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Article

Conceptual Model of Predictive Safety Management Methodology in Aviation

Faculty of Transport and Traffic Sciences, University of Zagreb, Vukelićeva 4, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Aerospace 2023, 10(3), 268; https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace10030268
Submission received: 6 February 2023 / Revised: 6 March 2023 / Accepted: 8 March 2023 / Published: 10 March 2023
(This article belongs to the Collection Air Transportation—Operations and Management)

Abstract

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Due to the continuous growth of air traffic and the development of aviation systems, the current safety management methodologies should be improved and upgraded. Safety management systems help aviation organizations to manage, maintain and increase safety efficiently. The focus of the research is on the development of the predictive safety management methodology to upgrade current reactive and proactive safety management methodologies and to improve the overall safety level in aviation organizations. Predictive methods are used in various aviation sectors (air navigation services, airport operations, airline operations) for planning purposes but not in the segment of safety management. Available examples of predictive methods were tested and analyzed. Time series decomposition methods were selected as most suited for implementation in aviation safety management. The paper explicitly emphasizes correlations between safety management methodologies in the sample aviation organization. The paper also shows how causal links among organizational and safety performance indicators can be detected, by developing causal models of mutual influences using causal modeling methods, on the sample organization. This research defined steps and tools of the conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology, which enables an organization to identify and mitigate future adverse events.

1. Introduction

The Safety Management System (SMS) is developed to manage aviation safety. As a regulatory requirement, SMS is implemented in every aviation organization. It uses various active tools to manage safety, such as clear safety policies and objectives, hazard identification, risk management, risk mitigation, safety reporting, safety audits, safety investigations, corrective or mitigative safety actions, safety culture, safety education, safety communication, etc. [1,2,3,4,5].
Safety Management Systems has significantly contributed to aviation safety since their first introduction in the field. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and aviation organizations worldwide are continuously making efforts to ensure improvements and advances in aviation safety management [6].
ICAO’s global plans define the tools and goals by which ICAO, states and aviation organizations can efficiently manage, maintain and increase safety [6,7,8]. Defined policies and procedures aim to allow the aviation industry to achieve set objectives through prescribed ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The main documents regulating such policies and procedures are outlined in ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) [6] and Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation—Safety Management [9].
Considering the continuous growth of air traffic and the development of the aviation system, the existing safety management methodologies need to be improved and upgraded. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted the aviation industry, the continuous growth of air traffic and the development of aviation systems is still anticipated in the near future. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) [10], the recovery in air travel continued in 2022, with an increase of 64.4% in total traffic in 2022 (measured in revenue passenger kilometers or RPKs) compared to 2021. Globally, 2022 air traffic was at 68.5% of pre-pandemic (2019) levels, which shows a speedy recovery and increasing trend from 2020 onwards. Therefore, a full recovery of air traffic is expected in 2024 or 2025. Also, it is important to mention that according to Aviation Safety Network, which released the latest air crash statistics [11], the data on air crash fatalities increased in 2020, in comparison to previous years, despite the Covid-19 pandemic’s negative impact on the aviation industry and enormous decrease in the number of transported passengers during this period. Due to these observations, the existing safety management methodologies should be upgraded.
In most aviation organizations, reactive safety management methodology is used, while some organizations use proactive safety management methodology.
Various examples of the application of predictive methods in aviation can be found in individual segments of the aviation system to conduct safe operations, but none in a segment of safety management. The predictive methodology in the safety management segment is not yet established or clearly defined.
Theoretically, predictive safety management methodology should be based on the notion that safety is best accomplished by identifying a problem before it occurs. Hence, predictive safety management is assumed to relentlessly seek information from various sources that could indicate emerging hazards.
The main objective of this research is a development of a conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology to improve the level of safety in aviation organizations.
The research strives to identify sources of hazard identification, identify correlations between safety management methodologies, identify the link between causation and prediction, identify causal links among organizational and safety performance indicators, an, develop a conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology.
For this research, actual safety data from sample aviation organizations were used to make analyses and draw conclusions.
By developing a conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology, hazards that may arise in the future can be identified. This ensures early response and early definition of mitigation measures.

2. Overview of the Aviation Safety Management

This chapter gives an overview of aviation safety management, including background on aviation safety management systems, essential elements and role of safety performance management, an overview of all safety management methodologies in aviation, and a comprehensive overview of the entire safety management system in aviation.

2.1. Aviation Safety Management System

The SMS is the system used to manage and improve aviation safety [9]. ICAO defines SMS as a tool to manage aviation safety, including organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures [9]. Effective SMS must have four main components in place to work properly and efficiently. The four main components of SMS are safety policy and objectives, risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion [1]. According to [1,5,12,13,14], the framework of organizational SMS should include the previously mentioned four components and accompanying twelve elements: management commitment, safety accountability and responsibilities, the appointment of key safety personnel, coordination of emergency response planning, SMS documentation, hazard identification, safety risk assessment and mitigation, safety performance monitoring and measurement, management of change, continuous improvement of the SMS, training and education, and safety communication. The SMS framework is presented in Figure 1.
The second and most relevant component of the SMS is Safety Risk Management (SRM), and it includes hazard (occurrence) identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation [15,16,17,18,19]. The third component of the SMS is called Safety Assurance (SA), and it includes safety performance monitoring and measurement, management of change and continuous improvement of SMS [1]. These components are emphasized specifically because the improvement of aviation safety management systems, as observed through the research, lies within them. The next part explains the role of Safety Performance Management (SPM) more closely.

2.2. Role of Safety Performance Management

Safety performance management monitors an organization’s safety performance and determines whether its activities and processes are working properly to achieve its safety objectives [20,21,22,23,24]. The key to successful safety performance management lies in defining Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), which monitor and measure an organization’s safety performance [25,26]. Information obtained through SPIs ensures the organization is aware of the current situation and facilitates decision-making to ensure the achievement of organization’s safety objectives. SPIs can be qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative indicators are measured by quantity, and qualitative indicators are descriptive and measured by quality [1]. Therefore, the definition of SPIs should be realistic, relevant, and linked to safety objectives [27,28]. Along with SPIs, Safety Performance Targets (SPTs) are defined to set the target value of the SPIs, representing the desired level of safety performance.
Safety performance management helps the organization define safety objectives, determine top safety risks, monitor progress made toward defined safety objectives, and gather safety data and safety information needed to make informed decisions regarding safety management [29].
Initial SPIs are frequently developed using limited resources of safety data. However, over time, more safety data is going to be available and the organization’s safety performance capabilities would become stronger [1]. Organizations can consider refining the scope of SPIs and SPTs to better align with the desired safety objectives, as their system matures [30,31,32]. Examples of SPIs can include events regarding structural damage to equipment, circumstances in which an accident nearly occurred, operational personnel who became incapacitated or unable to perform their duties safely, operational personnel or members of the aviation community who were fatally or seriously injured, rate of mandatory/voluntary occurrence reports, etc. [1].
Figure 2 shows general safety performance management process and its connections to Safety Data Collection and Processing Systems (SDCPS) and safety analysis [1,33].

2.3. Safety Management Methodologies in Aviation

Up until 2018, the aviation safety management defined three methodologies: reactive, proactive, and predictive [34,35,36]. As per [34], predictive methodology assumed data gathering to identify possible negative future outcomes or events, analyzing system processes and the environment to identify potential future hazards, and initiating mitigative actions. In 2018, ICAO issued the new (fourth) Safety Management Manual (SMM) edition. It defined only two safety management methodologies: reactive and proactive [1], due to a lack of implementing previously defined “predictive methodology” in the segment of safety management. It also redefined what used to be called “predictive methodology” into “predictive analysis”, describing the possibilities of extracting information from historical and current data and using it to predict trends and behavior patterns of the data, but not of “future events”. It is important to emphasize that “predictive methodology” does exist in certain forms, such as real-time flight monitoring systems (e.g., Flight Data Analysis—FDA [37,38]) that gather an enormous amount of flight data and analyze them to detect possible infractions. However, true “predictive methodology” is not yet well established, as it assumes discovering potential and possible hazards (events) based on predictive analyses (forecasts) [5,39,40,41,42]. On the other hand, predictive (forecasting) methods are used in the aviation industry, mostly for planning purposes of future capacity or traffic demand [43], but not in the segment of aviation safety management.
As per [5], the predictive methodology of the SMS can use historical and current safety data, specifically SPIs and SPTs of the organization [44], as the input information to conduct predictive analysis, i.e., forecasts using predictive (forecasting) methods. The obtained results show predicted trends and future behavior patterns of established SPIs in the organization, which gives an improved picture of future safety performance in the organization and detection of future hazards. Furthermore, as per [44], it has been shown how predictive methods (such as trend projection or moving average [45]) can be used to analyze organization’s safety data.
Figure 3 shows processes of reactive, proactive, and predictive safety management methodology in the current form. All three methodologies are closely linked to every element of the ICAO framework, but their most important role is within the element of hazard identification, where they act as a tool to acquire necessary data to identify hazards [5]. Reactive methodology (Figure 3a) gathers data from previous accidents and incidents and learns from their outcomes by establishing causes of the accident or incident (RCA—Root Cause Analysis). Proactive methodology (Figure 3b) uses safety reporting systems and safety performance indicators/targets to gather safety information continuously, to detect and mitigate the potential threats that may consequently trigger the occurrence of accident or incident. Proactive methodology extended safety data input sources and introduced so-called “defenses”, (D1, D2, D3 in the figure) representing regulations, technology, and training, respectively. As already mentioned, predictive methodology (Figure 3c) is not yet well established, as it assumes the detection of future hazards based on predictive analyses (forecasts). Current predictive methodology implies the use of real-time monitoring and analysis systems (e.g., FDA), which extends previous proactive methodology, and introduces another defense layer to the system (D4 in the figure).

