Special Issue "Boundedly Rational Behavior in Games"

Quicklinks

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 September 2012)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
PD Dr. Markus Pasche

School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Jena, Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3, D-07743 Jena, Germany
Website | E-Mail
Fax: +49 3641 943162
Interests: rationality concepts; behavioral game theory; social norms; heterogenous agents

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Bounded rationality is a broadly and controversially discussed topic in behavioral economics and behavioral game theory. Agents with limited cognitive abilities who act in complex and uncertain environments will develop behavioral patterns and underlying cognitive models and belief structures which can hardly be reconciled with expected utility maximization. In strategic interactions, it is of special interest how coordination and cooperation problems are resolved by boundedly rational players. When modelling boundedly rational behavior, however, there is the danger of ad hoc explanations. Arbitrary assumptions about non-observable parts of the explanans drive the results. Therefore, this special issue puts the focus on economic explanations of specific patterns of boundedly rational behavior. We consider models of other-regarding behavior like fairness or reciprocity models which are based on preferences (and therefore axiomatic utility theory) not to represent boundedly rational behavior. Relevant topics for this special issue include

  • decision principles like satisficing
  • models of rule-governed behavior and heuristics
  • adaptive behavior and simple learning rules
  • role of emotions
  • equilibrium concepts for boundedly rational players

PD Dr. Markus Pasche
Guest Editor

Published Papers (1 paper)

View options order results:
result details:
Displaying articles 1-1
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

Open AccessArticle Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management
Games 2012, 3(2), 97-118; doi:10.3390/g3020097
Received: 29 February 2012 / Revised: 29 March 2012 / Accepted: 30 March 2012 / Published: 15 May 2012
Cited by 8 | PDF Full-text (337 KB)
Abstract
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state
[...] Read more.
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state transition process. We define a Markov perfect equilibrium among the selves with individual identity (preferences) as the state variable. The approach allows to characterize generic personality types and derive some comparative static results. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Boundedly Rational Behavior in Games)

Journal Contact

MDPI AG
Games Editorial Office
St. Alban-Anlage 66, 4052 Basel, Switzerland
games@mdpi.com
Tel. +41 61 683 77 34
Fax: +41 61 302 89 18
Editorial Board
Contact Details Submit to Games
Back to Top