Editorial

4 pages, 173 KiB

Open AccessEditorial

by Mark Alfano, Hannes Rusch and Matthias Uhl

Games 2018, 9(2), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020020 - 26 Apr 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 6630

Ethics is a field in which the gap between words and actions looms large. Game theory and the empirical methods it inspires look at behavior instead of the lip service people sometimes pay to norms. We believe that this special issue comprises several [...] Read more.

Ethics is a field in which the gap between words and actions looms large. Game theory and the empirical methods it inspires look at behavior instead of the lip service people sometimes pay to norms. We believe that this special issue comprises several illustrations of the fruitful application of this approach to ethics. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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755 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Moral Entitlements and Aspiration Formation in Asymmetric Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from Germany and China

by Heike Hennig-Schmidt and Gari Walkowitz

Games 2017, 8(4), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040044 - 17 Oct 2017

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 6175

Abstract

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from Germany [...] Read more.

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from Germany and China. Over the course of the negotiation, bargainers discuss the distribution of an amount of money by alternating offers until they consent or break off. Legal rights are randomly assigned by asymmetric outside options. We videotape and code the in-group discussions. In total, verbal data from 30 groups, 1100 pages of transcripts, and 65 h of discussions are content-analyzed. Our main finding is that strong groups derive and defend moral entitlements from equity concerns with regard to their outside options. They strive for equitable but unequal distributions (e.g., proportional split and split the difference). Moral entitlements materialize in the recorded aspiration levels and final payoffs, which exceed the equal split. By contrast, weak groups aim at equality. Over the course of the negotiation, equity tends to lose, while the prominence of round numbers gains importance. Similarities between the subject pools are found in that equity and prominence are both decisive for the formation of aspiration levels. Chinese negotiations are characterized by long periods of stagnation, only minimal concessions, and the communication of false goals. By contrast, Germans steadily reduce their goals and make concessions. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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444 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity

by Jelle De Boer

Games 2017, 8(4), 43; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040043 - 13 Oct 2017

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5244

Abstract

This paper is a partial review of the literature on ‘social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are [...] Read more.

This paper is a partial review of the literature on ‘social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a figure, to discuss a range of empirical studies. Where appropriate, I also briefly discuss a couple of insights from the (mostly parallel) evolutionary literature about cooperation. A concrete case of the Orma in Kenya will be used as a motivating example in the beginning. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

291 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Towards a Fair Distribution Mechanism for Asylum

by Philippe Van Basshuysen

Games 2017, 8(4), 41; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040041 - 25 Sep 2017

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 8167

Abstract

It has been suggested that the distribution of refugees over host countries can be made more fair or efficient if policy makers take into account not only numbers of refugees to be distributed but also the goodness of the matches between refugees and [...] Read more.

It has been suggested that the distribution of refugees over host countries can be made more fair or efficient if policy makers take into account not only numbers of refugees to be distributed but also the goodness of the matches between refugees and their possible host countries. There are different ways to design distribution mechanisms that incorporate this practice, which opens up a space for normative considerations. In particular, if the mechanism takes countries’ or refugees’ preferences into account, there may be trade-offs between satisfying their preferences and the number of refugees distributed. This article argues that, in such cases, it is not a reasonable policy to satisfy preferences. Moreover, conditions are given which, if satisfied, prevent the trade-off from occurring. Finally, it is argued that countries should not express preferences over refugees, but rather that priorities for refugees should be imposed, and that fairness beats efficiency in the context of distributing asylum. The framework of matching theory is used to make the arguments precise, but the results are general and relevant for other distribution mechanisms such as the relocations currently in effect in the European Union. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

202 KiB

Open AccessCommunication

On Adverse Effects of Consumers’ Attaching Greater Importance to Firms’ Ethical Conduct

by Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe

Games 2017, 8(3), 39; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030039 - 14 Sep 2017

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 5162

Abstract

Consumers increasingly care about firms’ ethical conduct (e.g., labor and environmental practices) when making their consumption choices. This note presents a simple framework to highlight the possibility that this development may induce a less desirable production technology choice and bring about lower market [...] Read more.

Consumers increasingly care about firms’ ethical conduct (e.g., labor and environmental practices) when making their consumption choices. This note presents a simple framework to highlight the possibility that this development may induce a less desirable production technology choice and bring about lower market transparency. When faced with consumers’ greater moral concerns, more firms may choose an undesirable mode of production and shroud information about it. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

971 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists

by Ingela Alger and Jörgen W. Weibull

Games 2017, 8(3), 38; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030038 - 11 Sep 2017

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 7568

Abstract

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who [...] Read more.

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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862 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?

by Roberto Sarkisian

Games 2017, 8(3), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030037 - 05 Sep 2017

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5733

Abstract

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents [...] Read more.

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts; the probability of a high realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is sufficiently high; and either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is sufficiently low. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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317 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving: Learning from Non-Results

by Zachary Grossman and Joël J. Van der Weele

Games 2017, 8(3), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030036 - 21 Aug 2017

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 6868

Abstract

To identify dual-process reasoning in giving, we exposed experimental participants making a charitable donation to vivid images of the charity’s beneficiaries in order to stimulate affect. We hypothesized that the effect of an affective manipulation on giving would be larger when we simultaneously [...] Read more.

To identify dual-process reasoning in giving, we exposed experimental participants making a charitable donation to vivid images of the charity’s beneficiaries in order to stimulate affect. We hypothesized that the effect of an affective manipulation on giving would be larger when we simultaneously put the subjects under cognitive load using a numerical recall task. Independent treatment checks reveal opposite responses in men and women and cast some doubt on the reliability of our mainstream treatment manipulations and assessment tools. We find no evidence for dual-process decision-making, even among women, whose responses to the manipulations conformed most to our expectations. These results highlight the need for caution in the use of these common manipulations, the importance of independent manipulation checks, and the limitations of dual-process models for understanding altruistic behavior. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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299 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Reacting to Unfairness: Group Identity and Dishonest Behavior

by Nives Della Valle and Matteo Ploner

Games 2017, 8(3), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030028 - 14 Jul 2017

Cited by 8 | Viewed by 7210

Abstract

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either [...] Read more.

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either share the same group identity or have distinct group identities. Then, they approach a task in which they can opportunistically engage in dishonest behavior. Our results show that when individuals share the same group identity, unfair distributive decisions do not trigger a dishonest reaction. In contrast, when different group identities coexist, dishonest behavior is observed as a reaction to unfairness. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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