Next Article in Journal
Nested One-to-One Symmetric Classification Method on a Fuzzy SVM for Moving Vehicles
Previous Article in Journal
Interweaving the Principle of Least Potential Energy in School and Introductory University Physics Courses
Article Menu
Issue 3 (March) cover image

Export Article

Symmetry 2017, 9(3), 46; doi:10.3390/sym9030046

Article
Symmetry in Domination for Hypergraphs with Choice
Kenneth S. Berenhaut 1,*, Brendan P. Lidral-Porter 1, Theodore H. Schoen 1 and Kyle P. Webb 2
1
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC 27106, USA
2
Department of Statistics, Virginia Tech University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA
*
Correspondence: Tel.: +1-336-758-5922
Academic Editor: Angel Garrido
Received: 7 January 2017 / Accepted: 14 March 2017 / Published: 22 March 2017

Abstract

:
In this paper, we introduce the concept of (pair-wise) domination graphs for hypergraphs endowed with a choice function on edges. We are interested, for instance, in minimal numbers of edges for associated domination graphs. Theorems regarding the existence of balanced (zero-edge) domination graphs are presented. Several open questions are posed.
Keywords:
hypergraph; choice; symmetry; hypertournament; domination

1. Introduction

In this paper, we introduce the concept of pair-wise domination for hypergraphs endowed with a choice function on edges. A hypergraph is a pair H = ( V , E ) , where V = { v 1 , v 2 , , v n } is a set of n vertices (or nodes) and E = { e 1 , e 2 , , e m } is a set of m non-empty subsets of V called hyperedges or edges (see for instance [1]). A k-hypertournament is a complete k-hypergraph H = ( V , E ) (i.e., E consists of all the n k possible k-subsets), with each k-edge endowed with an orientation. Here we are interested in hypergraphs where each edge, e, has a chosen element C ( e ) e (in place of a complete orientation). We will refer to the pair ( H , C ) as a (complete) k-hypergraph with choice (or an ( n , k ) choice-hypergraph). For various considerations of choice functions, see for instance [2,3]. For some recent work related to choice in the context of Cayley graphs, see [4].
In the case k = 2 , both k-hypertournaments and hypergraphs with choice reduce to standard tournaments. For discussion of tournaments, see for instance [5,6,7]. The following is an example of a standard tournament with n = 5 vertices.
Example 1.
Consider the complete 2-hypertournament with five nodes and ten edges, depicted via the table in Figure 1a. Here, for instance, vertex 1 is chosen in the presence of vertices 2 and 4 (the first and third lines in the table). In fact, in this particular instance, each vertex is chosen for exactly two of the 5 2 = 10 edges. Figure 1b gives a graphical display with a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w whenever vertex v is chosen in the presence of w.
In the next example, we consider a complete 3-hypergraph with choice.
Example 2.
Consider the complete 3-hypergraph with choice with five vertices and 10 edges, depicted in the table in Figure 2a. Here, vertex 1 is chosen once in the presence of vertices 2 and 4 (for edges { 1 , 2 , 3 } and { 1 , 3 , 4 } , respectively), twice in the presence of vertex 3 (again edges { 1 , 2 , 3 } and { 1 , 3 , 4 } ) and never in the presence of vertex 5. Note that again, as in Example 1, each node is chosen in the case of exactly two edges.
In considering possible analogues to Figure 1b, summarizing domination, one might include a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w, if and only if, for edges that include both v and w, the tally of wins for v exceeds that of w. The resulting graph is depicted in Figure 2b. Note that there is a directed edge from vertex 1 to vertex 2, since vertex 1 is chosen for edge { 1 , 2 , 3 } , while there is no edge, e, where vertex 2 is chosen when 1 e . It may be noted that in this case the associated graph is path connected.
Now, define the function τ : V × V Z + via:
τ ( v , w ) = | { e E : v , w e   and   C ( e ) = v } | ,
i.e., τ ( v , w ) is the number of edges for which v is chosen in the presence of w.
Example 2 leads to consideration of potential appropriate graphs on n vertices reflecting domination properties among vertices. Here, we mention three possibilities.
(i)
There is a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w if:
τ ( w , v ) = 0 ,
i.e., if vertex w is never chosen in the presence of vertex v.
(ii)
There is a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w if:
τ ( v , w ) > τ ( w , v ) ,
i.e., among the edges containing both v and w, v is chosen with greater frequency.
(iii)
There is a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w if:
τ ( v , w ) > n 2 k 2 2 ,
i.e., v is chosen for a majority of the edges containing both v and w.
We will restrict attention henceforth to Option (ii), above, unless stated otherwise. It should be noted that for a standard tournament graph (i.e., k = 2 ) all three formulations are equivalent; furthermore, Option (iii) is a stricter requirement than Option (ii). For discussion of ranking for vertices in hypertournaments, see for instance [8].
We refer to graphs as in Figure 2b and Figure 3 (below) as ( n , k ) -choice-domination graphs or simply ( n , k ) -domination graphs. When n and k are clear from context, we will at times simply refer to these as domination graphs. As with tournaments, domination graphs could be valuable in considerations of individual dominance in competitive settings, as may arise for instance in biology, game theory or decision analysis. Note that hypergraphs with choice allow for analysis of scenarios wherein selection (but not full orientation) information is available.
Example 3.
