Special Issue "Coalition Formation"

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A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 May 2010)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. Anke Gerber

Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
Website | E-Mail
Fax: +49 40 42838 4894
Interests: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory; evolutionary game theory; public goods; intertemporal choice; experimental economics; financial economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Since the earliest days of mankind we have realized that there are gains from cooperating with others. As a consequence our socio-economic environment abounds with group structures like families, clubs, firms, political interest groups, military alliances and all kinds of international organizations and agreements. While the early literature in cooperative game theory has taken the coalition structure as exogenously given and has focused on the question of how the gains from cooperation are distributed among the members of a coalition, the theory of coalition formation deals with the emergence and stability of coalitions among individual decision makers. The problem of coalition formation becomes very complex if coalitions impose externalities on each other and if multiple memberships are allowed. For the Special Issue in Games I invite original contributions on coalition formation (including matching problems) from cooperative and non-cooperative game theory as well as from experimental economics. General and applied contributions, e.g. dealing with international environmental agreements, are equally welcome.

Prof. Dr. Anke Gerber
Guest Editor

Keywords

  • coalition formation
  • matching
  • farsightedness
  • international agreements

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization
Games 2010, 1(3), 338-356; doi:10.3390/g1030338
Received: 18 May 2010 / Revised: 6 August 2010 / Accepted: 14 September 2010 / Published: 21 September 2010
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Abstract
We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for
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We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Open AccessArticle Universally Balanced Combinatorial Optimization Games
Games 2010, 1(3), 299-316; doi:10.3390/g1030299
Received: 27 May 2010 / Revised: 18 August 2010 / Accepted: 23 August 2010 / Published: 13 September 2010
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (223 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
This article surveys studies on universally balanced properties of cooperative games defined in a succinct form. In particular, we focus on combinatorial optimization games in which the values to coalitions are defined through linear optimization programs, possibly combinatorial, that is subject to integer
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This article surveys studies on universally balanced properties of cooperative games defined in a succinct form. In particular, we focus on combinatorial optimization games in which the values to coalitions are defined through linear optimization programs, possibly combinatorial, that is subject to integer constraints. In economic settings, the integer requirement reflects some forms of indivisibility. We are interested in the classes of games that guarantee a non-empty core no matter what are the admissible values assigned to the parameters defining these programs. We call such classes universally balanced. We present characterization and complexity results on the universally balancedness property for some classes of interesting combinatorial optimization games. In particular, we focus on the algorithmic properties for identifying universally balancedness for the games under discussion. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Open AccessArticle Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
Games 2010, 1(3), 286-298; doi:10.3390/g1030286
Received: 29 June 2010 / Accepted: 27 August 2010 / Published: 2 September 2010
Cited by 6 | PDF Full-text (183 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if
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A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Open AccessArticle Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation
Games 2010, 1(2), 159-167; doi:10.3390/g1020159
Received: 5 May 2010 / Revised: 10 June 2010 / Accepted: 15 June 2010 / Published: 25 June 2010
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Abstract
We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average
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We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Open AccessArticle Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?
Games 2010, 1(2), 137-158; doi:10.3390/g1020137
Received: 11 May 2010 / Revised: 1 June 2010 / Accepted: 14 June 2010 / Published: 24 June 2010
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (486 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a
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The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Open AccessArticle The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games
Games 2010, 1(2), 66-88; doi:10.3390/g1020066
Received: 23 January 2010 / Revised: 2 April 2010 / Accepted: 8 April 2010 / Published: 15 April 2010
Cited by 2 | PDF Full-text (311 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically
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We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

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