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Games
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Game Theory in Social Networks
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Game Theory in Social Networks

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Applied Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (10 April 2022) | Viewed by 10292

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Paolo Pin

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics and Statistics, Università di Siena, 53100 Siena, Italy
Interests: economics of social networks; game theory; behavioral experiments; analysis of complex networks; homophily; vaccination intentions
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals
Prof. Dr. Yongli Li

E-Mail Website1 Website2
Guest Editor
School of Economics and Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China
Interests: network science; social networks; artificial intelligence; deep learning; financial risk; data mining; data-driven methods
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The network of social relations between individuals has profound effects on economic processes. The fact that social relations are an important factor in conveying opportunities and information is evident, but it has been analyzed through economic modeling only in the recent past, because of the technical difficulties of including graph theory in a framework of full rationality.

The natural approach is to combine the techniques of game theory and graph theory, but the first definitions of network games were provided by computer scientists only in the early 2000s.

However, in the last 10 years, a literature on games played on networks has grown in economics. This literature is now booming and has been applied to all possible interactions that are mediated by networks of social contacts.

This Special Issue welcomes any contribution that studies or applies network games. Applications can be widespread and interdisciplinary.

Dr. Paolo Pin
Dr. Yongli Li
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • game theory
  • social networks
  • key players
  • network externalities
  • graph theory
  • local public goods

Published Papers (4 papers)

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17 pages, 397 KiB  
Article
Information Sharing in Oligopoly: Sharing Groups and Core-Periphery Architectures
by Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
Games 2021, 12(4), 95; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040095 - 17 Dec 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1986
Abstract
The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm’s private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing [...] Read more.
The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm’s private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of collusion. Recent contributions have looked at bilateral information sharing, showing that information sharing is consistent with pairwise stability, This paper studies the networked pattern of bilateral information sharing on market demand, focusing on the role of heterogeneous information (firms’ signals have different variances). We show that while pairwise stability predicts that i.i.d. signals are always shared in groups with a symmetric internal structure (both with and without side-payment and linking costs), heterogeneous signals are shared in asymmetric core-periphery architectures, in which “core” firms have more valuable information than periphery firms. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Social Networks)
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16 pages, 1047 KiB  
Article
Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks
by Dario Madeo and Chiara Mocenni
Games 2021, 12(3), 60; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030060 - 29 Jul 2021
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 2240
Abstract
Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation [...] Read more.
Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Social Networks)
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13 pages, 320 KiB  
Article
Horizon-K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks
by P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Games 2021, 12(3), 56; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030056 - 05 Jul 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1815
Abstract
We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal [...] Read more.
We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set consisting of the complete network is a horizon-K farsighted set whenever the degree of farsightedness of the criminals is larger than or equal to (n−1). Moreover, the complete network is the unique horizon-(n−1) farsighted set. Hence, the predictions obtained in case of completely farsighted criminals still hold when criminals are much less farsighted. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Social Networks)
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12 pages, 286 KiB  
Article
The Evolution of Networks and Local Public Good Provision: A Potential Approach
by Markus Kinateder and Luca Paolo Merlino
Games 2021, 12(3), 55; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030055 - 02 Jul 2021
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2997
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a game in which each player decides with whom to establish a costly connection and how much local public good is provided when benefits are shared among neighbors. We show that, when agents are homogeneous, Nash equilibrium networks [...] Read more.
In this paper, we propose a game in which each player decides with whom to establish a costly connection and how much local public good is provided when benefits are shared among neighbors. We show that, when agents are homogeneous, Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs. Additionally, we show that the game is a potential game, even when we introduce heterogeneity along several dimensions. Using this result, we introduce stochastic best reply dynamics and show that this admits a unique and stationary steady state distribution expressed in terms of the potential function of the game. Hence, even if the set of Nash equilibria is potentially very large, the long run predictions are sharp. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Social Networks)
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