Special Issue "Games and Psychology"

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A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 April 2012)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Dr. Alan Sanfey

Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, P.O.Box 9101, NL-6500 HB Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Fax: +31 24 36 10989

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Recent interdisciplinary work has attempted to explain how people behave in game theoretic scenarios in terms of fundamental psychological and neural mechanisms such as reward processing, attention, emotion, and personality measures, amongst others. This type of work can deliver important insights, from demonstrating that complex interactive behavior can be understood in terms of basic processes to explaining the variability of behavior by individual differences in cognitive and social abilities as well as variation in genes and pharmacology. This Special Issue seeks to better understand the link between psychological processes and behavior in interactive settings. We welcome all contributions which are interested in exploring the psychological processes, defined broadly, underlying interactive decision-making.

Alan Sanfey
Guest Editor

Keywords

  • decision-making
  • choice
  • neuroeconomics
  • game theory
  • experimental economics
  • learning
  • memory
  • attention
  • risk
  • emotion

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Responder Feelings in a Three-Player Three-Option Ultimatum Game: Affective Determinants of Rejection Behavior
Games 2012, 3(1), 1-29; doi:10.3390/g3010001
Received: 24 October 2011 / Revised: 16 January 2012 / Accepted: 7 February 2012 / Published: 13 February 2012
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (344 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms [...] Read more.
This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible explanation. In particular, feelings of fairness, anger and envy are likely candidates as affective determinants. We introduce a three-player ultimatum game with three-options, which permits the responder to either penalize the proposer or to penalize a third party by rejecting offers. This allows for partially distinguishing rejections due to a retaliation motive driven by anger towards the proposer from rejections due to inequity aversion driven by feelings of envy towards a third party. Results from two experiments suggest that responders experience feelings of dissatisfaction and unfairness if their share is small in comparison to the proposer’s share; anger, then, may trigger rejections towards the proposer. Responders also experience dissatisfaction and envy when third party shares exceed their own shares; however, in contrast to anger, envy does not trigger rejections and is dissociated from the decision to accept or reject an offer. We conclude that acting upon anger is socially acceptable, whereas envy is not acceptable as a reason for action. Furthermore, we find that responders generally feel better after rejections, suggesting that rejections serve to regulate one’s affective state. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Psychology)
Open AccessArticle The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective
Games 2011, 2(4), 452-462; doi:10.3390/g2040452
Received: 18 July 2011 / Revised: 1 September 2011 / Accepted: 2 December 2011 / Published: 9 December 2011
PDF Full-text (284 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other [...] Read more.
This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful consumption is distributed bimodally. Therefore, our result fits better with our daily observations concerning a lot of ambivalent goods where we often form nonrigid resolutions. The normative analysis uses the device of a hypothetical impartial self that regards both conflicting motives as equally legitimate. The result of this analysis is dilemmatic. It demonstrates that the resolution is broken too often to be welfare maximal. However, the introduction of external self-commitment devices results in their overuse and is welfare decreasing. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Psychology)
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