How to Regain Green Consumer Trust after Greenwashing: Experimental Evidence from China

Abstract

Greenwashing leads to consumer skepticism of all green products as well as doubts about company claims regarding sustainability. However, the understanding of how to regain green consumer trust after greenwashing is rather limited. The authors fill this gap by exploring the psychological process of green consumers following intervention strategies designed to reduce greenwashing. We collect and interpret quantitative data from two psychological experiments, the first experiment identified two types of intervention strategies that serve to counter the negative impact of greenwashing and based on our findings from the first studies, we proposed and tested the moderating effect of two factors—implicit beliefs of consumers and companies who implement intervention strategies after greenwashing. The results indicate that distrust regulation (quantifying a product’s green attributes) and trustworthiness demonstration (visualizing environmental behaviors) are effective intervention strategies that can enable consumers to re-evaluate the cost-benefit of green products, and which may serve as critical psychological factors for green consumers and contribute to the degree of trust. Validation and comparative study of the derived results show that distrust regulation, followed by trustworthiness demonstration, has the best effect on increasing green trust after intervention. If the sequence is reversed, the effect of the intervention strategy is worse than if only one strategy had been applied. The implicit beliefs of green consumers play a moderating role between intervention strategies and reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products. The behavior of genuinely green companies and the incremental beliefs of consumers can promote the intervention effect after greenwashing. Alternatively, the behavior of greenwashing companies can easily counter these effects. These findings contribute to knowledge about which psychological factors can promote or hinder the effectiveness of an intervention.

1. Introduction

Greenwashing leads to consumer skepticism of all green products as well as doubts about company claims regarding sustainability. However, the understanding of how to regain green consumer trust after greenwashing is rather limited. Greenwashing occurs when companies label products as green and then deliberately exaggerate or even fabricate the environmentally conscious attributes of their products, with the ultimate goal of generating higher profits [1,2,3,4]. Due to the deceptive and ambiguous characteristics of greenwashing, government and marketing regulators are slow to identify and determine whether a company is greenwashing.

Greenwashing contributes to consumer skepticism of all green products as well as the claims of sustainability of the company [5,6]. As a result, genuinely green companies have a hard time competing because so many companies greenwash in the lucrative green market [7,8,9]. The result is that the whole market loses the benefits of being genuinely green [10,11,12].

Despite the potential impact of greenwashing in the marketplace, knowledge about its effects is rather limited. There is little theoretical research that addresses how consumers process information related to greenwashing and how companies develop strategies to combat its negative effects. Literature on trust crisis management has examined this problem to some degree but has not converged on a unifying theoretical framework. One underlying assumption in the literature is that greenwashing is almost always devastating [13]. For example, one psychological experiment shows that the impact of greenwashing has a negative effect which outweighs any marketing effects. Green consumers respond to a company that is determined to be involved in greenwashing (by government or regulators) in a negative or even defensive manner [3,14,15,16,17].

Case studies have been used to derive conclusions about which strategies work and which do not to work to combat the effects of greenwashing [16,18,19]. These studies, however, provide little direction for understanding the problem from a theoretical perspective. Current research presents a framework for crisis management based on the study of some companies in crisis situations. Recommendations to address the issue include apologies [19], denial [13], making a commitment for the future [18], or a combination of denial, commitment, and other legitimacy strategies [16,20]. These are proposed without any attempt at understanding how consumers process greenwashing and any factors that might serve to moderate the effects of greenwashing on regaining consumer trust. This paper examines effective strategies for regaining green consumer trust. It validates the effects on reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products and the degree of trust regained after intervention.

In exploring consumer behavior and the internal cognition of consumers when they are presented with strategies of intervention after greenwashing, some scholars have turned their attention to the field of psychology and the use of attribution theory [21,22,23]. This theory suggests that consumer judgements about the causes of the negative behaviors of a company will damage consumer trust and that companies should, therefore, adopt targeted strategies to help consumers to reestablish positive expectations. Current research in attribution theory provides a good theoretical basis but ignores some important issues. The role of the individual consumer and the positive psychological factors that lead them to regain trust have not been thoroughly examined. There is still a gap regarding which kind of psychological factors lead to reducing the negative effects of greenwashing and how those factors contribute to regaining green consumer trust through intervention strategies.

Apart from existing research, which has assumed a homogeneous consumer response to greenwashing, this study argues that the implicit beliefs of green consumers and the companies that implement intervention strategies can moderate the effects of greenwashing and the degree of green trust regained after greenwashing. Recent studies on consumer trust and greenwashing have produced inconsistent results. Some studies indicate that greenwashing appears to reduce the intention of green consumers to buy green products, increase their skepticism, and even cause them to boycott or abandon specific products entirely [24]. However, others have found that greenwashing does not damage the trust of all consumers [6,25], and that even after greenwashing, some consumers actively seek out positive information that would support their initial sentiment of trust. Most of the current research has focused on the state of consumer trust after greenwashing but has failed to explain the psychological causes underlying these responses.

This study contributes to the literature in three ways. The paper focuses on two kinds of intervention strategies and their effectiveness in regaining green consumer trust after greenwashing: distrust regulation (quantifying the green attributes of a product) and trustworthiness demonstration (visualizing environmental behavior). Current research on trust crisis management has proposed several coping mechanisms that consumers adopt when confronted with unethical marketing behaviors, but there is no evidence to support their effect on the trust of green consumers. We verify that the positive effect on green trust is higher when the sequence of distrust regulation is implemented and followed up by the trustworthiness demonstration. If the sequence is reversed, however, the effect of the combined intervention strategies is worse than if either strategy is implemented. In the case where only one strategy is implemented, trustworthiness demonstration is more effective than distrust regulation.