Table 1 gives a 3-hypergraph with n = 5 vertices and m = 10 edges, along with four possible choice functions, C 0 (from Example 2), C 1 , C 2 and C 3 on E, while Figure 3 includes the associated domination graphs, for comparison.
For fixed n and k, many natural questions arise as to the properties of the resulting domination graphs; for instance:
  • What are the maximal and minimal number of edges possible for an ( n , k ) -domination graph?
  • What proportion of ( n , k ) -domination graphs are strongly path connected (for example, Figure 3a,b?
  • What is the distribution of the number of edges in the domination graph for a uniformly selected choice function on the edges of a k-hypergraph on n vertices?
  • What is the number of non-isomorphic ( n , k ) -domination graphs?
Example 4.
( ( 5 , 3 ) domination graphs.) For ( n , k ) = ( 5 , 3 ) , we have that | E | = 10 and the number of distinct choice functions on E is 3 10 = 59049 . Table 2 and Table 3 give frequency tables for the number of choice functions leading to domination graphs with a given number of edges, and a given number of strongly connected components, respectively. Note that 3348 choice functions result in strongly connected domination graphs. There are 225 non-isomorphic ( 5 , 3 ) -domination graphs (of which 21 are strongly connected); plots of these are provided in the Supplementary Materials; Table 4 gives the frequencies for these graphs. The two most frequent domination graphs (each occurring for 1560 distinct choice functions, C), are given in Figure 4a,b respectively; the most frequently occurring strongly connected domination graph is given in Figure 4c.
In reference to Question 1 above, in Section 2 below, we will prove the following two results.
Theorem 1.
Suppose n , k 1 and H = ( V , E ) is a complete k-hypergraph on n vertices. If k is odd and g c d ( n , k ) = 1 , then there exists a choice function, C, on E resulting in a zero-edge domination graph.
Theorem 2.
If ( H , C ) is a choice-hypergraph with a zero-edge domination graph, then for all v V :
{ e E : C ( e ) = v } = 1 n · n k
that is, each vertex is chosen for an equal number of edges, in E.
The question of minimal edges in associated domination graphs may be of interest in instances where notions of “fairness” and equitable distribution are of importance, such as in resource allocation, decision theory, data and network processing, and clinical trials. Fairness and choice have been considered in the past, notably in the context of social welfare and information processing. The interested reader might like to consult, for instance [2,3,4,9,10,11,12,13].
Figure 5 provides an example of a ( 9 , 5 ) choice-hypergraph with vertex set V = { 1 , 2 , , 9 } , possessing a zero edge domination graph (employing the construction in the proof of Theorem 1). Note that | E | = 9 5 = 126 , and τ ( 1 , 2 ) = 8 = τ ( 2 , 1 ) (as highlighted in red; C ( e ) for e E satisfying { 1 , 2 } e are indicated in bold). It may also be verified that | { e E : C ( e ) = 1 } | = 126 / 9 = 14 , as required by Theorem 2.
Before turning to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, we will briefly mention some recent related work on hypertournaments, which carry over to choice-hypergraphs. Recall that a k-hypertournament is a complete k-hypergraph H = ( V , E ) , with each edge endowed with an orientation. We will refer to the oriented edges as arcs.
One concept considered extensively in the literature is score sequences (see for instance [6,7,14,15,16,17,18]). In particular, for a given 1 i n define the score, s i of a vertex v i of a k-hypertournament on H = ( V , E ) as the number of arcs containing v i in which v i is not the last element (this is with a complete orientation on the edges, rather than a choice function solely selecting a single element). Similarly, define the losing score, r i as the number of arcs containing v i in which v i is the last element. The total score, t i , is then given by t i = s i r i . Finally, we obtain the score sequences ( s 1 , , s n ) , ( r 1 , , r n ) and ( t 1 , , t n ) . Guofei et al. proved the following results regarding the existence of score sequences (see also [16,19]).
Theorem 3.
(Guofei et al. [14]) Given two non-negative integers n and k with n k > 1 , a non-decreasing sequence R = ( r 1 , r 2 , , r n ) of non-negative integers is a losing score sequence of some k-hypertournament if and only if for each j ( k j n ):
i = 1 j r i j k ,
with equality when j = n .
Theorem 4.
(Guofei et al. [14]) Given two non-negative integers n and k with n k > 1 , a non-decreasing sequence S = ( s 1 , s 2 , , s n ) of non-negative integers is a score-sequence of some k-hypertournament if and only if for each j ( k j n ):
i = 1 j s i j n 1 k 1 + n j k n k ,
with equality when j = n .
A k-hypertournament is said to be regular if for each vertex, v, the tally of arcs containing v as the last element is n k / n . Koh and Ree [16] proved the following.
Theorem 5.
(Koh and Ree, [16]) A regular ( n , k ) hypertournament exists if and only if n | n k .
For alternative considerations of regularity, see [8,20].
Compare Theorem 5 with Theorems 1 and 2, above. Note that symmetry in domination (i.e., the existence of choice functions resulting in zero-edge domination graphs) is a stronger requirement than regularity. To see this, simply note that all standard tournaments have n k -edge domination graphs.
For further work on hypertournaments or score sequences, see for instance Pirizda et al. [15], Landau [18], Marshall [8], Khan et al. [6], Guofei et al. [14], Gunderson et al. [21], Li et al. [22], Guo and Surmacs [23], and Chou and Guofei [24].
In the next section, we prove Theorems 1 and 2.

