Games

14 pages, 814 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Strategy Consensus of Networked Evolutionary Games Based on Network Aggregation and Pinning Control

by Haitao Li, Zhenping Geng and Mengyuan Qin

Games 2025, 16(1), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010010 - 11 Feb 2025

Viewed by 671

The computational complexity of large-scale networked evolutionary games has become a challenging problem. Based on network aggregation and pinning control methods, this paper investigates the problem of control design for strategy consensus of large-scale networked evolutionary games. The large-size network is divided into [...] Read more.

The computational complexity of large-scale networked evolutionary games has become a challenging problem. Based on network aggregation and pinning control methods, this paper investigates the problem of control design for strategy consensus of large-scale networked evolutionary games. The large-size network is divided into several small subnetworks by the aggregation method, and a pinning control algorithm is proposed to achieve the strategy consensus of small subnetworks. Then, the matchable condition between the small subnetworks is realized by the input–output control. Finally, some sufficient conditions as well as an algorithm are proposed for the strategy consensus of large-scale networked evolutionary games. Full article

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22 pages, 578 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Differential Games of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of Pollution, Network Structure, and Continuous Updating

by Guennady Ougolnitsky and Alexey Korolev

Games 2025, 16(1), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010009 - 9 Feb 2025

Viewed by 846

Abstract

We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed time consistency for [...] Read more.

We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed time consistency for a cooperative solution of the game. For a specific example, we built a non-empty subgame perfect subcore. We considered stochastic versions of the proposed model and received results similar to the deterministic case. Full article

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16 pages, 461 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Learning Optimal Strategies in a Duel Game

by Angelos Gkekas, Athina Apostolidou, Artemis Vernadou and Athanasios Kehagias

Games 2025, 16(1), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010008 - 5 Feb 2025

Viewed by 954

Abstract

We study a duel game in which each player has incomplete knowledge of the game parameters. We present a simple, heuristically motivated and easily implemented algorithm by which, in the course of repeated plays, each player estimates the missing parameters and consequently learns [...] Read more.

We study a duel game in which each player has incomplete knowledge of the game parameters. We present a simple, heuristically motivated and easily implemented algorithm by which, in the course of repeated plays, each player estimates the missing parameters and consequently learns his optimal strategy. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)

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7 pages, 862 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Note on the Welfare and Policy Implications of a Two-Period Real Option Game Under Imperfect Information

by Congcong Wang, Yuhan Wang, Shanshan Chen, Shravan Luckraz and Bruno Antonio Pansera

Games 2025, 16(1), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010007 - 3 Feb 2025

Viewed by 942

Abstract

We show that the discrete real option game model proposed in the recent literature can be extended to the case of imperfect information. As a result, the model can cover a wider range of applications. However, we also observe that the effectiveness of [...] Read more.

We show that the discrete real option game model proposed in the recent literature can be extended to the case of imperfect information. As a result, the model can cover a wider range of applications. However, we also observe that the effectiveness of implementing the subsidy is affected by the imperfect informational structure. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)

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15 pages, 269 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Model of k-Winners

by Diego Armando Canales

Games 2025, 16(1), 6; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010006 - 1 Feb 2025

Viewed by 1665

Abstract

The concept of the Condorcet winner has become central to most electoral models in the political economy literature. A Condorcet winner is the alternative preferred by a plurality in every pairwise competition; the notion of a k-winner generalizes that of a Condorcet [...] Read more.

The concept of the Condorcet winner has become central to most electoral models in the political economy literature. A Condorcet winner is the alternative preferred by a plurality in every pairwise competition; the notion of a k-winner generalizes that of a Condorcet winner. The k-winner is the unique alternative top-ranked by the plurality in every competition comprising exactly k alternatives (including itself). This study uses a spatial voting setting to characterize this theoretical concept, showing that if a k-winner exists for some

k > 2

, then the same alternative must be the

k^{'}

-winner for every

k^{'} > k

. We derive additional results, including sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a k-winner for some

k > 2

. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Conflict and Communication: Applications of Game Theory to Political Economy)

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11 pages, 890 KiB

Open AccessArticle

N-Tuple Network Search in Othello Using Genetic Algorithms

by Hiroto Kuramitsu, Kaiyu Suzuki and Tomofumi Matsuzawa

Games 2025, 16(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010005 - 9 Jan 2025

Viewed by 1016

Abstract

As one of the strongest Othello agents, Edax employs an n-tuple network to evaluate the board, with points of interest represented as tuples. However, this network maintains a constant shape throughout the game, whereas the points of interest in Othello vary with respect [...] Read more.

As one of the strongest Othello agents, Edax employs an n-tuple network to evaluate the board, with points of interest represented as tuples. However, this network maintains a constant shape throughout the game, whereas the points of interest in Othello vary with respect to game’s progress. The present study was conducted to optimize the shape of the n-tuple network using a genetic algorithm to maximize final score prediction accuracy for a certain number of moves. We selected shapes for 18-, 22-, 26-, 30-, 34-, 38-, 42-, and 46-move configurations, and constructed an agent that appropriately shapes an n-tuple network depending on the progress of the game. Consequently, agents using the n-tuple network developed in this study exhibited a winning rate of 75%. This method is independent of game characteristics and can optimize the shape of larger (or smaller) N-tuple networks. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)

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12 pages, 759 KiB

Open AccessArticle

High Cost of Survival Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation

by Oleg Smirnov

Games 2025, 16(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010004 - 9 Jan 2025

Viewed by 1902

Abstract

Living organisms expend energy to sustain survival, a process which is reliant on consuming resources—termed here as the “cost of survival”. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a classic model of social interaction, individual payoffs depend on choices to either provide benefits to others [...] Read more.

