Game of Life-like Opinion Dynamics: Generalizing the Underpopulation Rule
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Related literature. The study of various aspects of graph dynamics has received very wide attention in the literature, and a detailed discussion of papers and results about this topic is out of the scope of this paper. Broadly speaking, two scenarios may be identified in this setting.
- Paper contribution. This paper is devoted to the study of the generalization of the underpopulation rule to signed and directed graphs. Both the underpopulation rule and the deterministic major dynamics are special occurrences of local threshold-based dynamics: indeed, as it will become clear in the next section, the underpopulation rule occurs by choosing and , that is, as two constant functions, while the deterministic majority dynamics occurs by choosing and . Hence, on the majority dynamics side, the amount of a node’s neighbors in a given opinion needed to make that node change or keep its current opinion linearly increases with the node degree, while such an amount is independent of the node degree in the underpopulation rule.
- Like in the majority dynamics case, unless P = PSpace, the total number of opinion configurations an unsigned directed graph enters while evolving according to an underpopulation rule is not polynomially bounded in the size of the graph, and this is true even when the maximum indegree of the graph is 6 and and .
- The total number of opinion configurations a structurally balanced undirected graph enters while evolving according to an underpopulation rule is polynomially bounded in the size of the graph.
2. Results
- For , ;
- There exists such that .
3. Proofs
3.1. Proof of Theorem 1: Polynomial Bound to in Structurally Balanced Graphs
3.1.1. First Step: Symmetric Dynamics and Support Graphs
- if then and, hence, if and only if ,
- if then and, hence, if and only if .
- If and thenSimilarly, if and , then so that , that is, -supports . On the other hand, if and then and , so that .
- If and then , so that does not -support . On the other hand, if and then and , so that , that is, .
3.1.2. Second Step: Structurally Balanced Graphs
- set and ;
- set and ;
- while , repeat the following steps
- –
- set and ;
- –
- for each and for each , set , and .
- -
- If then the path contains an odd number of edges e such that . Furthermore, since , then and, hence, the number of edges e in the path such that is even. This would imply that the number of edges e in C such that is odd, so contradicting that is structurally balanced.
- -
- If , then the path contains an even number of edges e such that . Furthermore, since , then and, hence, the number of edges e in the path such that is odd. Again, this would imply that the number of edges e in C is such that is odd.
3.1.3. Summarizing
3.2. Proof of Theorem 2: Polynomial Bound to in Structurally Balanced Graphs
- If and then: and , and and ; hence, if and only if .
- If and then , and .
- If and then: and so that , and .
- If then
- –
- if then and, hence, ;
- –
- if then and, hence, .
- If then
- –
- if then and, hence,
- –
- if then and, hence,
3.3. Proofs of Theorem 3: u-RT Is PSpace-Complete in Directed Graphs
- An oriented unsigned graph ;
- An opinion configurations for G;
- A subset U of V.
3.3.1. Connecting Components of G
- if , for , layer i contains the pairs of nodes ; each node in the first pair has an incoming arc from each node in the first 2 pairs of nodes of layer and, for , each node in the jth pair of nodes has an incoming arc from each node of the th pair of layer
- if , for , layer i contains the pair of nodes with each such node having an incoming arc from each node in layer .
- If there exists a level i of H such that both nodes of a pair in level i of H have a positive opinion at ω, then for every , all descendants of such nodes in level obtain a positive opinion at step t of the dynamic process.Formally, if there exist and such that then, for any , where .
- If there exists a level i of H such that all nodes in level i of H have a negative opinion at ω then, for every , all nodes in level obtain a negative opinion at step t of the dynamic process.Formally, if there exists such that, for every , then, for any and for any , .
- If there exists a level i of H such that both nodes of a pair in level i of H have a negative opinion at ω then, for every , all descendants of such nodes in level obtain a negative opinion at step t of the dynamic process.Formally, if there exist and such that then, for any , where ;
- If there exists a level i of H such that all nodes in level i of H have a positive opinion at ω then, for every , all nodes in level obtain a positive opinion at step t of the dynamic process.Formally, if there exists such that, for every , then, for any and for any , .
3.3.2. Graph G
- Subgraph , with .consists of the following set of acting nodes: the cell nodes , , , , and and , , , , and , designed to describe the content of tape cell k of , and, for , the quintuple nodes, , and , designed to point out which quintuple of is to be executed at any step of the computation when the head tape of reads cell k.
- Subgraph .consists of the -selector , having as outputs, the acting starting nodes , , of the the -selector having as outputs the acting starting nodes and , and of the acting accepting node . The input nodes of have indegree 0 in G, the in-neighbors of each input node of are the output nodes of 4 stable cliques, and the output nodes of 2 stable cliques are in-neighbors of . In Figure 5, an example of the subgraph is shown (together with its connections to that will be described in a few lines).
- Connections among subgraphs. They connect quintuple-nodes in (or , , and if ) to quintuple-nodes in or . For every , we have the following:
- denotes the set of indexes of the quintuples in P ending at q and moving right, that is,
- Similarly, denotes the set of indexes of the quintuples in P ending at q and moving left, that is, ;
- denotes the set of indexes of the quintuples in P starting at q, that is, .
- For every : for every , G contains a -selector and a -reverse selector such that
- -
- is the input set of and each output of its is an in-neighbor of both and for every ,
- -
- is the input set of and each output of its is and in-neighbor of both and for every .