2. Proof of Theorems 1 and 2

Before moving on to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, we introduce some preliminary notation. First, suppose n k 1 are fixed and ( H , C ) is an ( n , k ) -hypergraph with choice, where H = ( V , E ) is a complete k-hypergraph on n vertices. Without loss of generality, we assume that V = { 0 , 1 , , n 1 } . Similar to in [16], define the rotation operator P : E E , via P ( e ) = e + 1 ( mod n ) , i.e., P acts on k-subsets of V by shifting the elements (cyclically) to the right by one. Here, e + 1 indicates { v + 1 : v e } .g For e E and j 0 , define P j as the j-fold iteration of P and the order of e, α e , via:
α e = d e f min { γ 1 : P γ ( e ) = e } .
We will denote the set of equivalence classes under successive application of P by R = { R 1 , , R q } . Note that for R R , | R | is the order of each e R . We will refer to elements of R as rotation classes of H.
In general, addition of the form S + c for S Z and c Z , will be modulo n, unless stated otherwise.
The set e E is said to be symmetric if e = e ( mod n ) , and more generally R R is symmetric if, for all e R , e R . Note that if for some e R , e = e , then for 1 i n , ( e + i ) = e i = e i R , and hence if e R is symmetric, then R is symmetric. If R is not symmetric, then there exists an R R R such that e R implies e R .
Let H n , k be the set of all ( n , k ) -choice hypergraphs for fixed n , k Z + and G n be the set of all directed graphs on n vertices. Suppose a domination scheme, D is fixed (see (i)–(iii), above, for examples) and define G D : H n , k G n , where G D ( T ) is the domination graph for choice-hypergraph T = ( H , C ) under domination scheme D.
We have the following elementary lemma:
Lemma 1.
Suppose H is a k-hypertournament on n vertices with g c d ( n , k ) = 1 . Then, for any R R , | R | = n .
Proof. 
Suppose g c d ( n , k ) = 1 , and R = { R 1 , R 2 , , R q } for some q 1 . For any R R and any e R , set α = α e and represent e as a binary vector ζ = ( ζ 1 , ζ 2 , , ζ n ) . We then have, with a = 1 i α ζ i and b = n / α :
k = b a , n = b α .
Now, suppose n = α p + r , with p 0 and 0 r α 1 . Then:
e = P α ( p + 1 ) ( e ) = P n r + α ( e ) = P α r ( e ) .
Since α is minimal, we have r = 0 and hence b = n / α Z . Thus, since g c d ( n , k ) = 1 , (9) gives that b = 1 , α = n and finally | R | = n . ☐
For convenience of notation, as in (1), define the function τ R : V × V Z + via:
τ R ( v , w ) = | { e R : v , w e   and   C ( e ) = v } | ,
i.e., τ R ( v , w ) is the number of edges in the rotation class R R for which v is chosen in the presence of w. Note that
τ ( v , w ) = R R τ R ( v , w ) .
Lemma 2.
Suppose n , k 1 with k odd, H = ( V , E ) is a complete k-hypergraph on n vertices, and R R . If R is symmetric and e R , then there exists a ξ V and T = { δ 1 , δ 2 , , δ k } , such that e = ξ + T , and δ T implies δ T .
Proof. 