This study also extends prior research by exploring the psychological processes that green consumers experience as they experience the intervention strategies. Previous research looks at intervention strategies and their results only once the intervention has run its course; the positive psychological factors that lead to green consumers regaining trust and their experiences in this process cannot be determined. Our study aims to address this gap and explore the mindset of consumers after they have been exposed to greenwashing, but throughout the course of the intervention to rebuild trust. This paper reveals the intricacies of the process by exploring the mediating role of reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products between intervention strategies and their results. We identify that green consumers set a resistance threshold after becoming conscious of greenwashing, but this threshold can be overcome by consumers reconsidering the cost-benefit of green products.

This study is the first to demonstrate that the effectiveness of intervention strategies in increasing green consumer trust after greenwashing depends on a range of conditions linked to: (1) the implicit beliefs of consumers (incremental beliefs vs. entity beliefs), and (2) companies implementing intervention strategies (genuinely green companies vs. greenwashing companies). Our results show that companies implementing intervention strategies and the implicit beliefs of consumers have significant moderating effects on the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products. The effects of intervention strategies on green trust are enhanced when applied to consumers with incremental beliefs when genuinely green companies implement these strategies. The same strategy implemented for green consumers with entity beliefs generated fewer positive results. The combination of genuinely green companies who implemented intervention strategies and incremental-belief consumers can promote the intervention effect after greenwashing and enhance the mediating effect of reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products. Our findings also contribute to knowledge of the psychological factors which may promote or hinder intervention effectiveness in the process.

2. Conceptual Foundation

2.1. Green Trust

Trust is defined as the level of confidence one has in the anticipated behavior of another party [26]. As opposed to trust, green trust is more specifically defined as the willingness to depend on a product or service based on the belief or expectation resulting from its credibility, benevolence, and ability related to environmental performance (Chen, 2013b; Chen et al., 2020) [27,28]. Therefore, green trust refers to a consumer belief that a company is committed to sustainability and their positive attitudes towards the green products or services offered by the company [29,30,31,32]. Recent studies have explored green trust based on perceived green value derived from the quality of green products and services. They describe what takes place when consumers identify the environmental value of products or services as credible and benevolent [33,34]. Green trust is an important driver of green product adoption because of the high level of risk and skepticism among consumers regarding the environmental performance claimed by companies. Consumers who trust claims related to health, reliability, and environmental standards are believed to express positive attitudes and behaviors towards these products and brands [28]. Trust in the green attributes of products induces a lower perceived risk, removes barriers to purchasing these products, and increases consumer brand loyalty, equity, or attachment [33]. Hameed and Warris (2018) [35] argue that eco-labels that provide information about green products increase green brand trust and, in turn, lead to more environmentally conscious behaviors. Consumer trust affects purchasing behaviors which makes trust an invaluable commodity for green brands.

2.2. Strategies for Enhancing Trust among Green Consumers: Intervention Approaches and Techniques

Green consumers undergo a cognitive reappraisal of green products following a breach in their trust, with a tendency to privilege negative evidence over positive evidence [36,37]. During this fragile period, consumers are strongly motivated to avoid risk and are hypervigilant, as they then anticipate future untrustworthy behavior on the part of green companies. Thus, the primary objective of any trust repair process is to overcome these salient negative expectations and to restore confident positive expectations about green purchases in the future [37,38]. Two complementary intervention strategies that underlie the repair of green consumer trust include distrust regulation and trustworthiness demonstration.

Distrust regulation attempts to overcome green consumer distrust by confidently confronting negative expectations [39] with the expectation of greenwashing action [40]. Regaining trust is much more difficult after repeated greenwashing than after an initial failure [41]. Distrust regulation involves implementing sufficient regulatory controls to prevent or constrain green companies from acting in ways that could lead to greenwashing, including the removal of incentives that may encourage greenwashing behaviors. These legal remedies [42,43] can include green certification and environmental protection information disclosure [44,45,46]. Under market information asymmetry, green consumers struggle to determine whether products that claim to be green are truly green, so ratings launched by a public association such as Greenspace, TerraChoice, or CSR-China have a powerful effect on the credibility of green consumers [47,48] and can also prevent misleading labels from affecting the whole green product market. Green companies disclose quality environmental information to promote positive perceptions of their companies and brands [49,50], such as inviting green consumers to test the carbon footprint of a green product [51], providing a free trial of a new green product [52,53] or by offering carbon-offset accounts for them, as in the case of Ant Forest [54]. Research suggests that these strategies can significantly enhance and repair perceived trust [42,48], particularly when introduced voluntarily rather than being imposed externally by government or regulators [55,56,57]. When interventions are imposed (e.g., by the government), compliance may be attributed to the desire to avoid sanctions, raising concerns that the green company may try to get around or attempt to weaken the imposed constraints. In contrast, a voluntary effort is seen as an expression of the green company itself, implying that it has learned a lesson and is intrinsically committed to its ability to act differently [55,58].

