Formal Institutional Pressure and the Integration of Corporate Environmental and Financial Performance: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in Heavily Polluting Industries in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
2.1. Heterogeneous Formal Institutional Pressure and Corporate Environment Financial Integration
2.2. Impact of Heterogeneity of Property Rights
2.3. Effect of Regional Heterogeneity
2.4. Impact of Executive Heterogeneity
2.5. Effects of Informal Institutional Pressures
3. Methodology and Sample Description
3.1. Sample and Data Collection
3.2. Study Design
3.3. Empirical Analysis
3.3.1. Descriptive Statistics
3.3.2. Regression Analysis of Formal Institutional Pressure on Enterprise Environmental–Financial Integration
3.3.3. Influence of Property Right Heterogeneity
3.3.4. Effects of Spatial Heterogeneity
3.3.5. Impact of Cultural Differences among Executives
3.3.6. Influence of Informal Institutions
4. Robustness Test
4.1. Test of Regional Difference
4.2. Test of Sample Selection Bias
5. Conclusions
5.1. Research Conclusions
5.2. Enlightenment and Suggestion
5.3. Research Innovations and Future Research Directions
5.3.1. Research Innovations
5.3.2. Future Research Directions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Target | Secondary Index | Tertiary Indicator |
---|---|---|
EFI | Environmental Legality | Provide separate environmental reports and sustainability reports |
Joint monitoring with governments or third parties | ||
Disclose environmental violations or complaints or penalties received | ||
Environmental protection tax expenditure intensity | ||
Implement ISO14001 [42] and SA8000 [43] at the workshop or company level | ||
Environmental information disclosure score | ||
Environmental Communication | Environmental report information amount | |
Receive environmental awards | ||
Make a statement about the company’s environmental policies, values and principles, and environmental code of conduct | ||
Promote social environmental awareness or environmental charity | ||
Score for environmental communication upstream and downstream of the supply chain | ||
Environmental Management | Have innovative reform plans for environmental protection | |
Have an emergency plan for environmental accidents | ||
Proportion of suppliers passing environmental management system certification | ||
Green purchasing ratio | ||
Voluntarily participate in third-party environmental performance score | ||
Internal environmental management and monitoring inspection score | ||
Green Operation | Energy consumption indicators | |
Water resource utilization indicators | ||
Exhaust gas indicators | ||
Wastewater indicators | ||
Waste indicators | ||
Environmental governance indicators | ||
Financial Level | Total asset turnover ratio | |
Sales margin | ||
Assets and liabilities | ||
Sustainable growth rate | ||
Comprehensive leverage | ||
Net cash content of operating income |
Appendix B
EFI | Enpenal | Ensubsidy | Enaware | Compen | Sep | Shrhfd3 | Indep | Size | Lev | Roa | Opercash | Gsales | Freemark | GDP | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
EFI | 1 | ||||||||||||||
Enpenal | 0.126 | 1 | |||||||||||||
Ensubsidy | 0.254 | −0.053 | 1 | ||||||||||||
Enaware | 0.180 | 0.108 | −0.007 | 1 | |||||||||||
Compen | 0.261 | 0.136 | 0.047 | −0.124 | 1 | ||||||||||
Sep | −0.023 | −0.006 | −0.001 | 0.017 | 0.050 | 1 | |||||||||
Shrhfd3 | 0.147 | −0.033 | 0.019 | −0.115 | 0.022 | 0.071 | 1 | ||||||||
Indep | −0.013 | 0.010 | 0.019 | −0.006 | −0.086 | −0.040 | 0.056 | 1 | |||||||
Size | 0.393 | −0.048 | 0.206 | −0.145 | 0.394 | −0.002 | 0.322 | 0.016 | 1 | ||||||
Lev | 0.135 | −0.093 | 0.163 | −0.048 | 0.007 | −0.040 | 0.039 | 0.013 | 0.457 | 1 | |||||
Roa | 0.045 | 0.075 | −0.035 | 0.016 | 0.262 | 0.054 | 0.115 | −0.024 | −0.017 | −0.431 | 1 | ||||
Opercash | 0.366 | −0.033 | 0.194 | −0.139 | 0.419 | 0.016 | 0.324 | 0.010 | 0.238 | 0.295 | 0.198 | 1 | |||
Gsales | −0.081 | −0.041 | −0.003 | 0.006 | −0.098 | −0.015 | 0.012 | 0.014 | −0.048 | 0.045 | −0.003 | −0.063 | 1 | ||
Freemark | 0.016 | 0.490 | −0.129 | 0.129 | 0.162 | 0.025 | −0.049 | 0.045 | −0.153 | −0.190 | 0.086 | −0.102 | −0.042 | 1 | |
GDP | 0.015 | 0.619 | −0.062 | 0.325 | 0.113 | 0.012 | −0.105 | 0.035 | −0.152 | −0.148 | 0.086 | −0.101 | −0.040 | 0.390 | 1 |
References
- Xu, G.; Shen, Y.; Ying, S. Corporate Environmental Financial Index and Integrated Environmental Financial Performance Traction; Economy & Management Publishing House: Beijing, China, 2018. (In Chinese) [Google Scholar]
