The Role of Domestic Formal and Informal Institutions in Food Security: Research on the European Union Countries

Abstract

Although food seems abundant in the European Union, challenges related to specific aspects of food security continue to exist and require ongoing attention. A country’s food security depends on various economic, social, environmental, and institutional factors, which are studied using several scientific research methodologies. The role of institutions in determining national success and failure has been increasingly emphasized in recent academic discourse. Our research makes a novel contribution to the literature on institutions and food security by integrating New Institutional Economics with food security metrics. It aims to examine the relationships between food security dimensions and country-specific institutional matrices in the twenty EU member states from 2012 to 2019. How strong were those relationships, and how did they differ between the new and old member states? Food security is proxied by the Global Food Security Index and its three pillars (economic accessibility, physical availability, and quality and safety). The institutional quality of a country is represented by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption). Using the food security indices as the dependent variables, we apply multiple regression models to identify which institutions determined national food security over time. The study revealed that between 2012 and 2019, there was no evidence of sigma convergence or reduction in the dispersion of institutional quality (except for control of corruption) and overall food security within the EU20. The domestic institutions were generally statistically significantly positively related to the GFSI and its elements. The weakest correlations for the EU20 were those linking institutional variables with food quality and safety. The rule of law, incorporating such formal institutions as the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, positively affected food security within the EU20, with the mostgreatest impact on food quality, safety, and availability. The dependence of food security on national institutional factors was stronger in new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The exploratory results shed some light on the role of institutions in shaping food security. However, further research is required to gain a more detailed understanding of this phenomenon. The research findings suggest that policymakers in the EU countries could enhance national institutions to promote food security and, consequently, achieve the Sustainable Development Goals more effectively.

1. Introduction

The impact of formal and informal institutions on the performance and development of countries throughout history has been a vital area of modern economic research since the seventies, when New Institutional Economics (NIE) began to emerge. Since then, institutional phenomena have received more attention, and an increasingly large number of scientific works have been written on the subject. According to a leading architect of the NIE, Oliver Williamson, the proposition that institutions matter is embraced by institutional economics of all kinds, old and new ones, but what distinguishes the latter from earlier work on institutions is that institutions are susceptible to analysis [1]. In the NIE framework, institutions (composing the institutional environment) are “the rules of the game” or “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” or govern everyday life [2]. The significance of economic and political institutions for a country’s prosperity has been elucidated by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, the laureates of the 2024 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in the field of economics. Their research demonstrates the pivotal role of economic institutions (e.g., property rights structures and the presence and efficacy of markets) and political institutions, including democracy, in fostering a nation’s economic growth. In their view, societies characterized by a lack of rule of law and exploitative institutions cannot facilitate positive change. They argue that institutions cause cross-country differences in productivity, economic growth, and development [3].

The starting point of our exploration is to answer the question of why food security and safety are a vital issue for the country’s citizens, consumers, and policymakers. It is widely acknowledged that nutrition is fundamental to human health and well-being. Food is central to our daily lives and lifestyles (sustenance, health, pleasure, social interactions, personal identity, religion, etc.). As the adage goes, we are what we eat and what we do not eat [4]. Food significantly contributes to the national economy, with impacts across various sectors, including agriculture, food processing, and energy. In addition, the food sector affects several other areas, such as politics, policy, culture, tradition, and the environment [5,6,7,8,9,10,11].

The food security issue was exemplified during the unprecedented public health crisis of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. Lockdowns, trade restrictions, supply chain disruptions, and significant economic slowdowns have caused cascading risks and effects on the components of food security within individual countries, regions, and at the global level [12,13,14,15]. As the COVID-19 pandemic progressed, food system resilience, defined by Tendall and co-authors as the “capacity over time of a food system and its units at multiple levels, to provide sufficient, appropriate and accessible food to all, in the face of various and even unforeseen disturbances” [16] (p. 19) seemed to be more important than ever before. In light of the findings of the literature review [17], it can be posited that the resilience of the system is enhanced, inter alia, through the implementation of fair governance and governance capacity; the establishment of an appropriate institutional framework with equitable rights and entitlements; the capacity of institutions to adapt; and the formulation of efficacious policies by the government.

It is not solely the occurrence of crises and recessions that contribute to the reduced affordability of food for households. The problem of food insecurity in democratic, market-oriented economies, including rich ones, is particularly alarming in non-crisis times characterized by growing socio-economic inequalities and poverty [18,19,20,21,22,23,24]. The insufficient availability of food and the inability to acquire and prepare it—such as due to a lack of access to affordable energy—is specifically related to limited household assets and resources (endowments) or simply poverty. Amartya Sen [25], who has focused on the causation of starvation in general and specific famines in particular, has shown that famines cannot be explained by food shortages alone. They are likely to occur even with prosperity and food availability at the national level. People can die due to starvation in front of food-filled shops because they lack financial sources to purchase the food. Sen’s entitlement theory provides a robust framework for exploring the institutional determinants of food accessibility [26]). He identifies four principal sources of food: production-based entitlement, trade-based entitlement, entitlement based on one’s labor, and inheritance and transfer entitlement.

Disparities in food access and the subsequent inequities in food security are still persistent problems across developed nations. FAO estimates show that even in high-income economies, a significant part of the population does not have regular access to nutritious and sufficient food. In 2019, in Northern America and Europe, 8% of the inhabitants were food-insecure, mainly at moderate levels [27]. According to Eurostat, about 6% of the total EU28 population (16 years or over) in 2019 (circa 9% in 2012) was unable to afford a quality meal [28]. The EU as a whole is food-secure through internal production and imports, which suggests that household undernourishment cannot be triggered by the failure to provide sufficient food supply but rather is a matter of distributional justice. In 2023, as much as 21.3% of EU27 citizens were at risk of poverty or social exclusion [29].

Moreover, in high-income states, there are concerns over the nutritional value of industrially produced foods and the harmful health effects of improper diets, such as epidemiological overweight and obesity among the population, especially childhood obesity [30,31,32]. In the EU, in 2022, more than half of adults (50.6%) were overweight, and this share was increasing rapidly in most of the EU countries [33,34]. In some countries of the WHO European Region, in 2015–2017, one in three children (aged 6 to 9 years) was overweight or obese, with the highest rates noted in the Mediterranean region (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain) [35]. The prevalence of unhealthy diets and food-borne diseases has a detrimental impact on population welfare, in addition to imposing significant economic, social, and environmental costs.

In searching for food security, it is vital to acknowledge the pervasive issue of food loss and wastage in affluent societies [36]. Food waste is often framed as a social issue in light of household food insecurity. In Europe and North America, food losses and waste accounted for around a third of produce for human consumption in the first decade of the present century [37]. Some authors confirm that certain characteristics of the national culture (the values and habits of different nations) in the EU states are factors that affect the amount of wasted food there [38]. Both food waste and food packaging materials have large energy content: by the time they are thrown away, a substantial amount of energy, including fossil fuel, has been put into them [39]. The issue of food security is inextricably linked to energy security, and it is imperative to recognize the necessity of trade-offs in this regard [40,41,42]. Evidence for this phenomenon is the increasing trend of utilizing agricultural land for biofuel crop cultivation instead of food and feed crops. Some authors believe that the quest for energy security and sustainability in Western economies has contributed to food insecurity [43], as biofuels have added to the food price spikes with negative implications for people living in poverty. However, some proponents think that developing renewable energy (including bioenergy) has considerable potential to reduce poverty and, thus, food insecurity by creating new jobs and business opportunities.

