Special Issue "Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind)"

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A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 February 2014)

Special Issue Editors

Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. Wolfram Elsner

Structural Research and Policy Division, iino Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
Website | E-Mail
Fax: +49 421 218-4974
Interests: institutional economics; institutional emergence; evolutionary game theory; history of economic thought; \'meso\'-economics; sectoral and regional cooperation and networks; theory of interactive policy
Co-Guest Editor
Dr. Torsten Heinrich

Structural Research and Policy Division, iino Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
Website | E-Mail
Fax: +49 (421) 218 - 66612
Co-Guest Editor
Dr. Henning Schwardt

Structural Research and Policy Division, iino Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
Website | E-Mail
Fax: +49 (421) 218 - 66612
Co-Guest Editor
Dr. Claudius Gräbner

Structural Research and Policy Division, iino Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
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Special Issue Information

Submission

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. Papers will be published continuously (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are refereed through a peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed Open Access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 500 CHF (Swiss Francs). English correction and/or formatting fees of 250 CHF (Swiss Francs) will be charged in certain cases for those articles accepted for publication that require extensive additional formatting and/or English corrections.


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Published Papers (5 papers)

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Editorial

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Open AccessEditorial Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics
Games 2014, 5(3), 188-190; doi:10.3390/g5030188
Received: 30 July 2014 / Accepted: 5 August 2014 / Published: 4 September 2014
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Abstract
Classical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence
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Classical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence Ayres. In their writings, direct interdependence, interactions (or transactions) among agents, with all beneficial and with all problematic consequences, took center stage in economic analysis. Why, for instance, do people adhere to a particular new fashion or trend? Because others do, after eminent people, wealthy people, the “leisure class” (T. Veblen), have made it a symbol for status. The new fashion, however, ceases to serve as such a symbol once too many people follow it. The constant effort put into following trends and adopting fashion turns out to be a social dilemma, driven by Veblenian instincts, such as invidious distinction in predatory societies, conspicuous consumption and emulation. [...] Full article

Research

Jump to: Editorial

Open AccessArticle An Agent-Based Model of Institutional Life-Cycles
Games 2014, 5(3), 160-187; doi:10.3390/g5030160
Received: 15 February 2014 / Revised: 4 August 2014 / Accepted: 8 August 2014 / Published: 18 August 2014
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (10260 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social structures. We show
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We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social structures. We show how endogenized trust and exogenously given leader authority influences institutional change, i.e., diversity in institutional life-cycles. It turns out that these governed institutions (de)structure in cyclical patterns dependent on the overall evolution of trust in the artificial society, while at the same time, influencing this evolution by supporting social learning. Simulation results indicate three scenarios of institutional life-cycles. Institutions may, (1) build up very fast and freeze the artificial society in a stable but fearful pattern (ordered system); (2) exist only for a short time, leading to a very trusty society (highly fluctuating system); and (3) structure in cyclical patterns over time and support social learning due to cumulative causation of societal trust (complex system). Full article
Open AccessArticle Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur
Games 2014, 5(1), 53-89; doi:10.3390/g5010053
Received: 19 August 2013 / Revised: 10 December 2013 / Accepted: 31 January 2014 / Published: 25 February 2014
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (735 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main
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Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper. Full article
Open AccessArticle Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results
Games 2014, 5(1), 1-25; doi:10.3390/g5010001
Received: 26 November 2013 / Revised: 11 January 2014 / Accepted: 23 January 2014 / Published: 30 January 2014
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Abstract
The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a
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The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and ‘satisficers’. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold. Full article
Open AccessArticle Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment
Games 2013, 4(4), 584-607; doi:10.3390/g4040584
Received: 17 July 2013 / Revised: 11 September 2013 / Accepted: 8 October 2013 / Published: 10 October 2013
Cited by 4 | PDF Full-text (355 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join.
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We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a voluntary contribution mechanism, the other group an allocator contribution mechanism. The setup of the allocator mechanism differs between two treatments. In the coordinator treatment, the randomly selected allocator can set a uniform contribution for all group members, including herself. In the dictator treatment, the allocator can choose different contributions for herself and all other group members. We find that subjects willingly submit to authority in both treatments, even when competing with a voluntary contribution mechanism. The allocator groups achieve high contribution levels in both treatments. Full article

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