Trustworthiness demonstration refers to the actions involved in overcoming the negative expectations and distrust of green consumers. This process is essential in regaining trust but is not sufficient in itself. It is also necessary to restore positive expectations [13,37] and a sense of good faith and fair dealing [59]. This second intervention strategy refers to the positive promotion of renewed trustworthiness through behaviors that actively demonstrate the commitment and integrity of the company. This intervention includes participating in green economic forums, climate summits, and social responsibility ratings that demonstrate a commitment to protect public welfare and support the building of green communities [35,60,61]. Hence, intervention is distinct from distrust regulation since it focuses on both symbolic and actual displays of positive trustworthiness, rather than on negative behaviors related to the cause of the failure [21,49]. Some charity events of green companies add a symbolic feature for green products, which is good for improving green consumers’ psychological satisfaction and perception of green consumption utility [56,62]. At the same time, if green consumers would assume an intervention that a green brand may adopt, the more the actual intervention strategies adopted by green companies are consistent with their expectations, the lower the degree of green consumer trust damage will be [63]. The environmental protection signal released in official or formal venues are considered to enjoy high credibility among green consumers. It would reduce the possibility of being deemed as a negative brand and gain strong goodwill from the media and social public [64]. The combination or superposition of the intervention strategy is good for green consumers to build up a connection between the visible trustworthiness strategy adopted by green companies from more abundant dimension and their initial trust [22,65]. This trustworthiness strategy is complementary to distrust regulation, since information released by an official body is treated as highly credible among green consumers, reducing negative brand image and fostering goodwill from the media and public. Based on this, we propose hypothesis H1a:

H1a. 

After green consumers notice greenwashing, distrust regulation (quantifying the green attributes of products) and trustworthiness demonstration (visualizing environmentally protective responsibility) increase the regaining of green trust after their implementation.

Further, we carry out a comparative analysis on the effect among different sequences of two intervention strategies on the regaining of green trust. From the process of green trust building, the initial trust of green consumers comes from the green attributes of products [65]. Most consumers only buy green products of reasonable premiums and good quality, and their initial purchases are mostly made due to the marginal value brought by products’ green attributes, such as energy savings or a long service life [66]. After learnt about greenwashing of the product or their claimed green attributes, distrust regulation mitigates the superposition and accumulation effects of negative spillovers of damaged trust and buffers the breadth and depth of the negative effects of greenwashing [64]. When green consumers gradually formed their fixed purchasing habits and considered green purchasing behavior as a long-term psychological investment [2], compared to the initial trust that comes from the green attributes of products, they tend to believe that green enterprises would handle problems in a positive way, and they believe that green companies support green consumers and think more about them, so the trustworthiness demonstration adopted by such companies has a higher likelihood of forming their positive expectation. Based on this, we propose hypothesis H1b:

H1b. 

The degree of green trust regained following a strategic intervention is greater when distrust regulation is implemented first, followed by a trustworthiness demonstration.

2.3. The Mediating Role to Overcome Psychological Threshold

Once green trust has been violated, concerns about further transgressions and unconscious influences, such as confirmation bias, which can deter green consumers, encourage consumers to maintain a sense of mistrust until and unless they are provided sufficient reason to change their perspective [67]. Genuinely green or greenwashing companies may make several attempts to regain consumer trust, but the consumer ultimately sets the threshold of what is considered an adequate response [65]. Indeed, even in cases where green consumers desire to repair their trust in the green companies, they must do so in ways that are sufficient to overcome their own resistance. Research suggests that the resistance threshold can be overcome, to some extent, by reconsidering the cost (reduction of retry costs) and benefit of green products [62,68,69,70]. In this case, the costs would refer to the actual cost of the green products in store. Free trials of a green product or a carbon-offset account can be identified as credits to offset the premium incurred by the selection of a green product [52,71]. The benefits here can be either symbolic or functional, and refer to the desire of a consumer to remain a green consumer even after they have experienced greenwashing [47]. Carbon labels and green certifications, which are functional benefits, strengthen the psychological expectations of green consumers with regards to brand effects and enhance their tendency to trust green products and brands [72]. More symbolic features, such as a company’s efforts to host charitable events, can improve psychological satisfaction [7,65,73,74,75]. If a green consumer can see an increase in benefits in excess of what they initially expected, then the perception of cost is reduced, and it is likely that trust will be rebuilt, and the perceived risks will decrease [62]. Based on this, we propose hypothesis H2:

H2. 

After green consumers notice greenwashing, the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products have a mediating effect on intervention strategies and the degree of green trust regaining following a strategic intervention.

2.4. The Moderating Role of Implicit Beliefs

Although recent research has begun to explore wide individual variations—some green consumers refuse to give transgressors a second chance, while others are very receptive to trust-recovery efforts [76]—little prior work has considered what factors might affect regaining trust after greenwashing. A critical factor that influences whether green consumers are receptive to efforts made to regain their trust is their implicit belief system, which we classify as entity beliefs and incremental beliefs. Green consumers with entity beliefs are likely to view greenwashing information as more indicative of the company than green information about the brand [67,77]. After experiencing a trust violation, green consumers with entity beliefs may be more skeptical of, and insensitive to, efforts to regain their trust, which means they are more reluctant to retry green products even after intervention strategies.

