Combating Climate Change through Network Governance in Singapore’s and Australia’s Air, Land and Water Sectors from 2000 to 2019

Abstract

Reversing the detrimental effects of climate change requires governments worldwide to collaborate with academia and industry to pursue more environmentally friendly socio-economic national policies. Towards these ends, Singapore and Australia provide useful but currently lacking insights. This warrants case-study-driven interrogations into the government/industry/academia-oriented success and risk factors respectively informing their well-performing climate change policies and under-performing climate change policies in the air, land and water sectors from 2000 to 2019 (n = 8). By employing the Triple Helix Theory to analyse the policies, the notable success factors found are government-industry organizational belief in the long-term commercial potential of scientific climate change potential; government-industry-academia recognition of collective intellectual and technological collaboration as necessary; government-industry-academia commitment to methodically pre-empt and mitigate potential conflicts. In contrast, the notable risk factors involve inadequate/un-sustained organizational will by governments to pursue long-term environmentally friendly economic development; government-industry-academia managerial oversight in climate change resource allocation. Finally, implications for future climate change research and policy are discussed.

1. Introduction

Climate change creates and will create adverse effects on the health quality of the young [1,2,3]. Furthermore, climate change has already been demonstrated to result in rising sea levels, more droughts and melting glaciers [4,5]; thereby heightening environmental degradation in general. Indeed, in 2015, the United Nations (UN) adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) [6], including SDG 13, which seeks to fight climate change as a global effort [7].

Hence, to ultimately reverse these detrimental effects, it is necessary for governments worldwide to pursue two courses of action. Firstly, they need to increase cooperation in regional/global climate change partnerships to better fight climate change as a regional/global effort. Indeed, in 2019, 185 parties had ratified the Paris Agreement and are therefore expected to prepare, communicate and uphold successive nationally determined contributions [8]. Secondly, governments, industry and academia need to collaborate to pursue more environmentally friendly socio-economic national policies to better combat climate change as individual countries.

Singapore and Australia provide useful insights. Both countries signed the Paris Agreement in 2016 [9,10] and have seen considerable success in their respective past and current collaborative Government-Industry-Academia sustainable development efforts to fight climate change. For instance, in Singapore’s built environment sector, the National University of Singapore (NUS), the Singapore government’s Economic Development Board (government agency primarily responsible for driving economic development in Singapore) (EDB) and City Developments Limited (CDL) (private property corporation) partnered together to launch the NUS-CDL Smart Green Home lab and NUS-CDL T² Lab in 2016 to pursue innovative environmentally friendly building solutions [11] CDL. In Australia’s energy sector, several Australian companies, by participating in the Australian government’s Emissions Reduction Fund that was established in 2015, are reducing their emissions by buying Australian carbon credit units from indigenous savanna fire management initiatives [12,13].

However, in Singapore, more effort needs to be directed toward reducing its greenhouse gas emissions [14]. In Australia, the unprecedented duration of the wildfires beginning in 2019 [15] necessitates more efforts to combat high temperature-driven wildfires. Importantly, these compelling observations underlie key interactions between key stakeholders (i.e., government, industry, and academia) focused on fighting climate change in the air, land, and water sectors of Singapore and Australia. These interactions, in turn, warrant deeper interrogations into the success factors informing successful climate change policies and risk factors informing under-performing climate change policies in the air, land, and water sectors of Singapore and Australia from 2000 to 2019, respectively. Yet, apart from some recent studies on climate change policies in Singapore’s built and air environments; population perception on environmental policies in Singapore and climate change in Australia; health impacts of climate change in Australia’s urban environments [16,17,18,19,20], to date, extensive and chronological research focusing on the above-mentioned interrogations, is lacking. Inquiring deeper into the success and risk factors underpinning the well- and under-performing climate change policies in Singapore and Australia, respectively, is timely given that both Singapore and Australia have made notable policy inroads into mitigating climate change, but concurrently encounter notable challenges in doing so as well.

Therefore, this paper’s objective is to inquire about the success and risk factors that underpin well-performing and under-performing climate change policies in Singapore and Australia, respectively, from the period of 2000 to 2019. This paper’s direction is as follows. First, this paper reviews key trends from the climate change literature. Then, the paper’s theoretical framework (i.e., Triple Helix), policy backgrounds, and the case study methodology will be detailed. Based on this case data, this paper will discuss the success and risk factors underpinning the well-performing and under-performing climate change policies respectively as well as the theoretical contributions and policy insights from these factors.

2. Literature Review

Much of the literature on climate change has detailed the adverse impacts of climate change (e.g., health; economic and social stability; natural ecosystems’ survivability) in various social and ecosystems worldwide. For instance, an extensive review of research on the impacts of climate change on England’s water environment found that climate change is risky to the implementation of water management goals but these risks vary according to the local catchment and water environment situations [21]. On economic impacts, Goods (2017) [22] highlights that climate change influences the types of future jobs and industries that will and will not be created, the labour workflows, wages and workers’ conditions as well as organisational and managerial strategies. Globally, Bowles, Butler and Morisetti (2015) [23] note that future climate change predictably reduces necessary natural resource availability in many areas and possibly globally; leading to inadequate water, food and livelihoods that can result in increasingly desperate societies that subvert governments, which increases the risk of conflict within and among many other countries.