2.4. Comprehensive Overview of Aviation Safety Management System

Based on existing regulatory and organizational set-up, Figure 4 shows a comprehensive overview of the current aviation safety management system with all its elements and processes. Safety management system comprises three main areas: safety data collection, safety risk management, and safety documentation. The safety data collection stage includes methodologies and safety database. This part presents the front of every safety management system, where information about hazards is captured and forwarded to the next step of the process. Safety risk management comprises five elements: hazard identification, risk definition, risk assessment, risk mitigation, and the implementation of mitigation measures. Safety documentation implies documenting all activities related to identified hazard, storing them back to the safety database, and updating the safety database which participates in the initial hazard capturing process. It can be observed that safety management system works like a closed loop, where every new hazard, after being processed by the system, returns to the initial phase (safety database) and helps in capturing the next hazard that needs to be processed.

3. Materials and Methods

Considering the continuous growth of air traffic and aviation system development, the current safety management methodologies need to be upgraded. In most aviation organizations, reactive safety management methodology is used, while some organizations use proactive safety management methodology.
As already mentioned, various examples of the application of predictive methods in aviation can be found in individual segments of the aviation system. The purpose is to conduct safe operations, but none in a segment of safety management. The predictive methodology in the safety management segment is not yet established nor it is clearly defined. The objective was to develop a predictive safety management methodology and based on that, develop a new conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology, which would be an upgrade of the existing reactive and proactive safety management. It would ensure a more efficient collection and analysis of safety data, as well as an improved hazard identification process [15].
In addition to conceptualizing predictive safety management methodology, the research aimed to prove the possibility of upgrading the existing methodologies with predictive one and the application of a combination of all methodologies, instead of introducing and applying each one individually. The research is focused on detecting correlations between safety management methodologies and correlations among organizational and safety performance indicators on the sample aviation organizations. It is possible to improve safety management processes in aviation organizations by identifying these correlations, detecting causal factors, and using predictive methods.
The IBM SPSS Statistics is a statistical and predictive analytics software used for the research conducted in this paper [46]. By using this software, all data in the observed datasets were analyzed, optimal forecasting models and forecasts were obtained, and causal model were made presenting causal links among all variables in the observed datasets.
After collecting and analyzing available examples of predicting methods used in various aviation sectors (air navigation services, airport operations, airline operations), the following nine methods were selected to be tested as appropriate for aviation safety management, they are: Holt’s linear trend, Brown’s linear trend, damped trend, simple exponential smoothing, simple seasonal exponential smoothing, Winter’s additive method, Winter’s multiplicative method, moving average method, and ARIMA modeling. Statistical data on the number of flights at a sample airport, in the period from December 2017 to February 2022 (as per Appendix A) served as dataset for all examples of forecasting, using various predictive (forecasting) methods. Software for statistics and predictive analytics, IBM SPSS Statistics, was used to analyze and compare the results of each selected method. A detailed overview of most suitable predictive methods that can be applied in the segment of aviation safety management is presented in Appendix A. The best fits have proven to be simple seasonal exponential smoothing, Winter’s additive method, and moving average method.

4. Results

A conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology in aviation was developed, based on conducted research and obtained results presented in this chapter.

4.1. Using Predictive Methods to Forecast Safety Performance Indicators

Organizations usually measure safety performance indicators such as the number of accidents or incidents, the number of changes, the number of findings related to safety, etc., in relation to time frame (monthly or yearly basis) or to conducted operations (aircraft operations made or flight hours flown).
As per [15,44], the focus of the research was to show how predictive methods (forecasting methods) can be used in safety management to improve current SMS. For this research, actual safety data of an aviation organization were used to show example of the application of predictive methods to forecast safety performance indicators. The sample organization in question is an aviation training organization. Hence, it is certified as the Approved Training Organization (ATO). It owns its own fleet of aircraft. Hence, it is certified as aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness organization. It also provides the synthetic flight training. Hence, it is certified as flight simulation training operator. The sample organization applies reactive and proactive safety management methodologies to gather safety information and data, via established safety reporting systems. As a part of the safety assurance component of their SMS, the sample organization has several Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) established. SPIs are monitored yearly to show the safety performance of the organization (Table 1). Targets for some of the SPIs are set, and for some are not. Table 1 shows examples of those SPIs which have set accompanying targets, i.e., SPI1—Total number of reported occurrences/hazards, SPI2—Number of hazards reported via mandatory occurrence reporting system, SPI11—Number of conducted risk assessments and mitigations, SPI14—Number of held safety review boards, and SPI15—Number of reported occurrences vs. the number of flight hours. The complete dataset and detailed explanation can be found in Appendix B.
Table 2 and Figure 5 show one example of forecasting safety performance indicator behavior (SPI1—Total number of reported occurrences/hazards) in the terms of incline/decline of its values in the future period 2020–2024 based on historical safety data of the organization in the period 2014–2019. The deviation from target area is also shown in the figure (marked green). The predictive method used for this example is called Simple Moving Average (SMA). All other examples of forecasting safety performance indicators can be found in Appendix C.

4.2. Correlation between Safety Management Methodologies

As presented in [15,44], the objective was to show correlations between reactive, proactive, and predictive methodology of safety management to obtain more efficient SMS.
Based on what had been learned so far, safety performance indicators were recognized as very important ingredient of safety management, and were observed in each safety management system separately, i.e., reactive, proactive, and predictive, to present them as a bridge between safety management methodologies (Figure 6) [15].
Figure 6a shows how arbitrary safety performance indicator (SPI—Number of accidents or serious incidents) behaves in reactive safety management system. It can be observed that SPI (not defined as SPI, but as historical data) is monitored and recorded over time. However, the reaction to each occurrence happens after occurrence has already happened. Decision on mitigative and preventive measures are made after conducting investigation and determining causes of event. Figure 6b shows how arbitrary safety performance indicator (SPI—Number of accidents or serious incidents) behaves in proactive safety management system. It can be observed that SPI (defined and established) is monitored and recorded over time with its set safety performance target (SPT) and reaction to each occurrence happens in the moment occurrence happens. Decision on mitigative and preventive measures are made right upon obtaining information on breaching the target area. Figure 6c shows how arbitrary safety performance indicator (SPI—Number of accidents or serious incidents) could behave in predictive safety management system. It can be observed that SPI would be monitored and recorded over time with set safety performance target (SPT). With the use of predictive methods, its behavior could be forecasted for future periods. Reaction to each breach in the future (predicted at time points where occurrence is likely to happen) could be made before breach (occurrence) happens. Decision on mitigative and preventive measures in this case, could be made before breaching the target area.
Example of predictive methodology using predictive methods to predict safety performance indicators’ behavior was presented in Section 4.1. The historical and current safety data, SPIs and SPTs of the sample organization were used as the input information to conduct predictive analysis using the predictive method (simple moving average). Results show SPIs’ future trends and behavior in the organization and provide insight into future safety performance.
While studying all three safety management methodologies, as per Section 2.3, it was observed that there are some differences, but more importantly, some similarities between them. All three methodologies form specific approaches to managing safety issues, i.e., there can be reactive, proactive, or predictive safety management systems depending on the approach to safety management in a specific organization. However, each approach has the same key steps in dealing with safety issues: hazard identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation (Figure 7).
It can be observed (Figure 7) that each methodology of safety management is different in the step of identifying hazards. Every defined safety management methodology needs and uses safety (input) data collected from various sources. The reactive methodology uses safety data from mandatory occurrence reporting (accident/incident reports). Proactive methodology collects data from mandatory and voluntary occurrence reports, and safety audits and safety performance measurement (establishment of SPIs and SPTs). Predictive methodology gathers and uses data from mandatory/voluntary occurrence reports, safety performance measurements (SPIs and SPTs) and data obtained from real-time monitoring systems (e.g., FDA) that extract information from historical and current safety data to predict trends and behavior patterns of upcoming hazards. Hence, safety data obtained from various sources represent the correlation between the three methodologies of safety management. It is also observed that proactive methodology acts as an upgrade for reactive methodology, while predictive methodology acts as an upgrade for proactive methodology.
It can be concluded that input (safety data) from various sources is the common denominator in reactive, proactive, and predictive methodology. It represents the correlation between safety management methodologies.
The research showed how predictive methodology can be expanded with inclusion of predictive methods, as it is shown in the example in Section 4.1, where predictive methods use historical data of previously obtained SPIs and SPTs (which are defined as a part of proactive methodology) and predict the future behavior pattern of the same SPIs (Figure 8).