Green consumers with incremental beliefs, conversely, are likely to engage in processing greenwashing information. They may be expected to counterargue greenwashing information more extensively, and, therefore, resist changing their attitude and response to greenwashing information [56]. In addition, they are expected to show attitudinal shifts in the direction of advocacy when a message portrays their favored brand in a positive light. Because of their high level of attachment to the brand, they are less likely to accept greenwashing information as more diagnostic [36]. As a result, they may perceive efforts of regaining their trust (e.g., quantifying the green attributes of products, visualizing environmentally protective responsibility) as sincere [78]. Under intervention strategies, they are more likely to overcome the resistance threshold they have set to reconsider the cost-benefit of green products. Based on this, we propose hypotheses H3a and H3b:

H3a. 

Green consumers with implicit beliefs about a company have a moderating effect on the relationship of intervention strategies and reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products.

H3b. 

Compared to green consumers with entity views, those with incremental views will strengthen the relationship of intervention strategies and the reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products.

2.5. The Moderating Role of Companies Who Implement the Intervention Strategies

In the common interests of the green industry, both greenwashing companies and genuinely green companies should make efforts to regain green consumer trust after greenwashing [63,79,80]. Objectively identical firm responses may have substantially different impacts on green trust after the intervention depending on the prior expectations of consumers. Research has shown that the interpretation of evidence is affected by the prior expectations of consumers [64,81,82]. There are contradicting opinions considering the hypothesis that evidence consistent with prior positive evaluations leads to more positive evaluations than positive evidence alone [1]. In this study, we propose two different subjects of investigation: genuinely green companies who implement intervention strategies following greenwashing and greenwashing companies and the influence of both on consumer response [83]. If the environmental performance of a company has deteriorated, its credibility shrinks, and further environmental actions likely invoke skepticism among the general public [84,85]. When green consumers are processing the message of an intervention strategy implemented by greenwashing and genuinely green companies, negative framing is more effective than positive framing. Based on this, we propose hypotheses H4a and H4b:

H4a. Companies who implement intervention strategies (genuinely green companies vs. greenwashed companies) have a moderating effect on the relationship of intervention strategies and the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products.

H4b. Compared to greenwashing companies, genuinely green companies strengthen their relationships with green consumers to approve their benefits while reconsidering of green products.

We argue that the robust regaining of consumer trust involves a psychological process about how to intervene, the cost-benefit balance under intervention strategies, and the conditions that moderate this relationship. We describe how intervention strategies (distrust regulation and trustworthiness demonstration) underlie trust-regaining actions. Figure 1 shows a conceptual model of how to regain green consumer trust after greenwashing.

3. Experimental Design and Hypothesis Verification

In two studies, the differential responses to the greenwashing of green consumers were tested, and the psychological processes responsible for these effects were delineated. The first experiment identified two types of intervention strategies that serve to counter the negative impact of greenwashing. The effectiveness of these strategies is determined by the level of reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products by consumers and serves as an indicator of green trust after the intervention. Based on our findings from the first studies, we proposed and tested the moderating effect of two factors—implicit beliefs of consumers and companies who implement intervention strategies after greenwashing. We then discuss the implications of the findings for marketers of green products.

Green consumers were defined as those who purchased more than 5 categories of green goods. The reason for selecting 5 categories is that the per capita sales of green basket goods show an accelerated growth rate when the consumer goods category is larger than 6, while it shows a more stable growth rate when it is smaller than 6 [86]. Among them, we identified green products by keywords with the attribute of greenness, such as green care products, greenhouse supplies, green clothing, organic food, and green home appliances. We took on-the-job MBAs as our experimental subjects. One reason for this is that they tend to have higher and more stable incomes (most of them are functional or line manager in a company, and they take courses of an MBA in their spare time), consumption habits, and preferences, and they also have some knowledge about green consumption. Another reason is that we could conduct our experiments on-site as on-the-job MBA students take their courses on weekends at a university in Tianjin. There are more than 10,000 MBA students available to take part in our experiments, which increases the reliability of our scenario-based experiment.

A prerequisite established for product selection was the familiarity of the consumer with the product in question, as well as the degree of influence of greenwashing on regaining consumer trust [5] (See Appendix A for the specific questionnaire). Based on these criteria, with 50 MBAs as our subjects to take part in the pre-test, we selected 4 of the 18 available products that they were most familiar with: namely, a fluorine-free refrigerator (M = 2.27, on a five-point scale), recyclable tissue paper (M = 2.47), a degradable lunch box (M = 2.37), and LED environmental lighting (M = 2.6). The results of the effect of greenwashing on the trust of subjects are as follows: LED lights (M = 3.67), recyclable tissues (M = 3.4), degradable lunch boxes (M = 3.37), and fluoride-free air conditioners (M = 3.03). Therefore, we chose the LED lights with the highest probability of purchase (M = 2.6) and the highest degree of the effect of greenwashing on the trust of the subject (M = 3.67) as our experimental product.

3.1. Variable Development and Their Measures

3.1.1. Intervention Strategies

We constructed a comparison between common bulbs and LED bulbs. After presenting the advantages that green products can bring about, we presented the control group with “Scenario of greenwashing of Company TT”. We then asked subjects to complete “Scale of Reconsideration of Cost-benefit of Green Products” and “Scale of Green Consumer Trust after Intervention”, while we presented the environmental group the “Scenario of Greenwashing of Company A”, “Intervention strategies1”/“Intervention strategies2”/“Intervention strategies1” + “Intervention strategies2”/“Intervention strategies2” + “Intervention strategies1”, and then asked them to complete “Scale of Reconsideration of Cost-benefit of Green Products” and “Scale of Green Consumer Trust after Intervention”. Intervention strategies 1 included prefatory trials, self-inspection of the greenwashed LED bulbs, carbon footprint marks labeled on the bulbs, etc. Intervention strategies 2 included “make carbon emission project videos”, “take part in industrial conferences, forums, and summits”, “community donation”, and “investment in the refurbishment of natural-based projects” (See Appendix B for the descriptive texts).