While much research has paid considerable attention to the impacts of climate change, growing attention has been paid to studying climate change response on three key fronts. The first front concerns how societies perceive climate change both online (e.g., blogs) and offline (e.g., print media reports/surveys/interviews) in a variety of countries (e.g., Czech Republic, Germany, United States), e.g., [24,25,26,27,28,29]. This perception landscape takes two forms. Firstly, whether or not members of the general public (e.g., non-climate change experts/policymakers) perceive climate change as a significant enough issue to merit systematic and sustained policy resources (e.g., financial investment, technical/scientific expertise; public educational campaigns on climate change). Secondly, the ways in which the local media portray or frame the climate change issue see [17]. For instance, whether or not climate change is a serious enough issue to warrant greater governmental and public concern; and whether or not climate change measures take priority over economic development.

On these societal perception accounts, some recent studies shed considerable insights. Specifically, Lucas and Davidson’s (2018) [18] Australian study investigated the sources of the lackadaisical/ignorant/apathetic public attitudes towards climate change; and their interviews with Australians displaying such attitudes reveal that these attitudes stem from “…social relationships, discursive processes, moral values and embodied experiences…”. In contrast, by employing a mixture of quantitative questionnaires and qualitative interviews, Yousefpour, Prinz, and Ng’s (2020) [20] Singapore study on societal attitudes and perceptions on climate change reveals “…a moderate to high concern for climate change, in general, and sea level rise and flooding, in particular, and the concern is expected to increase in the future”.

In the same country, Forsyth’s (2014) [17] case study of societal attitudes towards the transboundary haze issue in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia reveals that newspaper reporting about this haze issue has (i) shifted from discussing potential health and economic effects of fires partly naturally due to El Nino-resulted droughts to increasingly vilifying Indonesia for not ratifying the 2002 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreement on transboundary haze pollution; and (ii) criticisms of Singaporean as well as Malaysian corporations investing in palm oil plantations and ASEAN.

The second front concerns climate change activism. Climate change activism can constitute a wide range of activities, from public protest to community/town hall meetings and climate change research to push for more policy action to at least address climate change. On this note, Hall, Taplin, and Goldstein’s (2009) [30] work is illuminating. Specifically, by using participatory action research to guide the development of the Climate Action Coogee (i.e., a citizen grassroots organization involved in voluntary action to respond to their climate change concerns), the researchers found that this organisation “…contributed to legislative outcomes on climate change [in Australia]”.

The third front concerns state/non-state/state and non-state policy responses e.g., [31,32,33]. Bambrick et al. (2011) [16] argue that given that Australia is one of the most highly urbanized territories in the Asia-Pacific region and much more vulnerable to high morbidity and mortality rates arising from negative environmental conditions (e.g., air pollution, flooding, thermal stress) following climate change; the need for the development of climate change policies to focus on cities, is increasingly urgent. In the same region, Vize’s (2012) [34] case review on climate change education initiatives in Kiribati essentially demonstrates that “…school-based formal educational approaches to climate change education are making progress across much of the Pacific, from primary through to tertiary levels” (p. 231). In a more general slant on this network approach to fighting climate change, Walker and Hills (2012) [35] found that in Hong Kong, inter-organizational trust among government, industry and civil society stakeholders and network behavior trends (e.g., interactions) between industry and civil society actors contribute towards perceived project performance.

Yet, what is perhaps notably missing or lacking in the growing body of climate change response research is a focused in-depth and comparative analysis of key government-industry-academia oriented factors/forces (e.g., cooperation- and conflict resolution-based interactions between government, industry and academia) that drive well-performing and under-performing policies in particular policy and natural environmental contexts. Filling this gap is timely and crucial. This is given the increasingly urgent need to actively respond to climate change as illustrated above as well as the rise of collaboration between government, industry and academia in fighting climate change [36,37]. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to the climate change response literature by (i) strengthening the knowledge base of success and risk factors that can underpin well-performing and under-performing policies respectively; and (ii) enhancing the applicability of the triple helix framework in future climate change response research by proposing a revised triple helix framework.

3. Policy Background

In Singapore, climate change policies often see key policy design and implementation decisions being made by top climate change ministers in the Singapore’s central government. Singapore only has a centralised government given its geographically small size. However, the Singapore government, during the design and implementation phases of climate change policies, tends to engage in extensive consultations with industry and academic experts on climate change issues [38]. Key government agencies include the NCCS, the National Environment Agency (NEA), the Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources and the Agency for Science, Technology and Research. Notable industry parties include Keppel Seghers and GalxoSmithKline; and notable academic partners include the National University of Singapore and the Singapore Institute of Technology.

However, in Australia, the climate change policy landscape is highly extensive and more decentralized as it spans across many local government agencies, as well as business, community, and research sectors [39,40]. Specifically, while the Australian Federal government may implement broad climate change guidelines, local government, industry and research sectors have more decision-making autonomy in climate change initiatives design and implementation for a local jurisdiction. Like Singapore, the Australian government works notably closely with industry and academic partners in designing and implementing climate change policies. Notable government agencies include the Department of Industry, Science, Energy, and Resources (now the Department of Industry, Science and Resources since July 2022); the Department of the Environment and Energy; and the Australian Research Council which advises the Australian government on research issues [41,42,43]. Notable industry stakeholders include Hydro Tasmania and EnergyAustralia. Notable academic partners include the University of Western Australia and the University of Queensland, Australia.