During the past decades, food security questions have gained growing attention in the academic literature [20,44,45,46,47]. Some researchers and professionals with backgrounds in various disciplinary fields have focused on investigating the connection of food security with the institutional performance of the states and governance at different levels [48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56]. In particular, market governance and governance within the agri-food chains have attracted considerable interest from scholars and practitioners in the domain of food security [49,57,58]. Broadly speaking, there is a rising acknowledgment that good governance of the food chains and food security matters. However, despite the recognition that institutions matter, little knowledge has been produced on associations between food security and the national institutional matrix.

This article proposes a novel approach to address this gap by integrating New Institutional Economics with food security metrics. The study interrogates the hypothesis that food security is contingent on national institutional settings, including the quality of regulation, the efficacy of the rule of law, and the capacity to avoid corruption. In other words, the study determines whether and in what manner better institutions can impact food security across EU states. By doing this, we intend to contribute to the debate on food security and the role of formal and informal institutions in mitigating the problem of food insecurity. The rationale underpinning this study is fourfold. Firstly, the extant literature addressing food security within the institutional context has, in general, focused on the governance of the food supply chain, while relatively little is known about the contribution of the country’s formal and informal institutions to food security. The literature on the relationship between food security and institutions is largely descriptive, as the review of existing publications indicates. Empirical quantitative research based on institutional proxies at the national level and food security measures concerning developed economies is seldom undertaken. Secondly, in the developed states, including those of the EU, the problem of ensuring food provision to feed everyone has remained in the background. This was due to the advances in the industrialized agri-food system and large-scale production that have ensured sufficient food supplies at national levels. Nevertheless, these countries still face the dilemma of food insecurity, such as ineffective nutrition leading either to starvation or obesity, food waste, and food–energy trade-offs.

Third, although institutions are included in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), they have not yet been distinguished as a dimension of sustainable development in the same way as the SDGs’ three key pillars of economic, social, and ecological, which may suggest that they are not given the same attention. Last but not least, the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, wherein European countries were among the worst affected, as well as the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, a country known as the “breadbasket of Europe”, have highlighted the importance of food security and are exacerbating related existing challenges worldwide.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the importance and interaction of institutions with food security based on the international scholarly literature. Section 3 explains the data and methods used in the empirical study. Section 4 presents the main findings and discussion. The following investigation will analyze the time-series data concerning institutions and food security. Subsequently, we undertake an econometric analysis to explore the interactions and impacts of national institutions on food security using a balanced panel data set of twenty EU countries over the 2012–2019 period. The final section contains a summary and conclusions.

2. The Theoretical Context: Interaction Between Institutions and Food Security

2.1. Perspective on Food Security

The notion of food security has undergone a substantial evolution in response to the shifting dynamics of the global economy and society, and used to mean different things at the individual, household, national, regional, and global levels [59]. The term food security emerged in the international literature in the sixties and seventies of the twentieth century. However, global food security issues were first discussed in 1948 in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognized everyone’s right to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being, including food [60] (art. 25). The post-second-world-war food shortages, particularly in Europe, emphasized the importance of keeping an adequate domestic food supply and avoiding excessive dependence on imports. Food security was one of the main drivers for the original formulation of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), launched in 1962, intending to improve agricultural productivity and ensure a stable supply of affordable food. In the 1960s, when it was recognized that UN food aid could be an obstacle to the development of self-sufficiency, the concept of food for development was introduced and institutionalized; the UN World Food Programme (WFP) was created in 1963 [61].

Public concerns about global and national food security rose sharply after the world’s oil crisis and related food crises in 1972–1974. Food security was initially defined by the 1974 World Food Conference in terms of food supply as the availability, at all times, of adequate world supplies of basic foodstuff to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices [62]. In the next decade, the definition was expanded to incorporate accessibility, in that people have, at all times, both physical and economic access to the food that they need. At the beginning of the eighties, the emphasis was on food entitlement and structural adjustment, and subsequently on linking food security with poverty eradication. The World Bank focused on both transitory (due to natural disasters or economic collapse) and chronic food insecurity (due to poverty and low incomes). In the nineties, the Rome Declaration on World Food Security elaborated the concept of food security as physical and economic access of all the people, at all times, to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food required for an active and healthy life (i.e., as food accessibility, availability, and quality for consumers) [63]. In 2001, the FAO refined the food security definition by including the social aspect, thus outlining food security as a condition “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” [64]. The 2007–2008 financial crisis opened a global food crisis that required new responses at the European and global levels. Finally, food security concerns have had a revival in response to the COVID-19 global crisis. The associated lockdowns caused an economic slowdown and loss of employment and household income, which has resulted in widespread food insecurity [14,59,65,66,67].

Referring to the most commonly used UN FAO definition [58], food security at the national level comprises an adequate supply of foods (its availability for human consumption) and individuals’ and households’ physical, social, and economic access to food as well as food utilization. Food insecurity, therefore, exists when people do not have such access to food as defined above or when they are deprived of food security in some or all of its aspects. In simple words, insecurity means the opposite of security.

Approaching food security as a “wicked problem”, with alternative perspectives, could provide valuable insights. Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, who introduced the concept of wicked problems, describe them as social problems that cannot be definitively and objectively defined until an exhaustive inventory of all conceivable solutions ahead of time has been found. But what is important is that there are no solutions to wicked problems in the sense of definitive and objective answers. They may be only temporarily settled or resolved. As the cited authors remark, every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”. Moreover, public policies that respond to such problems cannot be meaningfully true or false but either good or bad, or, more likely, better or worse, or satisfying or good enough [68]. Food security and sustainability are examples of wicked problems with no easy solution.

Despite the arguments presented, there is a common belief in addressing nearly all societal problems by choosing the most suitable policy alternatives. A prime example of this is the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), supported by 169 targets and 232 indicators developed by governments worldwide. These include “zero hunger” (SDG 2), “good health and well-being” (SDG 3), “reduced inequalities” (SDG 10), and “peace, justice and strong institutions” (SDG 16), which are closely related to our study. To establish which states require improved food security status, a variety of indicators and composite indices have been proposed [69,70,71,72]. One of them is the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global Food Security Index (GFSI), applied in our study. As its creators state, the GFSI “provides a common framework for understanding the root causes of food insecurity by looking at the dynamics of food systems around the world” ([73], p. 5). It comprises three key category scores—affordability, availability, and quality and safety—and addresses the holistic interpretation of food security.

The ongoing problem of food insecurity in wealthy nations shows that various policies and programs are not achieving their intended results. According to Deborah Stone, a major shortcoming in this respect is that existing theories do not or hardly consider the role of societal norms and patterns, cultural values, and power in dealing with problems [74,75].

2.2. Perspective on Institutions

The notion that economic and social prosperity is contingent on the presence of certain economic institutions can be traced back to the works of Adam Smith [76,77] and John Stuart Mill [78]. The hypothesis that institutions matter in economic performance was a central tenet of New Institutional Economics (NIE). The primary role of NIE as a school of economic thought is to explain economic, social, and political changes over time by emphasizing the important role of institutions. The NIE is interested in economic, social, and political institutions that govern human action. Institutions or “ways the game is played” are written and unwritten rules that govern interactions among society members. The institutional matrix consists of the framework of interconnected institutions that together make up the formal rules of an economy [79]. They provide both the constraints and the incentives that vary in their capacity to motivate agents. In a democratic market-oriented economy, formal institutions exist to ensure the voluntary nature of most economic interactions and protect people from security and safety disturbance, violence, coercion, and unjustified discrimination. Democracies, as political institutions, laid the foundations of property rights and put limits or constraints on the state and governing elites. Among the fundamental features of limited government are the rule of law and free and representative elections.

