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Games
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Choice and Decision Making
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Choice and Decision Making

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 April 2018) | Viewed by 11613

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Dinko Dimitrov

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Chair of Economic Theory, Saarland University, Campus C3 1, 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany
Interests: coalition formation, cooperative game theory, individual and group decision making, social choice theory

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue of Games is devoted to the analysis of novel models of choice behavior and their implications for group decisions. Submissions are encouraged from all areas of individual and group decision making, including, but not restricted to, axiomatic foundations of choice rules, procedural aspects of individual decision making, (computational) complexity analysis of individual and group decisions, characterizations of collective choice methods. The keywords below are merely indicative.

Prof. Dr. Dinko Dimitrov
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • axiomatic foundations
  • bounded rationality
  • choice rules
  • collective choice
  • computational complexity
  • procedural rationality

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

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15 pages, 5531 KiB  
Article
Imitation of Peers in Children and Adults
by Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jörg Oechssler, Elke Weidenholzer and Simon Weidenholzer
Games 2018, 9(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010011 - 01 Mar 2018
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 7007
Abstract
Imitation of the successful choices of others is a simple and superficially attractive learning rule. It has been shown to be an important driving force for the strategic behavior of (young) adults. In this study we examine whether imitation is prevalent in the [...] Read more.
Imitation of the successful choices of others is a simple and superficially attractive learning rule. It has been shown to be an important driving force for the strategic behavior of (young) adults. In this study we examine whether imitation is prevalent in the behavior of children aged between 8 and 10. Surprisingly, we find that imitation seems to be cognitively demanding. Most children in this age group ignore information about others, foregoing substantial learning opportunities. While this seems to contradict much of the literature in the field of psychology, we argue that success-based imitation of peers may be harder for children to perform than non-success-based imitation of adults. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Choice and Decision Making)
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Review

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261 KiB  
Review
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey
by Bezalel Peleg and Ron Holzman
Games 2017, 8(4), 46; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040046 - 23 Oct 2017
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 4271
Abstract
We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players [...] Read more.
We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No prior knowledge of social choice is assumed: As far as definitions are concerned, the paper is self-contained. Section 2 supplies the necessary general tools for the rest of the paper. Each definition is followed by a simple (but nontrivial) example. In Section 3 we give a complete account of representations of committees (proper and monotonic simple games), by exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We start with Peleg’s representations of weak games, and then provide a complete and detailed account of Holzman’s solution of the representation problem for simple games without veto players. In Section 4 we deal with representations of constitutions by game forms. Following Gärdenfors we model a constitution by a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fully characterize the representations for three kinds of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium; acceptable equilibrium (Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium); and strong Nash equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5 with a report on two recent works on representations of constitutions under incomplete information. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Choice and Decision Making)
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