conflict” Between Projecting Visual Material and Policy Issues

Research shows that political candidates use various techniques and strategies to communicate with citizens more directly, quickly, and easily (Gounas, 2019). This includes prioritising the creation of visual content over in-depth analysis of policy issues or adopting a personalised and sometimes aggressive approach on many topics.
In the era of the “attention economy,” a popular modern technique involves creating short, accurate, and effortlessly watchable videos that capture the audience’s attention by simply explaining the election programme or the candidate’s positions on a specific issue (Wittenberg et al., 2021). In this context, the role of text has generally been reduced, and disseminated content is often presented through visual representations, such as infographics, to make it more appealing to digital users (Towner, 2017).
Furthermore, “virality” has recently become a crucial strategic goal for political campaign teams seeking to amplify their messages. Research indicates that visual content, in comparison to text-only posts, on platforms like Instagram and X, garners significantly higher engagement and visibility. As a result, politicians are increasingly focusing on visual elements in their digital strategies. Producing and sharing visual content on social media, along with digital promotion and broad sharing, can dramatically boost the campaign’s influence. This creates a chain reaction that increases the visibility of a candidate’s views or proposals, effectively placing them on the political agenda (Li & Xie, 2020).

1.3. Political Actors and the Dynamics of Personalisation in Social Media Environments

The strong presence of visual elements on social media is closely linked to the rise in personalisation strategies used by many political candidates. Visual communication tools, such as videos and images, are especially effective for sharing personal stories (Farkas & Bene, 2021). In modern political communication, politicians often share personal stories, achievements, and private moments, supplementing traditional political content (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). This approach enhances a sense of intimacy and authenticity, which is highly valued by social media users (Kruikemeier et al., 2013).
As previously discussed, the inherently personal and interactive nature of social media platforms encourages users, including politicians, to present themselves in a relatable and humanised manner (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Political figures often aim to project an image of honesty and authenticity, trying to appear familiar and approachable to the electorate by sharing personal thoughts, aspects of their personality, and moments from their private lives (Steffan, 2020).
Additionally, scholars argue that the logic of social media, which favours personalised, emotional, and even conflict-oriented narratives, has surpassed traditional political logic. This shift compels politicians to adapt to these new media norms in order to gain visibility and appeal to their target audiences (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). This trend is partly reflected in the distinction between the concepts of individualisation and privatisation, the two primary dimensions of personalisation (Farkas & Bene, 2021). Individualisation refers to the trend of promoting politicians as central figures in the political arena, often overshadowing their political parties. Privatisation, on the other hand, involves projecting politicians’ personality traits and moments from their personal and family lives (Farkas & Bene, 2021). In this regard, TikTok is emerging as a platform that, due to its structural emphasis on visual content, has the potential to promote a more personalised approach for political actors (López-Fernández, 2022; Cervi et al., 2023), even though personalization on TikTok is far from being considered yet as part of politicians’ digital persuasion strategy (Zamora-Medina et al., 2023; Grantham, 2024).
Furthermore, studies analysing the use of X by politicians show that posts sharing personal views or experiences tend to gain higher levels of engagement (e.g., likes, retweets) compared to posts that focus only on political, ideological, or partisan issues (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014). Similarly, posts containing aggressive or harmful content, often expressed as blame or attack, are shared more widely than those that show support for a specific political stance (Fine & Hunt, 2021; Stromer-Galley et al., 2018). As a result, the algorithmic design of social networks, which promotes content that generates engagement, encourages politicians to produce and share negative and aggressive content that is more likely to provoke reactions and go viral (Tucker et al., 2018). However, Hansson et al. (2023) offer a nuanced view, revealing that X posts perceived by users as critical or aggressive are not necessarily more likely to be retweeted—a phenomenon the researchers call the “retweetability paradox,” which contrasts with earlier findings.
In the digital age, where even political leaders can easily create and disseminate their tailored-made content without mediation, the prevalence of attacking messages, caustic political speech, and intense confrontations has become a significant aspect of daily political discourse (Crilley & Gillespie, 2019).

1.4. Significant Trends in the Greek Case That Triggered the Research

The research into the Greek case mainly arises from notable patterns observed in the interaction between social media and the country’s political landscape. As Ferra and Karatzogianni (2019) thoroughly analyse, the rise in social media in Greece occurred alongside a severe financial crisis and widespread political and social instability. This period transformed social media into a battleground for “cyberconflicts,” where intense disputes and harsh criticisms were directed at the “old political system,” blamed mainly for the state’s near bankruptcy in 2010. In Greece, a nation heavily impacted by the economic recession and the austerity measures of the memorandum period, social media became a key outlet for expressing anti-establishment sentiments and radical viewpoints (Ferra & Karatzogianni, 2019).
Despite these challenges, political candidates could not ignore the growing influence of digital platforms. From the 2009 elections and increasingly from the 2012 dual electoral contests onwards, Greek political leaders began to organise comprehensive communication campaigns on social media, utilising these platforms for direct and unmediated communication with voters (Veneti et al., 2021). This trend reached its peak in the May and June 2023 national elections, where leaders of New Democracy, SYRIZA, and PASOK-KINAL heavily focused on digital platforms to coordinate their campaigns. They systematically shared their positions on key issues and promoted their activities on X, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, aiming to connect emotionally with younger audiences by presenting themselves as accessible and relatable (Steffan, 2020). These elections were especially notable as the first to occur during TikTok’s surge in popularity, particularly among dynamic younger demographics, marking a significant development for this study.