Internationally, Singapore “…ratified the UNFCCC in 1997, and acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in 2006… [and] the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol in 2014” [44]. Multilaterally, it has participated in efforts supporting a comprehensive and whole approach to tackling climate change including talks under the World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organisation, the International Maritime Organisation and the International Civil Aviation Organisation [45]. In 2012, it joined the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and its participation in this group has allowed it to learn best practices in building energy efficiency and transportation from other C40 cities [45]. Similarly, Australia ratified the Paris Agreement and the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, thereby reinforcing its commitment to global climate change action [46]. Its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is responsible for international climate change engagement via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [47]. In addition, the Australian government promotes global action to improve activities aimed at lowering forest degradation in the Asia-Pacific through the Asia-Pacific Rainforest Partnership [48].

4. Theoretical Framework

Societies addressing climate change require the involvement of government, industry, and academic sectors [49]. Apart from Singapore and Australia, these three sectors are often involved in other countries and are notably effective in fighting climate change (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Holland). Given this and the detriments of climate change illustrated above, research utilising the triple helix theory (i.e., a broad systems-based approach; agent and functional interactions-driven focus on policy innovation) [50] to analyse well-performing and underperforming climate change policies, is warranted. Yet, this theory or its ideational equivalent/counterpart is only adopted in a limited number of climate change response research e.g., [19,35]. To address this gap, the Triple Helix theory is used to advance success and risk factors by focusing on government-industry-academia interactions in Singapore’s and Australia’s well-performing and under-performing air, land and water climate change policies. Figure 1 below depicts the theory’s key tenets.

With reference to Figure 1 below, the bi-directional arrows denote that collaboration and conflict moderation can be undertaken by both parties at each end of the policy innovation network triangle (i.e., industry-government, government-university, industry-university). The grey box depicts the key actors of the Triple Helix framework (i.e., R&D innovators, Non R&D innovators, single sphere institutions, multi-sphere institutions and individual and institutional innovators. In contrast, the white box depicts the key interactions of the Triple Helix framework (i.e., collaboration and conflict moderation, collaborative leadership, inter- & intra-sector substitution and network).

The green, brown and blue rectangles that encapsulate the policy innovation network triangle and the grey and white boxes denote that the key activity outputs of the policy innovation network, the key actors of the Triple Helix framework and the key interactions of the Triple Helix framework are knowledge, innovation and consensus activities.

5. Materials and Methods

The case study approach offers an in-depth study of the climate change policy landscapes of Singapore and Australia. Hence, based on Yin (2014) [51]’s case study approach, pointers I to V below detail the methodological procedures taken to facilitate the collection of well- and under-performing climate change policy case data from Singapore and Australia.

I.

Interestingly, FitzGerald, O’Malley and O Broin’s (2019) [52] conception of policy programmatic success “… refers to whether the policy met objectives, produced desired outcomes and created benefit for the target group”. However, McConnell (2010) [53] notes that “a policy fails if it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is non-existent”. Therefore, this paper defines well-performing policies as ongoing encompassing policy initiatives and in the direction of achieving/already largely achieved their respective goals. In contrast, under-performing policies refer to ongoing encompassing policy initiatives but not adequately meeting its goals.

II.

Next, publicly available secondary data of eight policy cases from Singapore and Australia (i.e., government policy reports; media reports; policy audit reports) from 2000 to 2019 is studied closely. This timeline is selected because Singapore and Australia began to take more pro-active stances toward managing climate change in the 2000s, as demonstrated by Singapore’s accession to the Kyoto Protocol in 2006 [44] and Australia’s Fuel Quality Standards Act 2000 [54].

III.

The following major policies in Singapore and Australia are selected. In Singapore, two policy cases in the land and water sectors, namely, the Third Green Building Masterplan and Four National Taps respectively, were chosen. Given the notable success of the first and second masterplans in achieving their respective green building targets see [55], the Third Green Building Masterplan was launched in 2014. Since then, Singapore has performed relatively well in meeting its 80% green building target by 2030; and it has “ranked second among global cities for green buildings” [19,56]. These observations coincide with the abovementioned definition of a well-performing policy; thereby warranting the Third Green Building Masterplan closer analysis. On the Four National Taps, collectively, they have significantly been able to achieve their aim of being more water-independent in Singapore (an issue of national security given Singapore’s lack of its own supply of potable water) from water imports from Malaysia in an environmentally sustainable manner. Therefore, this water policy aligns with the abovementioned definition of a well-performing policy; hence warranting closer attention. However, one policy case in the air sector (i.e., Vehicular Emissions Scheme) is selected. Private car emissions contribute the most to Singapore’s land transport pollution (35%) [57]. Yet, since the launch of its preceding Carbon Emissions Scheme and Revised Carbon Emissions Scheme in 2013 and 2015 respectively [57,58], more effort needs to be directed towards reducing its greenhouse gas emissions [14]. These trends demonstrate that the Vehicular Emissions Scheme has inadequately met its aim of reducing vehicular greenhouse gas emissions. This coincides with the abovementioned definition of an under-performing policy; therefore, warranting the Scheme’s closer analysis.

In Australia, three policy cases in the water, air and land sectors, namely, the Pumped Hydro Storage initiative, Emissions Reduction Fund and Updated Commercial Building Disclosure program respectively, were chosen. These policies have been identified to be moving in the direction of meeting their respective objectives [59,60,61]. Hence, this observation aligns with the abovementioned definition of a well-performing policy; thereby warranting closer attention to the policy. However, two other policy cases in the land sector (i.e., National Green Lease Policy and Mid-Tier and Building Retrofit Toolkit) were chosen. These policies have been identified to be making insufficient or no progress toward achieving their respective goals [62,63]. This coincides with the abovementioned definition of an under-performing policy; hence warranting closer attention to the policy.

