How Do Power Type and Partnership Quality Affect Supply Chain Management Performance?
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Background
2.1. Power
- Coercion power is the power to induce fear of punishment when subordinates do not meet a certain expectation, thus stimulating acquiescence to the commands of the power holder. Coercion power can also be strengthened by threatening or warning that an undesirable or disadvantageous result will occur if the subordinate does not abide by the requests, policies, or rules of the transactor [9].
- Reward power is the power that is formed by the understanding that the power holder can offer the subordinate a reward. The greater is the ability to reward, the stronger is the effect of the reward [20].
- Legitimate power is power based on the power holder’s standing and the power that results from the partner company’s obligation to acquiesce to that standing. Therefore, the effect of legitimate power is dependent on acceptance and consent through the involved party’s tacit understanding [21].
- Expert power is influenced by respect for the power holder’s specialized technology or knowledge. Therefore, expert power is valuable when an important issue is resolved. Expert power provides expertise for optimal decisions and reliable advice [19].
- Information power refers to a situation where power is granted by the ability to control the access or distribution of information despite no expertise [22].
- Reference power is power attained when the subordinate has equal standing with the power holder and occurs through the partner company’s attractiveness or charisma. The strongest form of reference power is influence on the subordinate to assume equality with the partner company [15].
2.2. Partnership Quality
2.3. SCM Performance
- Quality performance: Degree of quality of the parts and products enhanced after the innovation of the product manufacturing and distribution process due to the implementation of the SCM system.
- Cost performance: Degree of the reduced cost within a supply chain through the shortening of the manufacturing, distribution, and inventory processes due to the implementation of the SCM system.
- Delivery performance: Degree of success in meeting promised deadlines and quality demands after the implementation of the SCM system.
- Decision performance: Degree of improvement in terms of faster and better decision making after the implementation of the SCM system.
3. Research Model and Hypotheses
3.1. Hypotheses Development
3.2. Sample and Data Collection
- Coercion: Regulations to Force a Company to Adopt Its Partner Company’s Requests.
- Reward: Reward for not Accepting the Partner Company’s Suggestions.
- Legitimate: Legal Grounds for Accepting the Partner Company’s Requests.
- Expert: Benefits of the Partner Company’s Expertise to My Company.
- Information: Value of Information Held by the Partner Company.
- Reference: The Degree of Excellence in Culture that can Influence My Company’s Attitude and Actions.
- Partnership Quality: Mutual Trust that can Maintain Consistent Transactions with the Partner Company.
- SCM Performance: Degree of Quantitative and Qualitative Performance that Match the Strategic Goals within the Supply Chain in SCM Implementation.
3.3. Measurement Model
4. The Model Structure
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Reference | Major Studies on Power Used in the Study | |
---|---|---|
Ke et al. (2009) [15] | Mediated Power | Coercion, Reward, Legitimate |
Non-mediated Power | Information, Expert, Reference | |
Zhao et al. (2013) [9] | Mediated Power | Coercion, Reward |
Non-mediated Power | Information, Expert, Legitimate | |
Flynn et al. (2008) [19] | Mediated Power | Coercion, Reward |
Non-mediated Power | Information, Expert, Legitimate | |
Benton & Maloni (2005) [20] | Non-mediated Power | Expert, Reference |
Coercive-mediated Power | Coercion, Legitimate | |
Reward-mediated Power | Reward |
Construct | Items | References | |
---|---|---|---|
Mediated Power | Coercion | I will be in a bad situation if I do not comply with the partner company’s suggestions. | Ke et al. (2009) [15]; Flynn et al. (2008) [19]; Benton & Maloni, (2005) [20]; Maloni & Benton (2000) [21] |
I will be in an undesirable situation if I do not accept the partner company’s requests. | |||