2. Research Questions

Based on the above theoretical considerations, the present study seeks to explore the following research questions:
  • RQ1: Are there distinct patterns in how political leaders in Greece utilise social media platforms to achieve electoral success, and to what extent do these patterns reflect mainstream political communication strategies?
    To address this question, we examine potential differences in social media usage among leaders during the two pre-election periods (May and June 2023) to determine whether a familiar pattern emerges and how closely it aligns with established political communication strategies.
  • RQ2: Do political leaders differ in their familiarity with the technological affordances of social media platforms, particularly regarding the use of visual communication tools (e.g., photos and videos)?
    We aim to identify any differences or similarities in the approaches of political leaders and assess which political actor shows the most excellent familiarity with the visual features of these platforms.
  • RQ3: Do former opposition parties adopt more aggressive campaigning strategies on social media (e.g., attacking political rivals, using intimidation, fostering conflict) compared to the former governing party? Additionally, which social media platforms are most conducive to such strategies?
    To answer this question, we examine the use of aggressive campaign messaging on social media by the leaders of the two former opposition parties, Tsipras and Androulakis. We analyse the frequency and nature of their posts on various platforms during the two pre-election periods to identify any common patterns or differences between them.
  • RQ4: Do the social media posts of the three political leaders differ in terms of digital user engagement (e.g., views, likes, shares), and is there a difference in engagement between posts featuring visual content versus those focusing on policy issues? Which platforms demonstrate the highest levels of interaction?
    This question involves analysing the relative impact of various social media platforms on the engagement of political leaders with their audiences during both pre-election campaigns. We also examine whether posts with visual content generate higher engagement compared to those emphasising policy issues and identify which leader had the most significant overall influence.
  • RQ5: To what extent does TikTok, as an emerging tool of political communication in Greece, introduce innovative patterns in the ways political leaders engage with the electorate?
    To address this question, we evaluate whether common patterns have emerged and analyse the effectiveness of each leader’s utilisation of TikTok’s technological affordances. This includes examining post topics, types of references, dialogue features, personalisation, calls to action, and levels of engagement, particularly within the context of aggressive negative campaigning.

3. Data and Methodology

The data for this study comes from a content analysis of the social media accounts managed by the three political leaders (Table 1) included in the sample on Facebook, X, Instagram, and TikTok during the last three weeks of the 2023 national parliamentary elections, which took place in May (first round) and June (second round) of the same year. The unit of analysis includes any text, image, or video in each post uploaded during the specified periods. The empirical data comprises 1222 posts by the following three political figures: Kyriakos Mitsotakis, former Prime Minister and leader of the right-wing New Democracy party; Alexis Tsipras, leader of the left-wing opposition party SYRIZA; and Nikos Androulakis of the centre-left opposition party PASOK-KINAL.
The coding process was conducted using the Shout platform (www.shout.com), where each post was systematically coded according to predefined questions and variables (Table 2). The coding protocol consisted of a series of questions aimed at capturing various aspects of social media content. These aspects are summarised in the following table.
Initially, a coding training session focused on discussions about variables was conducted, followed by a pilot coding exercise to identify and resolve discrepancies, ensuring a reliable and effective coding scheme. Two coders performed the coding to enhance objectivity, and reliability tests were conducted throughout the coding process, along with revisions to the coding manual as needed. Reliability pertains to the consistency of the results, emphasising intercoder reliability or “the level of agreement among two or more coders” (cf. Neuendorf, 2017). Specifically, a randomly chosen sub-sample of 10% of the core sample (N = 122 posts) was coded to evaluate intercoder reliability. All variables showed a satisfactory level of agreement. To be specific, the agreement for “the content of the post” was 0.91, for “the audiovisual material use” 0.82, for “the content of the audiovisual material” 0.94, for “the specific topics raised in the posts” 0.82, for “the tone of the post” 0.75, for “the elements of aggressive communication and intimidation” in the post 0.78, for “the source and the content of the intimidation” 0.82, for “the personalisation features in the post” 0.75, for “the dialogue features in the post” 0.94, for “the features concerning the call to action in the post” 0.98, and for “the mobilisation features in the post” 0.96.