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson define effective economic institutions as those that enforce property rights for a broad cross-section of society. Private property institutions create incentives for investment, allow a wide range of people to participate in economic relations, and promote equality of opportunity, including equal treatment under the law [3]. In the view of Douglas North, a prominent promoter of the NIE approach, enforcing the rules is the primary issue. The degree to which formal rules and informal constraints are enforced determines how effective those rules and constraints are in shaping human actions [80]. Formal institutions are enforced by official entities, such as courts, judges, bureaucracy, police, etc. Informal institutions are self-enforced or self-committed through mechanisms of obligation, expectations of reciprocity, religious principles, a person’s moral code, and beyond. The breaking of informal rules is sanctioned through societal pressure, such as rational arguments and persuasion, ostracism, boycotting, shaming, gossip, shunning, exclusion, and even threats and violence. North argues that while self-enforcement would be ideal, it is often unlikely to succeed, and that legal enforcement is generally more effective. However, it is worrying that the coercive force vested in the state can be used by those in power in their interests at the expense of the rest of society [2]. Additionally, unlike formal enforcement mechanisms, such as the police and courts, informal sanctioning may be hidden and even illegal. Including informal institutions in the research is more challenging, as they are harder to identify and measure than formal institutions, which are usually written down, officially communicated, sanctioned, and enforced, making their analysis more straightforward. Take the example of public bribery or corruption: this is informal behavior and can be considered an informal institution if it is rooted in widely shared expectations among politicians, public officials, and citizens. The secret or covert nature of corrupt activities is a factor contributing to the difficulties in their assessment. The same applies to businesses’ informal impact on policy (state capture), often connected with corruption.

In stable or normal situations (times of peace, basic respect for human rights, acceptable levels of food security and malnutrition), the factors that create livelihood vulnerability (including food vulnerability) are likely to be due to long-established political and institutional (formal and informal) dynamics [81]. The FAO provides a conceptualization of food security governance stating that “food and nutrition security relate to formal and informal rules and processes through which public and private actors articulate their interests and decisions for achieving food and nutrition security (at local, national and global level) are made, implemented and sustained” [82]. This definition reflects the World Bank’s perspective on good governance, which has been dominant in recent decades. It should be recalled that, according to the NIE approach, institutions comprise the rules and customs of the game. The question then arises of what governance is. In short, governance is about playing the game. Its purpose is to get the formal rules of the game right. Governance is an effort to craft order, thereby mitigating conflict and realizing mutual gains. Institutions of governance are located in a legal system for, among other purposes, defining contract laws and enforcing contracts [83].

The good governance idea is closely associated with the World Bank’s efforts to couch political renewal in terms of increasing political legitimacy as a precondition for sustainable development. The World Bank defines good governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a county’s economic and social resources for development”, and treats it as a counterpart to sound development management ([84], p. 3). However, the approach to governance is open not only to state actors (e.g., governments) but also to private actors (market players and civil society). Kaufmann and co-authors broadly describe governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised [85]. Some of the main symptoms of good governance include a predictable framework of law and government behavior conducive to development or predictability in the application of rules and laws; rules, regulations, licensing requirements, and so forth, which do not impede the functioning of markets and do not encourage rent-seeking; and a clear separation between what is public and what is private, which prevents the tendency to divert public resources for private gains [84].

The quality of the institutional matrix is reflected in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), which provide a summary measure of several dimensions of institutional development, including (1) voice and accountability; (2) political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; and (6) control of corruption [85].

2.3. Combined Perspective on Food Security and Institutions

How do informal and formal institutions matter for food security? In this sub-section, we present a logical explanation based on the conceptual model. Scheme 1 depicts a graphical conceptualization that helps explain how institutions impact human well-being, including food security.

Scheme 1. Factors of economic development and food security. Note: The arrows point from a cause to an effect. Source: adopted and modified from [86].

Scheme 1. Factors of economic development and food security. Note: The arrows point from a cause to an effect. Source: adopted and modified from [86].

The impact of institutions on food security generally is not direct but rather through some intermediate channels. These important channels embrace savings, investment, and efficiency (technical, economic, social), which lead first to capital accumulation and then to economic growth and development. We do not discuss these pathways in detail, as they are well documented in the literature across countries. Since people living in poverty usually lack access to enough food, reducing food insecurity means alleviating poverty and vice versa. Institutions can also exert a direct influence on food security. This is evidenced by the impact of traditional norms and mental models on the behaviors of agents within the food supply chain. It is important to note that these norms and mental models can also lead to undesirable behaviors, such as morally questionable opportunism, the pursuit of political gain, or corrupt and fraudulent practices.

Referring to Scheme 1, natural resources are the first fundamental factor for progress. A country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its changes (economic growth and development) depend on natural assets or resources that it owns or has, which finally allow its inhabitants to receive income. Institutions underpin the access to and allocation of resources to meet people’s needs. Furthermore, as North [87] and the 2024 Economic Nobel Prize winners stress, countries with good, inclusive institutions can use their production factors more efficiently to achieve higher levels of income. The primary means of ensuring food security is to enhance the national economy’s productivity and to augment the real disposable incomes of individuals experiencing food insecurity. Nevertheless, we must note that even when food is available and accessible to individuals, it does not alleviate their food insecurity if they do not utilize food properly. The things affecting an individual’s income, called endowments, include physical assets (e.g., owned or rented land), financial wealth (savings), citizenship (e.g., the right to legally work and entitlement to social benefits), education, qualifications, and health (value to an employer), among other attributes. People possess varying endowments that determine the income they can earn. Wealthy people can use their financial assets to acquire capital goods, thereby assuming the role of employers. Moreover, they have the option to extend financial loans to others within the financial market. According to Gary Becker, differences in earnings among persons, areas, or periods result from differences in physical capital, technological knowledge, ability, human capital, and institutions [88].

As previously hypothesized, the endowment variation among individuals and income inequality can be attributed, at least in part, to the influence of formal and informal institutions (the second and the third basic components in Scheme 1). Formal institutions, such as property rights, contracts, policies, and regulations, are based on legally enforceable sanctions. These institutions determine the degree of inequality in the economy. Legislators and governments can affect the endowment an individual possesses and its value (pre-distribution) along with an individual’s disposable income, using taxes and public expenditures (redistribution). Examples of pre-distribution include boosted human capital (education, training, health), technological innovations, defining and enforcing the legal framework in which key economic actors (producers, consumers, lenders, borrowers, employers, employees, trade unions, etc.) interact, and protecting property rights by the legal system. When property rights are poorly secured, contracts become difficult to specify and enforce, and transaction costs (costs of search, information, bargaining, decision, policing, monitoring, and enforcement) are high. Societies with persistently higher transaction costs have less investment and lower productivity or efficiency growth [89].

Formal institutions or rules establish a minimum degree of conduct expected from individuals, businesses, policymakers, and others in society. State interventions and regulations, however, may stimulate several illicit responses, such as extra-legal activities (e.g., fraudulent practices in the food sector, organized food crime, labor exploitation, soil pollution) and corrupt acts. Wrong involvements by the state (like bad intervention, over-regulation, mismanagement, and corruption by politicians and public officials) may lead to significant problems—damage to incentives, harmful behavior, etc.