4.3. Link between Causation and Prediction

Every organization has a set of conditions or resources (personnel, equipment, procedures, etc.) necessary for it to achieve its goal of conducting business in the first place. The goal is to provide services or products to users. Those conditions, i.e., organizational indicators are the first front in successfully completing the service or product for users. Any task to be completed needs to fulfil certain set of conditions, otherwise, it cannot be completed. Every occurrence (adverse event) is mostly related to those initially established values of organizational indicators. Any breach of that value (either if it is too low or too high, or there is a lack of it) will impact the outcome of the desired task. The number of external causes also affects the desired outcome (goal of the organization). However, every organization sets procedures regarding changes or emergencies in the organization (in manuals such as Organization’s Management Manual, Operations Manual, Standard Operating Procedures, Maintenance Manual, etc.) to ensure the successful completion of tasks and ultimately successfully achieved goals. Those procedures are tested and proven to be successful. Otherwise, the organization would not be certified to perform its services; hence, if we assume that keeping organizational indicators and procedures (which include management of change and emergency preparedness) in designated values known to produce successful outcomes, the outcomes (goals) would be achieved. We can detect which area event is bound to occur, based on past (historical) data of an organization, by using predictive analysis to predict safety performance indicators, i.e., future adverse events. By using causal modeling, it is possible to determine the causes of past events. Those same causes can help mitigate the future predicted events, hence, giving the possibility to react in advance and mitigate the areas of concern (Figure 9). The link between causation and prediction is that they both refer to an event caused by a set of factors but at different time points (past and future).

4.4. Predicting Using Predictive Methods and Causal Links among Organizational and Safety Performance Indicators

As per [15,47], by using the software for predictive analytics and causal modeling, predictions and causal links among organizational and safety performance indicators are made and presented in this part.
The dataset of actual organizational and safety performance indicators of a sample organization (see Appendix D) was used to create forecasts and causal models. The sample organization in question is an aviation training organization. Hence, it is certified as the Approved Training Organization (ATO). The sample organization applies reactive and proactive safety management methodologies to gather safety information and data via established safety reporting systems.
Using causal models, specifically detected relations (impacts), it can be learned which indicators (variables) should be modified to obtain the desired safety performance target level in each indicator.
In this part, forecasts for each safety performance indicator are made using the IBM SPSS Statistics software. Forecasting is performed using IBM SPSS options “Forecasting” and “Expert Modeler”. This includes a variety of applicable predictive methods such as nonseasonal exponential smoothing (simple, Holt’s linear trend, Brown’s linear trend, damped trend), seasonal exponential smoothing (simple, Winter’s additive, Winter’s multiplicative), ARIMA modeling, etc. The Expert Modeler finds the optimal method to conduct the forecast according to all given values in the dataset and isolates (or includes) the outliers. Microsoft Excel was also used to emphasize safety performance targets (SPTs) of each safety performance indicator (SPI). Figure 10 shows an example of predicted values of the safety performance indicator (SPI1). Red curve presents observed values of SPI1–Total number of recorded occurrences, named “Number”, purple dotted curves present upper confidence limit (UCL) and lower confidence limit (LCL) of predicted values, and blue curve presents predicted values (forecast) of SPI1. All examples of forecasting safety performance indicators can be found in Appendix E.
As per [15,47], after forecasting, the aim was to establish causal model of defined safety performance indicators (SPIs) to present causal links among organizational and safety performance indicators in the sample organization. Detecting causal links among indicators, provides a possibility to enhance future planning and improve the safety performance of an organization. Figure 11 shows causal model of organizational indicators (OIs) and safety performance indicators (SPIs).
Figure 12a shows an example of impact diagram of causes of safety performance indicator (SPI1), as per [13,45]. There are eleven OIs and SPIs that directly (first lag in the figure) impact (cause) the SPI1 values. Figure 12b shows an example of an impact diagram of the effects of the safety performance indicator (SPI1). There are four SPIs on which SPI1 has a direct (first lag in the figure) impact (effect). All impact diagrams can be found in Appendix E.
As per [15,47], by learning causal links, it is possible to simulate, i.e., make case scenarios of the increase or decrease of certain OIs and SPIs and see how it would affect the initially predicted values of SPIs.
The next part shows how forecasted (predicted) values of SPI1 can be affected due to change (increase/decrease) in values of top causal factors for SPI1, e.g., OI3 and OI9. Figure 13 shows an example of impact diagram of organizational indicator OI3 on safety performance indicator SPI1. Figure 14 shows example of impact diagram of organizational indicator OI9 on safety performance indicator SPI1.
Using causal model, specifically their causal links, it can be learned which indicators (variables) should be modified to obtain the desired level of safety performance target (SPT) in each safety performance indicator (SPI).
Two case scenarios were created by using an IBM SPSS Statistics function, “Apply Temporal Causal Model”, function “Run Scenarios” and top causal factors for SPI1 (e.g., OI3 and OI9), which revealed how OI3 and OI9 affect SPI1 (Figure 15) [15,47].
Figure 15a shows two series of organizational indicator OI3. The blue one is showing observed (initial) values from April 2019 until March 2020. The pink one shows scenario-adjusted values (initial ones increased by 30%) in the same period. Figure 15b shows two series of safety performance indicators SPI1. The blue one is showing observed (initial) values from April 2019 until March 2020. The pink one shows scenario-adjusted values due to the application of causal model links and the increase of OI3. It also shows scenario-forecasted values. It can be observed how scenario SPI1 had changed behavior due to increase of OI3, and, in comparison with initial forecast (green curve) of SPI1 (Figure 10). Figure 15c shows two series of organizational indicator OI9. The blue one shows observed (initial) values from April 2019 until March 2020. The pink one shows scenario-adjusted values (initial ones decreased by 30%) in the same period. Figure 15d shows two series of safety performance indicators SPI1. The blue one shows observed (initial) values from April 2019 until March 2020. The pink one shows scenario-adjusted values due to the application of causal model links and the decrease of OI9. It also shows scenario-forecasted values. It can be observed how scenario SPI1 had changed behavior as well, due to decrease of OI9, and, in comparison with initial forecast (green curve) of SPI1 (Figure 10) [15,47].
It has been shown how detecting causal links among variables, in this case organizational and safety performance indicators, can help determine impacts among them and detect vulnerabilities in the entire system. The examples show how increasing/decreasing values of OIs can improve values of SPIs of the organization, i.e., it can improve safety performance of the organization.

4.5. Conceptual Model of Predictive Safety Management Methodology in Aviation

The objective was to develop a new conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology [15] which would be an upgrade to previous reactive and proactive safety management methodologies.
The research conducted in previous chapters helped establish steps and tools for predictive safety management methodology. This includes obtaining information on the organization’s safety performance for the future period, and through that, detecting future adverse occurrences using predictive and causal modeling methods.
Figure 16 shows an improved aviation safety management system with graphical presentation of safety management methodologies, their correlation, inputs, and tools, i.e., it presents conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology in aviation.