I will be at a business disadvantage if I do not accept the partner company’s requests. | |||
Reward | It is difficult to receive incentives if I do not accept the partner company’s suggestions. | ||
It is difficult to receive financial benefits if I do not accept the partner company’s suggestions. | |||
It is difficult to take part in new businesses if I do not accept the partner company’s suggestions. | |||
Legitimate | The contract states that I must accept the partner company’s suggestions. | ||
I am obligated to accept the partner company’s suggestions. | |||
We have established a relationship whereby I must accept the partner company’s requests. | |||
I am obligated to accept the partner company’s requests. | |||
Non-mediated Power | Information | The partner company can offer knowledge that is beneficial to our company. | Zhao et al. (2013) [9]; Ke et al. (2009) [15]; Sahin & Robinsonet (2002) [22] |
The partner company can offer experience that is beneficial to our company. | |||
The partner company can offer advice that is beneficial to our company. | |||
The partner company can offer judgments that are beneficial to our company. | |||
Expert | The partner company can offer useful information to our company. | ||
The work method that the partner company desires can be helpful to our company. | |||
The partner company’s judgments are reflected in our company’s work because they are reasonable. | |||
The partner company offers information that our company can trust. | |||
Reference | The partner company’s values are exemplary. | ||
The partner company’s decisions are exemplary. | |||
The partner company’s operational methods are exemplary. | |||
Assuming a similar culture to that of the partner company is advantageous. | |||
Partnership Quality | The partner company and our company have a deep, mutual trust. | Kwon & Suh (2004) [30]; Quinn (2000) [28]; Lee & Kim (1999) [25] | |
The partner company and our company both understand the task processing procedure. | |||
The partner company and our company share the risks and benefits. | |||
The partner company and our company both work to reduce divisions. | |||
The partner company and our company acknowledge each other’s value. | |||
SCM Performance | The quality of parts and products has improved through an innovative production and distribution process from the implementation of the SCM system. | Myhr & Spekman (2005) [13]; Frohlich & Westbrook (2001) [32]; Hoque & James (2000) [34] | |
We have reduced costs within the supply chain by shortening production, distribution, and stock processes while implementing the SCM system. | |||
We are better able to meet the promised payment date and demanded quantities by implementing the SCM system. | |||
We can make quicker and better decisions by implementing the SCM system. |
Frequency | Percent (%) | |
---|---|---|
Industry | ||
Manufacturing/engineering | 39 | 31.5 |
Services and utilities | 34 | 27.4 |
Transportation and logistics | 26 | 21.0 |
Retailing and wholesale | 25 | 20.1 |
Number of employees | ||
Less than 100 | 34 | 27.4 |
101–500 | 41 | 33.1 |
501–1000 | 7 | 5.6 |
More than 1000 | 42 | 33.9 |
Age of SCM (years) | ||
1–2 | 2 | 1.6 |
2–3 | 16 | 12.9 |
3–4 | 26 | 21.0 |
4–5 | 13 | 10.5 |
Over 5 | 67 | 54.0 |
Title of respondent | ||
Assistant manager | 44 | 35.5 |
Manager | 49 | 39.5 |
General manager | 26 | 21.0 |
Executive director | 5 | 4.0 |
Item | Expert | Reference | Partnership Quality | SCM Performance | Legitimate | Reward | Coercion | Information | Mean (S.D.) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CO1 | 0.090 | 0.150 | −0.091 | −0.053 | 0.257 | 0.262 | 0.788 | 0.056 | 4.30 (1.56) |
CO2 | 0.086 | 0.023 | −0.030 | −0.120 | 0.291 | 0.324 | 0.822 | −0.060 | |
CO3 | 0.038 | 0.068 | −0.075 | −0.070 | 0.143 | 0.401 | 0.794 | −0.014 | |
RE1 | −0.038 | 0.118 | −0.066 | −0.017 | 0.237 | 0.858 | 0.283 | 0.023 | 3.90 (1.44) |
RE2 | −0.032 | 0.100 | −0.102 | −0.026 | 0.187 | 0.872 | 0.299 | 0.098 | |
RE3 | 0.037 | 0.001 | −0.059 | −0.041 | 0.175 | 0.769 | 0.441 | 0.039 | |
LE1 | 0.041 | 0.056 | −0.041 | 0.088 | 0.819 | 0.131 | 0.137 | 0.121 | 3.90 (1.44) |
LE2 | 0.120 | 0.097 | 0.024 | 0.147 | 0.877 | 0.181 | 0.123 | 0.050 | |
LE3 | 0.141 | 0.069 | 0.113 | 0.000 | 0.847 | 0.099 | 0.269 | −0.111 | |
