A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on the Carbon Emission Reduction of Shipping Enterprises Considering Government and Shipper Behavior

This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, shipping enterprises, and shippers to analyze the dynamic interactions and strategic decision-making regarding carbon emission reduction within the shipping industry. The model examines how subsidies, penalties, and supervisory mechanisms influence stakeholders’ behavioral trajectories and equilibrium outcomes. The key findings reveal that the government’s active regulatory strategy evolves inversely with the probabilities of proactive emission reduction by enterprises and shipper supervision, while the likelihood of enterprises adopting low-carbon strategies increases with governmental and shipper engagement. Under a single reward-and-penalty framework, only subsidies can guide the studied system toward an evolutionary equilibrium characterized by active regulation, proactive emission reduction, and supervision. In a mixed reward-and-penalty scenario, increasing subsidy levels is crucial to achieving an equilibrium between passive regulation, proactive emission reduction, and supervision. Our sensitivity analysis highlights that subsidies for enterprises and shippers have a greater impact than penalties, although excessive subsidies may strain governmental budgets. Additional emission reduction costs and benefits are also key factors that affect the carbon emission reduction strategies of shipping enterprises.