- Shu, Y.; Xu, G.; Shen, Y.; Lyu, M. Measurement of Environmental and Financial Integration of Heavily Polluting Enterprises——The Theoretical Analysis and System Construction Environmental Financial Index. Account. Res. 2019, 8, 3–11. (In Chinese) [Google Scholar]
- Rauhut, D. Integration and Informal Institutions. Society 2020, 57, 211–218. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Xie, R.H.; Yuan, Y.J.; Huang, J.J. Different Types of Environmental Regulations and Heterogeneous Influence on “Green” Productivity: Evidence from China. Ecol. Econ. 2017, 132, 104–112. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Guo, X.; Fu, L.; Sun, X. Can Environmental Regulations Promote Greenhouse Gas Abatement in OECD Countries? Command-and-Control vs. Market-Based Policies. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6913. [Google Scholar]
- Li, R.; Ramanathan, R. Exploring the relationships between different types of environmental regulations and environmental performance: Evidence from China. J. Clean. Prod. 2018, 196, 1329–1340. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- DiMaggio, P.J.; Powell, W.W. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Am. Sociol. Rev. 1983, 48, 147–160. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Delmas, M.A.; Toffel, M.W. Organizational responses to environmental demands: Opening the black box. Strateg. Manag. J. 2008, 29, 1027–1055. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Tang, H.L.; Liu, J.M.; Wu, J.G. The impact of command-and-control environmental regulation on enterprise total factor productivity: A quasi-natural experiment based on China’s “Two Control Zone” policy. J. Clean. Prod. 2020, 254, 120011. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Shao, S.; Hu, Z.; Cao, J.; Yang, L.; Guan, D. Environmental Regulation and Enterprise Innovation: A Review. Bus. Strategy Environ. 2020, 29, 1465–1478. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Xia, Q.; He, J.; He, B.; Chu, Y.; Li, W.; Sun, J.; Wen, D. Effect and genesis of soil nitrogen loading and hydrogeological conditions on the distribution of shallow groundwater nitrogen pollution in the North China Plain. Water Res. J. Int. Water Assoc. 2023, 243, 120346. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Rodríguez-Pose, A. Institutions and the fortunes of territories. Reg. Sci. Policy Pract. 2020, 12, 371–386. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhou, Q.; Zhong, S.; Shi, T.; Zhang, X. Environmental regulation and haze pollution: Neighbor-companion or neighbor-beggar? Energy Policy 2021, 151, 112183. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhang, H.; Geng, C.; Wei, J. Coordinated development between green finance and environmental performance in China: The spatial-temporal difference and driving factors. J. Clean. Prod. 2022, 346, 131150. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Boakye, D.J.; Tingbani, I.; Ahinful, G.S.; Abala, R.N. The Relationship between Environmental Management Performance and Financial Performance of Firms Listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK. J. Clean. Prod. 2020, 278, 124034. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Chong, D.; Sun, N. Explore emission reduction strategy and evolutionary mechanism under central environmental protection inspection system for multi-agent based on evolutionary game theory. Comput. Commun. 2020, 156, 77–90. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Xin, X.; Mossig, I. Governments and Formal Institutions Shaping the Networks of Co-Production in the Chinese and German Film Industries. Tijdschr. Econ. Soc. Geogr. 2021, 112, 220–238. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- José, F.; Reynaud, A. Assessing the impact of formal and informal regulations on environmental and economic performance of Brazilian manufacturing firms. Environ. Resour. Econ. 2012, 52, 65–85. [Google Scholar]
- Zhao, X.; Mahendru, M.; Ma, X.; Rao, A.; Shang, Y.; Kalogirou, S.A.; Christodoulides, P. Impacts of environmental regulations on green economic growth in China: New guidelines regarding renewable energy and energy efficiency. Renew. Energy 2022, 187, 728–742. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ertör-Akyazi, P. Formal versus informal institutions: Extraction and earnings in framed field experiments with small-scale fishing communities in Turkey. Mar. Policy 2019, 109, 103673. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Shen, J.; Wei, Y.D.; Yang, Z. The impact of environmental regulations on the location of pollution-intensive industries in China. J. Clean. Prod. 2017, 148, 785–794. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Goodstein, E.S.; Polasky, S. Economics and the Environment, 7th ed.; China Renmin University Press: Beijing, China, 2019. (In Chinese) [Google Scholar]
