Fairness Concern in Remanufacturing Supply Chain—A Comparative Analysis of Channel Members’ Fairness Preferences
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- How does channel members’ (channel members refer to the manufacturer and the retailer in the proposed model of this paper) fairness preference affect operational strategies regarding wholesale and sales prices of new and remanufactured products, and collection rate of the EOL product?
- In the short term, which scenario of channel members’ fairness concerns is the most favorable for sustainable progress of the RSC?
- In the long term, how does fairness preference of channel members evolve in the game between the manufacturer and the retailer? And what is the influencing element for the channel to achieve evolutionary stable state?
2. Literature Review
3. Problem Characteristics and Assumptions
3.1. Notations and Definitions
3.2. Complementary Descriptions and Assumptions
4. RSC Strategies Considering Distinct Fairness Preferences of Channel Members
4.1. RSC Strategies and Utilities in Distinct Scenarios
4.2. Comparative Analysis of Distinct Scenarios
4.3. RSC Performance Considering Channel Members’ Fairness Concerns in a Single Period
5. Evolvements and Stable Strategy of Fairness Concern in Multi Periods
5.1. Pay-Off Matrix and Evolutionary Game Model of Channel Members with Fairness Concerns
5.2. Evolutionary Stable Strategy of Channel Members’ Fairness Concerns
6. Numerical Analysis
- Impacts of fairness concerns on RSC utility
- 2.
- Impacts of fairness concerns on RSC performance and environmental benefit in a single period
- 3.
- Evolutionary process and stable strategy of channel members’ fairness concerns
7. Conclusions
7.1. Theoretic Results
- For the impacts of fairness preferences on operational strategies and resulting utilities
- 2.
- For the favorable scenarios to accomplish desired objectives in the short term
- 3.
- For the evolutionary process and stability of fairness preferences in the long term
7.2. Managerial Implications
7.3. Limitations and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Appendix B. Proof of Corollary 1
- Scenario I (Both the manufacturer and retailer are fairness concerned)
- 2.
- Scenario II (The manufacturer is fairness concerned and retailer is fair neutral)
- 3.
- Scenario III (The manufacturer is fair neutral and retailer is fairness concerned)
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
- The sales price.
- 2.
- The wholesale price.
- 3.
- The collection rate.
Appendix D. Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 6
Appendix F. Stability Analysis of Equilibrium Solutions
- The equilibrium point (0,0)
- 2.
- The equilibrium point (1,0)
- 3.
- The equilibrium point (0,1)
- 4.
- The equilibrium point (1,1)
- 5.
- The equilibrium point (x*, y*)
Equilibrium Solutions | Conditions and Results | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
det (J) | tr (J) | Results | ||||
(0,0) | none | + | + | + | + | |
(1,0) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Saddle point | |
− | + | − | − | |||
− | 0 | − | − | |||
− | − | + | − | ESS | ||
(0,1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Saddle point | |
+ | − | − | − | |||
0 | − | − | − | |||
− | − | + | − | ESS | ||
(1,1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Saddle point | |
− | − | + | − | ESS | ||
0 | − | 0 | − | |||
+ | − | − | − | |||
+ | − | − | 0 | Saddle point | ||
+ | − | − | + | |||
+ | 0 | 0 | + | |||
+ | bbb+ | + | + | |||
) | none | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | Saddle point |
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Notations | Definitions |
---|---|
Parameters | |
i = M, R, S respectively represents the manufacturer, the retailer, and the RSC. | |
j = I, II, III, IV, C represent respective scenarios. | |
The manufacturer’s fairness concern coefficient, . The manufacturer is fair neutral if . | |
The retailer’s fairness concern coefficient, . The manufacturer is fair neutral if . | |
Production cost of unit new product. | |
Production cost of unit remanufactured product. | |
A cost-saving of a unit of remanufactured product compared to new product, . | |
The market size of the products (new and remanufactured). | |
The price sensitive coefficient of consumers, . | |
The market demand of new and remanufactured products, . | |
Transfer price of unit EOL product charged by the retailer. | |
Acquisition price of unit EOL product from consumers. | |
The cost investment of EOL product collection. | |
The collection scale coefficient, i.e., the available collection quantity of the EOL product. | |
Decision variables, profits, and utilities | |
Sales price of unit product (new and remanufactured). | |
Collection rate of the EOL product. | |
Wholesale price of unit product (new and remanufactured). | |
Profits of channel members and the entire RSC (i = M, R, S). | |
Utilities of channel members and the entire RSC (i = M, R, S). | |
RSC performance under distinct scenarios (j = I, II, III, IV). |
Scenario II | Scenario III | Scenario IV | Scenario C | |
---|---|---|---|---|
/ | ||||
Scenario I | Scenario II | Scenario III | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+ | + | + | + | + | + | + | / | |
+ | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | |
− | − | − | − | − | − | − | / | |
± | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | |
− | + | − | + | − | ± | − | + | |
− | ± | − | − | ± | − | + | ± |
Retailer | |||
---|---|---|---|
Fairness Concerned | Fair Neutral | ||
Manufacturer | Fairness concerned | ||
Fair neutral |
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Zhang, X.; Cao, J.; Zhao, Y.; Lu, J. Fairness Concern in Remanufacturing Supply Chain—A Comparative Analysis of Channel Members’ Fairness Preferences. Sustainability 2022, 14, 3813. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14073813
Zhang X, Cao J, Zhao Y, Lu J. Fairness Concern in Remanufacturing Supply Chain—A Comparative Analysis of Channel Members’ Fairness Preferences. Sustainability. 2022; 14(7):3813. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14073813
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Xuemei, Jian Cao, Yang Zhao, and Jiansha Lu. 2022. "Fairness Concern in Remanufacturing Supply Chain—A Comparative Analysis of Channel Members’ Fairness Preferences" Sustainability 14, no. 7: 3813. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14073813