3.1.2. Reattempted Costs and Benefits

We extracted six indicators to measure this variable, three of which measured the reduction of consumers’ reattempted costs (R1, R2, R3), and three which measured the improvement of green benefits (R4, R5, R6). The scale had good reliability and validity, where the normalized factor loadings were all greater than 0.9 and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.975 (See Appendix C for specific scale items, as well as the results of the reliability and validity verifications).

3.1.3. Implicit Beliefs

Molden and Dweck (2006) [87] identify implicit beliefs through descriptive materials of a fictional corporation. In conjunction with this finding, participants were asked to read two articles that we composed about the impact of public opinion on greenwashing enterprises prior to the start of the experiment, which was intended to bring them into the experiment more quickly, but also stimulated the incremental beliefs or entity beliefs of the implicit beliefs of the subjects. The titles of the two articles were “Companies can correct their greenwashing behaviors under the pressure of public opinion” and “It is still difficult for companies to change their greenwashing behaviors even under the pressure of public opinion” (Appendix D contains the descriptive articles). After reading these articles, consumers were asked to answer a short question: “To what extent will companies correct their greenwashing behaviors?” Participants were asked to scale their answers from 1 to 9, with 1 being “Very unlikely”, and 9 being “Very likely”.

3.1.4. Companies Who Implement Intervention Strategies

To distinguish between the companies who implemented intervention strategies, we constructed two fictional companies to represent the manufacturers of LED bulbs through descriptive materials and images. We presented the Control Group with two documents, “Scenario of Greenwashing of Company A”, “Scale of Reconsideration of the Cost-benefit of Green Products”, and “Scale of Green Consumer Trust after Intervention”. We presented the Environmental Group the “Scenario of Greenwashing of Company A”, “Scenario of Genuinely Green Company B” in the same industry, “Scale of Reconsideration of the Cost-benefit of Green Products”, and “Scale of Green Consumer Trust after Intervention”. (Appendix E contains the descriptive articles). After reading the articles, consumers were asked to complete the scale measuring reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products and green trust after the intervention.

3.1.5. Green Trust after Intervention

We used five indicators to measure consumers’ level of green trust after the intervention [88,89,90]. Among them, two indicators measured consumer trust in ability of the company (X1, X2), two measured consumer trust in the integrity of the company (X3, X4), and one measured consumer trust in the benevolence of the company (X5). The scale had good reliability and validity, where the normalized factor loadings were all greater than 0.9 and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.965 (See Appendix C for specific scale items as well as results of reliability and validity verification).

3.2. Experimental Design

3.2.1. Experiment 1

Experiment 1 was used to verify H1a, the impact of different intervention strategies on green consumers trust regaining, H1b, the impact of different sequences of intervention strategies on trust regaining, and H2, the mediating effect of reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products in the process of trust regain.

A total of 500 on-the-job MBAs (245 females, 255 males, average age 35) from a university in Tianjin were recruited. In order to increase validity, we ensured that all of our subjects were green consumers, but we did not define the psychological attributes of each group in advance. The subjects were randomly assigned to four experimental groups and one control group in equal numbers. In the control group, we provided the subjects with the scenario of greenwashing of LED bulbs. We implemented different trust intervention strategies for each experimental group. Experimental Group 1 was exposed to distrust regulation (quantifying the green attributes of products), Experimental Group 2 was presented with trustworthiness demonstration (visualizing the environmental behaviors of companies). Then, we carried out a comparative study to validate H1b, if different intervention strategies and their implementation sequences have different effects on green trust after intervention. In Experimental Group 3, distrust regulation was implemented first, followed by trustworthiness demonstration and in Experimental Group 4, trustworthiness demonstration was implemented first, followed by distrust regulation. We removed any incomplete questionnaires and collected 494 questionnaires which had been completed in their entirety, for an effective completion rate of 98.8%.

We used AMOS.24 to verify H1 and H2 based on the latent variable characteristics of reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products and green trust after intervention. Based on intervention strategies, data were divided into five categories and brought into the theoretical model to form Model 1 (Control Group + Experimental Group 1), Model 2 (Control Group + Experimental Group 2), Model 3 (Control Group + Experimental Group 3), Model 4 (Control Group + Experimental Group 4), and Model 5 (Control group + all Experimental Groups). We then compared the five models and analyzed them to obtain the verification results.

The first was the goodness of fit verification of Models 1–5. As shown in

Table 1. Goodness of fit verification.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Chisq	367.028	175.185	196.138	220.394	284.52
DF	52	52	52	52	52
Chisq/df	7.058	3.369	3.772	4.238	5.472
GFI	0.795	0.881	0.871	0.846	0.913
AGFI	0.693	0.822	0.807	0.769	0.869
CFI	0.905	0.968	0.946	0.961	0.973
RMSEA	0.177	0.109	0.116	0.128	0.095

, the fit indicator of each model was almost within the effective critical value, among which the absolute fit indicator and value-added fit indicator both performed well. Chisq/df was approximately 4, RMSEA was approximately 0.1, and other goodness of fit indicators (AGFI, CFI, GFI) were approximately 0.8, indicating that these 5 models demonstrate a good fit.

