Ownership Reduction in State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Social Responsibility: Perspective from Secondary Privatization in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature and Hypothesis Development
2.1. State Ownership and CSR
2.2. The Effect of State Ownership Reductions
3. Methods
3.1. Sample
3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Dependent Variable
3.2.2. Independent Variables
3.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
3.4. Model Specification
4. Findings
4.1. Results and Discussion
4.2. Robustness
5. Concluding Remarks
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
1 | Agriculture/forestry/stock raising/fishery | 19 | Manufacturing motors |
2 | Communication/cultural | 20 | Manufacturing non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing |
3 | Conglomerate | 21 | Manufacturing non-metal minerals |
4 | Construction | 22 | Manufacturing paper |
5 | Education | 23 | Manufacturing petrochemicals |
6 | Electricity/gas/water (utilities) | 24 | Manufacturing railway, ship, aerospace, and other transportation equipment |
7 | Hotels and catering | 25 | Manufacturing rubber and plastic products |
8 | Leasing | 26 | Manufacturing special equipment |
9 | Manufacturing chemical raw materials and chemical products | 27 | Manufacturing textiles |
10 | Manufacturing computer communication and other electronic equipment | 28 | Manufacturing wood processing and wood, bamboo, rattan, and brown grass products |
11 | Manufacturing electronics | 29 | Manufacturing farm and sideline food processing |
12 | Manufacturing ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing | 30 | Manufacturing wine and beverage and refined tea |
13 | Manufacturing food | 31 | Mining |
14 | Manufacturing furniture | 32 | Real estate |
15 | Manufacturing general equipment | 33 | Social service |
16 | Manufacturing instruments | 34 | Transportation/storage |
17 | Manufacturing medicine | 35 | Wholesale/retail trade |
18 | Manufacturing metals |
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Abbreviation | Details |
---|---|
(1) CSR Rating | CSR rating is used as a proxy for CSR performance measured as scores (1 to 100) given by a Rankins agency to a particular firm in a particular year. |
(2) SO Reduction | SO Reduction indicates state ownership reduction measured as a dummy variable which is equal to1 if there is a reduction in the state ownership and 0 otherwise. |
(3) StateOwn | StateOwn indicates state ownership measured as the percentage of shares held by the state. |
(4) BoardOwn | BoardOwn represents board ownership which is the proportion of shares owned by board members. |
(5) InstOwn | InstOwn indicates institutional ownership calculated as shares owned by institutions divided by total shares of the firm. |
(6) ROA | ROA indicates return on assets measured as net profit divided by total assets |
(7) Tobin’s Q | This is a market measure of performance calculated as the market value of the firm divided by total assets. |
(8) Firm Age | Firm age represents the number of years the company has been listed on the stock exchange. |
(9) Size | This shows firm size calculated as a natural log of total assets. |
(10) Growth | Growth of the firm is measured as the change in total assets. |
(11) Leverage | Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. |
(12) GrowthOpp | GrowthOpp indicates growth opportunity and is measured as the book value divided by the market value of shareholder equity. |
Year and Industry dummies | To control the effect of year and industry, we included year and industry dummies in all regressions. |
Variable | Mean | SD | Minimum | Maximum |
---|---|---|---|---|
CSR Rating | 28.711 | 19.439 | −15.2 | 90.84 |
StateOwn | 18.554 | 22.541 | 0 | 89.09 |
SO Reduction | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
BoardOwn | 0.1 | 0.184 | 0 | 0.892 |
InstOwn | 6.8 | 9.482 | 0.04 | 87.89 |
ROA | 0.038 | 0.526 | −48.316 | 22.005 |
Tobin’s Q | 2.698 | 26.485 | 0.065 | 2354.72 |
Firm Age | 10.659 | 6.292 | 1 | 26 |
Size | 3.092 | 0.059 | 2.622 | 3.35 |
Growth | 0.805 | 1.896 | −12.806 | 64.697 |
Leverage | 0.461 | 0.566 | 0.007 | 46.159 |
GrowthOpp | 0.964 | 1.023 | 0 | 15.473 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) CSR Rating | 1.000 | |||||||||||
(2)StateOwn | 0.186 * | 1.000 | ||||||||||
(3) SO Reduction | −0.021 * | 0.254 * | 1.000 | |||||||||