5. Discussion/Conclusions

For over a decade, there have been attempts to improve aviation safety management. Suffice to state that it has improved a great deal since then. As aviation industry progresses, with its ups and downs, general growth trends are recorded. It constantly pushes aviation organizations to improve their safety management, and to keep acceptable levels of safety. Safety performance measurement has been in the focus of the research regarding safety management for a long time. For example, in 2011, O’Conner and others performed examination of safety climate within commercial and military aviation. They recognized that the accident rate in commercial aviation is too low to provide a sufficient measure of safety performance. They suggested the correlation of safety climate with other metrics of safety performance. Luxhoj presented in 2013, a probabilistic model that can quantitatively draw the causal factors of an accident. In 2015, Di Gravio and others developed a statistical model of safety events to predict safety performance by combining a Monte Carlo simulation and an analytical models of historic data interpretation. In 2017, Wang and others created a new safety management approach called evidence-based safety management, by introducing evidence-based practice into safety management. Ioannou and others identified the factors that impact the implementation of a safety management system and the safety performance of the organization, by interviewing different service providers. In 2018, Sun and others proposed a safety performance evaluation model that can quantitatively reflect the state of safety of the civil aviation maintenance department. In 2021, Chen and others presented a systematic establishment process of safety performance indicator system, based on four types of safety performance indicators identified by system and job analysis, event tree analysis, fault tree analysis, bowtie, etc., to assess the operation risk of different departments.
Based on thorough literature review of previous research and analysis of basic methodologies (reactive, proactive, predictive) established in aviation safety management, it has been concluded that most organizations use reactive or proactive safety management methodology. Predictive safety management methodology is not yet well established nor used. Predictive methodology in its current form uses real-time analytics software to analyze large amounts of flight data to detect emerging hazards. However, it does not include predictive (forecasting) methods in the process. On the other hand, predictive (forecasting) methods are used in aviation industry mostly for planning purposes of future capacity or traffic demand, but not in the segment of aviation safety management. Due to the general increase in air transport activities and traffic, including the introduction of new technologies and equipment in the aviation sector, it is necessary, and almost inevitable, to keep track of all changes future aviation brings, including all the future hazards that come along with those changes. This dictates the necessity for an improved safety management that can cope with new and larger scope of future hazards. Hence, developing an improved aviation safety management with predictive upgrade is an imperative to keeping acceptable safety performance levels at every aviation organization.
New insights and possibilities were revealed by thoroughly analyzing safety management methodologies and safety management systems in aviation. The necessary inputs (safety data) and tools used were detected and described by looking closely at each of these safety management methodologies. Reactive methodology is used after event has already happened, and it uses historical data on similar previous events (mandatory occurrence reports) to determine the cause, and to prevent the reoccurrence of the same or similar events. Proactive methodology differs from reactive one, as it tries to detect potential (latent) threats that could lead to serious incidents or accidents. Proactive methodology uses an expanded set of safety information (in comparison to reactive one), i.e., it uses information from mandatory and voluntary safety reporting systems, safety audits and its findings, results from safety surveys, and from information regarding safety performance of the organization, i.e., using tools of safety performance monitoring and measurement (safety performance indicators and targets). In the general description of safety management methodologies, there is strict division of these inputs and tools regarding each methodology, but as it can be observed, these two have an obvious overlap in mandatory occurrence reports, as it represents the input for both methodologies. It has been observed that the proactive safety management methodology acts as an upgrade to the reactive one. By taking the next step in the research, i.e., analysis of existing “predictive” safety management methodology, it has been established, that the existing so-called “predictive” safety management methodology refers to flight data monitoring and analysis systems in real-time. It does not actually implement the use of predictive methods of any kind, but it is “predictive” because by gathering real-time data and analyzing them, it gives the organization insights into future emerging hazards. Hence, by using these methods, the organizations can anticipate, i.e., “predict” upcoming future hazards. It is also observed that existing “predictive” methods, besides using tools of real-time flight data monitoring and analysis, also use information from mandatory and voluntary safety reporting systems, safety audits and gets its findings, results from safety surveys, and from information regarding safety performance of the organization, to make “predictive” analysis. Hence, it can also be observed that the predictive safety management methodology acts as an upgrade to the proactive one.
After establishing correlations between all existing safety management methodologies, the aim was to expand existing “predictive” safety management methodology with introducing usage of predictive and causal modeling methods. The question was in which segment could these methods be of most use, and the answer is in safety performance management. By predicting safety performance indicators with the use of predictive methods, which are proactively monitored in an organization, future hazards can be detected and anticipated. Using causal modeling method as another useful tool, causal relations between safety performance indicators (occurrences) can be detected. It can provide the organization with the tool to mitigate anticipated future events (occurrences).
The research conducted in this paper helped establish steps and tools of predictive safety management methodology, i.e., the safety management that use predictive (forecasting) and causal modeling methods to identify potential and possible hazards in the future, as well as their causal factors which can help define timely and efficient mitigation measures to prevent or restrain emerging hazards turning into adverse events.
Due to conducted research regarding safety management methodologies, new conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology was developed, representing an upgrade to previous reactive and proactive safety management methodologies. It introduces the use of predictive methods and causal modeling methods in the area of safety performance management.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, D.B.; methodology, D.B.; software, D.B. and S.S.; validation, D.B. and S.S.; formal analysis, D.B.; investigation, D.B.; resources, D.B. and S.S.; data curation, D.B.; writing—original draft preparation, D.B.; writing—review and editing, D.B. and S.S.; visualization, D.B.; supervision, S.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

Data supporting reported results can be found in this paper, in the Appendix A, Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D and Appendix E.