The third element that favors economic development and food security is informal, uncodified institutions with enforcement mechanisms outside the scope of the law. These are rules and constraints typically unwritten but socially expected or taken for granted, shared, and broadly accepted [80]. They comprise norms, customs, beliefs and habits, business practices, morality (e.g., not taking unjustified advantage of others), entrepreneurship, ethics, thrift (deferred gratification), acquisitiveness (wealth and knowledge-seeking), and religion [90,91]. It is important to note that although formal institutions are generally based on ethical standards, not all moral issues in practice are enacted into official law. Informal institutions require greater commitment from members of society compared to formal institutions. Additionally, they frequently complement formal rules as well as impact their content and direction [2]. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky developed a typology of interactions between formal and informal institutions comprising four elements: complementarity and accommodation (where formal institutions are effective) and competition and substitution (where formal institutions are ineffective) [92]. Informal institutions are reflected in formal institutions’ formation and the latter’s outcomes in legislative politics, the judiciary, public policy, and state administration.

In summary, the institutional framework encompasses the allocation of rights and obligations between individuals and groups and the subsequent enforcement thereof. Its spectrum covers the rights of people to natural resources, assets, intangibles, working conditions, wages, social protection, adequate food and freedom from hunger, education, health, clean energy and natural environment, fair justice, and beyond. The enforcement of rules framing the exercise of the above rights is carried out by (1) economic rules and contracts, state law and order, regulation, and court decisions (formal institutions); (2) trust, confidence, reputation, social and business networks (informal institutions) determined by tradition, culture, religion, ideology, and ethical and moral norms; and (3) self-enforcing coordination mechanisms (organized private enforcement)—family relations, rules created by merchants or producers, and so on [2,93].

The population’s recognition of food security as either a right or an obligation is contingent on informal institutions. If enough citizens believe food security is a human right and if that right entails a claim on others, then relevant agents, for instance, farmers, food producers, and the national governments, will have a duty to guarantee that security. Citizens’ expectations of their governments’ responsibility for food security have increasingly become a measure of government success or failure. Researchers generally agree that the economic failure to ensure food security is rooted in institutional factors, among other determinants [90]. Food insecurity generally can be traced to poverty, and poverty, in turn, depends on economic development, while economic development flows from institutions and institutional arrangements (governance structures). Examples of the latter are governments that deliver policies and public goods and set rules that make markets work efficiently, and that, when they do not, correct market failures. The path can also lead from economic development to institutions, especially in rich economies that are better able to build inclusive institutions.

Food security at the national level, in its various dimensions, depends directly or indirectly on several interlinked public policies oriented toward producers, consumers, and the markets. The mix of these policies includes agricultural policy, food policy, energy policy, environmental policy, health policy, trade policy (e.g., food safety standards), fiscal policy (taxes, etc.), monetary policy (interest rates, inflation rate), and social policies. At the EU level, institutional arrangements and common policies influence the development and execution of specific guidelines in individual member states. These common policy domains range from the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union to agriculture, fisheries, foreign trade, research and innovation, transportation, foreign aid, regional development, cohesion, climate, and energy. The issue of food security is multi-faceted, with the solution being dependent on the convergence of interests from various policy domains.

Researchers acknowledge that governance deficiencies or weak institutional capacity, including a weak regulatory framework, as well as political interests with the growing power of the agro-industrial lobby, are among the main components of the EU food system’s vulnerabilities constraining and harming food security [53,94]. Earlier studies report that economic actors use a variety of strategies in an attempt to affect public policies, such as lobbying and other forms of rent-seeking, corruption, or bribery of public officials. They also demonstrate that political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices. Organized special interest groups engaged in policymaking have a decisive influence on the way these policies are designed, agreed upon, and implemented [93,94,95,96]. For example, the BSE crisis in the 1990s revealed how the agricultural and food processing industry, in close coalition with agrarian authorities, had taken over European food safety regulations [97]. Corruption is proven to harm economic, social, and ecological achievements in some countries. It is also one of the greatest obstacles to providing enough food for the population, as it distorts market operations and hampers enforcement of regulations. In states with high corruption levels, economic agents have been shown to choose immoral or illegal means to gain profits [98]. Corruption is a part of the ongoing debates on global public ethics and concerns about standards of behavior not only in the government sector but also in private business transactions.

Another potential and frequently reported threat to food security is food crime encompassing food fraud, particularly intentional and economically motivated food adulteration or counterfeiting [99,100,101]. Such practices lead to food risk and thus a food safety and public health hazard. Food fraud is harmful and morally reprehensible behavior. Comprehensive prevention of potential vulnerabilities to fraud and combating it within food supply chains require effective control measures or methods of detecting fraud, as well as the enforcement of informal institutions (through self-regulation and social control) and formal institutions (through legal pressure—more or better legislation and tougher sanctions/punishment).

Business ethics, the level of corruption in a country where the company operates, previous offenses and victimization, a low level of controls (countermeasures) implemented in the area of food fraud vulnerability factors, as well as weak values and laws, are considered behavioral factors that influence susceptibility to fraud [95,98,101]. In turn, sound laws and regulations are the foundation of the criminal justice system and law enforcement. They can help protect people from the harmful effects of food insecurity, not only in terms of food quality and safety but also in terms of food supply and accessibility. The government, as the institutional arrangement for managing the allocation and coordination of resources in the economy, can use its policy interventions to improve food production and its security (e.g., through subsidies to producers, including farmers, and safety net programs).

3. Materials and Methods

This section describes the key variables and methods used in our research. As the institutional variables of the country, we exploit the World Governance Indicators [85] obtained from the World Bank’s database [102]. They are popular proxy measures for the institutional environment (institutional quality) used in political and institutional economic literature. We have chosen three of the six WGI dimensions—regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and control of corruption (CC)—as they are optimally suited to the analysis’s objectives. We intentionally do not include the remaining three indicators: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, and government effectiveness. The latter dimensions reflect political attitudes and include political variables such as democracy. All EU states are democracies, and despite the numerous crises faced in recent decades, they are rather politically stable, at least in the sense that they have not experienced radical regime changes, civil wars, armed conflicts, etc.

This study employs the Global Food Security Index (GFSI) to comprehensively evaluate food security through its dimensions of economic accessibility, physical availability, and quality and safety. The GFSI, produced annually since 2012 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), is frequently used to report on the situation in countries at risk of food insecurity. This index comprises three pillars: affordability (AFF), availability (AVB), and quality and safety (Q&S). It should be noted that the GFSI focuses on the determinants of food security, not the outcomes of food security, and its components are measured at the national level, not at the household level.

Table 1. The description of variables used in empirical analysis.

Variable/Acronym	Description
	The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1
Regulatory Quality RQ	Captures perceptions of the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. It refers, inter alia, to unfair competitive practices, price controls, discriminatory tariffs and taxes, tax inconsistency, excessive market protections, the burden of government regulations, the extent of market dominance, conditions for rural financial services development, the investment climate for rural businesses, and access to agricultural input and product markets.
Rule of Law RL	Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, mainly the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. The individual variables that form this measure encompass organized crime and violent activities by criminal organizations, fairness and speediness of judicial process, the enforceability of contracts, property rights, private property protection, degree of security of goods and persons, and confidence in the police force and judicial system.
Control of Corruption CC	Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. It comprises such variables as corruption among public officials, diversion of public funds, irregular payments (in imports, public contracts, or judicial decisions), accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas, and anti-corruption policy.
	Global Food Security Index 2
Affordability AFF	Measures consumers’ ability to purchase food, their vulnerability to price shocks, and the presence of programs and policies to support customers when shocks occur. The individual variables include a change in average food costs, food consumption (a share of household expenditure), proportion of the population under the global poverty line, GDP per capita, agricultural import tariffs, presence and quality of food safety net programs, and access to financing for farmers.
Availability AVB	Measures the sufficiency of the national food supply, the risk of supply disruption, national capacity to disseminate food, and research efforts to expand agricultural output. The index is derived from such indicators as supply sufficiency (average food supply, dependency on chronic food aid), public expenditure on agricultural R&D, agricultural infrastructure (crop storage facilities; ports; road, rail, and air transport infrastructure; irrigation infrastructure), agricultural production volatility, political stability risk, corruption, urban absorption capacity, and food loss.
Quality and Safety (Utilization) Q&S	Measures the variety and nutritional quality of average diets and the food safety environment in each country. It is based on five indicators: dietary diversity, nutritional standards, micronutrient availability, protein quality, and food safety.
GFSI	The combination (average) of the three category scores. Weights: AFF = 40%, AVB = 44%, and Q&S = 16% (the default weightings).