IV.

Discourse and pattern-matching analyses are then utilized to pay particular attention to the stakeholder collaboration/conflict management context, which can underpin success and risk factors.

V.

Following these analyses, converging and diverging themes will be identified.

6. Case Material

Table 1. Summary of the eight policy cases.

Singapore		Australia
Well-Performing	Under-Performing	Well-Performing	Under-Performing
- Third Green Building Masterplan - Four National Taps	- Vehicular Emissions Scheme	- Emissions Reduction Fund - Pumped Hydro Storage Initiative - Commercial Building Disclosure program	- National Green Lease Policy - Mid-Tier and Building Retrofit Toolkit

below summarizes the eight respective well- and under-performing policies as identified in points I to V above. Following this, the details of the eight cases will be presented.

6.1. Third Green Building Masterplan

According to Singapore’s National Environment Agency [64], given Singapore’s highly built-up environment, “…the greening of buildings is an important part of Singapore’s [climate change] mitigation strategy. To address barriers to energy efficiency adoption in buildings such as limited capital and split incentives between building developers and owners, the Singapore Government implemented the Green Building Masterplan, and launched the BCA Green Mark, a national energy efficiency yard stick designed specifically for buildings in the tropics”.

The Third green building masterplan is built on the relative successes of the first and second (greening existing buildings; focused more on R&D) green building masterplans, which were launched in 2006 and 2009 respectively [55,64,65]. Key government-industry-academia initiatives include, but are not limited to the following. First, the BCA Skylab: launched in 2016 by Singapore, together with the U.S.’s Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, the BCA Skylaballows building parts and systems (e.g., lighting, air conditioning) to be subject to actual tropical weather conditions see [66]. Successfully tested electricity-saving technologies include Electrochromic (EC) glass, EC glazing/Automated blinds, Active Chilled Beam, LED and Auto-dimming see [67]. These technologies in turn help the to lower greenhouse gas emissions output from buildings.

Second, the Green Buildings Innovation Cluster (GBIC), which is a 52 million-dollar initiative launched by the Singapore government’s National Research Foundation, aims to “…integrate efforts in developing large scale and high impact demonstration projects for promising technologies and solutions. GBIC will also tightly couple research with translation to market for widespread adoption of energy efficient solutions and practices, as well as streamline, coordinate and disseminate building energy efficiency related activities through a central focal point” [55]. Third, the Green Mark Schemes: launched by the Singapore government in 2005. The Green Mark Schemes are environmental building regulations and incentives, under which buildings (e.g., retail, hotel, and office spaces) are subject [55,64]. For instance, as reported by [64]:

Incentives such as the “…$50 million Green Mark Incentive Scheme for Existing Buildings and Premises (GMIS-EBP) and Building Retrofit Energy Efficiency Financing (BREEF) scheme, for developers to achieve higher-tier Green Mark ratings, and to assist building owners in financing the high upfront retrofitting cost”.

Notably, the number of green buildings in Singapore rose from 17 buildings in the financial year of 2005 to 3225 buildings in the financial year of 2017 [64]. This provides a strong demonstration of the considerable success of the above-mentioned initiatives in achieving their central objective of ‘greening’ buildings in Singapore.

6.2. Four National Taps

The Four National Taps policy consists of four initiatives, namely, water imports from Malaysia, NEWater, desalinated water and water from local catchment areas [68]. The common policy context driving this policy thrust is Singapore’s lack of a local water supply, due to its geographically small size. This means that Singapore has had to look for other water supply sources to feed its water. A significant amount of locally consumed water in Singapore is imported from Malaysia, which has been the case for many decades, though historically Singapore has had less than friendly relations with Malaysia. Therefore, water is considered by the Singapore government as a national security issue. Given this, the Singapore government in an attempt to reduce its dependence on water imports from Malaysia and to address climate change effects that it has experienced (e.g., fiercer and more frequent storms and flashfloods), has turned to developing other sustainable water treatment technologies (detailed below). According to Singapore’s public utilities (i.e., water, gas, electricity) agency, the Public Utilities Board [69], under the 1962 water agreement with Malaysia, Singapore can currently draw up to 250 million gallons of water daily from the Johor River.

Next, NEWater is produced by recycling treated used (sewage) water into “…ultra-clean, high-grade reclaimed water…” [70]. Exploration of the NEWater process dates back to the 1970s; in 2000, “…[pub] commissioned a full-scale demonstration plant that could produce 10,000 cubic metres daily” [70]. NEWater’s safety standards have been found by international engineering, biomedical sciences, chemistry and water technology experts to be “…consistently safe and high, and well within the WHO and USEPA’s requirements for drinking water. They recommended it for indirect potable use, to be introduced into raw water reservoirs. The blended water undergoes naturalisation and further treatment in conventional waterworks to create drinking water” [70]. NEWater launched to the Singapore public in 2003, directed for non-potable industrial use and indirect potable use; undergoes audit checks by an international panel twice a year; and is consistently awarded top scores for high quality, safety and for surpassing international standards [70]. At present, there are five NEWater plans supplying 40% of Singapore’s current water demands [70]. For example, according to Kim and Kwa (2020) [71,72]:

• Ulu Pandan NEWater plant: PUB-Keppel Seghers (private energy company) joint project completed in 2007; to operate for 20 years.
• Changi NEWater plant: PUB-Sembcorp (private energy company) joint project completed in 2010; to operate for 25 years.
• BEWG-UESH NEWater plant: PUB-BEWG International Pte Ltd. (a subsidiary of Beijing Enterprises Water Group Limited) and UES Holdings Pte Ltd. joint project completed in 2017; to operate for 25 years.

