4.1. Stakeholders’ Roles and Perceptions of Fisheries Co-Management
The inclusion of multiple stakeholders due to their different roles in the governance of the Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery seemed to be critical to the feasibility of an effective co-management governance if adopted. This is because the primary stakeholders were already involved in the governance and management of the fishery, hence their suitability in contributing greatly to the fisheries co-management approach in terms of technical knowledge, administrative capabilities, and law enforcement skills. The inclusion of secondary stakeholders would be beneficial in providing financial and material support towards the fishers’ alternative livelihoods during the co-management governance arrangement. These findings are in line with the study by Kapembwa et al. [
46] on the Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery, who suggested the development or enactment of the right livelihood-tailored fisheries policies and legislative frameworks that would compel the incorporation of appropriate stakeholders in fishers’ livelihoods to promote sustainable fishing. The study by Kapembwa et al. [
46] is supported by that of Chama and Mwitwa [
35] on the Lake Bangweulu fishery in the northern part of Zambia, who recommended the formulation of a policy on fisheries management that should focus on uplifting the livelihood of local communities while conserving the fisheries resources.
The stakeholders’ perceptions largely entail that co-management is applicable for the governance of Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery, given that it will be adequately guided by the provisions of the legislation and the engagement of stakeholders. This finding is in line with the arguments put forward by Pomeroy and Williams [
54] and d’Armengol et al. [
55] that the different structural components in a co-management arrangement should be entrenched through the necessary legislation to make operational and collective decisions in the fishery. The current study also agrees with the argument by Carlsson and Berkes [
11] that, in order to foster the success of co-management, it should be defined in formalised arrangements, where multiple stakeholders share governance functions and responsibilities on a given fishery. Wilson et al. [
12] added that a centralised government approach has resulted in a significant barrier to integrating decision-making from other stakeholders in fisheries governance and management. As such, the different stakeholders in this study advocated for multiple stakeholder participation in the co-management governance arrangement of the Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery.
There is a further need for an appropriate policy to guide such a co-management arrangement. The current National Agriculture Policy (2015–2030) adopted by the Department of Fisheries (DoF) does not provide adequate guidelines, as it does not provide details on how co-management should be organisationally structured and implemented. If such a policy is not in place, there will be a great risk for conflicts and confusion around defining and delineating the roles and mandates of key actors [
56]. This study also argues that the lack of a properly defined policy framework on co-management could be a further reason why the government, through DoF, has been struggling to make progress on the issue of co-management implementation as demanded by the Fisheries Act (22 of 2011) [
18]. To date, there has been no proper co-management arrangement on any Zambian fishery that is operating based on the requirements of the Fisheries Act, though there have been collaborative or participatory management arrangements between government and fishing communities on some fisheries [
57,
58]. Some of such fisheries are the Lake Mweru-Luapula fishery and Lake Bangweulu fishery in the northern part of Zambia, whose performance in terms of collaborative or participatory fisheries governance was still not pleasant. This was so because the local fishers and other key stakeholders were still not engaged in decision-making about the governance of the fishery [
35,
37]. Furthermore, power and authority still resided with the central government on both fisheries [
35,
37].
4.2. Relating the Stakeholder Perceptions on Perceived Challenges and Benefits to the ‘Key Conditions’ Criteria for Successful Fisheries Co-Management
Studies on existing co-management arrangements in Asia, the South Pacific, and Africa have shown that small-scale fishers can manage fisheries resources sustainably by fulfilling certain ‘key conditions’ [
22,
54]. This study conducted a ‘pre-assessment of co-management’ based on stakeholders’ perceptions aligned to the ‘key conditions’ in order to ascertain the feasibility of undertaking what they would regard as a successful co-management at the Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery. The study indicates the need to fulfil most of the eleven ‘key conditions’ in undertaking co-management in order to address the challenges and realise the benefits highlighted by the stakeholders. These ‘key conditions’ should be fulfilled because none of them exists in isolation, but each one supports and links to another to make the process and arrangements for the co-management work [
22].
(i) Clearly defined boundaries: Having clearly defined physical boundaries around a fishery is essential in preventing conflicts between fishers and government authorities. Although a large part of Lake Itezhi-Tezhi was well defined in terms of physical boundaries, the boundary between the lake portion inside the Kafue National Park and the portion outside the park was still unclear and was a source of conflict. To avoid further conflict which may jeopardise co-management goals, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) would need to demarcate the contentious boundary.
(ii) Membership clearly defined: Membership of fishers on the fishery was not clearly defined because of the open-access nature of the fishery and the inefficiency of the Fishermen and Fish Traders Association (FFTA) in organising the fishers. Therefore, one option for defining membership would be to strengthen the fishing licensing process for fishers by the DoF, which would act as an inventory and monitoring tool for active fishers. A fisher is not permitted to fish in the lake without a fishing licence issued by DoF yearly, in accordance with the Fisheries Act of 2011(22 of 2011) [
18]. Fishers would be required to cooperate and collaborate with the DoF to make this operational. As was the case with the Beach Management Unit (BMU) on Lake Victoria [
25], the Fisheries Management Committee (FMC) earmarked for establishment would also be required to have a well-monitored fishers’ register for taking stock of the fishers’ population at any given time.
