Next Article in Journal
Research on the Sustainable Design Model of Tourism Brands in Ethnic Minority Areas: A Perspective Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior
Previous Article in Journal
Structural Characteristics of Small Ruminant Production in Muş, Türkiye: A Model for Organic Livestock on the Basis of Sustainability
 
 
Font Type:
Arial Georgia Verdana
Font Size:
Aa Aa Aa
Line Spacing:
Column Width:
Background:
Article

Master–Slave Game Pricing Strategy of Time-of-Use Electricity Price of Electricity Retailers Considering Users’ Electricity Utility and Satisfaction

1
Hubei Power Exchange Center, Wuhan 430077, China
2
School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2025, 17(7), 3020; https://doi.org/10.3390/su17073020
Submission received: 24 January 2025 / Revised: 24 March 2025 / Accepted: 25 March 2025 / Published: 28 March 2025

Abstract

With the establishment of a competitive electricity retail market, how to optimize the retail electricity price mechanism has become the core of all kinds of retail companies to explore. Aiming at the pricing problem of time-of-use electricity price, this paper proposes a pricing strategy based on the master–slave game model. Firstly, considering the user’s electricity utility and satisfaction factors, the comprehensive benefit function of the electricity selling company with electricity price as the decision variable and the user’s comprehensive benefit function with electricity consumption as the decision variable are established, respectively. Then, a master–slave game model is established with the electricity selling company as the leader and the user as the follower, and the reverse induction method is used to solve the model. Finally, considering the influencing factors of user response ability, different electricity price types and user types are set up for simulation. The results show that the revenue of electricity retailers can be increased by up to 170,000 yuan, and the average electricity price of users can be reduced by up to 8 yuan. It is verified that the model can effectively achieve a win-win situation for both sides and promote peak shaving and valley filling. At the same time, it is proved that the role of the model is positively related to electricity price flexibility and user response capability.
Keywords: demand response; time-of-use price; electricity retailer; master–slave game; pricing strategy demand response; time-of-use price; electricity retailer; master–slave game; pricing strategy

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Liu, J.; Zhang, W.; Hu, G.; Xu, B.; Cui, X.; Liu, X.; Zhao, J. Master–Slave Game Pricing Strategy of Time-of-Use Electricity Price of Electricity Retailers Considering Users’ Electricity Utility and Satisfaction. Sustainability 2025, 17, 3020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17073020

AMA Style

Liu J, Zhang W, Hu G, Xu B, Cui X, Liu X, Zhao J. Master–Slave Game Pricing Strategy of Time-of-Use Electricity Price of Electricity Retailers Considering Users’ Electricity Utility and Satisfaction. Sustainability. 2025; 17(7):3020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17073020

Chicago/Turabian Style

Liu, Jiangping, Wei Zhang, Guang Hu, Bolun Xu, Xue Cui, Xue Liu, and Jun Zhao. 2025. "Master–Slave Game Pricing Strategy of Time-of-Use Electricity Price of Electricity Retailers Considering Users’ Electricity Utility and Satisfaction" Sustainability 17, no. 7: 3020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17073020

APA Style

Liu, J., Zhang, W., Hu, G., Xu, B., Cui, X., Liu, X., & Zhao, J. (2025). Master–Slave Game Pricing Strategy of Time-of-Use Electricity Price of Electricity Retailers Considering Users’ Electricity Utility and Satisfaction. Sustainability, 17(7), 3020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17073020

Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Metrics

Back to TopTop