- Zhang, B.; Bi, J.; Yuan, Z.; Ge, J.; Liu, B.; Bu, M. Why do firms engage in environmental management? An empirical study in China. J. Clean. Prod. 2008, 16, 1036–1045. [Google Scholar]
- Liu, Y.; Wang, A.; Wu, Y. Environmental Regulation and Green Innovation: Evidence from China’s New Environmental Protection Law. J. Clean. Prod. 2021, 297, 126698. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Bradshaw, M.; Liao, G.; Ma, M. Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder. J. Account. Econ. 2019, 67, 255–277. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wang, Q.; Liu, M.; Zhang, B. Do state-owned enterprises really have better environmental performance in China? Environmental regulation and corporate environmental strategies. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 2022, 185, 106500. [Google Scholar]
- Estrin, S.; Nielsen, B.B.; Nielsen, S. Emerging Market Multinational Companies and Internationalization: The Role of Home Country Urbanization. J. Int. Manag. 2017, 23, 326–339. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Khalid, F.; Sun, J.; Huang, G.; Su, C.Y. Environmental, Social and Governance Performance of Chinese Multinationals: A Comparison of State- and Non-State-Owned Enterprises. Sustainability 2021, 13, 4020. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhang, R.; Lin, Y.; Kuang, Y.; Li, M.E. Will the governance of non-state shareholders inhibit corporate social responsibility performance? Evidence from the mixed-ownership reform of China’s state-owned enterprises. Sustainability 2022, 14, 527. [Google Scholar]
- Li, J.; Du, Y.X. Spatial effect of environmental regulation on green innovation efficiency: Evidence from prefectural-level cities in China. J. Clean. Prod. 2021, 286, 125032. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhong, S.; Xiong, Y.; Xiang, G. Environmental regulation benefits for whom? Heterogeneous effects of the intensity of the environmental regulation on employment in China. J. Environ. Manag. 2021, 281, 111877. [Google Scholar]
- Bai, X.; Lyu, C. Executive’s environmental protection background and corporate green innovation: Evidence from China. Sustainability 2023, 15, 4154. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wang, L.; Zeng, T.; Li, C. Behavior decision of top management team and enterprise green technology innovation. J. Clean. Prod. 2022, 367, 133120. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wu, Y.; Jacquline, T. The Impact of Executive Green Incentives and Top Management Team Characteristics on Corporate Value in China: The Mediating Role of Environment, Social and Government Performance. Sustainability 2023, 15, 12518. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yi, D.; Xiaoyan, W.; Daniele, B.; Angela, M. Changes in Environmental Awareness and Its Connection to Local Environmental Management in Water Conservation Zones: The Case of Beijing, China. Sustainability 2018, 10, 2087. [Google Scholar]
- Li, Q.; Xiao, Z. Heterogeneous environmental regulation tools and green innovation incentives: Evidence from Green Patents of Listed Companies. Econ. Res. J. 2020, 55, 192–208. (In Chinese) [Google Scholar]
- Nguyen TH, H.; Elmagrhi, M.H.; Ntim, C.G.; Wu, Y. Environmental performance, sustainability, governance and financial performance: Evidence from heavily-polluting industries in China. Bus. Strategy Environ. 2021, 30, 2313–2331. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Baah, C.; Agyeman, D.O.; Senyo, I.; Agyabeng, Y.; Atatsi, G.M. Examining the correlations between stakeholder pressures, green production practices, firm reputation, environmental and financial performance: Evidence from manufacturing SMEs. Sustain. Prod. Consum. 2021, 27, 100–114. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Danso, A.; Adomako, S.; Lartey, T.; Amankwah-Amoah, J.; Owusu-Yirenkyi, D. Stakeholder integration, environmental sustainability orientation and financial performance. J. Bus. Res. 2020, 119, 652–662. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wang, X.; Hu, L.; Fan, G. Marketizationg Index of China’s Provinces: NERI Report 2021; Social Sciences Academic Press: Beijing, China, 2021. (In Chinese) [Google Scholar]
- Liu, G.; Yang, Z.; Zhang, F.; Zhang, N. Environmental tax reform and environmental investment: A quasi-natural experiment based on China’s Environmental Protection Tax Law. Energy Econ. 2022, 109, 106000. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- ISO 14001:2015; Environmental Management Systems—Requirements with Guidance for Use. International Organization for Standardization (ISO): Geneva, Switzerland, 2015.