4. Results

4.1. Patterns of Social Media Use in Political Campaigning

In a comparative analysis of political communication platforms during the two 2023 pre-election periods, X emerges as the most frequently utilised tool, with Facebook lagging significantly in second place (Figure 1). Instagram and TikTok, being more visually oriented, were used less often by the political leaders examined. Notably, the ex-prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and the main opposition party leader, Alexis Tsipras, predominantly used X, while the other opposition party leader, Nikos Androulakis, preferred Facebook for sharing his content. In the Greek context, the dominance of the Χ platform during political campaigns aligns with trends observed in other election settings, where it has been found that candidates from established major parties (Raynauld & Greenberg, 2014; Vergeer & Hermans, 2013), incumbents (Gilmore, 2012), and those with substantial campaign budgets (Peterson, 2012) tend to be more active on X (formerly Twitter) than their counterparts.
Regarding opposition party leaders in Greece, Instagram became the third most used platform. Conversely, the former Prime Minister strategically adopted TikTok, making him the first Greek politician to do so systematically. This was part of a well-executed pre-election campaign that won an advertising award (Protothema.gr, 2024).
Regarding the topics of social media postings (Table 3), the findings show that all political parties in the sample mainly disseminated messages aimed at promoting their leaders’ public appearances. This type of communication is most common for the centre-left PASOK-KINAL party, which, being a weaker political force compared to the other two major parties, sought to maximise visibility for its leader’s pre-election activities. The data indicates that all political leaders widely used Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok to announce their public actions, whereas X was used significantly less for this purpose. The distinctiveness of X has also been emphasised in previous research, which examined the strategies politicians employ to project a favourable and professional image. The findings showed that self-promotion, particularly regarding personal qualifications and positions, was the most prominent tactic used by politicians on this platform (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011). Additionally, there is a noticeable rise in the frequency of posts announcing candidates’ public appearances during the second pre-election period.
Another strategic use of social media content, primarily adopted by SYRIZA and secondarily by the New Democracy party, involves expressing views on public interest issues during the two pre-election periods. The PASOK-KINAL party periodically demonstrates this trend, mainly focusing on promoting its political leader’s public activities. X is the primary platform used by political leaders to post on specific issues, with increased activity during the first pre-election period, aiming to convey key political messages. This observation aligns with the perception of X as a digital environment characterised by a networked design, which enables contextual communication through established social networks (Vergeer, 2015). During the second pre-election period, this trend diminishes as opposition parties seek to counter the New Democracy party’s dominance.
The research findings indicate that all political parties incorporate various issues into their social media posts, including announcements of public appearances and expressions of opinions on current issues. These dual-purpose messages can highlight important topics, encourage public engagement, or promote public events with a thematic focus that underlines the leaders’ connection with voters. The use of Instagram for posts covering multiple topics increased significantly during the second pre-election period.
According to data analysis, the posts of political leaders mainly focus on political themes rather than personal life snapshots (Figure 2), suggesting that election conflicts centre around political agendas (see Appendix A for examples). This pattern is evident on Facebook and X platforms, which are predominantly used for political matters. The focus of all candidates on “issues” highlights a fundamental aspect of election campaigns, which lies in providing information. In this process, each political party often emphasises its ‘own’ issues (those with which voters associate it), fostering a form of direct communication aimed at convincing potential voters of the party’s ability to solve problems (Russmann et al., 2021, pp. 27–28).
In the Greek case, one of the most distinctive issues of the campaigns under study was the so-called “Tempi train accident,” which resulted in 57 fatalities (Table 4) and subsequently became a major topic of online discourse, especially highlighted by the PASOK-KINAL party during the second pre-election period. The former Prime Minister and SYRIZA party also addressed this topic, though less frequently, with the TikTok platform prominently featuring several aspects of it. This finding contrasts with older studies arguing that political actors mainly use X to share updates on campaign activities and direct followers to their respective websites (Graham et al., 2013; Macnamara, 2011), while discussions related to policy matters tend to play a minor role in these online communications (Graham et al., 2014).
Campaign-related issues, such as debates and mobilisation messages, are often addressed using social media tools for political advertising. PASOK-KINAL party links the call for action to its motto of “change,” while the other two political parties also urge action to tackle the problem of low voter turnout (Table 4). Instagram and TikTok are primarily used for campaign-related references, with increased activity during the second pre-election period.
Our analysis of features related to “dialogue”, “personalisation”, and “calls to action” in political messaging (Figure 3) indicates that the politicians in our sample generally do not prioritise dialogic elements in their communications. Despite their limited use, incorporating dialogue, such as responding to questions raised in the public sphere, helps cultivate political personas that appear empathetic to the concerns of Greek citizens. This trend is particularly evident in the PASOK-KINAL party leader’s digital communications, which frequently include dialogue-related and call-to-action-related messages. Notably, calls to action are more prevalent during the second pre-election period and are primarily found on Facebook rather than TikTok, which is mainly used for messages that engage with public queries or positions. Finally, the feature of personalisation in social media posts is more prominently utilised by the New Democracy party leader (for illustrative examples, see Appendix A).
Our findings seem to agree with previous research suggesting that information about daily events and key political issues constitutes the largest category of posts (Aharony, 2012). Additionally, they match other studies showing that politicians intentionally tailor their messages depending on the social media platform they choose; for instance, X is mainly used for political criticism, while Facebook is predominantly used for promoting campaign activities and rallying supporters (Stier et al., 2018; Entman & Usher, 2018; Sahly et al., 2019).