Notes: ¹ Score ranging from −2.5 to +2.5, where higher values signify better institutional outcomes. ² Scores from 0 to 100, where 100 = the best possible outcome. Source: World Bank [103], The Economist Intelligence Unit [104].

provides a summary list of all indices used and their definitions. Note that certain institutional categories, i.e., political stability risk and corruption, are included in the availability indicator of the GFSI.

The study covers a group of twenty member states of the European Union (EU20), including fourteen old member states (EU14)—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—and six new member states (EU6): Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. These countries were selected based on the availability and quality of data from the EIU’s Global Food Security Index, which exclusively comprises countries with larger populations. Consequently, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia have been excluded.

To check whether there was convergence or divergence in the institutional environment and food security between the selected countries, we employ the coefficient of variation (CV). The CV is defined as the standard deviation (SD) ratio to the arithmetic mean of the relevant variables for a group of countries each year. The CV is the classical formula for capturing the sigma convergence (σ-convergence) [105]. We then apply two econometric techniques to assess the relationship between food security and the institutional variables. Firstly, correlation analysis was performed to assess the statistical validity of relationships between institutional variables and food security indicators, ensuring robustness in the findings. Pearson’s correlation coefficients were estimated for the whole EU. Secondly, we perform multiple linear regressions with annual observations per each of the twenty countries over the 2012–2019 period (N = 160). We also use regression models for two sub-groups of countries to capture the differences between old and new EU members. It is important to note that correlation and regression analyses do not allow us to make causal inferences. They allow us to investigate how a set of explanatory variables (institutional variables) is associated with a response variable of interest (food security variable).

The basic regression takes the specification:

FSECUR = α + β₁INST₁ + β₂INST₂ + β₃INST₃ + ε,

(1)

where the dependent or response variable, FSECUR, is one of the four measures of food security; α is the intercept or constant; the independent or explanatory variable, INST, is one of the three measures of institutions; ε is the error term; and β is the coefficient of interest, which we expect carries a positive sign.

Table 2. Summary statistics for the EU20 panel data (N = 160).

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value	Coefficient of Variation (%)
RQ	1.202	0.487	0.148	2.047	40.5
RL	1.157	0.671	−0.102	2.100	58.0
CC	1.080	0.851	−0.267	2.404	78.7
AFF	78.96	4.842	67.0	90.5	6.13
AVB	74.63	7.144	54.2	88.8	9.93
Q&S	80.64	7.261	59.4	91.8	9.00
GFSI	77.32	5.746	61.80	87.10	7.43

Notes: RQ—regulatory quality; RL—rule of law; CC—control of corruption; AFF—food affordability; AVB—food availability; Q&S—food quality and safety; GFSI—Global Food Security Index. Statistics are across both countries and the time. Data are annual from 2012 to 2019. Source: authors’ calculations.

provides the summary statistics of the selected variables for EU20 in 2012–2019.

4. Results and Discussion

This section presents the study findings on the relationship between selected measures of food security and selected measures of the institutional environment in EU countries over the 2012–2019 period. First, we discuss the governance scores, food safety scores, and their cross-country dispersion using the country time-series data. Then, we provide the results of both correlation and regression analysis.

4.1. Institutional Quality

Formal institutions, including policies created and enforced by the government, affect people’s access to livelihood assets (natural, physical, financial, human, and social), their livelihood strategies, and outcomes—combinations of goods and services that people can obtain by employing these resources. The NIE approach involves assessing the success of specific government policies and regulations aimed, inter alia, at protecting the nation’s food security.

Regulatory quality (RQ) relates to price controls, discriminatory tariffs or taxes, market competition intensity and protection, the burden of government regulations, the ease of setting up businesses, the effectiveness of the anti-trust policy, legislation and policy stringency, and investment and financial freedoms. Looking at the countries’ performance in the field of domestic regulatory quality, it is no wonder that the RQ score was generally higher in the old member states (except Greece, Portugal, and Spain) than in the new ones. The CEE had to accept a substantial array of EU regulatory and policy demands, including the acquis communautaire, comprising thousands of legal rules covering virtually every aspect of the economy. The best results were achieved by the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden, the worst by Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Italy. The variation in RQ across countries, measured by CV, exhibited a relatively high yet stable level over time. The value ranged from circa 38% in 2012–2013 to 44.7% in 2016 and returned to 38% in the final year of observation (

Table 3. Coefficients of variation in institutional quality scores (RQ, RL, and CC) for the EU20 (%).

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
RQ	37.8	37.5	44.0	41.7	44.7	43.9	43.6	37.8
RL	57.7	57.1	59.0	61.8	59.6	59.3	60.4	58.8
CC	85.2	85.3	85.7	83.8	81.3	81.4	80.5	81.0
EU14	51.3	50.4	53.4	52.8	52.5	52.8	50.2	49.5
EU6	218.0	229.2	180.0	157.0	133.1	134.3	142.4	157.2

Notes: RQ—regulatory quality; RL—rule of law; CC—control of corruption. Increasing (decreasing) CV values demonstrate an increase (a decrease) in inequality. Source: authors’ research.

). Evidence indicates that the EU20 countries have not experienced a convergence regarding national regulatory quality.

The second dimension of governance, the rule of law (RL), is, along with the absence of corruption, one of the most important social institutions that promote social order and the development of countries, including reducing poverty and social inequalities. The material temptations (economic gains that foster rule-breaking) and non-material behavioral determinants (protective factors that discourage rule-breaking) might be linked to people’s compliance with rules and regulations. Failure to comply with or intentional violation of laws by the food supply chain participants (food fraud and food smuggling, for example) may pose a growing food security risk. Consequently, this may hurt public health, consumer confidence, the reputation of food producers and distributors, market functionality, etc. [42,106]. The RL performance in a given country reflects, among others, the enforceability of contracts, protection of private property and intellectual property rights, confiscation/expropriation, fairness of the judicial process, violent and organized crimes, costs of business, speediness of judicial process, and the informal sector. Country rankings by RL scores are very similar to those of regulatory quality. The leading states were Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands, and the most lagging were Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Romania. Compared with RQ, the degree of dispersion of RL indicators between countries was visibly higher, with CV ranging from 57% to 62%. The upward trend in CV for RL shows a slight divergence in RL across states, which means that the worst-performing countries have not caught up with the best. The rule of law positively impacts food security by ensuring contract enforcement and property rights protection.

As the food supply chain becomes more extensive, complex, and economically valuable, it is more vulnerable to systematic large-scale corruption [107]. As earlier mentioned in this paper, it is widely acknowledged that corruption is a significant factor that motivates the adulteration and counterfeiting of food items for financial gain. It also inspires people to engage in illegal shipping of commodities across state borders—food smuggling and trafficking for profit, forging health inspection certificates, and beyond [108,109,110]. Political corruption can disrupt compliance with even the best laws and regulations, including those relating to food security [111].