Acknowledgments

Special thanks goes to my mentor during the doctoral study programme, Sanja Steiner, who provided support, knowledge, and supervision during the development of conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology in aviation.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Statistical data on the number of flights were used as dataset for all examples of predictive analysis, using various predictive methods. Table A1 shows statistical data on indicator named “Number of flights” at sample airport, for period from December 2017 to February 2022.
Table A1. Statistical data on number of flights at a sample airport [15].
Table A1. Statistical data on number of flights at a sample airport [15].
Month/YearNumber of FlightsMonth/YearNumber of FlightsMonth/YearNumber of Flights
Dec-172912Jun-194088Dec-201392
Jan-183039Jul-194356Jan-211403
Feb-182692Aug-194401Feb-211249
Mar-183143Sep-194190Mar-211648
Apr-183384Oct-194045Apr-211840
May-184023Nov-193344May-212092
Jun-184124Dec-193351Jun-212426
Jul-184461Jan-203133Jul-212931
Aug-184393Feb-202994Aug-213086
Sep-184176Mar-202310Sep-213401
Oct-183970Apr-20365Oct-213394
Nov-183223May-20572Nov-212917
Dec-183060Jun-201138Dec-213218
Jan-193045Jul-202037Jan-222776
Feb-192826Aug-202246Feb-222637
Mar-193356Sep-201995
Apr-193776Oct-201772
May-194283Nov-201556
An overview of selected predictive methods applicable in aviation safety management are presented in Table A2. As per statistical criterion RMSE (Root Mean Squared Error), the best fit is shown to be simple seasonal exponential smoothing, Winter’s additive method, and moving average method.
Table A2. Selected predictive methods applicable in aviation safety management [15].
Table A2. Selected predictive methods applicable in aviation safety management [15].
TimelineHolt’s Linear TrendBrown’s Linear TrendDamped TrendSimple
Exponential Smoothing
Simple Seasonal Exponential SmoothingWinter’s Additive MethodWinter’s
Multiplicative Method
Moving
Average Method
ARIMA Modeling ARIMA (0,1,1) (1,1,0)
RMSE = 454.187RMSE = 489.109RMSE = 437.490RMSE = 448.684RMSE = 358.459RMSE = 373.104RMSE = 454.465RMSE = 403.010 RMSE = 430.170
Values ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCLValues ForecastLCLUCL
Dec-172912 2912 2912 2912 2912 2912 2912 2912 2912
Jan-183039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039
Feb-182692 2692 2692 2692 2692 2692 2692 2692 2692
Mar-183143 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143
Apr-183384 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384
May-184023 4023 4023 4023 4023 4023 4023 4023 4023
Jun-184124 4124 4124 4124 4124 4124 4124 4124 4124
Jul-184461 4461 4461 4461 4461 4461 4461 4461 4461
Aug-184393 4393 4393 4393 4393 4393 4393 4393 4393
Sep-184176 4176 4176 4176 4176 4176 4176 4176 4176
Oct-183970 3970 3970 3970 3970 3970 3970 3970 3970
Nov-183223 3223 3223 3223 3223 3223 3223 3223 3223
Dec-183060 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060
Jan-193045 3045 3045 3045 3045 3045 3045 3045 3045
Feb-192826 2826 2826 2826 2826 2826 2826 2826 2826
Mar-193356 3356 3356 3356 3356 3356 3356 3356 3356
Apr-193776 3776 3776 3776 3776 3776 3776 3776 3776
May-194283 4283 4283 4283 4283 4283 4283 4283 4283
Jun-194088 4088 4088 4088 4088 4088 4088 4088 4088
Jul-194356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356
Aug-194401 4401 4401 4401 4401 4401 4401 4401 4401
Sep-194190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190
Oct-194045 4045 4045 4045 4045 4045 4045 4045 4045
Nov-193344 3344 3344 3344 3344 3344 3344 3344 3344
Dec-193351 3351 3351 3351 3351 3351 3351 3351 3351
Jan-203133 3133 3133 3133 3133 3133 3133 3133 3133
Feb-202994 2994 2994 2994 2994 2994 2994 2994 2994
Mar-202310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310
Apr-20365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365
May-20572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572
Jun-201138 1138 1138 1138 1138 1138 1138 1138 1138
Jul-202037 2037 2037 2037 2037 2037 2037 2037 2037
Aug-202246 2246 2246 2246 2246 2246 2246 2246 2246
Sep-201995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995
Oct-201772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772
Nov-201556 1556 1556 1556 1556 1556 1556 1556 1556
Dec-201392 1392 1392 1392 1392 1392 1392 1392 1392
Jan-211403 1403 1403 1403 1403 1403 1403 1403 1403
Feb-211249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249
Mar-211648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648
Apr-211840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840
May-212092 2092 2092 2092 2092 2092 2092 2092 2092
Jun-212426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426
Jul-212931 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931
Aug-213086 3086 3086 3086 3086 3086 3086 3086 3086
Sep-213401 3401 3401 3401 3401 3401 3401 3401 3401
Oct-213394 3394 3394 3394 3394 3394 3394 3394 3394
Nov-212917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917
Dec-213218 3218 3218 3218 3218 3218 3218 3218 3218
Jan-222776 2776 2776 2776 2776 2776 2776 2776 2776
Feb-22263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637263726372637
Mar-22 260616933519 244814653430 258817093468 263717363538 277220513492 255818073308 327823644191 270816893728 252416643385
Apr-22 257512843867 22614854037 257311434002 263713633911 249914803517 228812263349 341720904744 21248983350 1286−3822954
May-22 25449624127 2075−6284777 25686924443 263710764198 290016534147 269213913993 407222315914 23459423748 1508−6893705
Jun-22 25136854341 1888−18585634 25663164816 26378354439 310116624541 289713944399 402019666073 24689084028 1997−6244618
Jul-22 24824384527 1702−31936597 2565−95140 26376224652 360419945213 340217215083 426518796652 289411904598 2766−2195751
Aug-22 24512104692 1515−46267656 2565−2995429 26374304844 368919265452 349016485332 417816426714 313512994971 2957−3536267
Sep-22 2420−14842 1329−61488806 2565−5625692 26372535021 359816945502 340214115393 379612916301 320912495169 2893−7126498
Oct-22 2390−2014980 1142−775510,040 2565−8055935 2637885186 345314175488 326011315389 355410106098 316210855239 2742−11376620
Nov-22 2359−3905107 956−944111,353 2565−10316161 2637−665340 29177585076 27284684987 28325855080 26324444820 2439−16946573
Dec-22 2328−5715226 769−11,20412,743 2565−12446374 2637−2135487 29446685220 25401574923 24602834637 25542604848 2429−19446802
Jan-23 2297−7455338 583−13,03814,204 2565−14466576 2637−3525626 28374505224 2436−654937 2531854976 2333−634728 2290−23116891
Feb-23 2266−9135444 397−14,94115,734 2565−16386768 2637−4855759 26371445130 2239−3744852 2274−1334681 2201−2924694 2141−26776959
Mar-23 2235−10755545 210−16,91117,331 2565−18216952 2637−6125886 27721775366 2160−5614881 2822−3395983 2273−3664911 2371−27437485
Apr-23 2204−12325640 24−18,94518,992 2565−19987128 2637−7356009 2499−1945191 1890−9354715 2936−5216393 1688−10394416 2090−33667546
May-23 2173−13865732 −163−21,04120,715 2565−21677298 2637−8536127 29001135687 2294−6325220 3492−7747759 1909−9054724 2332−34468110
Jun-23 2142−15355819 −349−23,19722,498 2565−23317461 2637−9686242 31012235980 2499−5245522 3440−9187799 2032−8674931 2718−33658800
Jul-23 2111−16815903 −536−25,41124,339 2565−24907620 2637−10796353 36046366571 3004−1146122 3643−11268412 2458−5245439 3310−30639683
Aug-23 2080−18245984 −722−27,68226,237 2565−26437774 2637−11866460 36896366742 3093−1176303 3561−12558378 2699−3635761 3477−317410,128
Sep-23 2049−19646062 −909−30,00828,190 2565−27927923 2637−12916565 35984616735 3005−2956304 3228−12957752 2773−3675914 3666−325110,584
Oct-23 2018−21016138 −1095−32,38730,197 2565−29388068 2637−13936667 34532346671 2862−5256249 3016−13697401 2726−4915944 3612−356310,786
Nov-23 1987−22366210 −1282−34,81932,256 2565−30798210 2637−14936767 2917−3816215 2330−11425803 2398−12576053 2196−10965489 3192−423010,614
Dec-23 1956−23686281 −1468−37,30334,366 2565−32178348 2637−15906864 2944−4326319 2143−14135699 2078−12655420 2118−12485485 3390−427111,052
Jan-24 1926−24986349 −1655−39,83636,527 2565−33528482 2637−16856959 2837−6156288 2038−15995676 2132−14695733 1897−15435336 3049−484610,943
Feb-24 1895−26266416 −1841−42,41938,736 2565−34848614 2637−17787052 2637−8896163 1842−18765560 1912−14925316 1765−17455275 2906−521411,027
Mar-24 1864−27536480 −2028−45,04940,994 2565−36138743 2637−18697143 2772−8276370 1762−20345559 2366−20116742 1837−17815454 2907−561111,425
Apr-24 1833−28776543 −2214−47,72743,299 2565−37398869 2637−19587232 2499−11716168 2330−11425803 2455−22507160 1252−24334938 1985−705011,021
May-24 1802−30006604 −2401−50,45145,650 2565−38638993 2637−20457319 2900−8406639 2143−14135699 2912−28348658 1473−22795226 2214−731211,739
Jun-24 1771−31226664 −2587−53,22148,046 2565−39859115 2637−21317405 3101−7076909 2038−15995676 2861−29518673 1596−22235415 2669−732212,660
Jul-24 1740−32426722 −2774−56,03550,488 2565−41049234 2637−22167490 3604−2727479 1842−18765560 3021−32889329 2022−18625906 3379−705713,815
Aug-24 1709−33606778 −2960−58,89352,973 2565−42219351 2637−22997573 3689−2537631 1762−20345559 2944−33789266 2263−16856211 3562−730114,425
Sep-24 1678−34776834 −3147−61,79455,501 2565−43369467 2637−23807654 3598−4097605 2607−16336847 2661−32268547 2337−16746349 3582−769114,856
Oct-24 1647−35936888 −3333−64,73858,072 2565−44509580 2637−24617735 3453−6187524 2465−18456775 2478−31778133 2290−17846365 3463−820715,132
Nov-24 1616−37086941 −3520−67,72460,685 2565−45619691 2637−25407814 2917−12177051 1933−24466312 1964−26916619 1760−23765897 3122−893115,174
Dec-24 1585−38226992 −3706−70,75163,339 2565−46719801 2637−26187892 2944−12527140 1745−27026192 1696−25005891 1683−25155880 3180−924415,604
Jan-25 1554−39347043 −3893−73,81966,034 2565−47799909 2637−26947968 2837−14217094 1641−28746155 1734−27336201 1461−27975718 2974−981015,759
Feb-25 1523−40467093 −4079−76,92768,769 2565−488610,016 2637−27708044 2637−16816955 1444−31366025 1549−26205718 1329−29885646 2828−10,30815,963
Aerospace 10 00268 i001
Holt’s linear trend
Aerospace 10 00268 i002
Brown’s linear trend
Aerospace 10 00268 i003
Damped trend
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Simple exponential smoothing
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Simple seasonal exponential smoothing
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Winter’s additive method
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Winter’s multiplicative method
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Moving average method
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ARIMA modeling ARIMA (0,1,1) (1,1,0)

Appendix B

As a part of the Safety Assurance component, the sample organization has established several Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs). SPIs are monitored yearly to show the safety performance of the organization. Targets are set for some of the SPIs, while for some targets are not set. The safety data and SPIs of the sample organization SMS are presented and elaborated in the following table.
Table A3 shows the sample organization’s actual safety data and safety performance indicators (SPIs) from 2014 to 2019. There are 15 defined SPIs: The total number of reported hazards (SPI1), the number of hazards/reported via mandatory occurrence reporting system (SPI2), the number of hazards reported via voluntary occurrence reporting (SPI3), the number of hazards reported as changes (SPI4), the number of hazards reported as internal changes (SPI5), number of hazards reported as an external changes (SPI6), number of hazards reported in Department 1 of an organization (SPI7), the number of hazards reported at Department 2 of an organization (SPI8), the number of hazards reported at Department 3 of an organization (SPI9), Number of hazards reported at the Department 4 of an organization (SPI10), the number of conducted risk assessments and mitigations (SPI11), the number of registered unacceptable risk indexes (SPI12), the number of registered tolerable risk indexes (SPI13), the number of held safety review boards (SPI14), and the number of reported occurrences vs. the number of flight hours (SPI15). The last two rows show target areas (SPTs) for five SPIs: SPI1, SPI2, SPI11, SPI14 and SPI15 [15,44].
Table A3. Safety data and safety performance indicators (SPIs) in the period 2014–2019 [15,44].
Table A3. Safety data and safety performance indicators (SPIs) in the period 2014–2019 [15,44].
Year SPI1SPI2SPI3SPI4SPI5SPI6SPI7SPI8SPI19SPI10SPI11SPI12SPI13SPI14SPI15
201429714844281402581640.012
201522241611518252144740.017
2016349111495342112471460.019
2017213513103200211311230.012
20184355331221364591631320.020
2019704364164857719184534220.030
SPT102////////10//50.002