4.2. The Visual Aspects of Social Media Campaigning

Our research shows a strong trend among political parties to use audiovisual materials as a key part of their strategies for spreading political messages (Figure 4). The inherent structural and operational features of social networking platforms can explain this trend. Notably, for two out of three political parties, SYRIZA and PASOK/KINAL, the use of video content greatly exceeds that of photography in frequency. This preference highlights the intention of political actors to utilise the semiotic power of moving images, aiming to boost their persuasive efforts through visual messages that take advantage of the dynamic and performative qualities of video content and its capacity to evoke emotional responses. This focus on the spectacular aspect of political messaging aligns with earlier research, which suggests that while visual political communication may fall short in delivering a complete narrative or building a coherent argument, it is very effective in grabbing audience attention and shaping decisions through emotional manipulation (Lilleker, 2019).
In contrast to SYRIZA and PASOK-KINAL parties, the New Democracy party more effectively balances the use of photographs and videos in social media posts, with only a few messages lacking visual content. The SYRIZA party, despite emphasising videos, also posts many updates without any visual elements. Tsipras of SYRIZA tends to use edited photos more often, while Mitsotakis of New Democracy prefers a mix of audiovisual material. Notably, during the second pre-election period, there was a marked increase in posts without any audiovisual content.
Beyond TikTok’s short video content, moving images dominated on Facebook, Instagram, and X platforms (62.4%, 59.1%, and 46.9%, respectively). Photographs were the second most used visual content, especially on Instagram (36.9%), followed by Facebook (28.2%) and X (17.2%). Regarding the latter platform, politicians often rely solely on text (23.9%).
All three political leaders used audiovisual content to emphasise their political activities, with PASOK-KINAL’s leader utilising this approach more extensively. This content was mainly shared on Facebook and Instagram. Instagram, with its photo-centric nature, effectively showcased both political actions (61.1%) and interactions with the public (23.2%), outperforming other platforms in personalised political communication.
Comparing the two pre-election periods, there was a decline in the use of audiovisual material to capture political activities in the second period; in contrast, its use to depict a mix of political activities and public connections increased. Audiovisual content also emphasised policy measures, public benefits, and behind-the-scenes moments, especially on TikTok, where informal content was prominent. The leader of New Democracy used this approach more frequently, along with personal moments on Instagram (2.5%).
Video use decreased markedly during the second pre-election period, whereas the use of photographs increased. Many posts in that period lacked audiovisual content. These findings accord with previous research indicating that candidates utilise social media to present themselves as ideal candidates and personalise communication during campaigns (Steffan, 2020; Metz et al., 2019; Farkas & Bene, 2021).

4.3. Intimidation and Attack as Political Communication Components

The research findings show that references to political opponents are relatively uncommon in social media posts (Figure 5). However, a comparative view reveals that the two main opposition parties, SYRIZA and PASOK/KINAL, use representations of rival parties’ leaders to different extents. Importantly, SYRIZA appears to use this tactic more assertively, suggesting a trend towards more direct and frequent confrontational messaging (Figure 6).
This attitude is particularly prominent on the X platform, although it diminishes during the second pre-election phase. Conversely, the New Democracy party appears to avoid this tactic and instead prefers to promote representations associated with its own leader. This divergence in communication strategy has been corroborated by previous research on electoral messages, which indicates that candidates seeking office tend to employ more aggressive tactics than incumbents (Trent & Friedenberg, 2000). Similarly, other research findings emphasise how candidates’ standing in the polls influences their negativity, as those leading tend to refrain from attacks, unlike trailing candidates who create tailored communication strategies and approaches (Dover, 2006).
The SYRIZA party’s tendency towards confrontational campaigning is evident in its frequent use of intimidation, which appears twice as often in its social media posts compared to those from the PASOK-KINAL party (Figure 6), as well as through conflict and attack features (Figure 7). In contrast, the New Democracy party tends to avoid this approach, favouring content that lacks alarming elements. Our research shows that conflict- or attack-oriented features in posts were significantly more common during the second pre-election phase. Facebook was the platform where the highest volume of conflict and attack messages regarding politics or political positions was shared during both pre-election periods. Conversely, Instagram served as the leading platform for posting conflict and attack messages targeting rival candidates. This finding contradicts earlier research emphasising the harmful material shared, particularly on X. The platform is portrayed as an environment prone to negative campaigning, with politicians criticising opponents through negative messaging (Parmelee & Bichard, 2011). Our study also indicates that intimidation was more prominent in posts during the second pre-election phase; such content was especially distinctive across Instagram, Facebook, and X. However, TikTok was not used for intimidation in the posts shared by political leaders.
The research findings align with existing studies on politicians’ use of social media during election campaigns, which indicate that conflict (attacking rivals) and emotional frames (mainly negative and positive emotional content) are frequently employed on social media platforms by politicians in the lead-up to elections (Enli, 2017; Kreis, 2017; Sahly et al., 2019).

4.4. Major Trends in Digital User Engagement

To evaluate the major trends among social media users regarding engagement, the analysis uses data showing the number of views, likes, shares, and retweets on the social media platforms of the sample. These data were summed, and several T-tests were conducted using SPSS 20 software, where the mean values helped facilitate some interesting findings.
Comparing the average engagement levels between the two pre-election periods shows that during the first period (May 2023), digital users were significantly more active in terms of interaction signals than in the second period (June 2023). The political posts that attract the highest levels of digital audience engagement concern messages of attack between political opponents or messages containing words of intimidation towards the electorate.
Research findings show that digital users tend to engage more with social media content that reflects the opinions of political leaders on specific issues or when responding to questions or public statements about the public sphere (Figure 8 and Figure 9). Sharing meetings with other political figures is another area that attracts digital users’ attention, whereas announcing their public appearances appears to be among the topics with less interest for the digital audience.
Our findings align with the relevant literature, which indicates that morality, emotional, and conflict frames used by politicians on social media attract voters’ engagement, such as retweeting and favouriting behaviours or popularity cues on Facebook (Blassnig et al., 2021; Metz et al., 2019; Sahly et al., 2019), while more politics-related, candidate-centred images and topics also produce positive effects on audience engagement (Farkas & Bene, 2021).