The control of corruption (CC) index comprises corruption among public officials, public trust in politicians, diversion of public funds, irregular payments (in export and import, public utilities, tax collection, public contracts, and judicial decisions), corruption acts between administrations on one hand and local businesses and foreign companies on the other, as well as the phenomenon of state capture. During the investigation period, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria were the leading EU20 countries in the fight against corruption. Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Italy were on the other side of the spectrum. The old member states (EU14) performed better than countries from Central and Eastern Europe (EU6). When cross-country variability within EU20 in CC scores is considered, it is considerably higher than for RQ and RL. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates a convergence process in the CC across the entire group. Taking into account the relatively high volatility of the CC, we split the countries into two sub-groups according to their institutional preconditions (the post-communist states having experienced shorter EU membership and the remaining ones). It turned out then that the catching-up process was taking place only in the CEE, which exhibited a very high degree of intra-group volatility in this index (Table 3).

To sum up, we observe a clustering of the three institutional indices’ scores between the north, the south, and the new member states of the former socialist bloc, with the group of northwestern countries achieving the highest performance. The EU20 countries have not experienced convergence in the national institutional capacities, as indicated by the values of the coefficient of variation of the three indices. This is important given that during the accession negotiations between the EU and then-candidate states, as well as after joining the EU, the CEE countries were obliged to establish a set of formal rules aimed at establishing an autonomous administration, judiciary, competition regulators, and other pivotal national governance institutions. Our findings on disparities in institutional quality among EU countries raise a question of whether the alterations in the formal rules in new member states have been accompanied by changes in informal rules, which in turn could affect the behavior of the populace.

4.2. Food Security

Overall, food security in the EU20 (2012–2019) was strong, although the CEE countries lagged behind the group of old member states. The GFSI score for the EU14 was around 80 in 2012 and 2019, while for the EU6 it was 70 and 71, respectively. The entire group of countries benefits from the common policies related to agriculture and food security. The EU provides substantial financial support through subsidies in agriculture and financing for rural development as part of the CAP. Additionally, the Single Market facilitates the free trade of agri-food commodities within the EU, ensuring a reliable and affordable food supply. The EU20 experienced a slight improvement in food security; however, the GFSI showed varied trends across individual countries. In 2012, GFSI scores ranged from 62.7 to 83.9, while in 2019 from 66.2 to 84. Ireland, the Netherlands, France, and Germany were among the best performers over the period, while Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Greece were among the worst.

Ireland, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark had the best access to affordable food as measured by the AFF. In contrast, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Greece had the highest levels of food insecurity in this dimension. Food affordability is mainly related to consumers’ income and purchasing power as well as poverty levels [112,113], so it is clear that households in the more economically advanced countries were, on average, much better off in this respect. In the EU20, food affordability scores ranged between 67.5 and 82.2 in 2012, and between 77.8 and 90.5 in 2019.

As concerns food availability (AVB), this is contingent upon the national food supply (domestic production, net exports, food loss), distribution (transport, storage infrastructure), and public policies. During the investigation period, the EU14 (with Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria in the top positions) performed better than the EU6. According to the AVB scores, the least favorable situations were in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania. Generally, in the EU20, these scores kept improving over time (varying from 58 to 85.4 in 2012, and from 60 to 88.8 in 2018) but declined in 2019.

The last food security category—quality and safety (Q&S)—was a strong point for the EU20, with Portugal, France, Greece, Spain, and Finland as the top-performing countries, and Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania as the bottom-performing ones. All CEE countries lagged behind the rest, probably due to lower income levels and less developed infrastructure. The gap, however, is not limited to the EU6. Germany, Austria, and the UK displayed the lowest Q&S scores within the EU14. In Germany, as evidenced by official statistics, the food safety landscape remained precarious despite the implementation of stringent food legislation in the wake of notable incidents, including foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), a bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, a horse-meat scandal, and the German dioxin scandal. The agri-food business’s fear of detecting law infringements and formal sanctioning and penalizing offenders through government agencies seems insufficient to protect consumers [114].

While food availability and affordability improved in the EU20, food quality and safety deteriorated in more than half of the countries, including those with higher incomes whose citizens can generally afford healthy and nutritious food. The range of Q&S scores for countries was between 63.8 and 89.3 in 2012, and between 59.4 and 91.8 in 2019. From 2012 to 2019, the degree of cross-country variation in food security scores was less than in the institutional scores (Table 3 and

Table 4. Coefficients of variation in food security scores (GFSI, AFF, AVB, and Q&S) for the EU20 (%).

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GFSI	7.46	7.59	7.68	7.62	7.85	7.82	7.65	6.77
EU14	3.28	3.95	3.62	4.27	4.55	4.60	4.68	3.95
EU6	6.39	6.39	6.54	6.00	5.48	6.25	6.11	4.85
AFF	5.71	6.05	6.11	6.05	6.33	6.68	6.71	3.66
AVB	9.68	9.80	9.93	10.01	10.32	9.94	9.46	9.62
Q&S	8.68	8.66	8.70	8.80	8.81	8.81	8.86	11.76

Notes: GFSI—Global Food Security Index; AFF—food affordability; AVB—food availability; Q&S—food quality and safety. Increasing (decreasing) values of CV demonstrate an increase (a decrease) in inequality or divergence (convergence). Source: authors’ research.

). An analysis of the GFSI volatility levels reveals a distinction between the EU14 and EU6, with the former exhibiting a higher volatility profile. Disparities between countries in overall food security did not decrease over this period, indicating that the EU20 did not achieve sigma convergence. The highest volatility across the whole group occurred for food availability and Q&S. The trends for the coefficients of variation (not detailed here) indicate significant cross-country divergence in the Q&S scores.

4.3. Relationship Between Institutional Quality and Food Security

In this sub-section, we attempt to determine how closely and in what direction food security and institutions are related. The Pearson correlation analysis for a group of 20 countries shows that the values of all analyzed indices of the national institutional setting are directly and statistically significantly related to the values of the food security indices (

Table 5. Correlation matrix for the institutional and food security dimensions in the EU20 in 2012–2019.

Variable	RQ	RL	CC	GFSI	AFF	AVB	Q&S
RQ	1.00
RL	0.93	1.00
CC	0.31	0.42	1.00
GFSI	0.79	0.87	0.47	1.00
AFF	0.79	0.80	0.37	0.87	1.00
AVB	0.77	0.85	0.43	0.96	0.74	1.00
Q&S	0.43	0.60	0.51	0.79	0.56	0.71	1.00

Notes: RQ—regulatory quality; RL—rule of law; CC—control of corruption; AFF—food affordability; AVB—food availability; Q&S—food quality and safety; GFSI—Global Food Security Index. All Pearson correlation coefficients are significant (p < 0.01) and have a positive sign; N = 160. Source: authors’ research.

).