LE4 | 0.043 | 0.073 | 0.064 | 0.083 | 0.903 | 0.126 | 0.088 | 0.035 | |
EX1 | 0.889 | 0.057 | 0.032 | 0.071 | 0.140 | 0.027 | 0.102 | 0.076 | 5.03 (1.11) |
EX2 | 0.912 | 0.178 | 0.083 | 0.137 | 0.100 | −0.009 | 0.033 | 0.092 | |
EX3 | 0.896 | 0.180 | 0.060 | 0.127 | 0.038 | −0.016 | 0.059 | 0.184 | |
EX4 | 0.832 | 0.190 | 0.114 | 0.217 | 0.072 | 0.039 | 0.000 | 0.160 | |
IN1 | 0.407 | 0.114 | 0.243 | −0.102 | −0.007 | −0.174 | −0.017 | 0.521 | 4.62 (0.93) |
IN2 | 0.239 | 0.246 | 0.120 | 0.121 | 0.070 | 0.054 | −0.061 | 0.755 | |
IN3 | 0.106 | 0.419 | 0.078 | 0.242 | 0.104 | 0.385 | −0.038 | 0.599 | |
IN4 | 0.309 | 0.318 | 0.245 | −0.051 | 0.005 | 0.097 | 0.121 | 0.652 | |
RF1 | 0.202 | 0.827 | 0.144 | 0.137 | 0.038 | 0.158 | 0.063 | 0.149 | 4.40 (1.14) |
RF2 | 0.111 | 0.842 | 0.191 | 0.191 | 0.140 | 0.044 | 0.073 | 0.202 | |
RF3 | 0.190 | 0.861 | 0.201 | 0.140 | 0.053 | 0.046 | 0.004 | 0.115 | |
RF4 | 0.153 | 0.828 | 0.190 | 0.014 | 0.101 | −0.001 | 0.119 | 0.204 | |
PQ1 | −0.021 | 0.293 | 0.627 | 0.250 | −0.057 | −0.139 | −0.019 | 0.346 | 4.45 (0.94) |
PQ2 | 0.018 | 0.199 | 0.737 | 0.390 | 0.024 | −0.087 | 0.023 | 0.121 | |
PQ3 | 0.153 | 0.060 | 0.850 | 0.071 | 0.116 | −0.008 | −0.084 | 0.063 | |
PQ4 | 0.141 | 0.262 | 0.726 | 0.400 | 0.022 | −0.005 | −0.112 | −0.018 | |
PQ5 | 0.108 | 0.233 | 0.849 | 0.342 | 0.017 | −0.075 | −0.030 | 0.190 | |
SP1 | 0.085 | 0.081 | 0.286 | 0.812 | 0.018 | 0.003 | −0.110 | 0.013 | 4.36 (1.38) |
SP2 | 0.183 | 0.121 | 0.123 | 0.860 | 0.146 | −0.050 | 0.053 | 0.161 | |
SP3 | 0.110 | 0.011 | 0.377 | 0.814 | 0.064 | −0.073 | −0.120 | −0.066 | |
SP4 | 0.140 | 0.263 | 0.239 | 0.768 | 0.137 | 0.063 | −0.063 | 0.055 |
Measures | AVE | CR | Cronbach α |
---|---|---|---|
Coercion | 0.731 | 0.915 | 0.874 |
Reward | 0.773 | 0.932 | 0.902 |
Legitimate | 0.808 | 0.944 | 0.920 |
Information | 0.619 | 0.866 | 0.792 |
Expert | 0.861 | 0.961 | 0.946 |
Reference | 0.827 | 0.950 | 0.930 |
Partnership Quality | 0.699 | 0.902 | 0.856 |
SCM Performance | 0.781 | 0.934 | 0.907 |
Construct | Coercion | Reward | Legitimate | Information | Expert | Reference | Partnership Quality | SCM Performance |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coercion | 0.855 | |||||||
Reward | 0.692 ** | 0.879 | ||||||
Legitimate | 0.444 ** | 0.400 ** | 0.899 | |||||
Information | 0.108 | 0.177 * | 0.178 * | 0.787 | ||||
Expert | 0.141 | 0.046 | 0.227 ** | 0.527 ** | 0.928 | |||
Reference | 0.175 * | 0.168 * | 0.227 ** | 0.614 ** | 0.391 ** | 0.909 | ||
Partnership Quality | −0.132 | −0.132 | 0.110 | 0.444 ** | 0.276 ** | 0.482 ** | 0.836 | |
SCM Performance | −0.122 | −0.054 | 0.203* | 0.283 ** | 0.324 ** | 0.343 ** | 0.619 ** | 0.884 |
Construct | Tolerance | VIF | Tolerance | VIF | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coercion | 0.465 | 2.148 | Expert | 0.674 | 1.485 |
Reward | 0.473 | 2.114 | Reference | 0.539 | 1.857 |
Legitimate | 0.736 | 1.359 | Partnership Quality | 0.659 | 1.516 |
Information | 0.483 | 2.068 | Dependent Variable: SCM Performance |
Partnership Quality | SCM Performance | ||
---|---|---|---|
Mediated power | Direct Effect | 0.12 | 0.15 |
Indirect Effect | - | 0.02 | |
Total Effect | 0.17 | ||
Non-mediated power | Direct Effect | 0.48 ** | 0.18 * |
Indirect Effect | - | 0.20 ** | |
Total Effect | 0.48 ** | 0.38 ** | |
Partnership Quality | Direct Effect | 0.53 ** | |
Indirect Effect | - | ||
Total Effect | 0.53 ** |
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Park, K.O.; Chang, H.; Jung, D.H. How Do Power Type and Partnership Quality Affect Supply Chain Management Performance? Sustainability 2017, 9, 127. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9010127
Park KO, Chang H, Jung DH. How Do Power Type and Partnership Quality Affect Supply Chain Management Performance? Sustainability. 2017; 9(1):127. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9010127
Chicago/Turabian StylePark, Kwang O., Hwalsik Chang, and Dae Hyun Jung. 2017. "How Do Power Type and Partnership Quality Affect Supply Chain Management Performance?" Sustainability 9, no. 1: 127. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9010127
APA StylePark, K. O., Chang, H., & Jung, D. H. (2017). How Do Power Type and Partnership Quality Affect Supply Chain Management Performance? Sustainability, 9(1), 127. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9010127