4.5. The Use of TikTok as a New Political Communication Tool

In our analysis of how political candidates utilise social media platforms, we found that among the three candidates studied, TikTok is the least frequently used platform. However, for former Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, TikTok use slightly surpasses that of Instagram, indicating its recent incorporation into political communication strategies, at least in Greece. While TikTok’s appeal seems limited to specific segments of the Greek digital audience, mainly ‘clustered’ by shared interests and tastes (Gerbaudo, 2024), all political leaders in our study have begun to leverage its technological capabilities, albeit modestly, to connect with younger voters. The limited adoption of TikTok as a campaign tool by political actors has been confirmed by previous studies, which argue for the platform’s significance as an emerging medium for political engagement, against which the political community is still seeking to adapt (Orbegozo-Terradillos et al., 2025). Nonetheless, it appears to be already influencing the political beliefs and actions of its young users (Karimi & Fox, 2023).
Our findings show that TikTok, along with Instagram and Facebook, was widely used by all political leaders to announce public appearances and discuss campaign-related issues such as polls, debates, and calls to action. Interestingly, these activities occurred slightly more frequently during the second pre-election period. Moreover, TikTok was mainly used for sharing messages that included dialogue, such as responses to questions or public statements, as well as posts featuring personalisation elements. This reflects one of the platform’s key features, offering a unique way for audience engagement in political discourse, where candidates effectively use politainment to communicate their messages (Kulau, 2024). However, in the Greek context, a peculiarity arises in that digital users’ engagement was not limited to politainment or personalisation elements alone.
Although TikTok was not used for intimidation purposes, the platform hosted posts containing conflict or attack messages concerning political positions. This trend is exemplified by the prominence of the “Tempi train accident” as a recurring topic on the TikTok platform. The absence of intimidation tactics on TikTok can be understood through the platform’s unique characteristics and the strategies employed by political actors. Unlike other social media platforms such as X or Facebook, which often facilitate confrontational political discourse even in a subtle way (Torregrosa et al., 2023; Neubaum et al., 2021), TikTok attracts a younger demographic through engaging, entertaining, and relatable content (Shamsuddin & Azman, 2025). Consequently, Greek political leaders tend to avoid negative messaging on TikTok, instead focusing on personalised storytelling and moments that build familiarity and connection. This approach appears to be a strategic choice aimed at appealing to younger voters while mitigating the risk of backlash in a space that seems less receptive to overt hostility. Furthermore, TikTok’s algorithm, which promotes creativity, authenticity, and positive engagement, framed by the need for uniqueness in the effect of the platform’s tailored content on intentions for viral sharing (Chu et al., 2022), poses challenges for intimidation-based strategies. Thus, it is evident that Greek political figures are selectively utilising platforms, adapting their communication styles to align with the expectations of distinct digital environments.
Regarding the use of audiovisual material, our research shows that political leaders frequently utilise videos on TikTok. However, in comparison with other social media platforms, TikTok is less often used to promote or showcase political activities such as interviews, campaign videos, or moments from tours and speeches. Instead, the platform is more prominently used to record and share behind-the-scenes moments, particularly from the New Democracy leader, indicating a different strategic approach. Videos depicting personal moments are also shared, but to a lesser degree.
These findings support previous research suggesting that TikTok has recently become a tool for political campaigns (Morejón-Llamas et al., 2024; Cervi & Marín-Lladó, 2021), mainly functioning as a “politainment” platform. This role blends political messaging with the entertainment features of the platform, along with elements of personalisation, negative campaigning, and voter mobilisation (Grantham, 2024; Ureke, 2024; Cervi et al., 2021, 2023).