Appendix C

Table A4 and Figure A1 show forecast of SPI2 behavior in the terms of incline/decline of its values in the future period from 2020 to 2024 based on historical safety data of the organization in the period from 2014 to 2019 [15,44].
Table A4. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI2)—sample organization [15,44].
Table A4. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI2)—sample organization [15,44].
YearValues
(SPI2)
ForecastLower Limit of ReliabilityUpper Limit of Reliability
20147
20152
20169
20173
20185
20194444
2020 7410
2021 205
2022 7410
2023 205
2024 7410
Figure A1. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI2) [15,44].
Figure A1. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI2) [15,44].
Aerospace 10 00268 g0a1
Table A5 and Figure A2 show forecast of SPI11 behavior in the terms of incline/decline of its values in the future period from 2020 to 2024 based on historical safety data of the organization in the period from 2014 to 2019 [15,44].
Table A5. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI11)—sample organization [15,44].
Table A5. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI11)—sample organization [15,44].
YearValues
(SPI11)
ForecastLower Limit of ReliabilityUpper Limit of Reliability
201425
201514
201624
201713
201816
201945454545
2020 381363
2021 421469
2022 451576
2023 491682
2024 531788
Figure A2. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI11) [15,44].
Figure A2. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI11) [15,44].
Aerospace 10 00268 g0a2
Table A6 and Figure A3 show forecast of SPI14 behavior in the terms of incline/decline of its values in the future period from 2020 to 2024 based on historical safety data of the organization in the period from 2014 to 2019 [15,44].
Table A6. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI14)—sample organization [15,44].
Table A6. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI14)—sample organization [15,44].
YearValues
(SPI14)
ForecastLower Limit of ReliabilityUpper Limit of Reliability
20144
20154
20166
20173
20182
20192222
2020 104
2021 003
2022 003
2023 003
2024 003
Figure A3. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI14) [15,44].
Figure A3. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI14) [15,44].
Aerospace 10 00268 g0a3
Table A7 and Figure A4 show forecast of SPI15 behavior in the terms of incline/decline of its values in the future period from 2020 to 2024 based on historical safety data of the organization in the period from 2014 to 2019 [15,44].
Table A7. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI15)—sample organization [15,44].
Table A7. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI15)—sample organization [15,44].
YearValues
(SPI15)
ForecastLower Limit of ReliabilityUpper Limit of Reliability
20140.012
20150.017
20160.019
20170.012
20180.020
20190.0300.0300.0300.030
2020 0.0270.0190.035
2021 0.0290.0210.038
2022 0.0320.0240.040
2023 0.0340.0260.043
2024 0.0370.0290.045
Figure A4. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI15) [15,44].
Figure A4. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI15) [15,44].
Aerospace 10 00268 g0a4

Appendix D

Dataset is representing actual data on organizational and safety performance indicators of the sample organization. The safety management methodologies used in the sample organization, in terms of collecting safety data, are reactive and proactive. The sample organization has defined several safety performance indicators (SPIs) and established corresponding safety performance targets (SPTs). The SPIs are monitored on monthly basis. The list of organizational indicators (OIs), safety performance indicators (SPIs) and safety performance targets (SPTs) are presented in the following Table A8 [15,47].
Table A8. List of organizational indicators (OIs), safety performance indicators (SPIs) and safety performance targets (SPTs) in the sample organization [15,47].
Table A8. List of organizational indicators (OIs), safety performance indicators (SPIs) and safety performance targets (SPTs) in the sample organization [15,47].
MarkName of an IndicatorTargets (SPTs)
OI1Flight hours (aircraft)/
OI2Flight hours (simulator)/
OI3Total flight hours/
OI4Number of used aircraft/
OI5Number of used simulators/
OI6Number of used aircraft/simulators/
OI7Number of students in training on aircraft/
OI8Number of active instructors on aircraft/
OI9Number of students in training on simulator/
OI10Number of active instructors on simulator/
OI11Total number of students in training/
OI12Total number of active instructors/
SPI1Total number of recorded occurrences≤2
SPI2Number of reported MOR occurrences≤1
SPI3Number of recorded changes≤2
SPI4Number of conducted risk assessments≤2
SPI5Number of detected unacceptable risks≤1
SPI6Number of held safety review boards≥1
SPI7Number of conducted audits/inspections≥1
SPI8Number of determined findings≤4
Table A9 shows the dataset of organizational indicators (OIs) and safety performance indicators (SPIs) in the sample organization, from January 2014 to March 2020 [15,47]. A dataset is composed of monthly entries for twelve Organizational Indicators (OIs) and eight Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs). The dataset contains 75 entries.
Table A9. Dataset of organizational indicators (OIs) and safety performance indicators (SPIs) in the period from January 2014 to March 2020 [15].
Table A9. Dataset of organizational indicators (OIs) and safety performance indicators (SPIs) in the period from January 2014 to March 2020 [15].
Month OI1OI2OI3OI4OI5OI6OI7OI8OI19OI10OI11OI12SPI1SPI2SPI3SPI4SPI5SPI6SPI7SPI8
Jan-1431.5810.9242.50415941110510100000
Feb-1412.4210.5022.9231454227500000000
Mar-1488.6717.83106.5031419832221021110000
Apr-1463.670.0063.675052070020710100000
May-14323.9263.75387.6771843139352157011560210
Jun-14159.174.50163.67718291131321200000010
Jul-14438.500.00438.50808471200471200000116
Aug-14612.580.00612.58808451000451000000012
Sep-14390.750.00390.758083311003311500731115
Oct-14278.330.00278.33707351000351010030110
Nov-1459.330.0059.334041950019500000000
Dec-1424.750.0024.753039400942021410136
Jan-1531.580.0031.583031560015610100000
Feb-153.830.003.8320232003200000000
Mar-1546.830.0046.833031750017550430000
Apr-1550.670.0050.6750517600176602100200
May-15219.420.00219.427073790037910010010
Jun-1518.080.0018.0840496009600000026
Jul-15142.580.00142.587073080030810151100
Aug-15168.25181.08349.3361722713335800000014
Sep-15267.17153.50420.6771840718558921130114
Oct-15132.4283.67216.08819347185521011011000
Nov-15150.5860.83211.4271835712447830250010
Dec-1529.0016.4245.424151264416820200019
Jan-1628.8327.0055.833141168519720110000