Singapore currently utilises reverse osmosis for desalination, amounting to an approximate usage of 3.5 kWh m³⁻³ of energy to make seawater drinkable by channeling seawater through membranes to remove dissolved salts and minerals [73]. Additionally, “PUB’s goal is to reduce the energy requirement for desalination by more than halve from the current 3.5 kWh m³⁻³ to 1.5 kWh m³⁻³ and then to 1 kWh m³⁻³ in the long run” [73]. Electro-deionisation “…uses an electric field to pull dissolved salts from water” [73]. Furthermore, the feasible energy usage of 1.65 kWh/m³ has been tested; with plans to upscale electro-deionisation [73]. Another example concerns biomimicry, which is also under exploration by the PUB; and “…involves mimicking biological processes by which mangrove plants and euryhaline fish extract freshwater from seawater using small amount of energy” [73]. A notable desalination project involving government and private (industry) partnership is the Singspring desalination plant: PUB-Singspring (Hyflux’s subsidiary) joint project completed in 2005; contracted to operate for 20 years.

On the local water catchment area initiative, Singapore “…lacks the space to collect and store all the rain that falls on it. Through a network of rivers, canals and drains, rain that falls on two-thirds of Singapore’s land area is channelled to… 17 reservoirs” [74]. Rainwater is collected via “…a comprehensive network of drains, canals and rivers and channelled to the reservoirs before it is treated for drinking water” [74]; Used water is collected via “…a network of underground sewers that lead to a water reclamation plant. Separate systems ensure that the waterways are free of pollution” [74]. From 2011, the area of water catchment has grown from half to three-quarters of Singapore’s land surface; making it one of the few countries worldwide to collect urban stormwater on an extensive scale for potable usage.

6.3. Vehicular Emissions Scheme

According to the National Environment Agency [75], emissions grew by 1.1% “from 39 million tonnes in 2000 to 41 million tonnes in 2005 mainly due to the one-off fuel switch to natural gas in the power sector”. Furthermore, emissions increased by 4.8 percent from about 48.6 million tonnes in 2012 to 50.9 million tonnes in 2014. Launched in 2018, the Vehicular Emissions Scheme is a more comprehensive system than the previous Revised Carbon Emissions Scheme launched in July 2015 in that it accounts for hydrocarbons (HC), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NO_X), particulate matter (PM) and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions.

According to the Vehicular Emissions Scheme from 2018 to 2020 (CO₂ is measured in g km⁻¹; HC is measured in g km⁻¹; CO is measured in g km⁻¹; NO_X is measured in g km⁻¹; PM is measured in mg km⁻¹) [76]:

• Cars/taxis producing these emissions (i.e., CO₂ ≤ 90; HC ≤ 0.020; CO ≤ 0.150; NO_X ≤ 0.007; PM = 0.0) qualify for an emissions rebate of SGD20,000 and do not have to pay for an emission surcharge.
• Cars/taxis producing these emissions (i.e., 90 < C0₂ ≤ 125; 0.020 < HC ≤ 0.036; 0.150 < CO ≤ 0.190; 0.007 < NO_X ≤ 0.013; 0.0 < PM ≤ 0.3) qualify for an emission rebate of SGD10,000 and do not have to pay for an emission surcharge.
• Cars/taxis producing these emissions (i.e., 125 < CO₂ ≤ 160; 0.036 < HC ≤ 0.052; 0.190 < CO ≤ 0.270; 0.013 < NO_X ≤ 0.024; 0.3 < PM ≤ 0.5) do not qualify for an emission rebate and do not have to pay for an emission surcharge.
• Cars/taxis producing these emissions (i.e., 160 < CO₂ ≤ 185; 0.052 < HC ≤ 0.075; 0.270 < CO ≤ 0.350; 0.024 < NO_X ≤ 0.030; 0.5 < PM ≤ 2.0) do not qualify for an emission rebate but have to pay for an emission surcharge of SGD10,000.
• Cars/taxis producing these emissions (i.e., CO₂ > 185; HC > 0.075; C0 > 0.350; NO_X > 0.030; PM > 2.0) do not qualify for an emission rebate but have to pay for an emission surcharge of SGD20,000.

In contrast, the older Revised Carbons Emissions Schemes focus on targeting CO₂ emissions in that all new cars and imported used cars producing low carbon emissions of less than or equal to 135 CO₂ g km⁻¹ will qualify for rebates (i.e., financial incentive) of between SGD5000 and SGD30,000 [58]. However, cars producing high carbon emissions equal to or more than 186 CO₂ g km⁻¹, will incur a registration surcharge (i.e., financial disincentive) of between SGD5000 and SGD30,000 [58].