- SA 8000:2021; Social Accountability 8000 International Standard. Social Accountability International (SAI): New York, NY, USA, 2021.
Variable Type | Variable Name | Abbreviation | Variable Definition and Calculation |
---|---|---|---|
Explained variable | Environmental–financial integration | EFI | Environmental Financial Index [1,2] |
Explanatory variable | Command-based pressure | Enpenal | Natural logarithm of the number of environmental administrative punishment cases in China |
Market-based pressure | Ensubsidy | Natural logarithm of the Chinese government’s environmental protection subsidies | |
Regulating variable | Public awareness of environmental protection | Enaware | Natural logarithm of the total number of environmental proposals of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Congress |
Control variable | Executive compensation | Compen | Natural logarithm of high remuneration of directors and supervisors |
Degree of separation of two powers | Sep | Actual controller of the enterprise control-ownership | |
Degree of ownership concentration | Shrhfd3 | The square sum of the top three shareholders | |
Proportion of independent directors | Indep | Number of independent directors on the corporate board/total number of independent directors | |
Enterprise scale | Size | Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets | |
Asset/liability ratio | Lev | Total current liabilities/current assets of the enterprise | |
Return on total assets | Roa | Net profit after tax/total assets | |
Net cash flow from operating activities | Opercash | Natural logarithm of the net cash flow generated by a firm’s operating activities | |
Growth rate of operating income | Gsales | (Current main business income-previous main business income)/previous main business income | |
Marketization degree | Freemark | Enterprise location marketization index | |
Gross domestic product | GDP | Natural logarithm of GDP of a Chinese province for the year | |
A given year | Year | Year dummy | |
Industry | Industry | Industry dummy variable |
Variable | Sample Size | Average | Median | Std. | Minimum | Maximum |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
EFI | 3953 | 43.70 | 43.10 | 13.30 | 25.10 | 79.40 |
Enpenal | 3953 | 6.74 | 7.22 | 2.09 | 0.69 | 9.93 |
Ensubsidy | 3953 | 7.87 | 5.04 | 4.22 | 5.04 | 18.20 |
Enaware | 3953 | 5.99 | 6.40 | 1.05 | 4.52 | 7.51 |
Compen | 3953 | 15.40 | 15.40 | 0.70 | 13.30 | 17.50 |
Sep | 3953 | 8.56 | 1.50 | 12.00 | 0.00 | 64.00 |
Shrhfd3 | 3953 | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.63 |
Indep | 3953 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.05 | 0.30 | 0.60 |
Size | 3953 | 22.70 | 22.50 | 1.31 | 19.80 | 26.60 |
Lev | 3953 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.95 |
Roa | 3953 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.06 | −0.25 | 0.22 |
Opercash | 3953 | 19.80 | 19.80 | 1.64 | 14.30 | 24.30 |
Gsales | 3953 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.92 | −0.75 | 18.90 |
Freemark | 3953 | 9.38 | 9.51 | 1.59 | 4.45 | 11.90 |
GDP | 3953 | 10.60 | 10.60 | 0.68 | 8.40 | 11.60 |
Variable | Explained Variable—Environmental–Financial Integration EFI | ||
---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
Command-Based Pressure | Market-Based Pressure | Command + Market Pressure | |
Enpenal | 0.329 | 0.342 | |
(0.079) | (0.250) | ||
Ensubsidy | 0.377 *** | 0.379 *** | |
(4.295) | (4.344) | ||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3953 | 3953 | 3953 |
R2 | 0.366 | 0.377 | 0.378 |
Adj.R2 | 0.358 | 0.369 | 0.370 |
Variable | Explained Variable—Environmental–Financial Integration EFI | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Command-Based Pressure | Market-Based Pressure | |||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
State-Owned Enterprises | Private Enterprises | State-Owned Enterprises | Private Enterprises | |
Enpenal | 0.422 * | 0.196 | ||
(1.763) | (0.727) | |||
Ensubsidy | 0.252 | 0.446 *** | ||
(0.046) | (3.948) | |||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 1665 | 2288 | 1665 | 2288 |
