Performance-Based or Politic-Related Decomposition of Environmental Targets: A Multilevel Analysis in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
3.1. Theoretical Framework: Performance-Based or Politic-Related
3.2. Hypotheses Denoting Performance-Based Decomposition
3.3. Hypotheses Denoting Politic-Related Decomposition
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Samples
4.2. Measures and Data Sources
4.2.1. Dependent Variable
4.2.2. Independent Variables
4.2.3. Control Variables
4.3. Analytical Approach
5. Results
Robustness Check
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variables | Measures | Sources |
---|---|---|
Target | The target level of the investigated province for the investigated environmental obligatory indicator in the “12th Five-year Plan” Period (%) | FYP |
E_scale | The ratio between the investigated province’s total energy consumption and the national total energy consumption or the ratio of the investigated province’s total pollutant emission and the national total pollutant emission (one-year lagged) | CSY CESY CEY |
E_structure | The proportion of the secondary industrial output of the investigated province (one-year lagged, %) | CSY |
E_intensity | The ratio between the investigated province’s energy consumption per unit GDP and the national energy consumption per unit GDP or the ratio between the investigated province’s pollutant emission per unit GDP and the national total pollutant emission per unit GDP (one-year lagged) | CSY CESY CEY |
P_ranking | Number of secretaries/governors of the investigated province who had served as members of the Politburo from 1997 to 2011 | Author |
P_target | The target level of the investigated province for the investigated environmental obligatory indicator in the “11th Five-year Plan” period (%) | FYP |
Neighbor | The average target level of the investigated province’s neighboring provinces for the investigated environmental indicator (%) | Author |
Central | The target level of the central government for the investigated environmental indicator (%) | FYP |
Deprivation | Unemployment rate of the investigated province (one-year lagged, %) | CSY |
GDP | GDP per capita of the investigated province (one-year lagged, log) | CSY |
Variables | N | Mean | S.D. | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Target | 145 | 9.75 | 7.17 | −34.90 | 18 |
E_scale | 145 | 3.36 | 2 | 0.13 | 8.94 |
E_structure | 29 | 49.18 | 7.72 | 24 | 57.3 |
E_intensity | 145 | 1.25 | 0.76 | 0.16 | 4.99 |
P_ranking | 29 | 2.41 | 2.69 | 0 | 11 |
P_target | 87 | 13.29 | 6.76 | 0 | 30 |
Neighbor | 145 | 10.61 | 3.74 | 1.48 | 18 |
Central | 145 | 10.40 | 2.95 | 8 | 16 |
Unemployment | 29 | 3.61 | 0.61 | 1.37 | 4.35 |
GDP | 29 | 0.49 | 0.2 | 0.12 | 0.87 |
Variables | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1. Target | 1 | ||||||||
2. E_scale | 0.38 *** | 1 | |||||||
3. E_structure | 0.26 *** | 0.41 *** | 1 | ||||||
4. E_intensity | −0.17 ** | 0.035 | 0.14 * | 1 | |||||
5. P_ranking | 0.28 *** | 0.08 | −0.19 ** | −0.48 *** | 1 | ||||
6. P_target | 0.70 *** | 0.22 ** | 0.06 | −0.16 | 0.26 ** | 1 | |||
7. Neighbor | 0.59 *** | 0.09 | −0.05 | −0.32 *** | 0.30 *** | 0.76 *** | 1 | ||
8. Central | 0.45 *** | 0.004 | 0 | −0.065 | 0 | 0.69 *** | 0.78 *** | 1 | |
9. Unemployment | −0.07 | −0.03 | 0.45 *** | 0.34 *** | −0.28 *** | −0.10 | −0.13 | 0 | 1 |
10. GDP | 0.29 *** | 0.119 | −0.07 | −0.48 *** | 0.62 *** | 0.31 *** | 0.31 *** | 0 | −0.33 *** |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |
---|---|---|---|
Constant | 9.988 *** | 9.748 *** | 9.748 *** |
(0.622) | (0.644) | (0.644) | |
Layer-2 variables | |||
P_ranking | 0.545 ** | 0.640 ** | 0.640 ** |
(0.250) | (0.297) | (0.297) | |
E_structure | 0.323 ** | 0.349 ** | 0.349 ** |
(0.162) | (0.173) | (0.173) | |
Unemployment | −1.304 | −1.472 * | −1.472 * |
(0.860) | (0.806) | (0.806) | |
GDP | 5.094 | 4.792 | 4.792 |
(3.598) | (3.433) | (3.433) | |
Layer-1 variables | |||
E_scale | −1.013 | −1.438 | −1.186 |
(1.153) | (0.885) | (0.907) | |
E_intensity | 3.302 | 3.911 | 3.346 |
(3.438) | (2.616) | (2.613) | |
P_target | 0.753 *** | ||
(0.0949) | |||
Neighbor | 1.188 *** | ||
(0.153) | |||
Central | 1.152 *** | ||
(0.137) | |||
Model statistics | |||
N (layer 1) | 87 | 145 | 145 |
N (layer 2) | 29 | 29 | 29 |
Variance (layer 1) | 30.43 | 18.51 | 22.15 |
Variance (layer 2) | 7.04 × 10−11 | 7.92 | 7.20 |
Intra-class Correlation Coefficient | 2.3135 × 10−12 | 0.2997 | 0.2453 |
Log pseudolikelihood | −272.023 | −433.928 | −444.317 |
Wald Chi2 | 166.72 *** | 175.78 *** | 210.86 *** |
Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
---|---|---|---|
Constant | 10.06 *** | 9.748 *** | 9.7483 *** |
(0.608) | (0.668) | (0.668) | |
Layer-2 variables | |||
P_ranking | 0.569 ** | 0.672 ** | 0.672 ** |
(0.246) | (0.305) | (0.305) | |
R_structure | 0.270 * | 0.302 * | 0.302 * |
(0.153) | (0.166) | (0.166) | |
Unemployment | −0.880 | −1.289 * | −1.289 * |
(0.898) | (0.747) | (0.747) | |
GDP | 4.704 | 4.476 | 4.476 |
(3.362) | (3.420) | (3.420) | |
Layer-1 variables | |||
R_scale | −2.006 | −1.686 * | −1.354 |
(1.289) | (0.894) | (0.956) | |
R_intensity | 4.885 | 3.967 | 3.789 |
(3.590) | (2.483) | (2.644) | |
P_target | 0.720 *** | ||
(0.075) | |||
Neighbor | 1.131 *** | ||
(0.121) | |||
Central | 1.097 *** | ||
(0.108) | |||
Model statistics | |||
N (layer 1) | 87 | 145 | 145 |
N (layer 2) | 29 | 29 | 29 |
Variance (layer 1) | 28.594 | 18.200 | 21.655 |
Variance (layer 2) | 1.478 | 8.871 | 8.180 |
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient | 0.0491 | 0.3277 | 0.2742 |
Log pseudolikelihood | −271.403 | −434.001 | −444.081 |
Wald Chi2 | 145.21 *** | 191.62 *** | 192.23 *** |
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Zhang, P.; Wu, J. Performance-Based or Politic-Related Decomposition of Environmental Targets: A Multilevel Analysis in China. Sustainability 2018, 10, 3410. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103410
Zhang P, Wu J. Performance-Based or Politic-Related Decomposition of Environmental Targets: A Multilevel Analysis in China. Sustainability. 2018; 10(10):3410. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103410
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Pan, and Jiannan Wu. 2018. "Performance-Based or Politic-Related Decomposition of Environmental Targets: A Multilevel Analysis in China" Sustainability 10, no. 10: 3410. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103410