5. Discussion and Conclusions

In the current digital age, social media is an essential part of the communication strategies of political parties, regardless of their ideological stance. However, this relationship is complex and often associated with disinformation (González-Aguilar et al., 2023; Mendoza, 2022). For social media platforms to be effective and impactful as political communication tools, politicians need to use them systematically. Occasional engagement with these technological tools reduces their effectiveness as channels of communication. It weakens their capacity to build closer relationships with the public or enable public participation. As Papacharissi has emphasised, improved citizen interaction on social media stems from genuine two-way communication. Nevertheless, establishing such a relationship requires politicians to have research abilities, dedicated staff, and sufficient financial resources—requirements that not all politicians can meet (Papacharissi, 2014).
This study aims to offer insights into how online political campaigning was carried out on four social media platforms (Facebook, X, Instagram, and TikTok) by the leaders of Greece’s three major political parties during the 2023 election period. It reveals distinct patterns in how political leaders use social media platforms to attain electoral success, reflecting mainstream political communication strategies. Even in a small country like Greece, traditional models of political campaigning are being reevaluated under the influence of a platformised society, where the political landscape is characterised by traits such as audience fragmentation, declining party allegiance, an increasing number of independent voters, and heightened competition among political parties (Russmann et al., 2021, p. 23).
X emerged as the leading platform, followed by Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, with the latter two being used much less frequently. The popularity of the X platform is attributed to its suitability for short, impactful messages despite having limited influence on Greek news media and public agendas during elections (Triantafillidou et al., 2020). Conversely, Facebook’s prominence relates to its role as a news source for 44% of Greek digital users (Kalogeropoulos, 2024). Therefore, the X environment and Facebook proved to be the most frequently used platforms during the two pre-election periods (May and June 2023), with Kyriakos Mitsotakis (leader of the New Democracy party and former Prime Minister) and Alexis Tsipras (leader of the opposition party SYRIZA) primarily using X, while Nikos Androulakis (leader of the opposition party PASOK-KINAL) favoured Facebook.
Greek politicians carried out the three main functions of the campaign (information, interaction, and mobilisation (Russmann et al., 2021) with varying dynamics; however, it seemed that their interconnection was not fully understood. According to research findings, they mainly used social media to inform followers about their pre-election appearances and political activities. Candidates from opposition parties often combined announcements with political issues to emphasise their viewpoints and counter their opponents’ arguments. Additionally, they frequently posted calls to action to mobilise citizens emotionally, which is important given the declining voter turnout in Greek national parliamentary elections from 1974 to 2015 (Rori, 2016).
In terms of visual communication, politicians, particularly Nikos Androulakis, created audiovisual content to attract voters, a strategy enabled by digital technologies (Wittenberg et al., 2021; Li & Xie, 2020). Contrary to some research (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Kruikemeier et al., 2013) and the general rise of the dynamics of personalization in social media environments, Greek political posts focused on political issues rather than personal or family moments, possibly because X and Facebook, the primary platforms used, are more suited to political messages than Instagram and TikTok, and at the same time revealing part of the leaders’ strategies, in reference for example to levels of message personalization in different social media platforms (Farkas & Bene, 2021).
Political content remains common in candidates’ public statements; however, posts about personal and family matters attract more public interest and media focus. This trend is worsened by politicians’ involvement in infotainment television programmes, which fosters a misconception about the significance of personal stories in electoral debates. It seems that social media platforms are increasingly following television norms rather than traditional press standards for political communication.
Among the three leaders, Kyriakos Mitsotakis used TikTok to share personalised content, aiming to present a sympathetic and intimate image. This trend of personalisation in Greek politics (considering that major political and governing parties have the potential to influence the normalisation of social media use for campaign purposes) contrasts with a broader depoliticisation trend in Western Europe (Marino et al., 2022). Nevertheless, past research has indicated that interactive and personalised communication on social media platforms significantly boosts political involvement (Kruikemeier et al., 2013), enabling citizens to access political information and foster environments conducive to participation and dialogue with political figures, thus creating close connections between politicians and the electorate (Van Zoonen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000).
SYRIZA’s approach consistently emphasises its leader, Alexis Tsipras, highlighting his important role in boosting the party’s momentum. The same political party also used aggressive and intimidating tactics against the former ruling party, exaggerating Greece’s political and economic situation.
Engagement was higher during the initial pre-election period, possibly due to voter fatigue and the predictability of the election outcome. Posts featuring interactive content, such as political meetings and issue positions, attracted more engagement, supporting previous research on the appeal of contentious content (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013).
The 2023 national elections marked the first significant use of TikTok by Greek politicians to target younger voters. However, TikTok’s utilisation was limited due to the need for high-quality visual content and specialised teams. Only the leader of the New Democracy party, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, effectively used TikTok’s interactive features by creating and sharing original content; however, it was not intended to exert a direct, persuasive influence or alter electoral opinions, but rather to entertain and foster a sense of closeness with the political figure. Similar effects of the same platform have also been observed in Spain during the 2023 municipal and regional elections, where TikTok appeared unrelated to an effective process of political mobilisation of potential voters (Orbegozo-Terradillos et al., 2025, p. 17). In the Greek context, apart from the former Prime Minister, the other candidates mainly repurposed content from other media on TikTok, a finding consistent with research indicating that politicians underutilise TikTok’s capabilities (Zamora-Medina et al., 2023).
Overall, this study highlights the current state of the modernisation of political campaigns concerning social media use and the changing landscape of political communication in Greece. It has important implications for future research as new platforms continue to emerge and influence political strategies.
This research recognises several limitations. The analysis of candidates’ social media activity was restricted to the three weeks before the national parliamentary elections, which limits the assessment of long-term online strategies. Additionally, the study focused exclusively on content from Facebook, X, Instagram, and TikTok, overlooking significant platforms such as YouTube and LinkedIn, as well as political blogs and websites. Focusing on the leaders of the three largest political parties—New Democracy, SYRIZA, and PASOK-KINAL—based on their electoral strength, may not fully represent the overall political landscape. A comprehensive understanding of public communication during the 2023 national elections could be enhanced by integrating media coverage with social media analysis. While the study provides insights into the strategic patterns of social media use for pre-election communication, it also underscores the need for further research into the interactions between political actors and the public, as well as the impact of social media on public opinion. Future studies could explore the dynamics of political communication across different countries to identify both similarities and differences.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, S.P., A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Methodology, S.P., A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Software, A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Validation, S.P.; Formal analysis, S.P., A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Investigation, A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Resources, S.P.; Data curation, A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Writing – original draft, S.P., A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Writing – review & editing, S.P., A.K., D.S. and V.R.; Visualization, A.K.; Supervision, S.P.; Project administration, S.P.; Funding acquisition, S.P. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

The study was conducted in accordance with the obligations arising from the “Data Processing Agreement” as foreseen by the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and the Department of Communication and Media Studies (Annex B19.1) and the regulation (EU) 2016/679, as well as the provisions of applicable law regarding the processing of personal data, as defined by art. 4.1 GDPR, within all phases of the research project.

Informed Consent Statement

Our institution does not require ethical approval/personal consent for reporting individual cases or case series, given that the survey’s findings are anonymised. Posts by the politicians in the social media domain are publicly available, and in this case, there is no need for personal consent.