Living organisms expend energy to sustain survival, a process which is reliant on consuming resources—termed here as the “cost of survival”. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a classic model of social interaction, individual payoffs depend on choices to either provide benefits to others at a personal cost (cooperate) or exploit others to maximize personal gain (defect). We demonstrate that in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), a simple “Always Cooperate” (ALLC) strategy evolves and remains evolutionarily stable when the cost of survival is sufficiently high, meaning exploited cooperators have a low probability of survival. We derive a rule for the evolutionary stability of cooperation, x/z >T/R, where x represents the duration of mutual cooperation, z the duration of exploitation, T the defector’s free-riding payoff, and R the payoff for mutual cooperation. This finding suggests that higher survival costs can enhance social welfare by selecting for cooperative strategies. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolution of Cooperation and Evolutionary Game Theory)

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23 pages, 3607 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Subjective Game Structures: A Behavioral Game Theoretic Analysis of Hidden Perceptions and Strategic Properties Underlying the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

by Ilan Fischer, Shacked Avrashi and Lior Givon

Games 2025, 16(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010003 - 7 Jan 2025

Viewed by 1574

Abstract

Here, we apply a novel framework, termed Subjective Game Structures (SGSs), for uncovering and analyzing hidden motivations in ecological conflicts. SGSs enable the examination of implicit attitudes and motivations within individuals and groups. We elicited SGSs from Israeli and Palestinian participants between March [...] Read more.

Here, we apply a novel framework, termed Subjective Game Structures (SGSs), for uncovering and analyzing hidden motivations in ecological conflicts. SGSs enable the examination of implicit attitudes and motivations within individuals and groups. We elicited SGSs from Israeli and Palestinian participants between March 2019 and February 2020 (approximately three years before 7 October 2023), trying to answer the questions of whether Israelis and Palestinians perceived the conflict in a similar manner, whether they have identical assessments of the associated payoffs, and what can be done to reduce future hostilities and attain peaceful solutions. The results reveal meaningful differences between the parties. Israeli SGSs largely reflected expectations of mutually cooperative outcomes, while Palestinian SGSs exhibited ambivalence and a higher occurrence of confrontational expectations from both parties. Approximately 70% of Israeli SGSs and 40% of Palestinian SGSs were categorized as absolutely stable games, indicating that a meaningful portion of participants implicitly anticipated cooperative and mutually beneficial resolutions. Additionally, Palestinian participants’ perceptions of strategic similarity with Israelis were considerably lower than the perceptions of Israeli participants, pointing to meaningful gaps in the alternatives each side was expecting the other side to choose. The discussion highlights the importance of enhancing subjective perceptions of similarity and shaping parties’ perceived payoff structures as two key pathways to fostering peaceful interactions in diverse social and political conflicts. Full article

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21 pages, 890 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Investigating the Social Boundaries of Fairness by Modeling Ultimatum Game Responders’ Decisions with Multinomial Processing Tree Models

by Marco Biella, Max Hennig and Laura Oswald

Games 2025, 16(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010002 - 3 Jan 2025

Viewed by 1266

Abstract

Fairness in competitive games such as the Ultimatum Game is often defined theoretically. According to some of the literature, in which fairness is determined only based on resource allocation, a proposal splitting resources evenly (i.e., 5:5) is generally assumed as fair, and minimal [...] Read more.

Fairness in competitive games such as the Ultimatum Game is often defined theoretically. According to some of the literature, in which fairness is determined only based on resource allocation, a proposal splitting resources evenly (i.e., 5:5) is generally assumed as fair, and minimal deviation (i.e., 4:6) is considered enough to classify the proposal as unfair. Relying on multinomial processing tree models (MPTs), we investigated where the boundaries of fairness are located in the eye of responders, and pit fairness against relative and absolute gain maximization principles. The MPT models we developed and validated allowed us to separate three individual processes driving responses in the standard and Third-Party Ultimatum Game. The results show that, from the responder’s perspective, the boundaries of fairness encompass proposals splitting resources in a perfectly even way and include uneven proposals with minimal deviance (4:6 and 6:4). Moreover, the results show that, in the context of Third-Party Ultimatum Games, the responder must not be indifferent between favoring the proposer and the receiver, demonstrating a boundary condition of the developed model. If the responder is perfectly indifferent, absolute and relative gain maximization are theoretically unidentifiable. This theoretical and practical constraint limits the scope of our theory, which does not apply in the case of a perfectly indifferent decision-maker. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Non-cooperative Strategic Interactions)

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14 pages, 591 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Asymmetric Information and Credit Rationing in a Model of Search

by Cemil Selcuk

Games 2025, 16(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010001 - 2 Jan 2025

Viewed by 1101

Abstract

This paper presents a competitive search model focusing on the impact of asymmetric information on credit markets. We show that limited entry by lenders results in endogenous credit rationing, which, in turn, plays a key role in managing adverse selection and prevents the [...] Read more.

This paper presents a competitive search model focusing on the impact of asymmetric information on credit markets. We show that limited entry by lenders results in endogenous credit rationing, which, in turn, plays a key role in managing adverse selection and prevents the credit market from collapsing. Full article

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Games, Volume 16, Issue 1 (February 2025) – 10 articles

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