Feb-1619.7519.0038.7521352429410100021
Mar-1698.501.50100.005163182133800000000
Apr-16154.9218.50173.42516311173381163352137
May-16261.1757.25318.428193812144521230210112
Jun-16130.5348.67179.208193311115441342130024
Jul-16252.6793.00345.677183512123471281271121
Aug-16282.3391.83374.177183514124471561332011
Sep-16340.67128.67469.3361735141234714100101110
Oct-16115.0021.25136.25617231193321232131024
Nov-1640.9247.5088.423141478422900000112
Dec-1629.080.0029.084041270012700000110
Jan-170.006.006.0001100222200000010
Feb-179.085.5014.5821342539400000039
Mar-17152.1735.92188.0841524873318101001212
Apr-1780.6755.83136.5051616853219303300312
May-17187.83106.42294.2551628915343920210021
Jun-1787.0035.67122.67516281084361011010121
Jul-17193.5888.00281.585162911104391300000011
Aug-17292.5835.58328.175163295337951230011
Sep-17188.2557.17245.42516299633510000000210
Oct-17332.25124.33456.5871859113249112614311312
Nov-17166.3335.50201.837184610143601020020024
Dec-1794.9248.00142.9271826712538810100000
Jan-18123.2262.75185.9751617615432700000011
Feb-1866.3353.17119.50314127145267101001312
Mar-1829.582.6732.255162462226661474022
Apr-18145.5822.08167.6751631865371061350025
May-18161.3363.50224.835163588443851430021
Jun-1895.9229.55125.475162366229630194121
Jul-18324.83107.70432.5361733812345851400111
Aug-18467.0543.67510.726173797444980810010
Sep-18355.42137.48492.907185011213711150520010
Oct-18303.67157.93461.6061744821365811011022
Nov-1864.7579.75144.50516319216521030330021
Dec-1850.0062.50112.50516258146391000000000
Jan-1934.25104.33138.584151359522830320012
Feb-19132.0858.92191.005163510147491316112800315
Mar-19228.4539.75268.2041541117448128071940213
Apr-19206.9243.92250.83516348934391201260126
May-19104.17122.17226.3351632717649910110032
Jun-19246.0830.42276.50516311242351330310020
Jul-19377.9271.17449.08617381083461010110022
Aug-19312.8262.67375.4861731131244314724122000
Sep-19448.5064.00512.50617441282521260650031
Oct-19227.8357.25285.086174411123561180850039
Nov-1954.92165.52220.4341524103465810413400213
Dec-1985.9293.13179.05415308185481130253100
Jan-20150.4270.02220.436174110186591160630016
Feb-2092.4284.70177.1261729815544811010120
Mar-2066.5062.33128.83516309125421010011010
Table A10 shows the statistics of each indicator of the observed dataset, including the number of entries, missing values, mean, median, standard deviation, variance, skewness, standard error of skewness, range, minimum, and maximum.
Table A10. Statistics of each indicator of the observed dataset [15].
Table A10. Statistics of each indicator of the observed dataset [15].
IndicatorNMissingMeanMedianST.DEVVarianceSkewnessST.ERR of SkewnessRangeMinimumMaximum
OI175.000.00163.20132.42131.8817,393.381.030.28612.580.00612.58
OI275.000.0049.9243.9246.312145.060.890.28181.080.00181.08
OI375.000.00213.12185.97150.6222,686.560.600.28608.753.83612.58
OI475.000.005.215.001.682.82−0.400.288.000.008.00
OI575.000.000.801.000.400.16−1.530.281.000.001.00
OI675.000.006.016.001.732.99−0.550.288.001.009.00
OI775.000.0027.5630.0012.46155.22−0.200.2859.000.0059.00
OI875.000.008.298.002.888.29−0.410.2814.000.0014.00
OI1975.000.008.638.007.3754.290.990.2834.000.0034.00
OI1075.000.002.933.001.923.69−0.160.287.000.007.00
OI1175.000.0036.1937.0017.10292.320.130.2889.002.0091.00
OI1275.000.009.079.002.878.23−0.240.2813.002.0015.00
SPI175.000.002.922.003.109.621.570.2816.000.0016.00
SPI275.000.000.330.000.620.392.050.283.000.003.00
SPI375.000.001.961.002.596.692.080.2812.000.0012.00
SPI475.000.002.801.003.8414.762.130.2819.000.0019.00
SPI575.000.000.630.001.612.593.720.2810.000.0010.00
SPI675.000.000.310.000.490.241.200.282.000.002.00
SPI775.000.001.351.000.980.960.130.283.000.003.00
SPI875.000.003.361.004.4119.451.270.2815.000.0015.00
Table A11 shows tests of normality of each indicator of the observed dataset, including the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test.
Table A11. Tests of normality of each indicator of the observed dataset [15].
Table A11. Tests of normality of each indicator of the observed dataset [15].
Tests of Normality
IndicatorKolmogorov-Smirnov TestShapiro-Wilk Test
StatisticdfSig.StatisticdfSig.
OI10.125750.0060.911750.000
OI20.141750.0010.901750.000
OI30.105750.0400.943750.002
OI40.156750.0000.949750.005
OI50.490750.0000.490750.000
OI60.177750.0000.945750.003
OI70.119750.0100.978750.224
OI80.087750.200 *0.973750.112
OI190.121750.0090.910750.000
OI100.167750.0000.922750.000
OI110.082750.200 *0.974750.130
OI120.102750.0530.980750.289
SPI10.199750.0000.831750.000
SPI20.437750.0000.584750.000
SPI30.231750.0000.744750.000
SPI40.233750.0000.734750.000
SPI50.425750.0000.455750.000
SPI60.440750.0000.601750.000
SPI70.198750.0000.877750.000
SPI80.274750.0000.763750.000
* This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Figure A5 shows histograms of each organizational and safety performance indicator in the observed dataset.
Figure A5. Histograms of organizational and safety performance indicators: (a) Flight hours (aircraft); (b) Flight hours (simulator); (c) Total flight hours; (d) Number of used aircraft; (e) Number of used simulators; (f) Number of used aircraft/simulators; (g) Number of students in training on aircraft; (h) Number of active instructors on aircraft; (i) Number of students in training on the simulator; (j) Number of active instructors on the simulator; (k) Total number of students in training; (l) Total number of active instructors; (m) Total number of recorded occurrences; (n) Number of reported MOR occurrences; (o) Number of recorded changes; (p) Number of conducted risk assessments; (q) Number of detected unacceptable risks; (r) Number of held safety review boards; (s) Number of conducted audits/inspections; (t) Number of determined non-compliances (findings) [15].
Figure A5. Histograms of organizational and safety performance indicators: (a) Flight hours (aircraft); (b) Flight hours (simulator); (c) Total flight hours; (d) Number of used aircraft; (e) Number of used simulators; (f) Number of used aircraft/simulators; (g) Number of students in training on aircraft; (h) Number of active instructors on aircraft; (i) Number of students in training on the simulator; (j) Number of active instructors on the simulator; (k) Total number of students in training; (l) Total number of active instructors; (m) Total number of recorded occurrences; (n) Number of reported MOR occurrences; (o) Number of recorded changes; (p) Number of conducted risk assessments; (q) Number of detected unacceptable risks; (r) Number of held safety review boards; (s) Number of conducted audits/inspections; (t) Number of determined non-compliances (findings) [15].
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Appendix E