Of the three WGIs, the rule of law, in general, was the most strongly correlated with food security, particularly with food affordability and availability. However, a high correlation is observed between the RL and the RQ. The relationship between the RL and the Q&S was weaker but still of a high degree. As in the case of the RL, the RQ was highly correlated with the GFSI, the AFF, and the AVB but moderately with the Q&S. Rather small correlation coefficients derived between the two institutional variables above and the Q&S suggest the relatively low capacity of formal institutions and government bodies to influence food quality and safety. Linking these results to theoretical discussions, we can say that food security and safety depend much more on the actions of private sector actors and consumer behavior (including healthy eating behavior) than on the government. Furthermore, the estimation results indicate that, in the EU20, as a whole, an inverse relationship between corruption and food security existed. Higher values of CC indicate less corruption, while lower values indicate more. Therefore, a direct correlation between CC and other variables implies an inverse relationship between those variables and the spread of corruption. The control of corruption was strongly associated with the Q&S, and moderately with the remaining indices of food security. The positive impact of corruption control on food quality and safety underscores the importance of institutional trust and effective policy implementation.

4.4. Impact of Institutional Setting on Food Security

As explained in Section 3, we use multiple linear regressions to quantify the effects of institutional variables on food security, holding all other factors constant. We report statistically significant and non-significant results. In all the regressions conducted for the EU20 (see

Table 6. The multiple linear regression analysis results for the EU20.

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Dependent Variable = GFSI
Constant α	68.734	0.7142	96.238	0.0000
RQ	−1.057	1.2381	−0.854	0.3950
RL	7.744	0.9380	8.2560	0.0000
CC	0.829	0.2883	2.8783	0.0046
	R-squared = 0.777; AR-squared = 0.772 F(3,156) = 181.24; SEE = 2.74; Durbin–Watson = 1.399
Dependent Variable = AFF
Constant α	70.548	0.7397	95.375	0.0000
RQ	3.574	1.2823	2.787	0.0060
RL	3.164	0.9714	3.257	0.0014
CC	0.418	0.2986	1.400	0.1634
	R-squared = 0.663; AR-squared = 0.657 F(3,156) = 102.39; SEE = 2.84; Durbin–Watson = 1.21
Dependent Variable = AVB
Constant α	64.085	1.0193	62,874	0.0000
RQ	−1.511	1.7670	−0.855	0.3938
RL	9.979	1.3386	7.455	0.0000
CC	0.755	0.4114	1.835	0.0685
	R-squared = 0.727; AR-squared = 0.722 F(3,156) = 102.39; SEE = 2.84; Durbin–Watson = 1.27
Dependent Variable = Q&S
Constant α	77.023	1.3334	57.766	0.0000
RQ	−11.444	2.3115	−4.951	0.0000
RL	13.077	1.7511	7.468	0.0000
CC	2.062	0.5382	3.8307	0.0002
	R-squared = 0.513; AR-squared = 0.504 F(3,156) = 54.843; SEE = 5.11; Durbin–Watson = 1.78

Notes: GFSI—Global Food Security Index; RQ—regulatory quality; RL—rule of law; CC—control of corruption; AFF—food affordability; AVB—food availability; Q&S—food quality and safety. SEE is the standard error of the estimate. Source: authors’ research.

), we found, as we expected, a significant positive effect of the rule of law on food security. This institutional factor had the greatest influence on food Q&S and food availability.

Regarding regulatory quality, the regression coefficients are statistically significant only for the AFF (positive) and the Q&S (negative). The negative sign of the latter regression parameter is worthy of particular consideration and explanation. First, public regulators may struggle to address new threats quickly due to their obligation to follow specific procedural requirements when making rules [115]. In other words, domestic public regulation does not always keep pace with emerging risks, including food safety and quality risks. Second, public policies and regulations may be well-fitted but not respected by farmers, business operators, and consumers. Third, the institutional scores are based on public perceptions (see Table 1), and those (e.g., regarding RQ) may differ from reality. Control of corruption is shown to have a positive impact on food Q&S and overall food security. This suggests that reducing corruption among public officials, combating state capture, and implementing effective anti-corruption policies can help mitigate food safety risks and enhance households’ nutritional status.

The summarized results for the EU20 are presented in Table 6, taking into account the statistical significance of the regression coefficients. The GFSI depends positively on RL and CC; the AFF positively depends on RQ and RL; the AVB positively depends on RL, and the Q&S negatively depends on RQ but positively on RL and CC. The high coefficients of determination (R²), the standard metric by which the efficacy of regression analyses is evaluated, suggest that the models under consideration are efficient. Negative regressors, however, require further investigation. The results of our study demonstrate consistency with those reported by Subramaniam et al. [116], although the latter’s study focused on a group of developing countries rather than developed countries.

To account for the potential heterogeneity between the study countries, the effects of domestic institutions on food security are examined for two country groupings separately. The findings of the multiple regressions applied for these two groups are presented in

Table 7. The multiple linear regression analysis results for the EU14 and the EU6.

Variable	EU14 (N = 112)		EU6 (N = 48)
	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Coefficient	t-Statistic
DV = GFSI
Constant α (Std. Err.)	74.52 *** (0.70)	105.87	68.12 *** (1.32)	51.59
RQ (Std. Err.)	1.89 (1.01)	1.88	−3.97 (2.23)	−1.78
RL (Std. Err.)	3.10 *** (0.84)	3.71	9.84 *** (1.32)	7.48
CC (Std. Err.)	−0.92 *** (0.27)	−3.46	1.58 *** (0.42)	3.75
	R2 = 0.674; AR2 = 0.665; F(3,108) = 74.59 SEE = 1.893; Durbin–Watson = 2.17		R2 = 0.79; AR2 = 0.78; F(3,44) = 56.7 SEE = 1.854; Durbin–Watson = 2.12
DV = AFF
Constant α (Std. Err.)	74.20 *** (0.82)	90.4	68.48 *** (2.22)	30.89
RQ (Std. Err.)	5.95 *** (1.17)	5.07	6.24 *** (2.209)	2.824
RL (Std. Err.)	−0.36 (0.97)	−0.37	3.09 (3.75)	0.825
CC (Std. Err.)	−0.62 *** (0.31)	−2.00	0.467 (0.710)
	R2 = 0.60; AR2 = 0.59; F(3,108) = 54.74 SEE = 2.21; Durbin–Watson = 1.78		R2 = 0.51; AR2 = 0.48; F(3,44) = 15.48 SEE = 3.11; Durbin–Watson = 1.10
DV = AVB
Constant α (Std. Err.)	69.6 *** (1.34)	51.9	65.52 *** (2.08)	31.49
RQ (Std. Err.)	1.18 (1.92)	0.62	−7.42 (3.52)	−2.10
RL (Std. Err.)	5.80 *** (1.59)	3.64	12.53 *** (2.07)	6.04
CC (Std. Err.)	−1.08 ** (0.51)	−2.13	2.34 *** (0.67)	3.50
	R2 = 0.54; AR2 = 0.53; F(3,156) = 42.65 SEE = 3.61; Durbin–Watson = 1.56		R2 = 0.69; AR2 = 0.67; F(3,44) = 33.05 SEE = 2.92; Durbin–Watson = 1.83
DV = Q&S
Constant α (Std. Err.)	88.9 *** (0.90)	99	74.29 *** (2.99)	24.8
RQ (Std. Err.)	−6.42 *** (1.29)	−5.0	−11.96 ** (5.06)	−2.36
RL (Std. Err.)	4.41 *** (1.07)	4.14	11.25 *** (2.98)	3.78
CC (Std. Err.)	−1.23 *** (0.34)	−3.62	2.28 ** (0.96)	2.39
	R2 = 0.24; AR2 = 0.22; F(3,156) = 11.16 SEE = 2.41; Durbin–Watson = 1.88		R2 = 0.37; AR2 = 0.33; F(3, 44) = 8.77 SEE = 4.20; Durbin–Watson = 2.06

Notes: GFSI—Global Food Security Index; RQ—regulatory quality; RL—rule of law; CC—control of corruption; AFF—food affordability; AVB—food availability; Q&S—food quality and safety; DV—dependent variable; SEE—the standard error of the estimate; *** p value < 0.01; **p value < 0.05.. Source: authors’ research.