We then performed a manipulation check for intervention strategies and the verification results were consistent with H1a; that is, different intervention strategies have different effects on green trust after intervention. The degree of green trust after an intervention is the sum of the scores of each item, with a maximum score of 25. Differences existed in the Control Group (M = 7.55, SD = 1.89), Experimental Group 1 (M = 15.76, SD = 3.07), Experimental Group 2 (M = 19.27, SD = 1.14), Experimental Group 3 (M = 21.52, SD = 1.97), and Experimental Group 4 (M = 10.24, SD = 2.09). Moreover, ANOVA suggested that there are also differences among the different Experimental Groups (F (4,489) = 763.993, p < 0.001), which further proves H1a.

To validate comparative study H1b, if different intervention strategies and their implementation sequences have different effects on green trust after intervention, we further compared the differences in path coefficients in Models 1 to 4 and present these results in

Table 2. Comparison of different paths of coefficients in Models 1–4.

Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
0.913 ***	0.512 ***	0.505 ***	0.601 ***	0.68 ***
0.265 **	0.074 ***	0.104 ***	0.0800.325	0.848 ***
0.652 ***	0.936 ***	0.970 ***	0.582 ***	0.082 *

Note: *** p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

. On this basis, every model was verified by limited multigroup analysis, and the results show that P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6 were all less than 0.001, and the change values of NFI, IFI, RFI, and TLI were all greater than 0.1, indicating that the path coefficients of each model are significantly different.

Third, as stipulated in H1b, different types and sequences of intervention strategies have different effects on green trust after intervention. We verified that if only one strategy is selected to be implemented, the trustworthiness demonstration (M-trust level = 19.27, total effect = 0.974, indirect effect = 0.038, 95% CI [0.017–0.062]) is better than distrust regulation (M-trust level = 15.76, total effect = 0.894, indirect effect = 0.242, 95% CI [0.077–0.394]). The intervention effect in which distrust regulation is first implemented, followed by the trustworthiness demonstration (M-trust level = 21.52, total effect = 0.977, indirect effect = 0.007, 95% CI [−0.01–0.024]), is better than that in the opposite sequence (M-trust level = 10.24, total effect = 0.601, indirect effect = 0.048, 95% CI [−0.047–0.147]), which means that the sequence in which distrust regulation is implemented first, followed by trustworthiness, had the best effect on green trust after an intervention. The derived results show that if that sequence is reversed, the effect of intervention strategies on green consumers’ trust after greenwashing was worse than if either strategy was applied independently.

We then verified the mediating effect of reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products in H2. In the indirect effect verification of each Experimental Group in the model, the indirect effect of Experimental Group 3 and Experimental Group 4 was significant, so the data related to Experimental Group 3 and Experimental Group 4 were entered into Model 5 to further verify the mediating effect. As we predicted in H2, the reconsideration of cost-benefit is a mediating variable that had a significant indirect effect on green consumers trust after intervention (Total effect = 0.658, indirect effect = 0.576, 95% CI [0.525–0.632]). The path coefficients of the model are shown in Figure 2.

3.2.2. Experiment 2

The purpose of this experiment was to verify the moderating effects of H3a and H3b, which refer to the implicit beliefs of consumers (incremental beliefs vs. entity beliefs) and H4a and H4b, that concern the companies that are implementing the intervention strategies (genuinely green companies vs. greenwashing companies) on the relationship of intervention strategies on the reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products. As Experiment 1 confirms, the most positive impact on a consumer’s green trust was observed when implementing the distrust regulation first and followed by the trustworthiness demonstration. We used this sequence in Experiment 2.

A total of 500 on-the-job MBAs (245 females, 255 males, average age 35) from a university in Tianjin were recruited. To increase the external validity of our experiments, we ensured that all of our subjects were green consumers, but we did not define the psychological attributes of each group in advance. They were randomly assigned to four experimental groups and one control group equally. For the control group, we provided the subjects with the scenario of greenwashing of LED bulbs. To be different from Experiment 1, we exposed the Experimental Group to different trust intervention strategies (implementing the distrust regulation first, followed by the trustworthiness demonstration), and designed intergroup experiments to model the two subjects implementing intervention strategies (genuinely green companies vs. greenwashing companies) and two implicit beliefs (incremental beliefs vs. entity beliefs). After removing the unfinished questionnaires, we collected 474 complete questionnaires, with an effective completion rate of 94.8%.

We adopted the multiple regression method to verify the significance of the impact of the interaction terms on the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products in order to first verify the effectiveness of the moderating effect. Pursuant to the multigroup analysis using AMOS.24, we assumed that the coefficients were the same under the condition of different moderating variables in order to confirm the effectiveness of their moderating effect.

We first verified the interaction impact of two moderating variables on the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products, where the significance level of whether to implement intervention strategies × implicit beliefs, whether to implement intervention strategies × the companies implementing the intervention strategies, and implicit beliefs × the companies implementing the intervention strategies were 2.143 * (1.199), −10.567 *** (1.112), and 7.401 *** (0.906), respectively (

Table 3. Coefficients and significance levels in the regression model.