Suppose that R is symmetric and e = { x 1 , , x k } R . Then, there exists an i such that e + i = e , and hence a permutation ( j 1 , j 2 , , j k ) of ( 1 , 2 , , k ) such that:
x j q + i = x q , 1 q k .
Since k is odd, there exists a Q such that:
x Q + i = x Q ,
and taking differences, (13) and (14) imply:
x j q x Q = x Q x q = ( x q x Q ) , 1 q k .
The result follows upon setting ξ = x Q , and T = { x q x Q : 1 q k } . □
We will now prove Theorem 1 regarding the existence of choice functions with symmetry in domination.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Suppose g c d ( n , k ) = 1 , k is odd, and ( H , C ) is an ( n , k ) -choice hypergraph. Consider E, the set of all edges in H, and let R = { R 1 , R 2 , , R q } be the set of all rotation classes of H, where, by Lemma 1, for R R , | R | = n , and | R | = n k / n . Fix v , w V , with v w , and choose some R R .
Suppose R is symmetric and fix an e R . Then, by Lemma 2, e = ξ + T , where ξ V and T is closed under additive inverses. For u = e + i R , set C ( u ) = ξ + i . Suppose v = ξ + j v and w = ξ + j w for j v , j w { 0 , 1 , . . . , n 1 } . For f R , C ( f ) = v implies f = e + j v and C ( f ) = w implies f = e + j w . Note that w e + j v if and only if j w j v T . Similarly, v e + j w if and only if j v j w T . Since T is closed under inverses, we have:
τ R ( v , w ) = | { e R : v , w e   and   C ( e ) = v } | = | { e R : v , w e   and   C ( e ) = w } | = τ R ( w , v ) .
Suppose R is not symmetric, and consider R = { e : e R } , and note that R R = . Fix an e R and ξ e , and write e = ξ + T (note that T is not closed under inverses). For f R R , set:
C ( f ) = ξ + i if   f = e + i = ξ + i + T R ξ + i if   f = e + i = ξ + i T R .
Now, suppose v = ξ + j v and w = ξ + j w . For f R R , C ( f ) = v implies f = e + j v or f = e + j v , and C ( f ) = w implies f = e + j w or f = e + j w . Note that w e + j v if and only if j w j v T , and w e + j v if and only if j w j v T (i.e., j v j w T ). Similarly, v e + j w if and only if j v j w T , and v e + j w if and only if j v j w T (i.e., j w j v T ). Thus:
τ R R ( v , w ) = | { f R R : v , w f   and   C ( f ) = v } | = | { f R R : v , w f   and   C ( f ) = w } | = τ R R ( w , v ) .
Employing (16), (18) and (12), the result follows. □
We will now prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Suppose ( H , C ) is a choice-hypergraph with a zero-edge domination graph, where H = ( V , E ) is a complete k-hypergraph on n vertices. For a fixed vertex v V , define σ v = { e E : v e } and ω v = { e σ v : C ( e ) = v } , i.e., σ v is the set of edges to which v belongs and ω v is the set of edges for which v is selected. Note that:
| ω v | | σ v | = n 1 k 1 .
Assume | ω v | < n k / n . Since ( H , C ) has a zero-edge domination graph, τ ( w , v ) = τ ( v , w ) for all w V and hence:
n 1 k 1 = | σ v | = ( k 1 ) | ω v | + | ω v |
< k 1 n n k = n 1 k 1 .
Thus, | ω v | n k / n for all v V . The result follows upon noting that:
v V ω v = | E | = n k .
 ☐