- For : G contains the -selector , the -reverse selector , and, for every , the -selector and the -reverse selector such that
- -
- if then the input and the output sets of and of are identically defined as for ,
- -
- if then is the input set of and each output of its is an in-neighbor of both and for every ; similarly, is the input set of and each output of its is and in-neighbor of both and for every .
Denote as the set of indexes of the quintuples in P ending at (namely, if and only if ). G finally contains the -selector having as its input set and each output of which has an outgoing arc to .
- For : for every , G contains the -selector and the -reverse selector such that
- -
- is the input set of and each output of its is an in-neighbor of both and for every ,
- -
- is the input set of and each output of its is and in-neighbor of both and for every .
3.3.3. Global States and Mirroring Configurations
- For every and for every , if cell k contains u in S then and is positive or is positive, and, symmetrically, and is negative or is negative;
- For every and for every , if cell k does not contain u in S then and is negative or is negative, and, symmetrically, and is positive or is positive;
- For every and for every , if in S the head of is positioned on cell k, the internal state of is , and cell k contains then and is positive and is positive, and, symmetrically, and is negative and is negative;
- For every and for every , if in S the head of is not positioned on cell k or the internal state of is not or cell k does not contain then and is negative (if is not in state ) or is negative (if the head of is not positioned on cell k), and, symmetrically, and is positive or is positive;
- , and every stable clique is positive under .
- If or then v has 5 in-neighbors (the pair of outputs of , the pair of outputs of and the output of a stable clique). As a consequence, we have the following:
- –
- If then is positive or is positive so that, by Property 4, at least 3 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any ;
- –
- If then is negative or is negative so that, by Property 4, at most 3 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any ;
- If or then, again, v has 5 in-neighbors (the pair of outputs of , the pair of outputs of and the output of a stable clique). As a consequence, we have the following:
- –
- If then is positive or is positive so that, by Property 4, at least 3 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any ;
- –
- If then is negative or is negative so that, by Property 4, at most 3 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any ;
- If or then v has 4 in-neighbors (the pair of outputs of and the pair of outputs of ). As a consequence, we have the following:
- –
- If then is positive and is positive so that, by Property 4, all the 4 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any ;
- –
- If then is negative or is negative so that, by Property 4, at most 2 of the 4 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any ;
- If or then v has 6 in-neighbors (the pair of outputs of , the pair of outputs of and the output nodes of 2 stable cliques). As a consequence, we have the following:
- –
- If then is positive or is positive so that, by Property 4, at least 4 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any ;
- –
- If then is negative and is negative so that, by Property 4, at most 2 of the 6 in-neighbors of v push it to 1 at for any and, hence, for any .
- If and (), since and then and are in the input set of and and are not in the input set of and, hence, the opinion of both the outputs of and the outputs of at is so that ;
- If and or if , then and are not in the input set of the selector and and are not in the input set of the reverse selector and, hence, the opinion of the outputs of is and the opinion of the outputs of is 1 at ; hence, since exactly 3 in-neighbors push and to 1 at , this implies that and, by Property 5, .
- If and () then ;
- If and () then ;
- If and or if then .
- if and then, on one side, it is and, on the other side, the pair of inputs and of have opinion 1 at so that is positive under ; symmetrically, and a pair of inputs of have opinion at so that is negative under ;
- Similar to before, it can be proved that if and then is negative and is positive under , and that if or , then is negative, is positive, is positive and is negative under .
3.3.4. Finishing the Reduction
- We set for all nodes v in , in and ;
- We set for all nodes v in , in and .
- If and or if and then we set for all nodes v in and we set for all nodes v in ;
- If and or if and then we set for all nodes v in and we set for all nodes v in .
- and for every and ;
- is positive and is negative at , and is negative and is negative at , for every and ;
- and for every pair such that and and or ;
- is negative and is positive for every pair such that and .
3.4. Proof of Corollary 1: Unlikeliness of a Polynomial Bound to in Directed Graphs
4. Discussion
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Notation | Meaning |
---|---|
arc/edge sign function | |
(and sometimes ) | opinion configuration |
generic opinion dynamics | |
for , | the application of dynamics for t times |
( is the opinion configuration met by G after | |
t steps of its -evolution starting at ) | |
local threshold-based opinion dynamics ruled by | |
and | |
symmetric dynamics ruled by | |
( with and ) | |
underpopulation opinion dynamics ruled by | |
( with and ) | |
sequence of distinct opinion configurations met by graph G | |
while evolving according to dynamics | |
(it becomes , , | |
in the specific dynamics) | |
u-RT | the problem of deciding if exists |
such that for all , given: dynamics , | |
graph G, opinion configuration , subset of nodes U. |
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Di Ianni, M. Game of Life-like Opinion Dynamics: Generalizing the Underpopulation Rule. AppliedMath 2023, 3, 10-36. https://doi.org/10.3390/appliedmath3010002
Di Ianni M. Game of Life-like Opinion Dynamics: Generalizing the Underpopulation Rule. AppliedMath. 2023; 3(1):10-36. https://doi.org/10.3390/appliedmath3010002
Chicago/Turabian StyleDi Ianni, Miriam. 2023. "Game of Life-like Opinion Dynamics: Generalizing the Underpopulation Rule" AppliedMath 3, no. 1: 10-36. https://doi.org/10.3390/appliedmath3010002
APA StyleDi Ianni, M. (2023). Game of Life-like Opinion Dynamics: Generalizing the Underpopulation Rule. AppliedMath, 3(1), 10-36. https://doi.org/10.3390/appliedmath3010002