Yet, despite these efforts to reduce emissions in Singapore, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA) data [77], on carbon intensity (Emissions per $GDP), Singapore ranked 126th out of 142 countries; on per capita emissions, Singapore ranked 27th out of 142 countries. Ms Melissa Low, a research fellow at the National University of Singapore (NUS)’s Energy Studies Institute paints a slightly positive note on Singapore’s record on reducing its greenhouse gas emissions; noting that greenhouse gas emissions are “increasing, but at a decreasing rate” [78]. In contrast, Dr. Matthias Roth of NUS’ department of geography highlights that “…despite this drop in emissions intensity, absolute emissions are allowed to increase every year. In terms of man-made climate change and global warming, only the absolute amount of emissions is relevant” [78].

6.4. Emissions Reduction Fund

The Australian government intends to allocate 2.55 billion dollars to the Emissions Reduction Fund [79]. This fund provides “…important environmental, economic, social and cultural benefits for farmers, businesses, landholders, Indigenous Australians and others” (Australian Government, n.d.). This fund is contributing to achieving Australia’s 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 5 percent below 2000 levels by 2020 [79] and 26–28 percent below 2005 emission levels by 2030 [80]. Furthermore, the fund will work together with current programs already working to reduce Australia’s emissions growth (e.g., Renewable Energy Target) [79]. More specifically, under this fund:

“By running projects to reduce emissions and store carbon, businesses, land managers and others can earn Australian carbon credit units (ACCUs). These units can be sold to the Australian Government through a carbon abatement contract, or to other businesses seeking to offset their emissions. Over 770 projects have been registered under many eligible activities, including energy efficiency, waste management, revegetation, livestock management, savanna fire management and soil carbon sequestration.” [81].

Notably, in an April 2020 review report by the Australian government, the ERF has generated more than 75 million ACCUs, in terms of tonnes of abatement and the Australian government has awarded contracts that support the delivery of 193 million ACCUs [60]. This result strongly demonstrates the significant inroads made by the fund in achieving its respective emissions targets by 2020 and 2030.

6.5. Pumped Hydro Storage Initiative

According to the Australian Government [59], the Pumped Hydro Storage Initiative is “…a critical piece of energy infrastructure that can ensure the secure, reliable and affordable supply of energy”. Through the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, the Australian government is helping to maximise the potential of renewable energy by investing in pumped hydro technology [59]. More specifically, the Australian government is:

“…investing up to $8 million towards Snowy Hydro’s feasibility study on expanding pumped hydro storage in the Snowy Mountains (total cost of $29 million). Snowy Hydro 2.0 [hydro-electric power project] involves an extra 2000 megawatts of generation capacity—a 50 per cent increase in the capacity of the Snowy Scheme—which would help make renewables more reliable, and help stabilise electricity supply into the future” [59].

In addition, through ARENA, the Australian and Tasmanian governments are working with Hydro Tasmania (government energy business enterprise) on “…feasibility studies to assess several new pumped hydro energy storage schemes that could deliver up to 2500 megawatts of additional capacity for the NEM. The proposed expansion builds on the Government’s feasibility study for Snowy 2.0 and supports the Government’s technology-neutral approach to affordable, reliable electricity” [59]. Significantly, through ARENA, EnergyAustralia (a private energy company) has conducted a feasibility appraisal of a new pumped hydro storage project utilising sea water [59]. The potential project site is located near Port Augusta in South Australia [59]. This new development [82] arguably underscores the well-performing nature of the preceding Pumped Hydro Storage Initiative in enhancing Australia’s sustainable energy capabilities in general.

6.6. Commercial Building Disclosure Program

The Commercial Building Disclosure Program “…is a mandatory disclosure program, requiring information on a building’s energy performance to be disclosed when larger office spaces are sold or leased” [61]. According to the Australian Government [83], commercial buildings under this program include “…hotels and serviced apartments, office tenancies, data centres and shopping centres”. The program was launched in 2010 by the Council of Australian Governments National Strategy on Energy Efficiency [84]. Overall, this program was designed to “accelerate energy efficiency improvements and deliver cost-effective energy efficiency gains across all sectors of the Australian economy” [84]. From the findings [84], notable program directives include:

• Requiring most sellers and lessors of large office spaces to furnish energy efficiency details to prospective buyers and tenants.
• Energy efficiency details disclosure is compulsory for commercial office spaces of 2000 square metres or greater.
• National Australian Building Environment Rating System star ratings must be added into sale or lease advertisements.
• Disclosure-affected building owners need to obtain a Building Energy Efficiency Certificate. This certificate is valid for up to 12 months and are disclosed publicly in an online manner.

Following a 2015 review of this program, it has been found that on the whole, it is an effective program in enabling the Australian government to ultimately incentivize building sellers, owners, buyers and tenants to engage in environmentally sustainable practices within their respective buildings [84]. In turn, this helps to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions as a whole. The 2015 review recommended, among others, for the program to continue [84]. In a recent 2019 review of the program, a positive appraisal of the program has also been meted out—namely, that “[t]he CBD Program has been effective in promoting energy efficiency and emissions abatement” [61]. The review continues to note that:

“[u]nder the CBD Program, building owners/managers make their own decisions on energy efficiency improvements. As such, there is a lower risk of building owners being forced to make energy efficiency improvements that are not cost-effective, compared with programs where higher levels of energy efficiency are mandated. Average energy use for offices (base building) has declined over time from over 550 MJ m²⁻² in 2010–2011 to 400 MJ m²⁻² in 2018–2019” [61].

Importantly, the CBD program has reduced energy usage cumulatively by 3 PJ to date; saved more than 82.6 million dollars-worth of energy bills to date; and reduced emissions by approximately 600,000 tonnes of CO₂-e to date [61]. Broadly speaking, these achievements point to the well-performing record that the program has enjoyed to date.