(iii) and (ix) Group (fishers) cohesion, cooperation, and leadership at the community level: Cooperation among all stakeholders, motivated by incentives, is crucial for the success of a co-management arrangement [
10]. Lack of cooperation among stakeholders was one of the reasons for the failure of the current governance system at Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery. Incentives such as increased individual fish catches, high household income levels, low dependence on fishing, and decreasing numbers of immigrant fishers would be expected to enhance cooperation from the fishers. Incentives such as the reduced threat of overexploitation of the fishery’s resources, increased compliance with regulations, and increased resources for enforcement and monitoring would also promote cooperation from the government.
To improve leadership, the FMC would be expected to organise capacity-building and knowledge transfer programmes for fishers through the proposed sub-committees in the fishing villages and fishing camps. These programmes (workshops and seminars) would have to cover topics such as responsibility, accountability, and effectiveness. Such programmes were also being recommended for the BMU for Lake Victoria, Kenya, after the experience of elite capture at the expense of the less educated local fishers [
59].
(iv) Existing organisations (associations): The FFTA has been in existence since 2009. Because of its weak governance arrangement, it has not been effective in representing the fishers to other stakeholders on socio-economic matters. As such, the FMC would be expected to effectively represent the fishers on such matters. The proposed creation and inclusion of sub-committees in the co-management structure, apart from the FMC, would enhance effective representation and participation of fishers from the grassroots level.
(v) Benefits exceeding cost: The co-management system would be expected to provide benefits, especially at the fishers’ household level [
10]. Fishers would expect increased fish catches, increased incomes, and improved livelihoods for their input into the co-management operations. This expectation is in line with Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb’s [
10] argument that benefits from a co-management arrangement usually promote collective responsibility among fisheries resource users. That would also be an ideal situation in the governance of the Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery. Furthermore, the Fisheries Act (22 of 2011) [
18] provides for the establishment of the Fisheries Development Fund for the FMC operations, including participation in law enforcement by fishers, and this would also enhance benefit realisation towards the fishers’ livelihoods. However, government funding for co-management operations might not be reliable; additional sources, such as a portion of fishing licence fees, may be required for effective implementation [
2].
(vi) Participation by those affected: The results of the current study show that all the stakeholders were negatively affected by the current state of governance and fisheries resources and were accordingly willing to participate in the co-management arrangement. Enactment of the Fisheries Act (22 of 2011) [
18] was meant to incorporate fishers and other stakeholders in the decision-making processes of co-management. The incorporation of stakeholders is in line with the arguments proffered by Charles [
60] and d’Armengol et al. [
55] that engagement of a diversity of stakeholders in a co-management initiative of small-scale fisheries usually enhances the governance and management of fisheries resources.
(vii) Management rules enforced: To reduce unsustainable fishing practices, enforcement of or adherence to laws and regulations would be critical in co-management. According to Van Hoof [
61], the success of co-management mainly depends on cooperation and collective action among participating stakeholders, particularly the fishers, in law enforcement. The proposed formation of sub-committees in the co-management structure would encourage fishers at the grassroots level to get involved since they know the lawbreakers and how to best deal with them. Furthermore, with the current limitation of human resources by the government to enforce the law, it would even be necessary to legally empower some fishers with the authority to apprehend and prosecute offenders. Such legal empowerment of fishers may require providing them with training and financial incentives, and this undertaking should be specified in the policy framework.
(viii) Legal rights to organise co-management: As far as the Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery is concerned, the Fisheries Act (22 of 2011) [
18] provides a platform for stakeholders’ participation in the governance process of fishery through the FMC. The presence of legislation is in line with d’Armengol et al. [
55], who argue that a supporting legal and institutional framework is essential in facilitating the emergence of co-management. The same Fisheries Act of 2011 mandates the FMC to incorporate six fishers (to be selected through the proposed sub-committees) and at least seven other stakeholders of the fishery into its operations. However, most fishers were not aware of their legal right to participate in the prudent management of fishery’s resources. As such, the fisheries policy would be required to elaborate on specific guidelines and responsibilities for fishers and the other stakeholders of the fishery in the co-management, including those responsibilities suggested in this study.
(x) Decentralisation of authority: Allison and Badjeck [
62] argued that if empowering stakeholders in a co-management arrangement is the goal, then the process should be connected to the decentralisation of power and authority to the local community. However, the Fisheries Act (22 of 2011) [
18] does not elaborate on how the government intends to decentralise its power and authority and transfer it to local fishers and other stakeholders. According to Pomeroy and Berkes [
63], this lack of elaboration could be because the decentralisation of power was considered an evolving process that was adjusted and matured over time. Therefore, there was no better form of decentralisation, either delegation or devolution, to support a particular co-management [
63]. Moreover, the government needs to develop more knowledge, experience, and political will to implement an appropriate form of decentralisation. This scenario is what usually breeds bureaucracy in the co-management implementation by the governments. However, based on the recommendation of Pomeroy and Berkes [
63], the government of Zambia would have to give direction on the power-sharing and decision-making arrangements to participating stakeholders through the fisheries policy, which was not yet in place at the time of the current study.
(xi) Coordination between government and community: The establishment of the FMC, as demanded by the Fisheries Act (22 of 2011) [
18], would play a pivotal role in coordinating the governance and management of the fishery, resolving conflicts, mobilising the enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations, and enhancing fishers’ livelihoods. Its establishment would be done through engaging and mobilising all the stakeholders of the Lake Itezhi-Tezhi fishery.