Supplementary Materials

The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/9/3/46/s1, File S1: Plots of the 225 distinct non-isomorphic (5,3) domination graphs. File S2: Plots of the 21 distinct strongly connected, non-isomorphic (5,3) domination graphs

Author Contributions

Kenneth S. Berenhaut, Brendan P. Lidral-Porter, Theodore H. Schoen and Kyle P. Webb contributed to the results; Kenneth S. Berenhaut and Brendan P. Lidral-Porter wrote the paper.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

  1. Berge, C.; Minieka, E. Graphs and Hypergraphs; North-Holland Publishing Company: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1973; Volume 7. [Google Scholar]
  2. Johnson, M.R. Ideal structures of path independent choice functions. J. Econ. Theory 1995, 65, 468–504. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  3. Moulin, H. Choice functions over a finite set: A summary. Soc. Choice Welf. 1985, 2, 147–160. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  4. Beeler, K.E.; Berenhaut, K.S.; Cooper, J.N.; Hunter, M.N.; Barr, P.S. Deterministic walks with choice. Discret. Appl. Math. 2014, 162, 100–107. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  5. Kayibi, K.; Khan, M.A.; Pirzada, S. Uniform sampling of k-hypertournaments. Linear Multilinear Algebra 2013, 61, 123–138. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  6. Khan, M.A.; Pirzada, S.; Kayibi, K.K. Scores, inequalities and regular hypertournaments. J. Math. Inequal. Appl. 2012. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  7. Pirzada, S.; Naikoo, T. On score sets in tournaments. Vietnam J. Math. 2006, 34, 157–161. [Google Scholar]
  8. Marshall, S. Properties of K-Tournaments. Ph.D. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada, 1994. [Google Scholar]
  9. Brookes, S. Fairness, resources, and separation. Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 2010, 265, 177–195. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  10. Cooper, C.; Ilcinkas, D.; Klasing, R.; Kosowski, A. Derandomizing random walks in undirected graphs using locally fair exploration strategies. Distrib. Comput. 2011, 24. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  11. Jaeger, M. On fairness and randomness. Inf. Comput. 2009, 207, 909–922. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  12. Krawczyk, M.W. A model of procedural and distributive fairness. Theory Decis. 2011, 70, 111–128. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  13. Völzer, H.; Varacca, D. Defining fairness in reactive and concurrent systems. J. ACM 2012, 59. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  14. Guofei, Z.; Tianxing, Y.; Kemin, Z. On score sequences of k-hypertournaments. Eur. J. Comb. 2000, 21, 993–1000. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  15. Pirzada, S.; Chishti, T.; Naikoo, T. Score lists in [h-k]-bipartite hypertournaments. Discret. Math. Appl. 2009, 19, 321–328. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  16. Koh, Y.; Ree, S. On k-hypertournament matrices. Linear Algebra Appl. 2003, 373, 183–195. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  17. Pirzada, S.; Khan, M.A.; Guofei, Z.; Kayibi, K.K. On scores, losing scores and total scores in hypertournaments. Electron. J. Graph Theory Appl. 2015, 3, 8–21. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  18. Landau, H. On dominance relations and the structure of animal societies: III The condition for a score structure. Bull. Math. Biol. 1953, 15, 143–148. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  19. Pirzada, S.; Zhou, G. On k-hypertournament losing scores. Acta Univ. Sapientiae 2010, 2, 5–9. [Google Scholar]
  20. Surmacs, M. Regular hypertournaments and Arc-pancyclicity. J. Graph Theory 2017, 84, 176–190. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  21. Gunderson, K.; Morrison, N.; Semeraro, J. Bounding the number of hyperedges in friendship r-hypergraphs. Eur. J. Comb. 2016, 51, 125–134. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  22. Li, H.; Li, S.; Guo, Y.; Surmacs, M. On the vertex-pancyclicity of hypertournaments. Discret. Appl. Math. 2013, 161, 2749–2752. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  23. Guo, Y.; Surmacs, M. Pancyclic out-arcs of a vertex in a hypertournament. Australas. J. Comb. 2015, 61, 227–250. [Google Scholar]