6.7. National Green Lease Policy

Led by the Council of Australian Governments, generally speaking, the National Green Lease Policy “…provides a framework under which both landlord and tenant can achieve and maintain energy efficiency and other sustainability goals throughout the lease term” [66]. Additionally, the policy applies to private commercial buildings to encourage them to adopt green leases [85]. Nevertheless, the Council of Australian Governments [66] notes that:

“There is no uniform model green lease that will be appropriate for every commercial premise. Like an ordinary lease, there is no one-size-fits-all model. However components of a green lease [e.g., what measures to be pursued; type of cooperation between parties to pursue these measures; parties responsible for measures compliance monitoring; follow-up actions on unmet targets] can be mixed and matched to suit the objectives and requirements of the parties”.

In 2017, based on stakeholder consultations as well as a review of the relevant literature and best practices, the Australian government released a report that evaluated the current use and effectiveness of the Green Lease Schedules (GLS) in the Energy Efficiency of Government Operations (EGGO) policy to recommend guiding strategies for the development of the GLS [62]. Importantly, while the GLS in the EGGO policy on the whole has been perceived as helpful for their ability to create a dialogue between landlords and tenants on the building’s environmental (sustainability) performance, however, the EGGO policy is currently having a reduced effect primarily due to limited motivation to adhere to it as well as the perceivably complex and import of the GLS [62].

In a nutshell, arguably, this review has appraised the National Green Leasing Policy to be under-performing in terms of achieving its ultimate target of reducing emissions from buildings. Therefore, the review recommended improving the GLS by: improving GLS incentives, simplifying the GLS, and enhancing the GLS flexibility [62].

6.8. Mid-Tier and Building Retrofit Toolkit

Supported by the Australian Government, this toolkit is a policy response to commercial buildings with B, C and D grade assets (mid-tier), which face significant challenges in achieving energy savings as well as its related benefits (e.g., lower energy expenditure) [63]). Mid-tier buildings are on the whole, under 10,000 square metres and have a diverse range of owners, business models, investment approaches, risk bandwidth and understanding of energy efficiency advantages and chances [22,86]. Notably, this toolkit has admittedly been difficult to implement [63]. Arguably, this policy is therefore considered under-performing in terms of meeting its goals of reducing emissions from mid-tier commercial buildings.

6.9. Success and Risk Factors

Admittedly, non-organizational systems-based factors can collectively contribute to a well- and under-performing policy (e.g., political system/ideology, social normative and economic development factors). However, these factors lie beyond the analytical scope and hence, will not be addressed in, this paper. Given this, the following success and risk factors are proposed as notable factors, not the sole factors, in respectively driving the well- and under-performing policies previously detailed.

The first success factor pertains to the government and industry stakeholders. Specifically, the extensive and sustained government-industry interactional arrangements (e.g., collaborative policy pursuit of common social and economic outcomes against practical commercial considerations such as the financial cost of adopting environmentally sustainable building and energy practices; sharing of cost-effective and novel technological expertise) are key elements in the previously identified well-performing policy cases in Singapore and Australia across the water, land and air sectors. These joint efforts both by government and industry stakeholders, underscore their long-term policy commitment to making the pursuit of long-term sustainable economic and social development through commercially feasible scientific climate change innovation. Importantly, such a commitment further underscores a joint government-industry organizational belief in the long-term commercial potential of scientific climate change innovation to drive long-term sustainable economic and social development.

The second success factor looks to the three government, industry and academia sectors as a whole. Apart from organizational and policy collaboration, all of the outlined well-performing climate change policies in Singapore and Australia also emphasize the importance of joint application of climate change policy knowledge by the government, industry and academia. Here, the term knowledge refers not only to the scientific and technological innovations of environmentally sustainable practices (e.g., advanced water filtration and hydro-energy technologies; cost-effective energy-saving cooling systems in buildings) but also management skills in organizing financial, logistical, scientific innovation and manpower (e.g., scientists, administrative personnel) resources to implement climate change policies effectively. Indeed, the joint government-industry-academia application of such knowledge in fighting climate change to improve the overall physical living conditions of human beings at least in their respective resident countries, highlights the evident importance of joint government-industry-academia climate change policy collaboration. More importantly, the importance of such a collective policy collaboration, in turn underlines the fundamental importance of government-industry-academia recognition of their collective intellectual and technological collaboration as a necessary and indispensable factor in improving the overall physical living conditions of human beings at least in their resident countries.

Similarly, the third success factor re-looks at the government-industry-academia network as a whole. While the first and second success factors have essentially looked at policy collaboration between government, industry and academia as critical in ultimately pursuing well-performing climate change policies, another equally crucial aspect of these policies concern conflict management. It is practically inevitable that particularly (although not exclusively) at the policy implementation stage, conflicts between either or all of the key stakeholders (i.e., government-industry-academia) over a plethora of issues, can and will occasionally arise. Such issues include, but are not limited to, disputes over the cost of implementing environmentally friendly technologies at the workplace and sources of funding for climate change technological innovation research. Given these insights, it is therefore highly likely that all of the previously noted well-performing climate change policies have encountered some forms of conflict or dispute, be they financial and/or administrative. Yet, their well-performing track record suggests the government-industry-academia commitment to methodically pre-empt and mitigate potential conflicts among themselves over climate change governance policies and resources.