Multiple Regression Model for Verification of Moderating Effects (Dependent Variables Are the Reconsideration of Cost-Benefit of Green Products)
Constant	8.665 *** (0.850)
Whether to implement intervention strategies	15.489 *** (0.973)
Implicit beliefs	−4.050 *** (1.197)
Companies implementing intervention strategies	−0.8810.377 (0.998)
Whether to implement intervention strategies × implicit beliefs	2.143 * (1.199)
Whether to implement intervention strategies × companies implementing intervention strategies	−10.567 *** (1.112)
Implicit beliefs × companies implementing intervention strategies	7.401 *** (0.906)

Note: *** p < 0.01; * p < 0.1.

shows the specific coefficients and significance levels of other variables in the regression model). The change values of Pb1, Pb2, Pb3, Pb4, Pb5, and Pb6 were all less than 0.001, the change values of NFI, IFI, RFI, and TLI were all greater than 0.1, and the path coefficients based on each model were significantly different, which indicates that companies implementing intervention strategies (genuinely green companies vs. greenwashing companies) and implicit beliefs (incremental beliefs vs. entity beliefs) had a significant moderating effects on the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products (see Table 3 for verification results).

We then verified the combinations of implicit beliefs (incremental beliefs vs. entity beliefs) and companies implementing intervention strategies (genuinely green companies vs. greenwashing companies) and their impact on the reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products. The manipulation check of mediating effects and the verification results were consistent with H3a and H3b and H4a and H4b; that is, the combinations of implicit beliefs (incremental beliefs vs. entity beliefs) and companies implementing intervention strategies (genuinely green companies vs. greenwashing companies) had a different impact on the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products. The degree of reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products (the sum of the scores of each item, with maximum score of 30) varied in different groups. In the Control Group, these values were M = 8.031, SD = 1.790; in the Experimental Group in which the companies implementing intervention strategies were the greenwashing companies and green consumers have entity beliefs, the values were M = 10.711, SD = 3.089; and in the Experimental Group in which the companies implementing intervention strategies were the genuinely green companies and the green consumers have entity beliefs were M = 14.9412, SD = 4.245. Moreover, the values for the degree of reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products of the Experimental Group in which the companies implementing intervention strategies were the greenwashing companies, and the green consumers have incremental beliefs were M = 22.889, SD = 3.978. Finally, in the group where the companies implementing intervention strategies were the genuinely green companies, and green consumers have incremental beliefs, the values were M = 26.219, SD = 2.883. According to ANOVA, the degree of the reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products varies among different Experimental Groups (F (4, 469) = 455.786, p < 0.001), which further proved the effectiveness of the control of variables.

We finally verified the combinations of the companies implementing intervention strategies and green consumers with implicit beliefs conducting the moderating effect between intervention strategies and the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products. We adopted multi-group analysis and Amos 24 to show the verification results (see

Table 4. Verification results of mediating effects.

	Incremental Beliefs × Genuinely Green Companies	Incremental Beliefs × Greenwashing Companies	Entity Beliefs × Genuinely Green Companies	Entity Beliefs × greenwashing Companies
Total effect	0.964	0.901	0.729	0.463
Indirect effect	0.345	0.57	0.361	0.425
Indirect effect 95%CI	[0.045–0.611]	[0.431–0.693]	[0.270–0.480]	[0.332–0.580]

and

Table 5. Key path coefficients of interaction items.

Incremental Beliefs × Genuinely Green Companies	Incremental Beliefs × Greenwashing Companies	Entity Beliefs × Greening Companies	Entity Beliefs × Greenwashing Companies
0.975 ***	0.916 ***	0.712 ***	0.681 ***
0.354 ***	0.622 ***	0.507 ***	0.624 ***
0.619 ***	0.331 ***	0.368 ***	0.0390.299

Note: *** p < 0.01.

). Further, we adopted bootstrap sampling (sample size: 5000, 95% CI) to guarantee the mediating effect of the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products in that verification process. Almost all of the path coefficients of each group of moderating variables were significant when p < 0.01, and the indirect effect of the model was significant when the confidence interval was 95%, which showed us that under one type of subject—those who implemented intervention strategies (genuinely green companies or greenwashing companies)—green consumers with incremental beliefs enhanced the positive effects of intervention strategies on green trust after intervention (genuinely green companies: 0.964 > 0.729, greenwashing companies: 0.901 > 0.463). At the same time, the path coefficient of the model also supported such verification, and the path of intervention strategies on reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products showed that incremental beliefs and genuinely green companies 0.975 *** > entity beliefs and genuinely green companies 0.712 ***, and incremental beliefs and greenwashing companies 0.916 *** > entity beliefs and greenwashing companies 0.681 ***.

For the companies implementing intervention strategies, the intervention effect of genuinely green companies on the trust of green consumers is better than that of greenwashing companies, while greenwashing companies enhanced the mediating effect of reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products. When green consumers had incremental beliefs, the companies implementing intervention strategies that were genuinely green companies (total effect: 0.964, indirect effect: 0.345, indirect effect 95% CI [0.045–0.0611] had a better intervention effect than when the companies implementing intervention strategies were greenwashing companies, while the mediating effect was the opposite. Similarly, if green consumers have entity beliefs and the subject implementing intervention strategies was a genuinely green company (total effect: 0.729, indirect effect: 0.361, indirect effect 95% CI [0.270–0.480]), the intervention was more positive than that if the company implementing the intervention strategies was a greenwashed company while the mediating effect was reversed. This suggests that genuinely green companies and incremental-belief consumers can promote the positive effects of interventions after greenwashing, while greenwashing companies can better stimulate a change in the degree of the reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products.

