Special Issue "Coalition Formation"
A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 May 2010)
Prof. Dr. Anke Gerber (Website)
Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
Fax: +49 40 42838 4894
Interests: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory; evolutionary game theory; public goods; intertemporal choice; experimental economics; financial economics
Since the earliest days of mankind we have realized that there are gains from cooperating with others. As a consequence our socio-economic environment abounds with group structures like families, clubs, firms, political interest groups, military alliances and all kinds of international organizations and agreements. While the early literature in cooperative game theory has taken the coalition structure as exogenously given and has focused on the question of how the gains from cooperation are distributed among the members of a coalition, the theory of coalition formation deals with the emergence and stability of coalitions among individual decision makers. The problem of coalition formation becomes very complex if coalitions impose externalities on each other and if multiple memberships are allowed. For the Special Issue in Games I invite original contributions on coalition formation (including matching problems) from cooperative and non-cooperative game theory as well as from experimental economics. General and applied contributions, e.g. dealing with international environmental agreements, are equally welcome.
Prof. Dr. Anke Gerber
- coalition formation
- international agreements