Data Availability Statement

The data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. Indicative examples of social media posts informed by elements of political issues.
Table A1. Indicative examples of social media posts informed by elements of political issues.
  • “Our program sets clear objectives for the next four years. And these goals will be achieved through bold reforms. We have made important changes, and we can make many more. Let us continue the path of progress for every Greek” (Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Facebook, 14 May 2023)
  • “My vision is the real convergence of our country with Europe. Greece with better wages and less inequality, where every citizen can hope that their children will have a better tomorrow” (Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Facebook, 26 June 2023)
  • “For the middle class, which has been wronged, not only will there be no additional contributions, but there will also be a tax-free allowance of 10.000 euros for all debt adjustment, abolition of the business tax. In politics, you are forced to make unpleasant decisions. When you address the Greek people with a contract of change, you cannot give anyone the right to question it. I am determined to honour that contract” (Alexis Tsipras, Facebook, 19 May 2023)
Table A2. Indicative examples of social media posts featuring elements of “call to action” or “personalisation”.
Table A2. Indicative examples of social media posts featuring elements of “call to action” or “personalisation”.
  • “We worked a lot with our children. It is not just the publicity. It is the weight of love and hate” (Alexis Tsipras, X. 9 May 2023)
  • 17 days to the elections #TikTokDocumentary #BTS #ElectionDiaries #CampaignDiaries #KyriakosMitsotakis (Kyriakos Mitsotakis. TikTok. 4 May 2023)
  • Behind The Scenes Season 2 #kyriakosmitsotakis #ekloges2023 (Kyriakos Mitsotakis. TikTok. 5 June 2023)
  • “Trust us since we have a high index of both reliability and knowledge to build Greece of the real 21st century and not Greece of the wiretapping, bribery, discord, toxicity in social media that demolish personalities, human rights and separation of powers” (Nikos Androulakis TikTok. 7 May 2023)
  • “Thank you very much for such a nice welcome today in the Stylida region! On June 25th, we vote for our future. We vote for higher wages. For better public health and education. To make the significant changes that our country needs!” (Kyriakos Mitsotakis. X. 9 June 2023)
  • “Our party is making a dynamic return to the political scene. I would like to call on all Greeks to embrace our new effort. The political colour that suits our island is green, and we aspire to make Crete green again. The green of hope, of optimism, of perspective. The green of social justice and national dignity” (Nikos Androulakis, Instagram, 3 June 2023)
  • “We have a duty, not only to make PASOK somehow bigger, not only to increase our parliamentary power, but to rebuild the home of every democrat and progressive Greek. That is why I call on all the progressive people of the Left, of the Centre-Left, of the Centre to come back and support this new effort so that there is a genuine opponent to New Democracy” (Nikos Androulakis, Instagram, 10 June 2023)
Table A3. Examples of conflict-related/attack-related elements in social media posts by political party leaders.
Table A3. Examples of conflict-related/attack-related elements in social media posts by political party leaders.
  • “Forgive me for being late, but I am not travelling on the state plane and with the money of the Greek taxpayers. Some are born like kings and feel that the country belongs to them. However, I come from a humble mountain village in Tzoumerka, and I am proud of my background”. (Alexis Tsipras, X, 5 May 2023)
  • “The cost of Mitsotaki’s policy is incalculable. Really, how much do the 37.000 deaths of the pandemic cost? How much do 57 lives cost in Tempi? How much does the image we saw yesterday cost an 80-year-old disabled man in Halkidiki, being evicted from his home because he was a guarantor of his unemployed son’s loan? Really, how much does the reality we live cost?” (Alexis Tsipras, X, 8 May 2023)
  • “I am the leader of the party founded by Andreas Papandreou, and Mr. Tsipras leads the party that imprisoned Andreas Papandreou. This is history. Let’s also discuss politics, as he mentioned that he has followers of Andreas Papandreou in his party. Andreas Papandreou and “Prespes of the Aegean” are not in accordance (Nikos Androulakis, Facebook, 5 May 2023).
  • “The staff shortages in the EKAB, the primary health centres and the ESY in general have tragic results for the Greek people. The government is not using the billions from the Recovery Fund properly, so that we can create a modern NHS, with services all over Greece.” (Nikos Androulakis, X, 7 June 2023)
  • “We have insisted very much in this election that programs be opposed so that people can compare. On the contrary, our political opponent, New Democracy, has designed a toxic strategy, investing in fake news, constantly distracting from the real issues at stake. And not hesitating to throw even sensitive national issues into the electoral arena” (Alexis Tsipras. Facebook. 22 June 2023)
  • “Eviction to Mitsotakis on Sunday” (Alexis Tsipras. TikTok. 16 May 2023)