The forecasts for each safety performance indicator were made using the IBM SPSS Statistics software. Table A12 shows forecast model details for each indicator, obtained using the function “Forecasting” and IBM SPSS “Expert Modeler”. Model quality (model fit) for all the built models is evaluated using the R-squared criterion. R-squared is the coefficient of determination. It is defined as the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable which is predictable from the independent variable or variables. Many criteria can be used to do the evaluation (RMSE—Root Mean Squared Error, RMSPE—Root Mean Squared Percent Error, AIC—Akaike Information Criterion, BIC—Bayesian Information Criterion, R-squared). In this case, R-squared is selected, which is the default criterion, and the larger the R-squared value, the better the model [15,47].
Table A12. Forecast model description and statistics [15].
Table A12. Forecast model description and statistics [15].
Model DescriptionModel TypeNumber of OutliersModel Fit/Stationary R-SquaredSPTs
SPI1 Total number of recorded occurrencesARIMA (0,0,0) (0,0,0)30.531≤2
SPI2 number of reported MOR occurrencesSimple Seasonal00.772≤1
SPI3 number of recorded changesSimple Seasonal00.696≤2
SPI4 number of conducted risk assessmentsARIMA (0,0,0) (0,0,0)60.714≤2
SPI5 number of detected unacceptable risksARIMA (0,0,0) (0,0,0)161.000≤1
SPI6 number of held safety review boardsSimple Seasonal00.792≥1
SPI7 number of conducted audits/inspectionsARIMA (0,0,0) (1,0,0)10.383≥1
SPI8 number of determined non-compliancesSimple Seasonal00.618≤4
Table A13 shows the forecasted values of each safety performance indicator in the observed dataset from April 2020 to March 2022.
Table A13. Forecast of safety performance indicators [15].
Table A13. Forecast of safety performance indicators [15].
MonthSPI1SPI2SPI3SPI4SPI5SPI6SPI7SPI8
Apr-20101562125
May-2020320023
Jun-2021220022
Jul-2020220122
Aug-2021420011
Sep-2020320027
Oct-2021320025
Nov-2020220023
Dec-2020220013
Jan-2120320011
Feb-2120320025
Mar-2120320014
Apr-21101562125
May-2120320023
Jun-2121220022
Jul-2120220122
Aug-2121420011
Sep-2120320027
Oct-2121320025
Nov-2120220023
Dec-2120220013
Jan-2220320021
Feb-2220320025
Mar-2220320024
Figure A6 shows graphs of each predicted safety performance indicator in the observed dataset including target area and predicted breaches [15,47]. Red curve presents observed values of each SPI, named “Number”, purple dotted curves present upper confidence limit (UCL) and lower confidence limit (LCL) of predicted values, and blue curve presents predicted values (forecast) of each SPI.
Figure A6. Forecasts of safety performance indicators in a sample organization with outlined targets and predicted breaches: (a) The total number of recorded occurrences (SPI1); (b) The total number of recorded occurrences (SPI1) with its SPT; (c) The number of reported MOR occurrences (SPI2); (d) The number of reported MOR occurrences (SPI2) with its SPT; (e) The number of recorded changes (SPI3); (f) The number of recorded changes (SPI3) with its SPT; (g) The number of conducted risk assessments (SPI4); (h) The number of conducted risk assessments (SPI4) with its SPT; (i) The number of detected unacceptable risks (SPI5); (j) The number of detected unacceptable risks (SPI5) with its SPT; (k) The number of held safety review boards (SPI6); (l) The number of held safety review boards (SPI6) with its SPT; (m) The number of conducted audits/inspections (SPI7); (n) The number of conducted audits/inspections (SPI7) with its SPT; (o) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) (SPI8); (p) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) (SPI8) with its SPT [15,47].
Figure A6. Forecasts of safety performance indicators in a sample organization with outlined targets and predicted breaches: (a) The total number of recorded occurrences (SPI1); (b) The total number of recorded occurrences (SPI1) with its SPT; (c) The number of reported MOR occurrences (SPI2); (d) The number of reported MOR occurrences (SPI2) with its SPT; (e) The number of recorded changes (SPI3); (f) The number of recorded changes (SPI3) with its SPT; (g) The number of conducted risk assessments (SPI4); (h) The number of conducted risk assessments (SPI4) with its SPT; (i) The number of detected unacceptable risks (SPI5); (j) The number of detected unacceptable risks (SPI5) with its SPT; (k) The number of held safety review boards (SPI6); (l) The number of held safety review boards (SPI6) with its SPT; (m) The number of conducted audits/inspections (SPI7); (n) The number of conducted audits/inspections (SPI7) with its SPT; (o) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) (SPI8); (p) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) (SPI8) with its SPT [15,47].
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Table A14 shows fit statistics for all causal models of each safety performance indicator in the observed dataset [15,47].
Table A14. Fit statistics for top causal models of each safety performance indicator [15,47].
Table A14. Fit statistics for top causal models of each safety performance indicator [15,47].
Target Model
of SPIs
Model Quality
RMSERMSPEAICBICR-Squared
SPI10.280.05−202.24−65.090.98
SPI20.580.14−99.0538.110.95
SPI32.240.3091.08228.240.95
SPI40.990.15−22.63114.530.94
SPI52.310.3995.51232.670.93
SPI61.960.3272.63209.790.93
SPI73.270.57144.38281.530.93
SPI80.390.09−151.72−14.560.92
Figure A7 shows impact diagram of all causes of each indicator in the observed dataset, and Figure A8 shows impact diagram of all effects of each indicator in the observed dataset.
Figure A7. Impact diagrams—causes of each safety performance indicator: (a) The total number of recorded occurrences; (b) The number of reported MOR occurrences; (c) The number of recorded changes; (d) The number of conducted risk assessments; (e) The number of detected unacceptable risks; (f) The number of held safety review boards; (g) The number of conducted audits/inspections; (h) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) [15].
Figure A7. Impact diagrams—causes of each safety performance indicator: (a) The total number of recorded occurrences; (b) The number of reported MOR occurrences; (c) The number of recorded changes; (d) The number of conducted risk assessments; (e) The number of detected unacceptable risks; (f) The number of held safety review boards; (g) The number of conducted audits/inspections; (h) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) [15].
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Figure A8. Impact diagrams—effects of each safety performance indicator: (a) The total number of recorded occurrences; (b) The number of reported MOR occurrences; (c) The number of recorded changes; (d) The number of conducted risk assessments; (e) The number of detected unacceptable risks; (f) The number of held safety review boards; (g) The number of conducted audits/inspections; (h) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) [15].
Figure A8. Impact diagrams—effects of each safety performance indicator: (a) The total number of recorded occurrences; (b) The number of reported MOR occurrences; (c) The number of recorded changes; (d) The number of conducted risk assessments; (e) The number of detected unacceptable risks; (f) The number of held safety review boards; (g) The number of conducted audits/inspections; (h) The number of determined non-compliances (findings) [15].
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Figure 1. ICAO framework of the SMS [1,15].
Figure 1. ICAO framework of the SMS [1,15].
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Figure 2. Safety performance management process [1,15].
Figure 2. Safety performance management process [1,15].
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Figure 3. Safety management methodologies: (a) reactive safety management methodology; (b) proactive safety management methodology; (c) current form of predictive safety management methodology [5,15].
Figure 3. Safety management methodologies: (a) reactive safety management methodology; (b) proactive safety management methodology; (c) current form of predictive safety management methodology [5,15].
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Figure 4. Comprehensive overview of the aviation safety management system [15].
Figure 4. Comprehensive overview of the aviation safety management system [15].
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Figure 5. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI1).
Figure 5. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI1).
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Figure 6. Safety performance indicator (SPI) behavior in different safety management environments: (a) safety performance indicator (SPI) in reactive safety management; (b) safety performance indicator (SPI) in proactive safety management; (c) safety performance indicator (SPI) in predictive safety management [15].
Figure 6. Safety performance indicator (SPI) behavior in different safety management environments: (a) safety performance indicator (SPI) in reactive safety management; (b) safety performance indicator (SPI) in proactive safety management; (c) safety performance indicator (SPI) in predictive safety management [15].
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Figure 7. Overview of aviation safety management methodologies [5,15].
Figure 7. Overview of aviation safety management methodologies [5,15].
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Figure 8. Correlation between aviation safety management methodologies and inclusion of predictive methods to expand current version of predictive safety management methodology [5,15].
Figure 8. Correlation between aviation safety management methodologies and inclusion of predictive methods to expand current version of predictive safety management methodology [5,15].
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Figure 9. The link between causation and prediction [15].
Figure 9. The link between causation and prediction [15].
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Figure 10. The initial forecast of safety performance indicators SPI1—Total number of recorded occurrences for the period April 2020—March 2022: (a) Initial forecast of safety performance indicators SPI1; (b) Initial forecast of safety performance indicators SPI1 with set safety performance target (SPT) and its breaches [15,47].
Figure 10. The initial forecast of safety performance indicators SPI1—Total number of recorded occurrences for the period April 2020—March 2022: (a) Initial forecast of safety performance indicators SPI1; (b) Initial forecast of safety performance indicators SPI1 with set safety performance target (SPT) and its breaches [15,47].
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Figure 11. Example of causal model of organizational and safety performance indicators in a sample organization [15,47].
Figure 11. Example of causal model of organizational and safety performance indicators in a sample organization [15,47].
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Figure 12. Example of impact diagrams of causes and effects of safety performance indicator (SPI1): (a) Impact diagram of causes of safety performance indicator; (b) Impact diagram of effects of safety performance indicator [15,47].
Figure 12. Example of impact diagrams of causes and effects of safety performance indicator (SPI1): (a) Impact diagram of causes of safety performance indicator; (b) Impact diagram of effects of safety performance indicator [15,47].
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Figure 13. Impact diagram of organizational indicator OI3 on safety performance indicator SPI1 [15].
Figure 13. Impact diagram of organizational indicator OI3 on safety performance indicator SPI1 [15].
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Figure 14. Impact diagram of organizational indicator OI9 on safety performance indicator SPI1 [15].
Figure 14. Impact diagram of organizational indicator OI9 on safety performance indicator SPI1 [15].
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Figure 15. Scenario example of safety performance indicator behavior due to change in organizational indicator: (a) Increase of organizational indicator OI3; (b) Behavior of safety performance indicator SPI1 due to increase of OI3; (c) Decrease of organizational indicator OI9; (d) Behavior of safety performance indicator SPI1 due to decrease of OI9 [15,47].
Figure 15. Scenario example of safety performance indicator behavior due to change in organizational indicator: (a) Increase of organizational indicator OI3; (b) Behavior of safety performance indicator SPI1 due to increase of OI3; (c) Decrease of organizational indicator OI9; (d) Behavior of safety performance indicator SPI1 due to decrease of OI9 [15,47].
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Figure 16. Conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology in aviation [15].
Figure 16. Conceptual model of predictive safety management methodology in aviation [15].
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Table 1. Safety performance indicators (SPIs) dataset in the period 2014–2019.
Table 1. Safety performance indicators (SPIs) dataset in the period 2014–2019.
YearSPI1SPI2SPI11SPI14SPI15
20142972540.012
20152221440.017
20163492460.019
20172131330.012
20184351620.020
20197044520.030
SPT1021050.002
Table 2. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI1) in a sample organization.
Table 2. Example of forecasting safety performance indicator (SPI1) in a sample organization.
YearValues
(SPI1)
ForecastLower Limit of ReliabilityUpper Limit of Reliability
201429
201522
201634
201721
201843
201970707070
2020 7346101
2021 8247116
2022 9050130
2023 9953144
2024 10757157
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Bartulović, D.; Steiner, S. Conceptual Model of Predictive Safety Management Methodology in Aviation. Aerospace 2023, 10, 268. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace10030268

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Bartulović D, Steiner S. Conceptual Model of Predictive Safety Management Methodology in Aviation. Aerospace. 2023; 10(3):268. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace10030268

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Bartulović, Dajana, and Sanja Steiner. 2023. "Conceptual Model of Predictive Safety Management Methodology in Aviation" Aerospace 10, no. 3: 268. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace10030268

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