(4) BoardOwn | −0.074 * | −0.438 * | −0.172 * | 1.000 | ||||||||
(5) InstOwn | 0.113 * | 0.110 * | 0.073 * | −0.085 * | 1.000 | |||||||
(6) ROA | 0.055 * | −0.005 | −0.005 | 0.018 | 0.026 * | 1.000 | ||||||
(7) Tobin’s Q | −0.030 * | −0.036 * | −0.011 | 0.008 | −0.001 | −0.068 * | 1.000 | |||||
(8) Firm Age | 0.029 * | 0.334 * | 0.145 * | −0.548 * | 0.082 * | −0.022 * | 0.002 | 1.000 | ||||
(9) Size | 0.387 * | 0.434 * | 0.133 * | −0.284 * | 0.088 * | 0.029 * | −0.162 * | 0.245 * | 1.000 | |||
(10) Growth | 0.033 * | −0.058 * | 0.033 * | 0.064 * | 0.036 * | 0.063 * | 0.087 * | −0.052 * | 0.054 * | 1.000 | ||
(11) Leverage | −0.030 * | 0.095 * | 0.034 * | −0.150 * | −0.001 | −0.438 * | 0.243 * | 0.178 * | 0.091 * | −0.031 * | 1.000 | |
(12) GrowthOpp | 0.172 * | 0.316 * | 0.037 * | −0.235 * | −0.010 | −0.021 * | −0.059 * | 0.221 * | 0.514 * | −0.031 * | 0.194 * | 1.000 |
CSR Rating | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
StateOwn (H1) | 0.025 *** | ------- | 0.030 *** | -------- |
(2.77) | (3.19) | |||
SO Reduction * (H2) | ------ | −1.162 ** | −1.475 *** | −1.194 * |
(−2.10) | (−2.62) | (−1.83) | ||
BoardOwn | 3.983 *** | 3.005 *** | 3.838 *** | −17.899 |
(3.490) | (2.70) | (3.36) | (−1.23) | |
InstOwn | 0.118 *** | 0.123 *** | 0.120 *** | 0.087 *** |
(6.76) | (7.50) | (6.84) | (3.98) | |
ROA | −0.466 | −0.497 | −0.467 | 8.372 *** |
(−0.97) | (−1.03) | (−0.97) | (3.80) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.048 *** | 0.048 *** | 0.047 *** | 1.552 *** |
(7.20) | (7.28) | (7.18) | (8.65) | |
Firm Age | −0.123 *** | −0.108 *** | −0.119 *** | −0.175 *** |
(−3.65) | (−3.24) | (−3.54) | (−3.25) | |
Size | 175.380 *** | 178.762 *** | 175.773 *** | 206.207 *** |
(43.92) | (46.01) | (44.00) | (832.93) | |
Growth | −0.177 ** | −0.189 ** | −0.167 * | −0.304 ** |
(−2.02) | (−2.16) | (−1.90) | (−2.12) | |
Leverage | −2.000 *** | −2.028 *** | −1.993 *** | −9.193 *** |
(−4.18) | (−4.24) | (−4.17) | (−7.27) | |
Growthopp | −3.151 *** | −3.163 *** | −3.180 *** | −2.459 *** |
(−13.52) | (−13.55) | (−13.63) | (−7.84) | |
Year and industry variables | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Constant | −514.132 *** | −523.873 *** | −515.257 *** | −613.315 *** |
(−42.07) | (−43.93) | (−42.15) | (−31.64) | |
Adjusted R2 | 0.263 | 0.262 | 0.265 | 0.330 |
CSR Rating | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
---|---|---|---|
SO Reduction * (5%) | −2.465 *** | -------- | ------- |
(−3.53) | |||
SO Reduction (10%) | ------- | −3.093 *** | ------- |
(−3.69) | |||
SO Reduction (50%) | -------- | --------- | −3.391 * |
(−1.90) | |||
Control, year, and industry variables | Included | Included | included |
Adjusted R2 | 0.264 | 0.264 | 0.263 |
CSR Rating | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 (2-SLS) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
SO Reduction (one-year lagged) | −2.378 *** | -------- | ------- | -------- | −13.83 *** |
(−3.44) | (−3.13) | ||||
SO Reduction (one-year lagged 5%) | ------- | −3.084 *** | ------- | -------- | -------- |
(−3.57) | |||||
SO Reduction (one-year lagged 10%) | -------- | --------- | −3.494 *** | -------- | -------- |
(−3.40) | |||||
SO Reduction (one-year lagged 50%) | -------- | -------- | -------- | −4.352 ** | -------- |
(−2.04) | |||||
Control, year, and industry variables | Included | included | Included | included | Included |
Adjusted R2 | 0.259 | 0.266 | 0.260 | 0.262 | 0.225 |
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Khan, F.U.; Zhang, J.; Usman, M.; Badulescu, A.; Sial, M.S. Ownership Reduction in State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Social Responsibility: Perspective from Secondary Privatization in China. Sustainability 2019, 11, 1008. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11041008
Khan FU, Zhang J, Usman M, Badulescu A, Sial MS. Ownership Reduction in State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Social Responsibility: Perspective from Secondary Privatization in China. Sustainability. 2019; 11(4):1008. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11041008
Chicago/Turabian StyleKhan, Farman Ullah, Junrui Zhang, Muhammad Usman, Alina Badulescu, and Muhammad Safdar Sial. 2019. "Ownership Reduction in State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Social Responsibility: Perspective from Secondary Privatization in China" Sustainability 11, no. 4: 1008. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11041008