Despite the considerable successes that Singapore and Australia have achieved in fighting climate change in the air, water and land sectors to date, all of the under-performing policies described above have presented two notable risk factors. The first risk factor directly concerns the government stakeholder. Specifically, the organizational will of the government to adopt and sustain environmentally friendly policies in the long-term is highly crucial, albeit arguably not necessarily the primary factor, in ensuring a high likelihood of producing well-performing climate change policies. This is because such an organizational will can send a strong policy signal to both the industry and academia stakeholders that the government is likely to commit support (e.g., policy, financial, political, technical) to them in developing and implementing environmentally sustainable technologies and practices; thereby incentivizing them to do so. In this regard, the stronger the organizational will of the government, the higher the likelihood of producing well-performing climate change policies. Conversely, the weaker the organizational will, the lower the likelihood of producing well-performing policies. From these perspectives, the above-mentioned under-performing climate change policies therefore reveal an inadequate/un-sustained organizational will by the government to adopt environmentally friendly economic development policies in the long-term.

The second risk factor looks at the government-industry-academia relationship in its entirety. The joint pooling and management of financial, manpower and technical resources by government, industry and academia are necessary for enabling these three stakeholders to effectively pursue well-performing climate change policies in the long-term. It is given that practically speaking, no single stakeholder has all the necessary resources and management know-how to coordinate these resources to effect well-performing climate change policies. Hence, like the case for the first risk factor, this relationship is a relative one. Specifically, the more extensive and sustained the collective pooling and management of the above-mentioned resources, the stronger the capabilities of government, industry and academia in effectively pursuing well-performing long-term climate change policies. In contrast, the less extensive and sustained the collective resource pooling and management, the weaker the capabilities of government, industry and academia. Based on these insights, the under-performing policies underlie government-industry-academia managerial oversight in allocating more resources to drive up technological innovations in fighting climate change.

Importantly, the above success and risk factors from a Triple Helix approach should be understood to operate together to drive the well-performing and under-performing policies respectively. Overall, the success and risk factors have been found to tend to occur at the formulation and implementation stages of the policies. This insight, broadly speaking, seems partly aligned with Kim & Kwa (2020) [72] finding that most public-private partnership risk factors have the tendency to partly appear at the project operation stage in Singapore.

Importantly, the success and risk factor findings advance three key theoretical contributions to the climate change policy response literature. First, the above-detailed success and risk factors contribute to the knowledge body of success and risk factors in climate change response research from a Triple Helix theoretical approach. Second, the above-detailed success factors of organizational belief, recognition and commitment together constitute the necessary conditions under which the likelihood of effective co-ordination and organisation of technological, manpower and financial resources can increase. Specifically, under these conditions, the likelihood of government-industry-academia cooperation/successful negotiation/conflict-resolution over the creation and allocation of resources (e.g., type/scope and scale/amount) can increase. Therefore, clear policy design and implementation planning can materialise; thereby enhancing the likelihood of policy success. Conversely, barring the abovementioned necessary conditions, the likelihood of government-industry-academia cooperation/negotiation/conflict resolution over creation and allocation of resources can reduce. Consequently, unclear/conflicting policy design and implementation planning can result, lowering the likelihood of policy success.

Third, the above-detailed risk factors of inadequate/un-sustained organizational will and managerial oversight constitute the necessary conditions under which the likelihood of ineffective coordination and organisation of the abovementioned resources can increase. Specifically, under these conditions, the likelihood of un-cooperation/unsuccessful negotiation/unresolved conflicting expectations or objectives by government, industry and academia over resources, can increase. Hence, vague policy design and implementation planning can occur; raising the likelihood of policy failure. Conversely, without the abovementioned necessary conditions, the likelihood of un-cooperation/unsuccessful negotiation/unresolved conflicting expectations or objectives by government, industry and academia over resources, can reduce. Therefore, less vague policy design and implementation planning can result; reducing the likelihood of policy failure.

The above conditions demonstrate that the success and risk factors are crucial elements underpinning the Triple Helix theory. However, these conditions are currently absent and therefore warrant addition to the typology. The application of this revised typology in future climate change response research will better capture/analyse, in a government-industry-academia climate change governance system, the complex inter-actional (e.g., cooperation, negotiation, conflict) and systems-based (e.g., institutional capabilities/resources) factors that can drive, for instance, well-performing and un-der-performing policies respectively. Figure 2 below depicts the summarised version of the revised typology.

7. Conclusions

For policymakers, the success and risk factors are based on the centralised and decentralised policy systems of Singapore and Australia respectively. This demonstrates that the factors can apply to any policy system that addresses/aims to address climate change mainly via the Government-Industry-Academia approach. Hence, government, industry and academia should invest time and resources (e.g., funding, legal and policy training) in accordance with existing practical conditions (e.g., budgetary/policy knowledge capabilities; varying business/livelihood interests countrywide) to develop the following capabilities:

• Climate change cooperation/conflict governance frameworks/mechanisms
• Strengthen legal enforcement for the incorporation of environmentally friendly technologies (e.g., building, air cleanliness, water treatment etc.).
• Local research and development expertise on managing climate change solutions (e.g., scientific knowledge base and pool).
• Government climate change response units (e.g., climate change response think tanks, taskforces, departments, ministries etc.) that are primarily responsible for coordinating climate change response tools and resources (e.g., financial, technological, manpower) both at the local and national/federal levels (where applicable).