R2 | 0.391 | 0.374 | 0.397 | 0.387 |
Adj.R2 | 0.376 | 0.362 | 0.382 | 0.374 |
Variable | Explained Variable—Environmental–Financial Integration EFI | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Command-Based Pressure | Market-Based Pressure | |||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Developed | Developing | Developed | Developing | |
Enpenal | 0.220 *** | 0.289 | ||
(3.237) | (1.018) | |||
Ensubsidy | 0.390 *** | 0.620 *** | ||
(3.826) | (4.014) | |||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 2340 | 1613 | 2340 | 1613 |
R2 | 0.373 | 0.400 | 0.386 | 0.413 |
Adj. R2 | 0.360 | 0.384 | 0.372 | 0.398 |
Suest | F = 9.34, p = 0.000 | F = 8.32, p = 0.000 |
Variable | Explained Variable—Environmental–Financial Integration EFI | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Command-Based Pressure | Market-Based Pressure | |||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Ldegree | Hdegree | Ldegree | Hdegree | |
Enpenal | 0.291 | 0.334 ** | ||
(0.215) | (2.140) | |||
Ensubsidy | 0.376 *** | 0.187 | ||
(4.276) | (0.218) | |||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3628 | 325 | 3628 | 325 |
R2 | 0.386 | 0.367 | 0.378 | 0.416 |
Adj.R2 | 0.372 | 0.359 | 0.370 | 0.400 |
Variable | Explained Variable—Environmental–Financial Integration EFI | |
---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | |
Ldegree | Hdegree | |
Ensubsidy | 0.111 *** | 0.237 *** |
(4.340) | (3.690) | |
Enaware | 0.106 *** | 0.142 *** |
(5.627) | (5.477) | |
Ensubsidy × Enaware | 0.667 *** | 0.129 *** |
(7.968) | (5.168) | |
Controls | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes |
N | 3953 | 3953 |
R2 | 0.273 | 0.379 |
Adj. R2 | 0.265 | 0.370 |
Explained Variable | EFI | EFI | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
Command-Based Pressure | Market-Based Pressure | Command + Market Pressure | Command-Based Pressure | Market-Based Pressure | Command + Market Pressure | |
Enpenal | 0.013 | 0.035 | 0.351 | 0.370 | ||
(0.027) | (0.029) | (0.482) | (0.756) | |||
Ensubsidy | 0.011 *** | 0.021 *** | 0.395 *** | 0.398 *** | ||
(6.325) | (7.357) | (3.918) | (3.958) | |||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Constant | 2.434 *** | 2.798 *** | 2.575 *** | −51.943 *** | −51.343 *** | −48.059 *** |
(9.246) | (8.385) | (7.983) | (−5.352) | (−5.323) | (−4.993) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3953 | 3953 | 3953 | 239 | 239 | 239 |
R2 | 0.377 | 0.324 | 0.313 | 0.360 | 0.371 | 0.373 |
Adj. R2 | 0.365 | 0.298 | 0.287 | 0.352 | 0.364 | 0.365 |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2024 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Shu, Y.; Zhuang, X.; Ying, R.; Xu, G. Formal Institutional Pressure and the Integration of Corporate Environmental and Financial Performance: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in Heavily Polluting Industries in China. Sustainability 2024, 16, 2471. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16062471
Shu Y, Zhuang X, Ying R, Xu G. Formal Institutional Pressure and the Integration of Corporate Environmental and Financial Performance: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in Heavily Polluting Industries in China. Sustainability. 2024; 16(6):2471. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16062471
Chicago/Turabian StyleShu, Ying, Xiaobin Zhuang, Rui Ying, and Guanghua Xu. 2024. "Formal Institutional Pressure and the Integration of Corporate Environmental and Financial Performance: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in Heavily Polluting Industries in China" Sustainability 16, no. 6: 2471. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16062471
APA StyleShu, Y., Zhuang, X., Ying, R., & Xu, G. (2024). Formal Institutional Pressure and the Integration of Corporate Environmental and Financial Performance: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in Heavily Polluting Industries in China. Sustainability, 16(6), 2471. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16062471