. Following the division of the countries into EU14 and EU6, the results in Table 7 are qualitatively different from those in Table 6. For instance, there are differences in statistical significance. Additionally, the findings for EU14 do not fall in line with those for EU6. Specifically, in the case of the older member states, statistically significant parameters α (constant) in all regression equations have been estimated at higher levels, and parameters β at lower levels in absolute terms than for the newer member states. This evidence suggests that, from 2012 through 2019, food security in CEE countries was more closely linked to domestic institutional factors than in the other EU countries. Conversely, food security within the old member states demonstrated a greater reliance on extraneous or non-institutional factors (see regression constant). Moreover, the models employed for the new member states exhibited elevated coefficients of determination (except the dependent variable AVB).

The visible difference between the two groups is the effect of corruption. In the EU14, unlike in the EU6, the corruption level (interpreted inversely to the CC indicator) statistically positively affected three food security measures: overall food security, availability of food, and food quality and safety. This is a scientifically interesting finding that deserves further investigation and verification. In new member states, control of corruption has proven to be a significant predictor of food security; reduced corruption (increased CC scores) improved general food security, availability, and quality and safety. Our findings on the effects of corruption are, to some extent, consistent with those of Helal and co-authors, who empirically found at the global level that food insecurity is significantly higher in a population that perceives corruption [117]. In both countries’ groups, the RQ as a regressor for GFSI and AVB is not statistically significant. Similarly, the RL is not statistically significant for the AFF. We should not, however, be blinded by this lack of statistical significance.

The evidence presented in this section allows for recommendations to policymakers in certain EU countries, especially in the Central and Eastern Europe region, to prioritize improving national institutional capacity. Improving domestic institutions (e.g., property rights and their enforcement) can help reduce poverty and economic inequalities while enhancing food products’ affordability, quality, and safety. Even wealthy countries that have long been members of the EU should look for ways to improve overall food security in their national institutional environments.

4.5. Limitations of the Study

The results presented in this paper call for further research, particularly in light of the perceived limitations of the current study. It is, therefore, worthwhile to briefly reflect on these limitations. The primary limitation of this retrospective study is that it covers a relatively short time horizon, especially when following Williamson’s institutional hierarchy, showing the time it usually takes to change institutions at each stage. In the case of informal institutions present in a society (e.g., constraints on dishonest, fraudulent, and corrupt behavior), change can take a long time (even centuries). The formal rules tend to change more quickly than informal ones, but again over a fairly long period of 10 to 100 years [83]. The question, therefore, arises as to whether conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between food security and the institutional environment based on the short time series from 2012 to 2019, even if the institutional scores used in our research are not stable over time. Nevertheless, the research period excludes any significant external or internal shocks that could distort the observed relationships (major events like the Russia–Ukraine war and the global COVID-19 pandemic are excluded). The second study limitation lies in utilizing the macro-level (national) food security indicators. Such an approach does not fully allow us to understand and explain the links between institutions at the national level and food insecurity among specific population groups (households, low-income groups, people living in poverty, ethnic minorities, etc.). The third study limitation is related to the aggregate food security indices. In light of the distinct challenges confronting individual EU countries concerning food security, including, firstly, the prevalence of obesity resulting from inadequate nutritional intake and, secondly, the issue of food waste, the potential exists for further research to be conducted with a focus on the individual variables incorporated within the composite indices. Moreover, selected aggregate institutional measures such as the rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption are too broad to provide detailed information and often rely on subjective assessments. A further limitation of the present analysis is that linear relationships between institutional and food security variables were assumed. It is acknowledged that the complexity of real-world phenomena cannot be reduced to such simplistic assumptions.

Despite the above limitations, this article is among a few recent publications that provide evidence of the associations between domestic institutional factors and food security at the national level in developed countries. It also examines the differences between groups of EU states, including long-standing members and newer members from Central and Eastern Europe, regarding how institutional factors affect food security.

5. Summary and Conclusions

Food security is particularly pertinent in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, as enhancing food security is instrumental in promoting the well-being of individual households and contributing to the broader achievement of these development objectives. In some countries and situations, even in affluent societies, food insecurity may be caused more by inadequate institutional conditions than by poor natural and economic conditions. This study highlights the critical role of improving institutional environments in enhancing food security across EU member states. Understanding the relationship between food security and formal institutions is important to designing laws and public policies and their enforcement mechanisms. Food security, however, goes beyond the national government (formal institutions), as it is rooted in national culture, social norms, conventions, customs, and traditions (informal institutions).

This study explores the relationship between a country’s food security and national institutional environment. The institutional environment is characterized by various attributes, including regulatory performance, societal rules, and social norms, proxied by governance indicators such as the rule of law, regulatory quality, and the control of corruption. The research analyzes data from twenty EU member states from 2012 to 2019. Empirical findings for the EU countries confirm the supposition that, ceteris paribus, formal and informal institutions at the national level matter for food security. Overall, higher scores in institutional dimensions were significantly associated with higher scores in food security dimensions. In the group of twenty countries, the strongest correlations were between food security scores and the rule of law, and the weakest ones were between food quality and safety and institutional scores (except for control of corruption). After separating the countries into the EU’s old and new member states, our multiple regression analysis revealed that food security’s dependence on domestic institutional factors was more pronounced in post-communist countries having shorter EU membership. The primary distinction between the respective country groups pertains to the impact of corruption. In both sub-groups, the variable of control of corruption was found to be a statistically significant predictor of food security. In the Central and Eastern European countries, a reduction in corruption went hand in hand with improved food security scores. In contrast, the findings from the second group of countries showed an unexpected negative relationship between corruption control and food security, as indicated by the regression models. This research puzzle provides considerable motivation for further research.

The findings of this study, while not offering direct evidence of causality, suggest that national governments can enhance the food security status of their respective countries through a dual approach, namely, by concentrating on food chain governance and simultaneously improving the overall institutional quality of the nation. However, it is important to note that EU states vary not only in terms of their national institutional settings but also in their economic, social, and ecological progress (dimensions of sustainable development), the duration of EU membership, social welfare regimes, and historical and other factors that might explain cross-country differences in food security scores. Consequently, future studies that examine panel data incorporating both institutional and non-institutional variables could be capable of identifying the importance of other determinants of food security or insecurity. They could explore whether other factors are moderators or mediators in the relationship between institutions and food security.

This research relies on national-level data and does not address food security challenges at the household or individual levels, which could be explored in future studies to provide a more comprehensive understanding. As our statistical analysis looks at aggregated data for the EU as a whole and two country sub-groups, future research can include a similar comparative analysis of individual EU member states. Furthermore, instead of employing aggregate indicators of national institutional quality, future authors may consider applying individual indicators (e.g., scores for regulatory burden, enforceability of contracts, property rights, etc.) to conduct a more detailed analysis. We encourage future researchers to incorporate a range of methodologies into their respective studies, such as cross-country studies, qualitative case studies, and panel data analysis with instrumental variables.

Subsequent studies that address the limitations underlined in the paper and additional problems will advance our knowledge of the interface between institutions and food security on macro, mezzo, and micro levels. We hope that this research and its results will contribute to the growing body of research on food security within the framework of New Institutional Economics. The primary conclusion derived from the study is that any endeavor to elucidate food security or food insecurity without incorporating the institutions is inadequate.