4. Conclusions

4.1. Main Conclusions

Our two studies support H1a, H1b,H2, H3a, H3b, and H4a, H4b. The findings suggest that (1) the two types of intervention strategies that serve to counter the negative impact of greenwashing—distrust regulation (quantifying a product’s green attributes) and trustworthiness demonstration (visualizing environmental behaviors)—are effective intervention strategies that can enable consumers to reevaluate the cost-benefit of green products, and which may serve as critical psychological factors for green consumers and contribute to the degree of trust. Validation and comparative study of the derived results show that distrust regulation, followed by trustworthiness demonstration, has the best effect on increasing green trust after intervention. If the sequence is reversed, the effect of the intervention strategy is worse than if only one strategy had been applied. (2) The reconsideration of the cost-benefit of green products are mediating variables that have a significant indirect effect on green consumers’ trust after intervention, which means that the costs to retry green products or functional and symbolic benefits are sufficient to overcome the resistance threshold of consumers. (3) Implicit beliefs of consumers and companies who implement intervention strategies after greenwashing play a moderating role between intervention strategies and reconsideration of cost-benefit of green products. The effects of intervention strategies on green trust are enhanced when applied to consumers with incremental beliefs when genuinely green companies implement these strategies. Alternatively, the behavior of greenwashing companies can easily counter these effects. The same strategy implemented for green consumers with entity beliefs generated fewer positive results.

4.2. Managerial Implications

Our findings indicate that quantifying the green attributes of a product and visualizing environmental behaviors are effective at improving green consumers trust after greenwashing. Managers should consider several important factors in this respect. First, managers should make efforts to provide their green products with green certificates from third parties such as the International Standards Organization (ISO14001 [91]). Green consumers are keen to learn about the public quantitative ratings of the greening efforts of a company because they believe that once complete information on corporate green development is disclosed and perceived as credible, they can choose green products without confusion or deliberation. Second, genuinely green companies should make full use of carbon labels to increase transparency and integrity in carbon auditing. A carbon label refers to the greenhouse gas emissions emitted during the whole life cycle of the product, which is marked on the product label with a quantified index to inform consumers of the carbon rating of the product. The implementation of product carbon labels can guide consumers to choose more low-carbon goods. At present, there is no complete and implementable carbon labeling system in China, so greening companies should make efforts to encourage the research and establishment of such a system.

Our findings verified that the sequence of distrust regulation, implemented first, followed by trust worthiness, has the best effect on green trust after intervention. If that sequence is reversed, the effects of both intervention strategies are worse than if either strategy were implemented on its own. In the case of greenwashing among the whole industry or market, managers must keep distrust regulation as the first guidelines in mind, such as inviting consumers to conduct prefatory trials, conducting self-inspection of the green products, and disclosing the carbon emission of each product in a timely manner. Only when managers ensure the legitimacy of their company in the green market can visualizing environmental behavior seem to be convincing. Otherwise, it is difficult for green consumers to trust the reputation or image rebuilt by the companies after greenwashing, or they might even be considered as another kind of greenwashing.

Our study also demonstrates that green consumers’ re-evaluation of the cost-benefit of green products plays a mediating role between intervention strategies and green trust after greenwashing. To highlight the benefits of retrying green products for consumers, managers need to consider the reimbursement not only of the green attributes that consumers focus on but also the reputations and social contexts that green products represent. Forms of reimbursement, such as discounts, coupons, and gifts, are a tangible means by which to win back green consumers. However, this strategy involves investing considerable funds in rewards to consumers with incremental beliefs. A form of reimbursement called service reimbursement involving actions such as planting trees to improve air quality or donating to green events may be a more effective strategy. In ordinary operations, unrecyclable materials should be replaced with more sustainable materials through technological innovation and a standardized technique for capturing all relevant data for better green management should be considered. Green consumers worry that a product may still contain harmful chemicals despite claims that they have been reduced. They also worry about whether companies are truly ‘going green’ and not just advertising based on an expected message. Therefore, green companies should engage in an honest and open dialogue with green consumers to explain their efforts to offer more sustainable products and services.

4.3. Limitations and Areas for Further Research

This study presents a number of limitations that open interesting avenues for further research on regaining green consumers trust after greenwashing. First, while we have examined two intervention strategies, we cannot assume that our findings can be generalized to all circumstances. Some green consumers do not regain a sense of trust even after interventions. Future work should measure the impact on profits after an intervention strategy and explore other effective strategies.

Second, future work can also explore whether any new moderating factors activate the intervention process presented in this research. We theorize and test the initial trust of green consumers, which is established based on brand loyalty and is verified to be an effective factor in activating renewed cognitive schemas after intervention strategies. This seems to be an important area of future research.

A third limitation of our study lies in its reliance on scenario-based experiments and our use of MBAs to take part in the experiments. While this methodology is frequently used to maximize internal validity, it offers less validity than field data. Given our focus on testing the intervention process designed to regain green consumers’ trust after greenwashing, the design we adopted appears to be satisfactory. In the future, we plan to track the results of greenwashing and intervention efforts using questionnaires or interviews with larger and broader sample sizes of green consumers.

As for the limitations of the psychological experiment method, machine learning algorithms have the potential to enhance the performance of the validation and results. EEGs (electroencephalograms) can be adopted in the experiment for more accurate and detailed psychological factors and the process of green consumers after they receive intervention strategies and their green trust rebuilding after greenwashing. More visual psychological experimental methods can enable the tendency to modify and develop theories in consumer psychology and behavior.