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Figure 1. Frequency of social media platforms’ usage per political leader (%). Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 1. Frequency of social media platforms’ usage per political leader (%). Source: Authors’ research.
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Figure 2. Frequency of occurrence of social media postings’ thematic categories per political party leader (%). Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 2. Frequency of occurrence of social media postings’ thematic categories per political party leader (%). Source: Authors’ research.
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Figure 3. Frequency of occurrence of elements related to “dialogue”, “personalisation”, and “calls to action” in social media posts per political party (%). Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 3. Frequency of occurrence of elements related to “dialogue”, “personalisation”, and “calls to action” in social media posts per political party (%). Source: Authors’ research.
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Figure 4. Frequency of occurrence of visual communication elements per political party (%). Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 4. Frequency of occurrence of visual communication elements per political party (%). Source: Authors’ research.
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Figure 5. Focus of social media postings per political party (%). Source: Authors’ own research.
Figure 5. Focus of social media postings per political party (%). Source: Authors’ own research.
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Figure 6. Frequency of intimidation-related elements in social media postings per political party (%). Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 6. Frequency of intimidation-related elements in social media postings per political party (%). Source: Authors’ research.
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Figure 7. Frequency of conflict-related/attack-related content in social media postings per political party leader (%). Source: Authors’ own research.
Figure 7. Frequency of conflict-related/attack-related content in social media postings per political party leader (%). Source: Authors’ own research.
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Figure 8. Mean values of total digital users’ engagement per type of content. Source: Authors’ research. Note: Regarding the “Call to action” and “Dialogue/Answer to public positions postings” variables, there is a statistically significant difference in the mean values on digital users’ total engagement (Sig. 2-tailed ≤ 0.001).
Figure 8. Mean values of total digital users’ engagement per type of content. Source: Authors’ research. Note: Regarding the “Call to action” and “Dialogue/Answer to public positions postings” variables, there is a statistically significant difference in the mean values on digital users’ total engagement (Sig. 2-tailed ≤ 0.001).
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Figure 9. Mean values regarding digital users’ total engagement per topic of social media postings. Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 9. Mean values regarding digital users’ total engagement per topic of social media postings. Source: Authors’ research.
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Table 1. Sample of postings implemented by Greek political party leaders.
Table 1. Sample of postings implemented by Greek political party leaders.
Political PartyNumber of Postings (N)Sample (%)
New Democracy (Kyriakos Mitsotakis)30224.7%
SYRIZA (Alexis Tsipras)57246.8%
PASOK (Nikos Androulakis)34828.5%
Source: Authors’ research.
Table 2. Key variables based on which the coding process of social media postings was conducted.
Table 2. Key variables based on which the coding process of social media postings was conducted.
The Electoral Period That the Social Media Post Referred toPolitical Leader’s/Candidate’s Name and Party’s NameType of Social Media PlatformDate of Social Media PostNumber of Views, Likes, Shares, or Retweets Regarding the PostContent of the Post
Audiovisual material used in the postContent of the audiovisual material usedSpecific topics of the content of the postThe tone of the postElements of aggressive communication in the postElements of intimidation in the post
Source of intimidationContent of intimidationPersonalisation features in the postDialogue features in the postCall to action features in the postMobilisation features in the post
Source: Authors’ research.
Table 3. Frequency of occurrence of social media posts’ topics per political leader (%).
Table 3. Frequency of occurrence of social media posts’ topics per political leader (%).
New Democracy
(Kyriakos Mitsotakis)
SYRIZA—Progressive Alliance
(Alexis Tsipras)
PASOK/KINAL—Movement of Change
(Nikos Androulakis)
Announcement of the candidate’s public appearance (tours, interviews, meetings)33.831.854.0
Political party event announcement (tours, interviews, meetings)0.70.21.4
Posting on a specific issue (local, political, or other issues)22.836.010.6
Extract of the candidate’s public position held in real-time0.70.70.7
Answer to a question0.70.70.7
Lifestyle (e.g., family, trip, birthday, friends, etc.)0.00.20.0
Open political question0.00.20.0
Greetings, congratulations, wishes-related content, etc.2.30.50.3
Political project presentation (past)1.00.00.0
Meetings with political actors0.30.50.0
Reference to/Meetings with people of non-political fields0.00.70.0
Meetings with voters/supporters0.30.50.3
Other9.66.55.2
Combined message26.222.026.4
Source: Authors’ research.
Table 4. Frequency of reference to political topics categories in social media posts per political party leader (in %).
Table 4. Frequency of reference to political topics categories in social media posts per political party leader (in %).
Political Topics
of Public Interest
New Democracy
(Kyriakos Mitsotakis)
SYRIZA—Progressive Alliance
(Alexis Tsipras)
PASOK/KINAL—Movement of Change
(Nikos Androulakis)
Economy-Europe0.00.00.3
Economy-Greece3.45.814.9
Public Constructions0.00.21.3
Taxation-Tax Evasion1.41.90.7
Youth-Provisions0.61.40.3
Employment/Labour Issues0.93.02.6
Immigration0.33.03.0
Social Benefits0.31.25.3
Banks-Loans0.32.30.0
Terrorism-Criminality0.00.20.0
Education0.32.12.0
Culture0.00.30.0
Insurance-Pensions0.00.30.7
Greek-Turkish Relations-Defense Issues-Relevant Equipment1.12.41.3
Energy Policy0.90.50.7
Public Governance-Digitalization1.10.91.0
Justice0.30.50.0
Health5.27.39.9
(Post-)election issues0.66.10.7
Tempi Train Accident29.315.016.9
Wiretapping case1.43.80.0
Call for support10.97.53.6
Combination24.412.416.2
Other10.917.810.3
Source: Authors’ research.
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Papathanassopoulos, S.; Karadimitriou, A.; Souliotis, D.; Rousopoulos, V. Social Media Campaigning in Greece: The Case of the 2023 National Parliamentary Elections. Journal. Media 2025, 6, 142. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030142

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Papathanassopoulos S, Karadimitriou A, Souliotis D, Rousopoulos V. Social Media Campaigning in Greece: The Case of the 2023 National Parliamentary Elections. Journalism and Media. 2025; 6(3):142. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030142

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Papathanassopoulos, Stylianos, Achilleas Karadimitriou, Dimitrios Souliotis, and Vasileios Rousopoulos. 2025. "Social Media Campaigning in Greece: The Case of the 2023 National Parliamentary Elections" Journalism and Media 6, no. 3: 142. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030142

APA Style

Papathanassopoulos, S., Karadimitriou, A., Souliotis, D., & Rousopoulos, V. (2025). Social Media Campaigning in Greece: The Case of the 2023 National Parliamentary Elections. Journalism and Media, 6(3), 142. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030142

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