  24. Chao, W.; Guofei, Z. Note on the degree sequences of k-hypertournaments. Discret. Math. 2008, 308, 2292–2296. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
Figure 1. (a) An example of a standard tournament with five vertices; and (b) an associated graphical display with a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w whenever vertex v is chosen in the presence of w.
Figure 1. (a) An example of a standard tournament with five vertices; and (b) an associated graphical display with a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w whenever vertex v is chosen in the presence of w.
Symmetry 09 00046 g001
Figure 2. (a) An example of a possible (5,3) choice-hypergraph; (b) with a possible graph summarizing pair-wise domination.
Figure 2. (a) An example of a possible (5,3) choice-hypergraph; (b) with a possible graph summarizing pair-wise domination.
Symmetry 09 00046 g002
Figure 3. Domination graphs arising from choice-hypergraphs with choice functions (a) C 0 ; (b) C 1 ; (c) C 2 ; and (d) C 3 as in Table 1.
Figure 3. Domination graphs arising from choice-hypergraphs with choice functions (a) C 0 ; (b) C 1 ; (c) C 2 ; and (d) C 3 as in Table 1.
Symmetry 09 00046 g003
Figure 4. Three frequently occurring ( 5 , 3 ) -domination graphs. The two most frequent domination graphs are given in (a,b). The most frequently occurring strongly connected domination graph is given in (c).
Figure 4. Three frequently occurring ( 5 , 3 ) -domination graphs. The two most frequent domination graphs are given in (a,b). The most frequently occurring strongly connected domination graph is given in (c).
Symmetry 09 00046 g004
Figure 5. A (9,5)-choice hypergraph resulting in a zero-edge domination graph. For a given e E , the value of C ( e ) is listed to the right of the five elements of e in a demarcated column.
Figure 5. A (9,5)-choice hypergraph resulting in a zero-edge domination graph. For a given e E , the value of C ( e ) is listed to the right of the five elements of e in a demarcated column.
Symmetry 09 00046 g005
Table 1. Four possible ( 5 , 3 ) choice-hypergraphs.
Table 1. Four possible ( 5 , 3 ) choice-hypergraphs.
e C 0 ( e ) C 1 ( e ) C 2 ( e ) C 3 ( e )
1{1, 2, 3}1111
2{1, 2, 4}4122
3{1, 2, 5}5555
4{1, 3, 4}1344
5{1, 3, 5}3533
6{1, 4, 5}4411
7{2, 3, 4}3234
8{2, 3, 5}2222
9{2, 4, 5}2444
10{3, 4, 5}5353
Table 2. Edge distribution for (5,3)-domination graphs.
Table 2. Edge distribution for (5,3)-domination graphs.
Edges02345678910
Frequency6601201035332410080151801692091803144
Table 3. Component distribution for (5,3)-domination graphs.
Table 3. Component distribution for (5,3)-domination graphs.
Components1235
Frequency334866301176037311
Table 4. Frequency distribution for non-isomorphic ( 5 , 3 ) -domination graphs.
Table 4. Frequency distribution for non-isomorphic ( 5 , 3 ) -domination graphs.
Ind.Freq.Ind.Freq.Ind.Freq.Ind.Freq.Ind.Freq.Ind.Freq.Ind.Freq.
11560251033604300584064807240
848091201060011840122401396014120
15720161201748018360192402012021420
22840232402412025120269602718028180
29180301203112032240331203484035240
36480372403812039600401204124042360
43600441804536046300471548180491200
507205115605224053960544805512056360
57600582405912060240612406284063360
64840654806684067360681206924070720
71480723607324074240754807624077480
78360791208024081120822408312084120
85240862408712088120892409036091480
92360934809412095240962409712098120
99120100240101360102360103120104120105720
106240107120108210109120110240111120112120
113120114600115120116360117360118120119240
120360121120122120123120124120125240126120
127360128240129240130120131120132120133360
13412013524013630013712013812013912014060
14136014212014312014412014560146120147300
148240149120150120151360152240153240154120
155120156120157120158120159120160120161120
162120163240164120165480166120167240168240
169120170240171120172120173240174120175120
176120177240178120179120180120181240182120
183120184120185240186120187120188120189120
190120191120192120193120194120195120196120
197120198120199120200120201120202120203120
20412020512020612020712020812020912021060
21136021212021312021412021512021624217120
21812021912022012022112022224022312022424
2256
Symmetry EISSN 2073-8994 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top